Fraud on the Widow’s Share by Macdonald, W. D.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Michigan Legal Studies Series Law School History and Publications
1960
Fraud on the Widow’s Share
W. D. Macdonald
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/michigan_legal_studies
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School History and Publications at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Legal Studies Series by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Macdonald, W. D. Fraud on the Widow’s Share. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1960.
MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES 
FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW 
SCHOOL (WHICH, HOWEVER, ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIEWS 
EXPRESSED) WITH THE AID OF FUNDS DERIVED FROM GIFTS TO THE UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN BY WILLIAM W. COOK 
FRAUD ON THE 
WIDOW'S SHARE 
by 
W. D. MACDONALD 
Foreword 
by 
GEORGE E. PALMER 
Ann Arbor 




UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 




LEONARD EARLE BARBER 
Foreword 
Most American states are committed to the view that a 
widow who has been economically dependent on her hus-
band is entitled to a share of his estate. For a long time 
dower protected the widow of a man of property since his 
property usually was land, but this is no longer the case. 
The modern forced share statute, by which a widow may 
elect to take against the will and receive a share approxi-
mating her intestate share, serves to protect her against dis-
inheritance by will but has provided inadequate protection 
against inter vivos gifts. The problem has grown with the 
increased use of inter vivos trusts, and is particularly press-
ing in a country where marriage settlements have not been 
customary. Although the other side of the matter has not 
been much discussed until the present study by Professor 
Macdonald, the inflexible nature of the forced share legisla-
tion sometimes operates to give protection when none is 
needed. 
The case law built around the election statutes is unsatis-
factory, as this book amply demonstrates. The doctrines 
developed with respect to inter vivos gifts have been difficult 
to apply and insufficient in any event to achieve the statu-
tory objective. This is through no fault of the judges-they 
have been forced to work with statutes that are simply not 
adequate to the needs of the situation. It has been apparent 
for some time that there should be serious exploration of 
the possibility of better legislation. Professor Macdonald's 
study is an important contribution to the whole topic, with 
its careful analysis of the cases and the policies involved, 
but its greatest value comes from the illumination of the 
legislative problem. His suggested Model Act deserves the 
careful attention of state legislatures and other groups in-
terested in improvement of the law. 
GEORGE E. pALMER 
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Preface 
This study seeks the answer to a troublesome question: 
What should be done about gratuitous inter vivos transfers in 
alleged "evasion" of the widow's statutory share? My thesis 
is that the statutory share should be replaced by the type of 
decedent's family maintenance legislation found in the Brit-
ish Commonwealth, and that this legislation should be but-
tressed with anti-evasion provisions. 
Inter vivos "evasions" seem to be a permanent and increas-
ingly serious concomitant of our forced share system. Part 
I, dealing with matters of policy, explores the chief aggravat-
ing factors. These factors include the high rate of remarriage, 
which induces transfers to children of a prior marriage; the 
increasing popularity of gratuitous inter vivos property trans-
mission; and the inflexible nature of the typical statutory 
share. 
The remainder of Part I is devoted to the search for a cri-
terion with which to judge the work of the courts. The eva-
sion cases pose a disturbing conflict of values- an intellectual 
Gethsemane. For the widow, there must be some protection 
against her husband's inter vivos transfers; otherwise she has 
no real protection against disinheritance. For the transferee, 
there must be some defense against the widow's claim; else 
he has no security of title. And the husband should be able 
to plan his estate with some degree of predictability; other-
wise, as was urged somewhat extravagently in a Missouri case, 
"men with bad hearts or lungs or white in their hair must 
cease to trade . . . because . . . the way is open for a wife 
to follow every transaction and void it." 1 Accordingly, I try 
to identify the community values implicit in the statutory 
1 Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, ll62, 130 
S.W.2d 611, 618 (1939). 
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share and other protective measures, to relate these values 
to the broader values found in the well-being of the American 
family, and to weigh them all against the cost to the com-
munity if the widow is permitted to set aside inter vivos 
transfers. In other words, security for the surviving spouse, 
which is assumed to be the chief aim of the statutory share, is 
considered in the light of the community's interest in the wel-
fare of the family; and the "family welfare" values are bal-
anced against the values in freedom of alienation and security 
of title. My conclusion is that the solution to the evasion 
problem lies in a working compromise. This compromise 
involves the acceptance of three principles: (a) protection 
against disinheritance of the widow and children should be 
restricted to meritorious claims for maintenance; (b) if the 
estate assets are inadequate the courts should have discretion 
to require contribution from the transferee of any unreason-
ably large transfer; and (c) in determining the amount of 
contribution, the courts should weigh the "reliance interest" 
of the particular transferee. For lack of a better term I call 
these principles the "maintenance and contribution" for-
mula. Under the formula there can be no "evasion" problem 
when the claimant fails in her maintenance application. In-
terference with inter vivos transfers is restricted to allevia-
tion of family need, and only after consideration of the legiti-
mate expectations of the transferee. 
Inchoate dower and the ancient custom of London receive 
separate treatment, in Part II, because of their influence on 
the cases relating to evasions of the statutory share. These 
cases are covered in Part III, which comprises the main por-
tion of the book. As an aid to the practicing lawyer the deci-
sions are analyzed in terms of doctrine, of the persuasive 
evidentiary factors, and of the individual dispositive devices. 
The study is concerned mainly with postnuptial devices; but 
antenuptial transfers and spouses' rights in contracts to make 
a will are also examined in separate appendixes. The de-
cision in each case is also tested in the light of the mainte-
nance and contribution formula. 
PREFACE Xl 
The over-all case study indicates that the statutory share 
legislation is far too insensitive to adjust the varying family 
claims and obligations stemming from a remarriage. Many 
inter vivos "evasions" consist of understandable attempts by 
the decedent to provide for the children of his first marriage. 
The desire to follow the equities has engendered a tragi-
comic disorder of doctrine, particularly in jurisdictions where 
the equities supposedly play no part in the decisional process. 
This doctrinal confusion impedes predictability. To be sure, 
the factual analysis of each individual case suggests that in 
the main the courts do tend to follow the equities: in other 
words, the decisions usually approximate the result that 
would be reached under our formula. These findings, how-
ever, are not decisive; many cases contain insufficient data to 
gauge the state of the equities. Nor can we say that the find-
ings indicate that there is no need for legislative reform. 
What they do show is that the need for reform is more urgent 
in some states than in others. For example, some courts re-
ject the widow's claim against any transferee, regardless of 
the merits of that claim. 
Part IV examines various proposals for legislative change 
and concludes with a suggested model statute. The statute is 
based on the British Commonwealth decedent's family main-
tenance legislation, augmented by anti-evasion provisions. 
I began sustained work on the manuscript in the summer 
of 1951, while on the faculty of the University of Florida. 
The manuscript was accepted by the University of Michigan 
in the spring of 1956 as a thesis in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law. 
The book includes subsequent cases and developments to 
the end of May 1958. 
The views expressed in the book are my own. However, 
I am greatly indebted to the invaluable counsel of my thesis 
committee, consisting of Professors Simes (Chairman), Shar-
tel, and Palmer. Professor Niehuss (now Vice-President and 
Dean of Faculties) was a member of the committee in the 
early stages. It is also a pleasure to record my appreciation 
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of the many helpful suggestions made by others: in particular, 
by the members of the law faculty of the University of 
Florida, by Joseph Laufer, Director of the Harvard-Israel Co-
operative Research Project, and by Professor William J. 
Pierce of The University of Michigan Law School. Mrs. 
lla R. Pridgen, law librarian at the University of Florida, 
bought or borrowed needed books and reports. All drafts 
of the manuscript were typed by the secretarial staff of the 
University of Florida College of Law. I was fortunate in 
having the painstaking editorial services of Miss Virginia 
Ruland and Miss Alice Russell, of the staff of the Michigan 
Legal Publications. And finally, for tolerance in the last few 
years, my thanks to my wife. 
w. D. MACDONALD 
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PART I 
MATTERS OF POLICY 
CHAPTER I 
The Existing Confusion 
This chapter will present the broad outlines of the prob-
lem of the widow's elective share. It will attempt to identify 
the social and other pressures that are at the root of the 
problem; and, finally, it will attempt to determine whether 
or not those pressures are of a permanent nature. My con-
clusion is that the problem is serious: the number of actual 
evasions, if not the volume of litigation, is likely to increase. 
1. JUDICIAL CONFUSION 
Inchoate dower is no longer the main protection against 
disinheritance of the widow. Contrived in a feudal economy, 
dower succeeds only when wealth means land. In our modern 
era the average decedent's estate is comprised chiefly of per-
sonalty. Cash, credits, securities - these are the main assets. 
Hence most American jurisdictions now give the widow a 
statutory share in the husband's personalty as well as in his 
realty. A similar protection is generally afforded the 
widower. The usual provision is that the surviving spouse, if 
dissatisfied with the terms of the will, may elect to take his 
or her intestate share in the estate of the deceased spouse. A 
surprising number of states still retain inchoate dower; but 
even these states supplement it with a "forced" share of per-
sonalty. 
Protective legislation of this sort is a popular mandate. It 
caters to the needs of the widow. The policy is wholesome. 
But the beauty of the forced share is only skin-deep; protec-
tion is announced, but it is not given. The widow's share 
applies only to the property in the "estate" of her deceased 
husband. Inter vivos transfers are not affected. In some ex-
treme cases, where the husband transferred all his property 
3 
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inter vivos, the widow has received a segment of zero. And 
the statutory ineptitude is aggravated: by accepted proce-
dures the husband can "give" all his property and yet in sub-
stance retain it. Revocable inter vivos trusts, bank-account 
trusts, joint bank accounts, United States savings bonds-
these and similar devices all achieve the same effect. A legal 
"interest" is transferred inter vivos: in actuality the husband 
is the real owner until death. 
The silence of the legislatures on the problem of inter vivos 
"evasions" has imposed a heavy responsibility on the courts. 
Theirs has been the difficult task of identifying and formulat-
ing the policy of the community with respect to the decedent's 
inter vivos transfers. Thorough-going protection to the 
widow 1 necessitates infringement on the decedent's inter 
vivos transfers; but this infringement, carried to the extreme, 
entails an impracticable "inchoate dower" in personalty. In 
the circumstances, it is no wonder that the cases reflect acute 
judicial indecision. In fact, the entire topic is "intensely un-
defined." The case-law is cluttered with meaningless doc-
trine. There is talk of "illusory" transfers, "absolute" trans-
fers, "fraudulent" transfers, "colorable" transfers, of "good 
faith," of a "factual showing of reality"- a host of baffling cri-
teria. There is uncertainty as to whether the widow may set 
aside inter vivos transfers, and there is uncertainty as to ra-
tionale. As has been said of that conglomerate of nutriment, 
the Scottish haggis, there is here fine confused feeding to be 
had. 
Assume that a particular inter vivos transfer is otherwise 
valid; in other words, that it is a valid transfer aside from 
1 Since the forced share usually is available to both spouses it is ob-
vious that a similar problem occurs in connection with transfers by the 
wife in evasion of the rights of the surviving husband. The American 
evasion cases appear to treat transfers by a decedent wife on the same 
basis as transfers by a decedent husband. It seems clear, however, 
that a more convincing case can be made for protection of the widow 
(see pp. 24-29, infra); hence the discussion will proceed on that basis. 
On the other hand, there would appear to be no reason why a legis-
lature should not extend like protection to the widower. 
THE EXISTING CONFUSION 5 
any question of the widow's rights. The cases involving 
transfers of this sort 2 fall into two groups: those that concede 
the widow a chance to invalidate the transfer and those that 
refuse to concede her any possible cause of action that is based 
on her "rights" under the statutory share. Turning to the 
first group of cases, we may for convenience make an arbitrary 
subgrouping. One subgroup tests the validity of the transfer 
by the degree of "control" retained by the decedent over the 
res of the transfer. The other subgroup inquires into the 
"intent" (motive) with which the transfer was made. But this 
generalization, once made, must immediately be qualified. 
The validity of a given transfer depends on a variety of un-
certainties. The courts themselves are not clear as to the pre-
cise significance of the "control" and "intent" tests. The 
fuzziness of these tests is no doubt due in part to the judicial 
tendency to follow the equities but to announce the decision 
in terms of "control" or "intent." These equities, in addition 
to retention of control and intent to disinherit, include the 
amount of property transferred, proximity of the transfer to 
the date of death, relationship of the donee, treatment of 
the decedent by the claimant, independent wealth of the 
claimant, and the like. To summarize, the cases leave an 
impression of ad hoc compromise, couched in elusive doc-
trine. 
There can be no serious criticism of a test that weighs all 
the circumstances, considers all the equities. Where fraud is 
concerned, a flexible rationale is desirable. Indeed, risk is 
involved in attempting a specific definition of fraud: delinea-
tion facilitates evasion. But many courts are quite uninter-
ested in all the circumstances of the case; and others, although 
seemingly giving decisive weight to the equities, persist in 
speaking as if the only factor they are concerned with is re-
tention of control or the decedent's motive. These aspects of 
the case-law imply that some confusion exists as to the basic 
policy underlying the widow's claim, with serious conse-
2 Hereafter referred to simply as "evasion" cases. 
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quences: when the rationale stresses a single factor, the 
widow's share may be defeated by apt draftsmanship. A re-
vocable trust will probably be sustained against the widow, 
an irrevocable trust will be completely invulnerable. More-
over, predictability is adversely affected by cases that disguise 
the ratio decidendi. The legitimate expectations of the 
husband may be defeated- in some instances perhaps where 
the widow has no real need for economic protection. 
And there is equal cause for concern in the decisions that 
bar the widow from any claim against an otherwise valid 
inter vivos transfer. Until 1951 it had apparently been the 
view of the New York courts and of the New York bar that a 
Totten trust, i.e., a bank account trust, could not be utilized 
to defeat the widow's statutory share. In that year, however, 
the New York Court of Appeals stated, in Matter of Halpern,S 
that a Totten trust was not "illusory" as such and that it could 
not be reached by the widow. Although the court may have 
been thinking solely of Totten trusts,4 the implications of 
this rationale are clear, and they cut deep: the election 
statutes are to be construed strictly. In plain language, they 
apply solely to testamentary transfers. If anything is to be 
done about inter vivos transfers, it is to be done by the legis-
latures, not the courts. Let us assume for the moment that 
the basic goal of the statutory share is to provide economic 
assistance to the widow. Is that goal likely to be furthered by 
the rationale of the Halpern case? 
2. AccELERATING INCREASE IN LITIGATION 
Is the evasion problem likely to become more critical? The 
facts are disturbing. Looking first at surface phenomena, we 
find that cases involving attempts to evade the statutory share 
have seriously increased in number in recent decades. Set out 
below is an analysis of two hundred and sixty-three evasion 
3 In re Halpern's Estate, 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Surr. Ct. 
1950), modified and aff'd, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1st 
Dep't 1950), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). 
4 Infra, Chap. 9. 
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cases in terms of the date of the case. The cases affected 
comprise practically all of the cases dealing with postnuptial 
transfers.5 The analysis indicates that the sharpest increase 
in litigation has occurred in the last quarter of a century, 
during the period when inter vivos transmission of wealth 
has become decidedly popular. Nor can it be said that the 
increase in litigation 6 is entirely attributable to the natural 
increase in population. The country's population has a little 
more than doubled since 1900; 7 but in the same period the 
evasion cases have increased more than fourfold. 
Favoring 
Spouse 
Before 1850 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
1850-1874 ..................... II 
1875-1899 ..................... 14 
1900-1909 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
1910-1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
1920-1929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
1930-1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
1940-1949 ..................... 19 
1950-~ay 1958 ................ 25 
























It may be seen that of a total of two hundred and sixty-
three cases, two hundred and three, or 77 per cent, have been 
5 The list of cases used in this chronological analysis is the same list 
that is used in Chapter Eleven, infra, for an analysis from the viewpoint 
of the equities. From this list, which appears as Table C, infra, p. 387, 
some dozen cases were excluded, although technically dealing with 
postnuptial "evasions." In each instance, for one reason or another, 
I did not think it feasible to earmark the decision as inherently favor· 
ing or disfavoring the surviving spouse. Also excluded were cases 
dealing with antenuptial transfers and cases dealing with spouses' rights 
in contracts to make a will. The criteria for exclusion of cases are set 
out at p. 147, infra. Table E, infra, p. 379, contains a complete list of 
all cases dealing with postnuptial transfers, including the few cases 
excluded from Table C. 
6 It is still too early to gauge the over-all influence of the Halpern 
case (see infra, p. 126), but the fact that its rationale forecloses the 
widow may induce a decrease in litigation. Forty-four cases were noticed 
in the period from 1952 to May 1958, of which twenty-eight favored the 
donee. 
7 Census figures show a population, in 1900, of 75,994,575; in 1950 
the population was 150,697,361. See 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 732. 
As of September I, 1958, the provisional estimate, including Armed 
Forces overseas, was 174,595,000. Bureau of the Census, Series P 25, 
No. 184 (October 10, 1958). 
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decided since the tum of the century; and one hundred and 
forty-eight cases, or 56 per cent, have been decided since 
1930.8 To repeat, more than half of the cases have been liti-
gated in the last quarter of a century. Moreover, sixty-eight 
cases, or more than one-quarter of the total number, have 
occurred in the present decade up to May 1958.9 
The figures also reveal that the courts are not as liberal to 
the surviving spouse as they were formerly. In the nineteenth 
century the spouse was the favored litigant in thirty-one cases, 
as opposed to twenty-nine cases favoring the donee. By the 
turn of the century, however, this trend was reversed. From 
1900 there is a pronounced tendency to sustain the validity 
of the transfer. Until 1940 the ratio is a little more than two 
to one in favor of the donee; from 1940 on the ratio favoring 
the donee is slightly less than two to one. 
Nor can we assume that the modern trend against the sur-
viving spouse is indicative merely of the fact that in two out 
of every three evasion cases the spouse does not deserve to 
win, i.e., that the equities are against her. Relevant in this re-
spect is Chapter Eleven, where the cases are examined to 
determine whether or not each particular decision is con-
sistent with the individual equities of the case. The equities 
are considered to be with the spouse only when she could es-
tablish (a) that she was in financial need at the time of the ap-
plication, and (b) that the inter vivos transfer was unreasona-
bly large under the circumstances prevailing at the time of the 
transfer. The results of this study show that the surviving 
spouse is not faring as well in twentieth century cases as in the 
8 By coincidence, the year that the statutory share legislation was 
enacted in New York. 
9 The total number of evasion cases is not large. But there may be 
more there than meets the eye. The great bulk of an iceberg lies under 
the surface; so may these cases betoken widespread evasion of marital 
obligations. It is probable that many cases are never reported. An 
appeal may not be taken; or the case may be settled before appeal or 
even before suit. The chances of success would be slim in many in-
stances-as, e.g., where the transfer was by way of outright gift or irre-
vocable trust in a "control" jurisdiction, or, for that matter, any sort 
of an inter vivos transfer in a "reality" jurisdiction. 
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nineteenth century. Consider, for example, the cases that in-
volve an unreasonably large transfer, or one that probably was 
unreasonably large. Of the eighty-five cases concerned, fifty-
nine, or 69 per cent, were decided since 1900. This tends to 
show that the decedent spouse is no more malevolent nowa-
days than in the nineteenth century: it will be recalled that 
77 per cent of all evasion cases have occurred since 1900. 
Nevertheless, the box score for judicial reaction to unrea-
sonably large transfers 10 indicates that present-day courts are 
probably more apt to sustain such transfers.11 Of the twenty-
six unreasonably large transfers occurring in the nineteenth 
century, only six, or 23 per cent, were sustained. Since 1900, 
however, twenty-four out of fifty-nine, or 41 per cent, of these 
transfers have been sustained.12 
The increasing volume of cases is significant. Litigation 
is at best an inadequate gauge of unlitigated evasions, but at 
least it is suggestive of many such evasions. We are put on 
notice of the possibility that the community values implicit in 
the statutory share are not being achieved. 
10 As to cases in which the surviving spouse won, although the 
equities dictated otherwise, see Table C, infra. 
u CASES INVOLVING "UNREASONABLE" OR "PROBABLY 
UNREASONABLE" TRANSFERS 
Invalid Valid Total 
Before 1850 4 3 7 
1850-1874 8 I 9 
1875-1899 8 2 10 
1900-1909 4 2 6 
1910-1919 5 4 9 
1920-1929 0 3 3 
1930-1939 7 4 11 
1940-1949 10 6 16 
1950-May 1958 9 5 14 
Total 55 30 85 
12 Is there any relation between this trend and the emancipation of 
modern woman? Do present-day courts believe that women, as a class, 
have achieved economic parity with men? Such a generalization is easy 
to make, probably unwarranted. 
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3. AGGRAVATING FACTORS 
It is possible, if not probable, that in the future the number 
of "evasions," both reprehensible and otherwise, will seri-
ously increase. Too many forces in our modern way of life 
tend to undermine the frail structure of the statutory share. 
These forces are diverse - moral, social, economic, legal; and 
a quantitative analysis is impracticable. We can speculate, 
however, on the relative importance of the major factors, 
which would include the following: (a) increase in family 
disharmony, (b) growing popularity of inter vivos property 
transmission, and (c) the arbitrary nature of the statutory 
share itself. 
(a) Increase in Family Disharmony. How secure is the in-
stitution of the family 13 in the United States? Do marriage, 
the home, and children occupy the same firm place in the 
hearts of Americans as in the early days? The answer to this 
question should throw some light on the probable percentage 
of evasions. If the home is happy, it is unlikely that the hus-
band will evade his family responsibilities. If the home is 
unhappy, the husband may be tempted to disinherit his wife. 
Family disharmony, of course, is difficult to assess.14 The 
13 "The time has passed, it is believed, when the lawyer must preface 
his reference to a doctrine of social science by apologetic demonstration 
of the general relevance of the social sciences to legal problems." Julius 
Stone, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL Enuc. 373, 376 (1953). A forerunner in 
this approach in the field of succession law is Cavers, "Change in the 
American Family and the Laughing Heir," 20 IowA L. REv. 203 (1935). 
14 "Divorce is an effect, not a cause. It is a symptom, not the disease. 
It is safe to assert, except in the most attenuated institutional sense, that 
divorce never broke up a single marriage. It is adultery, cruelty, de-
sertion, drunkenness, incompatibility, the decay or transfer of affection, 
and the like that destroy marriages. Divorce never occurs until after 
the marriage has been completely wrecked-sometimes not until many 
years after." Lichtenberger, DIVORCE, A SociAL INTERPRETATION 16 
(1931). 
The popular excuse for the high divorce rate is the stress and tension 
of modern living. Jensen, THE REvoLT oF AMERICAN WoMEN 182-3 
(1952). Cf. Jacobs and Goebel, CASES oN DoMESTic RELATIONS 384 
(1952). Indicative of the "tensions" in modern living is the high U. S. 
suicide rate of 16,000 to 22,000 a year, with 100,000 failures. 75 per 
cent of the failures are women. Jensen, supra, at 202. 
In general, on family disharmony, see Zimmerman, THE FAMILY OF 
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interpretation of the available statistics may vary with the 
length of each sociologist's foot. In consequence, and out of 
prudence, the following discussion will deal in generalities. 
In attempting to estimate the extent of American family 
disharmony, we are immediately struck by the rising Ameri-
can divorce rate. Twentieth-century statistics indicate an up-
trend in dissolutions caused by divorce, and a downtrend 
in dissolutions caused by death.15 Until the last few years it 
was possible to state that the divorce rate has averaged a three 
per cent increase each year since the War Between the 
States.16 It has leveled off substantially since 1946; 11 and 
there have been predictions that it will continue to decrease. 
On balance, however, the over-all picture presents a more or 
less steadily rising rate. The figures do not flatter us. As 
Zimmerman pointed out in 1949: "By the turn of the Twen-
tieth Century, although the divorce rate was relatively low 
(one for each eleven marriages) as compared to the present 
it was higher than the total of all the divorce rates in the 
European countries, from which most of the American people 
ToMORROW (1949); Burgess, "The Family in a Changing Society," 53 
AM. J. SociOLOGY 417 (1948); Gruenberg, "Changing Conceptions of 
the Family," 251 ANNALS AMER. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 128 (1947); 
Haber, "The Effects of Insecurity on Family Life," 196 id. 35 (1938); 
Mowrer, "War and Family Solidarity and Stability," 229 id. 100 (1943); 
Murdock, "Family Stability in Non-European Cultures," 272 id. 195 
(1950). 
1s Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Nov. 1949; see also SuMMARY 
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS: UNITED STATES 1950 (Nat'l Office 
Vital Stat., Special Report, Oct. 29, 1952). 
Is there a link between the increase in divorce rates and the gradual 
increase in longevity? The longer persons live the more chance there 
is to "get on each other's nerves." For figures on longevity, see note 
23, infra. 
1s Burgess, "The Family in a Changing Society," 53 AM. J. SociOLOGY 
417 (1948). 
11 Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Aug. 1949. See also World-
wide Increase in Divorce, id., Apr. 1949. The general upward trend 
has been acute in England and Wales since the end of World War II. 
The divorce ratio in England and Wales is now about one half of ours, 
whereas 35 years ago it was only one-fiftieth of what we were then 
experiencing. The world-wide disruptive effect of war on family life 
is evident. See also note 23, infra. 
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came. Since then, particularly during the past decade, it has 
advanced to something like one divorce for every three mar-
riages .... Divorce is almost now as frequent as it was in the 
fateful third century preceding the spread of the Christian re-
ligion among western people." 18 
At first glance, the divorce rate appears to have no direct 
bearing on the possible percentage of evasions of the forced 
share. In divorce there is a clean break, property-wise: the di-
vorced wife loses rights of succession. For our purposes, how-
ever, the significance of the divorce rate lies not in the figures 
per se (appalling though they are), but in the high rate of re-
marriage that follows divorce. There has been a marked in-
crease in the frequency of remarriage since the turn of the cen-
tury.19 This is particularly true in the case of divorced per-
sons. 20 They tend to remarry with some promptness; indeed, 
the chances of remarriage for the divorced person are greater 
18Zimmennan, THE FAMILY OF TOMORROW 2 (1949). 
19 "Altogether, in somewhat more than one out of every six families, 
either the husband or wife had been previously married." Stat. Bull., 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., April 1951. "There are also definite indi-
cations that a considerable portion of the divorced lost little time in 
remarrying. This may be inferred from the fact that although about 
5,500,000 persons were divorced from 1940 through 1946, the number 
of divorced persons who had not remarried increased by only a little 
more than 500,000 during this period," !d., Mar. 1948. 
20 "Persons married more than once now constitute a larger propor-
tion of the total number of married couples, despite a decline in widow-
hood at the younger ages. The explanation . . . lies in the remarriage 
of divorced persons . . . among whom the remarriage rate is very 
high .... [In] the age range 25 to 34 years, for example, somewhat 
more than three-fifths of them were remarried according to the figures 
for 1940, as compared with about one-half in 1910 .... As a conse-
quence ... wives who have been married more than once are rela-
tively more frequent at present than at any time in the past half cen-
tury or longer; they now represent about one out of every eight married 
women in our country." Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Jan. 
1949. 
"Individual states differ markedly in the proportions of the single, 
divorced, and widowed among those getting married. . . . These geo-
graphic variations reflect a number of factors, including the age and 
marital composition of the population, differences in attitudes towards 
divorce among various religious groups, and-even more important-the 
diversity in our marriage and divorce laws." Stat. Bull., Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., June 1953. 
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than the chances of marriage for the unmarried person. 21 The 
propensity to remarry strengthens with advancing age, for 
both the widowed and the divorced. This desire of older 
people to "have another go at it" is clearly shown by the re-
marriage statistics set out in Appendix A. 22 Possibly the in-
crease in remarriages may be ascribed in part to the fact that 
nowadays people are living longer 23 and that they move 
about the country more than formerly. 24 In any event, we are 
probably justified in assuming that many remarriages are 
marriages of convenience, motivated by the desire for com-
panionship or security. To be sure, the chances of success in 
the second and succeeding marriages appear to be about the 
same as in the average first marriage.25 A substantial number 
are unsuccessful, however, probably due to the same intrinsic 
personality difficulties that led to the first divorce. And the 
presence of children by a former marriage is a complicating 
factor even when the remarriage is a successful one. Children 
under eighteen are involved in probably one half of all di-
vorces and annulments. 26 The evasion cases afford striking 
21 "Among women, the chances are about one in two for the spinster 
of 30, the widow of 33, and the divorcee of 45. In other words, the 
chances of marriage in each sex are as good among the divorced of 45 
as among the single of 30." Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
May 1945. 
22 Infra, p. 331. And see Glick, "First Marriages and Remarriages," 
14 AM. SocroL. REv. 726 (1949). 
23 "The average length of life in the United States increased to a new 
high of 68.5 years in 1951. This is a gain of 3.7 years in a decade and of 
19.3 years since 1900-1902, when the average length of life was 49.2 
years. Thus, the expected lifetime of the average American has been 
lengthened by almost 40 per cent since the beginning of the century. 
For white females, the expectation of life at birth in 1951 was as high 
as 72.6 years, compared with 66.6 years for white males; the correspond-
ing figures for the nonwhite population were 63.7 years and 59.4 years, 
respectively." Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., June, 1954; see 
also Stat. Bull., Apr., Sept., Nov., 1953. 
24 In 1948 and 1949, about one out of every five adults in the country 
changed residence. See Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., May 
1950. 
25 E.g., more than one fifth of the remarried husbands stay married 
at least 20 years. Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., April 1949. 
26 See Table 15, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 83 (1952). 
Divorces involving children are on the increase. They are concentrated 
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corroboration of the understandably human desire to make 
provision for one's own children.27 A choice between the 
children and the second wife usually favors the children; 
and, as was mentioned earlier, frequently the children will 
receive inter vivos transfers of most of the husband's assets. 28 
It is possible to rationalize the divorce figures in disparage-
ment of the evasion problem. The argument runs this way: 
if divorce is so easily and so frequently obtained, 29 it follows 
that those who remain married are probably content with 
their current spouses and that evasions of the statutory share 
will hence be relatively few in number. There is some merit 
to this contention. The great majority of husbands will not 
attempt to evade their marital responsibility. If this were 
not so, marriage as an institution could not survive. No law 
can endure that flouts human nature. The husband's com-
mon-law duty of support, for example, has had a long and ef-
in the early years of marriage. Fully two-thirds of the children affected 
by divorce are under age 10. The relative frequency of divorce for 
couples with minor children was little more than one-half that for 
couples without minor children at the time of divorce. Stat. Bull., 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Feb. 1950. 
Widows with children seem to be at a disadvantage in remarrying. 
Stat. Bull., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Aug. 1952. 
27 See Chap. 10, text at note 34, infra. 
2s It is of course probable that many children of a former marriage 
will be of adult age at the time of the parent's remarriage. This would 
not appear to be a deterrent to the making of gifts to children of a 
former marriage. The sentimental attachment to one's own children 
will survive most remarriages, particularly when the second marriage 
is one of convenience. 
A more important deterrent to inter vivos evasions, when there has 
been a remarriage, is the existence of an antenuptial contract. Such a 
contract is not unusual when the parties marry for convenience; and if 
the second wife thereby waives her forced share privileges there will of 
course be no problem of evasion. But it is not clear that the contract 
will always bar the statutory share. See Appendix D, note 3. 
29 As Westermarck, 3 THE HISTORY OF HuMAN MARRIAGE 377 (1922), 
has indicated, loose divorce laws do not necessarily connote a break-
down in the institution of marriage. The low Swedish divorce rate, 
for example, considered in conjunction with the very liberal Swedish 
grounds for divorce, indicates that there may be no connection what-
soever between the divorce rate and the legal grounds for divorce. On 
the other hand, it cannot be denied that in the United States there is 
a frighteningly high turnover in marriage partnerships. If this indi-
cates anything, it indicates marital disharmony. 
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fective validity because responsible monogamy is in general 
esteem. But the fact that most husbands do support their 
wives (at least, in those marriages that do not end in divorce) 
has never been urged as a reason for scrapping the common-
law duty of support. There are always some recalcitrant mem-
bers in any community. And we may assume that there will 
probably continue to be many first marriages in which one 
spouse or the other will be tempted to evade the statutory 
share legislation. Disharmony may exist between husband and 
wife without serious thought of a divorce. Marriages may sur-
vive under conditions that run from (a) a monotonous coexist-
ence under the same roof to (b) an irreconcilable separation; 
and yet divorce may be unsought for many reasons: considera-
tion of the children's happiness; fear of community censure; 
religious convictions; pride in the preservation of appear-
ances; sheer inertia; or even a perverse sense of loyalty. For di-
verse reasons a marriage may be merely a shared legal status, 
without happiness, without respect. Ironically, our present 
succession laws tend to discriminate against the wife who for 
some reason or another does not press her grounds for di-
vorce. If she does so, she perhaps may obtain a property 
settlement. But if she practices conciliation, cooperation, 
restraint, she is at the mercy of her husband's inter vivos 
transfers. At his death she may find no property in his 
"estate." 
To recapitulate, the high divorce rate is accompanied by a 
high rate of remarriage. These remarriages are often moti-
vated more by convenience than by romantic affection. The 
natural object of the husband's inter vivos bounty will be 
children of a former marriage. And marital disharmony 
may lead to inter vivos "evasions" even when the spouses 
do not seek a divorce. 
(b) Popularity of Inter Vivos Property Transmission. It is 
probably safe to say that inter vivos devices now comprise a 
large and ever-growing portion of all gratuitous transfers. 
The statistics about them are meagre, but this assumption 
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seems justified in the light of modern conditions. To begin 
with, inter vivos transfers are easier to effect now that the 
greater part of our total wealth is composed of personalty. 
The corporation, the trust, freely assignable chases -these 
and other devices ensure a wide diversity and flexibility in the 
media in which wealth may be held and transferred. In· the 
early days wealth meant land- stable, enduring, seldom trans-
ferred other than at death. Inter vivos transmission was ab-
normal. But in our time wealth is found in liquid intangi-
bles. Transferability is the sine qua non; and ease in aliena-
tion 30 tends to promote a greater percentage of inter vivos 
transfers. 
Secondly, survivorship devices have emerged as an effective 
substitute for the will. In a recent article 31 Gilbert Stephen-
son notes a significant increase in joint ownership, particu-
larly in joint ownership of homes and joint bank accounts. 
The increase in joint ownership of homes he ascribes to a de-
sire to minimize taxes, to save probate expenses, and to keep 
the home intact. Convenience in family banking explains 
the increase in joint bank accounts. Joint registration of War 
Bonds has stimulated increase in joint ownership of all prop-
erty; and the special requirements of persons in military 
service has led in many cases to joint ownership of the entire 
property of families concerned. A further contributing fac-
tor is the natural advantage of expediting payment of the 
decedent's property to his beneficiaries at his death. Joint 
ownership eliminates the time-lag (and expense) that occurs 
between death and eventual distribution under the auspices 
of the probate court. 
Thirdly, the heavy impact of modern death duties dis-
30 The demands of convenience have led to ease in transfer of land. 
For example, deeds and mortgages merely require written evidence of 
intent; "title" in sales of land need only be "marketable," not fool-
proof; and curative acts help to minimize the effect of antiquated 
recordation systems. Cf. Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Proce-
dure," 47 MicH. L. REv. 935, 1097 (1949). 
31 Stephenson, "Joint Ownership of Property," 25 TRUST BuLL. 25, 31-
32 (1945). 
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courages testamentary transmission. Conversely, the lower 
rate on the gift tax stimulates inter vivos gifts to relatives and 
to charities. 
Fourthly, the comparatively recent growth of "estate plan-
ning" is causing greater awareness of the benefits to be 
derived from inter vivos transmission. The man of modest 
means, for example, will find that he - as well as the man of 
wealth -can use the revocable inter vivos trust to advantage. 
Indeed, the main components of the average man's holdings 
are usually transmitted by an inter vivos device: the family 
home and the family bank account by survivorship; life in-
surance and United States savings bonds by contract. And 
undoubtedly in recent years the high cost of living and of 
education has induced many fathers to make an early ad-
vancement of a portion of their wordly goods. This assump-
tion finds corroboration in the fact that a large proportion of 
the evasion cases concern transfers to children, particularly 
to children of a prior marriage.32 
To summarize, the pattern of American property donation 
has changed since the original forced share statutes were 
enacted. No longer can it be said that transmission of wealth 
will in all cases coincide with death. Inter vivos transfers are 
now the rule, not the exception. This suggests that there 
should be an increasing community concern for the security 
of the transferee's title. Effective protection for the widow 
will involve ever-increasing interference with the legitimate 
expectations of both the decedent and the transferee. Thus 
we may expect the "evasion" problem to give greater trouble 
in the future to the courts and to the community. 
(c) Arbitrary Nature of the Statutory Share. It is possible 
that much of the evasion litigation is occasioned by the arbi-
trary, mechanical operation of the forced share statutes. As 
we shall see later, 33 the existing legislation pays no attention 
to the widow's need, and but casual attention to the merits 
32 Infra, Chap. 10, text at note 35. 
B3 Infra, Chap. 2, text at note 3. 
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otherwise of her claim. It is immaterial in the statutes that 
the widow has independent means, or that she has already 
been adequately provided for by the decedent's inter vivos 
transfers; and it is only in limited instances that her share will 
be barred by "misconduct." 34 Naturally, most husbands will 
try to prevent a widow from taking an elective share that she 
neither needs nor deserves. 
Consider a typical "evasion" situation. The husband has 
children by a prior marriage. The wife may also have chil-
dren by a prior marriage and perhaps a little money of her 
own. If the husband's children are adults, there will possibly 
be unpleasantness with the stepmother. In all probability 
the husband will wish (a) to provide his widow with sufficient 
income to continue her present standard of living and (b) 
to leave the principal to his own children. Naturally, he will 
not wish to leave the principal to the widow, since at her 
death it would in all likelihood go to her children or relatives. 
And, naturally, he will carry out his plan by inter vivos dispo-
sition; otherwise the widow may elect a statutory share. In 
these circumstances the dictates of sentiment and of common 
sense foster inter vivos transfers. "Evasion" here is laudable, 
not reprehensible. 
4. CoNCLUSION 
Predictions as to the present or future gravity of the eva-
sion problem are at best speculation: too many extra-legal 
factors are involved. It seems safe to say, however, that the 
statutory share legislation shows serious signs of wear. A 
brittle edifice, it is assailed by two powerful forces, (a) the in-
creasing instability in the American family and (b) the popu-
larity of devices for controlled lifetime giving. There is a 
greater incentive for making inter vivos transfers; there is a 
wider selection of practicable devices. Greater temptations: 
deft new expedients. The cumulative effect of these forces is 
to make the statutory share less effective unless protection is 
34 I d., text at note 18. 
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given against inter vivos transfers, and, at the same time, to 
render interference with inter vivos transfers intolerable if 
permitted to a widow in automatic fashion. It is this state of 
affairs that has led some courts to place subconscious stress on 
the "equities"; that has led other courts to deny any claim of 
any widow; and that probably will continue to aggravate the 
evasion problem so long as the statutory share legislation re-
mains in its present form. 
CHAPTER 2 
Basic Policy Considerations: The Need 
for Restraints on Disinheritance 
1. METHODOLOGY 1 
Our findings in Chapter One indicate that the "evasion" 
problem is, on the surface at least, a serious one. It would 
appear that "something must be done." Should something be 
done? If so, what? No decision can be made unless we ask 
further questions in the present chapter. What are the com-
munity values 2 involved in restraints on disinheritance of the 
widow, and how important are they? How does financial aid 
to the widow relate to the over-all welfare of the surviving 
family? Is there any justification for the commonly held 
belief that women, particularly widows, own the bulk of the 
country's wealth? Can the security of the surviving family be 
ensured by utilizing other legal or extra-legal controls that 
achieve the desired community goals without infringing on 
freedom of property transmission? 
In Chapter Three we shall try to reckon the cost of ade-
quate family protection; for example, how important is it to 
the community that the decedent be given complete freedom 
to make testamentary and inter vivos gifts? Chapter Four 
suggests a formula for reconciling the family protection value 
with the "reliance interest" of the transferee. Finally, in Part 
3, we shall.examine the case-law to determine whether or 
not the desired community goals are being achieved by exist-
ing judicial doctrine. 
1 I am indebted to the ideas found in Shartel, OuR LEGAL SYsTEM AND 
How IT OPERATES 434-594 (1951); Lasswell and McDougal, "Legal 
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public In-
terest," 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943); Lasswell, "The World Revolution of 
Our Time, a Framework for Basic Policy Research," Hoover Institute 
Studies, Series A: General Studies, No. I (1951). 
2 Or "goal," or "purpose," or "interest." 
20 
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2. THE STATUTORY SHARE 3 
(a) Typical Provisions. As mentioned earlier, the statutory 
(or "forced") share normally guarantees the surviving spouse 
a specified fraction of the "estate" of the deceased spouse. 
This share may be elected ("forced") regardless of the terms 
of the will. In most states 4 the share is specifically or by 
implication based upon the net estate.5 The phrase "estate" 
is significant. For one thing, it ensures the widow a share in 
the husband's personal property as well as in his realty. In 
another aspect, however, it breeds confusion: in literal terms 
it restricts the forced share to property that forms part of the 
husband's estate for purposes of administration. Inter vivos 
transfers, in theory, are unaffected. 
There is some variety in the statutory provisions. The 
amount recoverable may include: (a) the intestate share; 6 
(b) the intestate share limited to a defined amount or fraction 
of the estate; 7 (c) a share in the realty only; 8 (d) a combina-
a On the historical development and significance of the statutory 
share, see Simes, PuBLIC PoLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 12-31 (1955). See, 
in general, Simes, MoDEL PRoBATE CoDE §§31 and 32 and pp. 258-63 
(1946); 3 Vernier, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§189, 216 (1935); 4 P-H 
WILLS, EsT., & TRusTs SERV. §2371 (Dower), §2732 (Curtesy), §2734 
(Widow's and Children's Allowances), §2735 (Election of Widow or 
Surviving Spouse). 
4 The community property states, which are in a special category, 
are as follows: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The provisions differ from state to 
state, and generalizations are hazardous. To oversimplify, we may say 
that community property is the property that has been earned by 
either spouse during the marriage. The other spouse acquires imme· 
diately an undivided half-interest in the community. The decedent 
spouse cannot deal with the other spouse's interest by will, and it is 
not part of his estate. Since community property is of limited appli-
cation, we shall, for the most part, restrict our discussion to the re-
maining American states. On transfers in "fraud" of the surviving 
member of the community, see Chap. 20, note 21, infra. 
li But see Fla. Stat. §731.34 (1957). 
e E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §30-2 (1950). 
7 E.g., in Massachusetts the surviving spouse may elect to take the 
estate assets up to a value of $10,000, and the income for life in any 
surplus over that amount. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 191, §15 (1955). 
8 E.g., Georgia restricts the widow to dower in the realty, or to a 
"child's part" in the realty. Ga. Code Ann. §§31-101, 31-110(3) (1952). 
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tion of a share in personalty and inchoate dower; 9 (e) a 
limited right to elect; 10 (f) nothing.11 
The extent of the share usually varies with the number of 
children involved. Thus, if no children survive, the widow 
may receive one half or even all of the estate; but in the event 
of children surviving she may be relegated to a "child's 
share," which may be a third, or even less, depending on 
the number of surviving children.12 Aside from this me-
chanical variation, the over-all picture is one of fixed, unal-
terable, arbitrary portions. Relief is standardized; no atten-
tion is paid to individual equities or unusual circumstances. 
There are, of course, some isolated instances of flexibility. 
A Vermont statute provides that the surviving spouse may 
take, out of the intestate property or upon waiving the will, 
such part of the personalty "as the probate court assigns ... 
according to his or her circumstances and the estate and 
degree of the decedent, which shall not be less than a third, 
after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses 
of administration." 13 In Mississippi there is a proviso that 
the wife may not elect against the will if her separate estate 
is equal to the share of the realty and personalty that she 
would take under the will.14 A comparable provision exists 
9 E.g., Fla. Stat. §731.34 (1957). 
1 0 E.g., in New York the surviving spouse may not elect if the will 
gives him or her $2500 and the income for life from a trust fund the 
corpus of which equals the difference between the share in the will and 
the intestate share. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §18. 
n E.g., North Dakota, South Dakota. 
12 Thus in Nebraska the intestate share of the surviving spouse is 
limited to one·fourth, "if the survivor is not the parent of all the 
children of the deceased and there be one or more children, or the 
issue of one or more deceased children surviving." Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§30-101 (1943). 
1a Vt. Rev. Stat. §§3018-19 (1947). 
14 Miss. Code Ann. §670 (1942). If the wife's separate estate is less 
than her share in the will the deficiency may be claimed from the estate 
in amounts set out in the statute. If the wife is the beneficiary of her 
husband's life insurance she must consider it as part of her separate 
estate. Osburn v. Sims, 62 Miss. 429 (1884). This is not so if she took 
the proceeds as sole heir. O'Reily v. Laughlin, 92 Miss. 1, 45 So. 19 
(1907). 
Legislation of this sort would not appear to be suitable for modest 
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in AlabamaY South Carolina sloughs off the excess over 
one fourth of the net estate when testamenta.ry gifts are made 
to mistresses or illegitimate children.16 In the main, however, 
the pattern is one of unyielding rigidity. 
The wife is the favored spouse. A number of states have 
no forced share for the husband,17 but the wife seems to be 
provided for in all states but North Dakota and South 
Dakota. 
In slightly less than one half of the states where community 
property does not prevail, the share is barred by the mis-
conduct of the spouse. But statutes of this sort are of limited 
and, in some respects, uncertain application.18 Desertion 
without cause is their common denominator; but some of the 
statutes require adultery- or even a bigamous marriage. In 
many of the evasion cases the conduct of the surviving spouse 
has been reprehensible, but does not amount to "desertion." 
Naturally, this conduct will stimulate inter vivos transfers by 
the husband, and the widow will attack the transfers as being 
in "evasion" of her rights. 
The statutory share almost inevitably entails a lump sum 
payment. No thought is given to the possibility- indeed, 
the probability- that the widow will be inexperienced in 
money matters and that the lump sum will soon be dissi-
pated.19 The comparatively recent New York statute 20 is an 
exception. It encourages the testator to leave the widow an 
amount equivalent to her intestate share in trust for her life, 
estates. It would be unfair to a widow with minor children, when the 
separate estate is limited. Similar hardship would ensue to a widow 
with no children, when her husband leaves a small estate which, com-
bined with her own separate property, is not enough to sustain her. 
1 5 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 34, §§42, 43 (1940). United States bonds pay-
able to husband or to husband or wife have been considered a part 
of the wife's separate estate, even though purchased by the husband. 
Chambless v. Black, 250 Ala. 604, 35 So.2d 348 (1948). 
1s S.C. Code §19-238 (1952). 
17 E.g., Florida. See 3 Vernier, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §216 (1935). 
1s Simes, MoDEL PROBATE CoDE 263-67 (1946). 
19 Cahn, "Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 144 
(1936). 
20 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §18. 
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or as a legal life estate or annuity for life. But even in New 
York the husband has the power to denude his "estate" by 
inter vivos transfers; and even if he leaves a substantial trust 
for the widow, there is no effective protection for the chil-
dren: the widow may die during the minority of the children, 
thus cutting off the income. 
(b) Apparent Aims. It seems reasonably clear that the 
immediate goal of the statutory share is to provide economic 
assistance to the surviving spouse - for our purposes, the 
widow. In the oft-quoted words of a comparatively recent 
legislative report: "There is a glaring inconsistency in our 
law which compels a man to support his wife during his 
lifetime and permits him to leave her practically penniless at 
his death." 21 
The need for protection is obvious. By the marital vows 
the wife assumes her natural role of homemaking and the 
husband undertakes to "provide" for the home. If many 
years later the husband disinherits his family, the widow must 
then undertake both roles - homemaker and provider. By 
that time, however, she is one of the disadvantaged: she is 
much older; she lacks the practical or professional skills that 
would have been hers had she preferred a career to marriage; 
and by now she may have the distracting responsibility of 
rearing minor children. And disinheritance of the family 
may entail more serious consequences than the loss of ma-
terial comforts. For the widow, it means a loss of "face," of 
prestige. She can no longer keep up with the Joneses; in fact, 
she cannot even approximate her former standard of living. 
For the children, who depend on the widow, the conse-
quences are perhaps more drastic, in terms of potential harm 
to the community. Society is concerned that they, as future 
citizens, receive proper food, adequate dental and medical 
care, and educational opportunities commensurate with indi-
vidual talent and inclinations. Disinheritance makes it more 
21 The Reports of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws 
of Estates, New York Legislative Document No. 69, p. 86 (1930). 
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difficult for the widow to carry out these family responsibili-
ties. And for both the widow and children this may result 
in a lowering of morale, with consequent harm to the family's 
role in character-building.22 This in turn injures the com-
munity, for the community is essentially a collection of fami-
lies. The virtues inculcated by a happy family life are the 
virtues that support democracy: tolerance, integrity, a sense 
of responsibility. The welfare of the family is the welfare 
of the state. 
3. WoMEN's WEALTH 
It is frequently asserted nowadays that women own the 
great bulk of the country's wealth.23 This assertion cannot be 
ignored. It would appear that effective protection for widows 
requires intrusion on the husband's freedom of int~r vivos 
alienation. This means that appropriate legislation will be 
expensive, in terms of community convenience; it can be 
justified only if the need is great. We may well ask, then, if 
the emancipation of modern woman 24 has in turn led to her 
22 In some cases the family ties may be strengthened by adversity; but 
these are probably rare instances-occurring in spite of, and not because 
of, disinheritance. 
23 E.g., "between sixty and seventy per cent": THE SATURDAY REVIEW 
oF LITERATURE, Mar. 12, 1949, p. 18; "nearly 70 per cent of the invest-
.ment funds": "Women in the Dough," AMERICAN MAGAZINE, Mar. 1948, 
p. 112; "80 per cent of the wealth": FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, (Jackson-
ville) Mar. 4, 1954, p. 4, col. 7; see "A Woman Banker Looks at Women 
and their Money," 30 INDEPENDENT WoMAN 99 (Apr. 1951). 
24 On the proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing complete 
equality of the rights of men and women, see Murrell, "Full Citizen-
ship for Women: An Equal Rights Amendment," 38 A. B. A. J. 47 
(1952) (pro), and Brophy, "An Equal Rights Amendment: Would It 
Benefit Women?" 38 A. B. A. J. 393 (1952) (con). For early legislative 
protection against disinheritance of the widow, see Morris, STUDIES IN 
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 155-64 (1930). On modern legislation 
affecting the American family, see "Sex, Discrimination, and the Con-
stitution," 2 STAN. L. REv. 691, 697-712 (1950). On inheritance as a 
factor of decreasing importance in promoting family obedience, see 
Herkheimer, "Authoritarianism and the Family Today," in Anshen, 
THE FAMILY: ITs FuNCTION AND DESTINY 359, 361 (1949). In general, 
see Groves, THE CoNTEMPORARY AMERICAN FAMILY 564 (2nd ed. 1947); 
Murdock, SociAL STRUCTURE (1949); Cohen, "Social Security and Family 
Stability," 272 ANNALs AMER. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. II7 (1950); Tauber 
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economic independence. If this should be the case there 
would be no necessity for new legislation. It would be pre-
ferable to retain the statutory share as it now exists, and to let 
the widow of the future take her chances with the court. 
The status of women has been bettered in many respects 
since the present forced share statutes were introduced. As 
far as the power to own property is concerned, the liberation 
is all but complete. But a statement that women are entitled 
to separate property can have no significance without con-
sidering the extent of the average woman's separate prop-
erty.25 Here we encounter myth, conjecture, half-truth. The 
park-bench philosophy that "women own the country" prob-
ably stems from, or is fed by, two facts of modern life: (a) 
the institution of inheritance favors women, for the simple 
reason that women live longer; and (b) more women are 
working than ever before. 
Not much is known about women's wealth. 26 What little 
is known 27 indicates that a few women own great wealth but 
and Eldridge, "Some Demographic Aspects of the Changing Role of 
Women," 251 id. 24 (1947); Zimmerman, "The Family and Social 
Change," 272 id. 22 (1950). 
25 In fact, we cannot even rely on averages. Even if the average 
were high, it would mean only that many needed no protection, not 
that all were without need of a forced share. 
26 We know very little about the total distribution of wealth or the 
manner in which it is transferred. Doane, THE ANATOMY OF AMERICAN 
WEALTH (1940); see references collected in McDougal and Haber, 
PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 107, 108 (1948). 
27 At midsummer 1956 prices, women had "an approximate equity of 
$100 billion in common and preferred stock. They have about half 
of the $110 billion in savings accounts, about half the $66 billion in gov-
ernment bonds. . . . 
According to a recent survey made for the New York Stock Exchange, 
the largest single group in the occupational breakdown of all stock-
holders ... is Housewives and Non-employed Females. There are al-
most three million in that category, and they make up 34.2 per cent 
of the 8,630,000 stockholders of record .... " Hamill, "Women and 
Business," FoRTUNE, Oct. 1956, p. 149. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that some men register their securities in their wives' name 
for tax or business protection purposes. 
Figures compiled by the insurance companies indicate that women 
own 20 per cent of the life insurance issued in any year, but their 
policies are seldom for more than $1,000; and, although modern woman 
inherits more than 75 per cent of the death benefit payments, "there 
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that the average woman has modest means.28 She owns a 
limited amount of capital, if any, and her income is barely at 
the subsistence level. If the woman is married, most of her 
earnings probably go into the family budget. It follows that 
the average widow 29 will require financial assistance from her 
are reasons to believe that, on the average, these net her relatively 
small amounts." Adams, "Women's Wealth, BARRON's Dec. 18, 1950, 
p. 7, col. 4. 
More women are working than ever before. The 21 million women 
in the U.S. labor force in 1956 comprised a third of all women over 14, 
and 30 per cent of all married women. Hamill, "Women and Business," 
FoRTUNE, Aug. 1956, p. 173. The most significant increase is from the 
ranks of the older married women. In 1920 fewer than 20 per cent of 
married women in the 45 to 54 years age group were working; in 
1956 45 per cent were at work. "Working, rather than being at home 
(except during the years when the children are young) has become the 
'natural' thing to do." ld., July, 1956, p. 92. But women do not earn 
as much as men. "There are fewer than 40,000 U.S. women ... who 
earn as much as $10,000 a year (less than 0.2 per cent of all the 
women who work for a living) and this figure includes actresses, movie 
stars, buyers, and some of the professional women, as well as women 
executives." ld., June, 1956, p. 106. 
See also "Women as Workers (A Statistical Guide)," Women's Bureau 
Report, (U.S. Dep't of Labor) July 1952. On decedents' estates, see 
"Where Trusts Business is going, as recorded in the Probate Records of 
Los Angeles County," TRUST BuLL. 1940, p. 5. But cf. Doane, THE 
ANATOMY OF AMERICAN WEALTH 13, 14 (1940). 
28 Some humorous statistics on the reaction of the sexes to the eman-
cipation of women may be found in a survey-"Women in America," 
FoRTUNE, Aug. 1946. 
29 Statistical bulletins of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
reveal these current trends in widowhood: 
1. Increase in numbers: "As a result of the marked decline 
in mortality, the proportion widowed in the population has 
been decreasing at every period of life. Nevertheless, the num-
ber of widows in our country has been mounting rapidly, be-
cause the population at the older ages has been growing and 
because mortality has improved more rapidly among women 
than among men. In 1935 there were 7.4 million widows in 
the United States, compared with 5.7 million in 1940 and less 
than 4 million in 1920. Thus, between 1920 and 1953 the num-
ber of widows rose by almost 90 per cent, while the adult 
female population showed a gain of 63 per cent" (Stat. Bull., 
Jan. 1955). "Currently, about 660,000 marriages are broken by 
death each year. In two-thirds of these families the wife is 
the surviving spouse. Fifty years ago the corresponding pro-
portion was close to one-half. . . . Only if the wife is at least 
·· .. 
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husband's estate.30 The great wealth of a few women should 
not preclude community protection to the average married 
woman. The very fact of marriage puts her at an economic 
disadvantage. After all the raptures over the fine new 
woman's world,31 the facts of life remain: Nature has given 
to woman a vital task to perform for society. She has the re-
sponsibility, during the productive period of her life, of 
child-bearing, child-rearing, and homemaking.32 We deal here 
not with those who evade that responsibility, the single or the 
divorced, but with the wife who remains with her husband 
to the end. By that time it is, for most, too late to secure a 
job providing adequate support. If these premises are sound, 
our succession laws should be so drafted as to ensure adequate 
five years older than her husband are the odds against her 
being widowed" (Stat. Bull., Sept. 1953). 
2. Emphasis on the older ages: "Whereas in 1920 little more 
than one third of the widows . . . were at ages 65 and over, 
in 1953 the proportion was more than one half" (Stat. Bull., 
Jan. 1955). 
The median age at which wives enter widowhood is about 
56 years. However, a significant number are much younger 
when their family life is disrupted by the death of the hus-
band; almost one quarter of the new widows each year are 
under age 45" (Stat. Bull., Sept. 1953). 
3. Emphasis on urban areas: Between 1940 and 1953 the 
number of widows in urban areas rose by 44 per cent. In 
1953 " ... widows constituted 13.7 per cent of all women liv-
ing in urban areas, I 1.2 per cent of those in rural nonfarm 
areas, and only 8.5 per cent of the women residing on farms. 
This situation suggests that many widows in rural areas who do 
not remarry, especially the younger and middle-aged, soon move 
to urban centers" (Stat. Bull., Jan. 1955). 
4. Emphasis on the nonwhite population: "In the country 
as a whole in 1950, the proportion widowed at ages 45-54 was 
22.8 per cent among the nonwhite women and 9.9 per cent 
among the white; at ages 65-74 the proportions were 60.6 and 
44.9 per cent, respectively. Moreover, young widows are much 
more common among the nonwhite women. Of all the non-
white widows in 1950, no less than 19.2 per cent were at ages 
14-44, compared with 7.3 per cent for the white woman" (Ibid.) 
30 But cf. Cavers, "Change in the American Family and the 'Laugh-
ing Heir,'" 20 IowA L. REv. 203, 204 (1935). 
31 Cf. Evans, THE SPOOR oF SPOOKS, 146-56 (1954). 
32 But cf. Warne, "The Reconversion of Women,'' 8 CuRRENT His-
TORY 200 (Mar. 1945). 
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support to deserving widows, even if this necessitates some 
degree of interference with her husband's gratuitous inter 
vivos transfers. 
4. SUPPORT OF THE SURVIVING FAMILY: OTHER DEVICES 
The fact that the chief goal of the statutory share is unin-
terrupted family support points to the gravity of the evasion 
problem. But we cannot fully assess the gravity of the prob-
lem until we have given some thought to the other expedients 
used by society to ensure family support. No sleep need be 
lost over evasions of the statutory share if its basic goal may 
legitimately be attained by other controls that do not in-
fringe on inter vivos transfers. 
Our American community uses many devices to ensure 
financial assistance to the surviving family. Some of these 
expedients involve public welfare, such as widows' pensions, 
and relief payments. Others, including the statutory share, 
attempt to minimize the necessity for public welfare by 
tapping the most logical source of revenue-the decedent's 
property. Most devices of this sort operate as restraints on the 
decedent's testamentary transfers-for example, homestead 
legislation (in some instances); family allowances; legislation 
restricting testamentary gifts to charity; and statutory and 
judicial doctrines concerning mental incompetency, undue 
influence, and fraud. Allied to these protective devices is 
preferential treatment in death duties, as, for example, the 
marital deduction and gradation of inheritance taxes accord-
ing to the degree of relationship to the decedent. A relatively 
small group of controls affects the decedent's privilege of 
making inter vivos transfers, as, e.g.) inchoate dower, home-
stead legislation (in some instances), and judicial doctrines 
aimed at preventing evasions of inchoate dower and the 
statutory share. 
We need not consider public-welfare devices; the husband 
who has the means to do so should bear primary responsibil-
ity for his family's support. Preferential treatment in death 
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duties has some merit,33 but it affects only the larger estates. 
Inchoate dower will be discussed later, in Chapter Six. 
(a) Homestead. Most American states, by constitution or 
by statute, make the family dwelling place immune to the 
claims of the husband's creditors. Indigenous to the United 
States, the homestead legislation shows community solicitude 
for the family; continuance of the home is viewed as a more 
basic need than enforcement of creditors' claims.34 This 
community judgment is based on one or more, or perhaps all, 
of the following factors: (a) tangible community benefit: less 
public funds needed for welfare and allied purposes; (b) in-
tangible community benefit: family solidarity, particularly 
in periods of economic stress, enhances the general morale; 
(c) sentimental regard for the home; and (d) solicitude for 
debtors, owing to their large number and voting power. 
The protection is restricted to the premises used as a home. 
Moreover, it is effective only against debts that have been in-
curred by a person who factually is the head of a family. In 
keeping with its basic philosophy, it is not affected by the 
death of the head of the family; it continues for the benefit 
of the widow and minor children. In point of fact, in some 
states the wife and minor children may have indefeasible 
property interests in the homestead. The husband may not 
be able to make an inter vivos conveyance of the home with-
out the wife's consent; and on his death the homestead may 
be claimed as an "estate" by the widow and perhaps by the 
children. And this homestead legislation has still another 
facet: it may effect an exemption from property taxation. 35 
To the extent that the homesteader cannot devise the home 
away from the family the homestead protection is a valuable 
adjunct to the statutory share. But homestead does not play 
a large part in the total scheme of protection against disin-
S3 The relevance of the federal estate tax to our problem is discussed, 
infra, pp. 276-278. 
34 Chattel exemption laws antedate homestead legislation. Comment, 
46 YALE L. J. 1023, 1024 (1937). 
35 Crosby and Miller, "Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida Homestead 
Exemption: 1-111," 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 12 (1949). 
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heritance of the surviving family. Many testators do not own 
a home: most urban families live in rental property. And 
some of the homestead provisions afford immunity only up to 
a designated monetary value, which may be quite low- as 
e.g., $1,000.36 Further, the husband may defeat the home-
stead protection by abandoning the homestead in his lifetime. 
(b) Family Allowances. Family allowance legislation,87 
sometimes referred to as the widow's allowance or the year's 
support, constitutes another important supplement to the 
statutory share. The family allowance provides temporary 
maintenance for the surviving family, pending distribution 
of the decedent's assets. But for this protection the delay en-
tailed in probate and administration may operate as a real 
hardship to the needy family. By express wording or by im-
plication, the protection usually is restricted to the surviving 
spouse 38 and children. Generally it is restricted to per-
sonalty, up to a prescribed limit. Specified articles, e.g., 
clothing and furniture, may also be awarded. A few states ex-
clude from the estate assets a certain amount of money or 
other property and award it outright to the widow. The 
amount of the family allowance usually is free of claims of 
the creditors of the deceased spouse. In the absence of a con-
trolling provision in the statute, the allowance, being con-
sidered an administrative expense, is generally held not to be 
deductible from the widow's distributive share, and may be 
taken regardless of the terms of the will. But, ironically, the 
courts have been inclined to uphold a provision in the will 
that would prevent the widow from taking both the allow-
ance and a share in the will. The rationale here appears to be 
that the share in the will is in the nature of a windfall, hence 
the testator is at liberty to attach a restrictive condition to the 
legacy.39 
86 3 Vernier, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 628-34, 638-63 (1935). 
37 4 P-H WILLS, EsT., & TRUST SERV. 1[2734. 
38 In some states only the widow. 
89 Contra, Andros v. Flournoy, 22 N.M. 582, 166 Pac. 1173 (1917); 
see Annots. 4 A.L.R. 387 (1917); 140 A.L.R. 1220 (1942). 
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Normally the amount awarded will vary with the size of the 
estate, the size of the family, and its former standard of living. 
Frequently a top limit is prescribed.40 But even where no 
monetary limit is fixed the amount awarded will be limited 
judicially to reasonable support for a brief period. To sum-
marize, the family-allowance protection is limited in amount 
and temporary in nature. 
An exception to the usual restrictions is found in Maine. 
The Maine legislation 41 seems innocuous enough, except 
that no top limit is prescribed and the widow may be granted, 
on "final probate" of the will, a "final reasonable allowance 
from the personal estate, according to the degree and estate 
of her husband and the state of the family under her care." 42 
On occasion, this legislation has been administered quite 
liberally. In one case an award of $75,000, on complaint by 
one of the heirs as being excessive, was increased to $85,000. 
The husband's estate was in the neighborhood of "five to six 
hundred thousand dollars." 43 The widow, significantly, had 
been the second wife. Her dower was "normal," and the 
share given her in the will "was disproportionately inade-
40 E.g., in Florida the limit is $4200. Fla. Stat. §733.20(l)(d)(i)(l957). 
41 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Chap. 156, §§14-19 (1954). 
42 !d. at §16. 
43 Gilman v. Gilman, 53 Me. 184 (1865). The court stated: 
"All the attendant and accompanying circumstances are to be 
considered,-the ages of the husband and wife,-the length of 
their cohabitation,-whether a first or second marriage,-the 
number of children of each and of both,-that is, by former 
marriages or by their joint union,-the wealth of the husband,-
the estate of the wife in her own right,-any antinuptial [sic] 
agreements,-their performance or non-performance,-thc treat-
ment of each to the other,-the health, place of residence and 
necessary expenditures of the wife,-the family under her 
charge and whatever other circumstances may address them-
selves to a sound judicial discretion, and may enable the Court 
to approximate as nearly as possible to exact justice to all 
whose interests may be involved in its judgment .... No rule 
can be established in advance as to the relative weight of any 
particular fact, for it cannot be foreknown how far it may be 
modified by the other facts with which it is indissolubly con-
nected." 
For later proceedings, see 54 Me. 537 (1867). 
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quate." The court stated, however, that the allowance could 
be made "without infringing on the rights of others." 44 
This phrase hints at solicitude for beneficiaries of the will as a 
potential restriction on the allowance. A recent case has 
emphasized that the allowance need not be restricted to "pro-
vision for needs that are temporary and immediate as such as 
are presently foreseeable" and that "an allowance is available 
to provide means for a widow additional to what she would re-
ceive as her distributive share." 45 In general, however, the 
Maine legislation has been administered in a conservative 
fashion.46 It is more akin to the standard American family-
allowance statute than to the "family maintenance" legisla-
tion of the British Commonwealth.H 
(c) Legislation Restricting Testamentary Gifts to Charity. 
Found in about one quarter of the American states, legisla-
tion of this type operates as a form of family protection. The 
statutes either limit the amount of the estate that can be trans-
ferred, or invalidate the bequest if the will was made in too 
close a proximity to death.48 The purpose is to protect the 
surviving family, not to discriminate against charities. A 
common provision is that the statute does not apply unless 
designated close relatives survive. In fact, in the absence of a 
statutory directive, it is probable that the gift would stand 
even if the close relatives do survive, provided they do not 
44 53 Me. 184, 194 (1865). 
45 Perkins et al., Appellants, 141 Me. 137, 141, 39 A.2d 855, 857 
(1944). In this case the widow in addition to her intestate share re-
ceived an allowance of $2000 out of an estate of approximately $8000. 
No children survived. The award was sustained over the protests of 
the husband's parents, who had urged that the award should be re-
duced because the widow was self-supporting. But cf. Helt v. Ward, 
128 Me. 191, 146 Atl. 439 (1929). In general, see Hussey v. Titcomb, 
127 Me. 423, 144 Atl. 218 (1929); Walker v. Walker, 83 Me. 17, 21 Atl. 
176 (1890); Dunn v. Kelley, 69 Me. 145 (1879); Kersey v. Bailey, 52 Me. 
198 (1863); Cooper, Petitioner, 194 Me. 260 (1841). 
46 Note, 53 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1940). 
47 "Decedent's family maintenance" legislation differs from the 
American family allowance legislation both in scope and in function. 
See ChaJ?. 21, infra. 
48 Atkmson, WILLS §35 (2nd ed. 1953); Bordwell, "The Statute Law 
of Wills," 14 IowA L. REv. I, 196 (1929). 
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object to the gift.49 But the protection is of a doubtful ef-
ficacy. These statutes may be evaded even more easily than 
the statutory share legislation. Evasive devices that have been 
sanctioned include inter vivos trusts 50 and testamentary gifts 
to an individual who has a moral obligation to give to the 
charity.51 On the other hand, these evasions are perhaps 
not so reprehensible as are evasions of the statutory share. 
The donee in the statutory share cases may or may not be a 
deserving person; but gifts to charities accomplish a worth-
while purpose: they help to alleviate want and ignorance, 
and they ease the tax burden. 
(d) Lapse. A mild degree of family protection is afforded 
by anti-lapse statutes, which may be found in most American 
jurisdictions. These statutes prevent a lapse when the legatee 
or devisee, being a child or other issue of the testator, prede-
ceases him and leaves issue. But the surviving spouse has 
been held to be excluded even under a statute which refers 
to "relatives"; and, in any event, the statutes do not come into 
play if a "contrary intent" is expressed in the will. 52 
(e) Revocation by Operation of Law. At common law a 
man's will was revoked "by operation of law" if followed by 
marriage and birth of a child. This rule is still in effect in 
many American jurisdictions; and there is a legislative tend-
ency to declare that marriage alone is sufficient to effect a re-
vocation. 53 The protection is more apparent than real. If 
the husband's goal is disinheritance, we have seen that the 
widow is vulnerable to her husband's inter vivos transfers; 
and, as for the children, they are not even adequately pro-
tected against testamentary transfers. 
49 See, e.g., Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944); also 
see Annot., 154 A.L.R. 677 (1945). 
5° Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. I, 15 N.E.2d 627 
(1938); see Annot., 118 A.L.R. 475 (1939); also see President of Bowdoin 
College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896). 
51 Bickley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101, 113 Atl. 68 (1921); see Leaphart, 
"The Use, as Distinct from the Trust, a Factor in the Law Today," 79 
U. PA. L. REv. 253 (1931); note, 16 Kv. L. REv. 333. 
52 Mechem, "Some Problems Arising under Anti-Lapse Statutes," 19 
IowA L. REv. I (1933). 
53 Atkinson, WILLS §85 and references cited therein. 
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(f) Statutory Protection to Chifdren.54 In most American 
jurisdictions a child may be completely disinherited if the 
will shows sufficient evidence of that intent. It is only when 
the disinheritance is unintentional that many states have 
legislation giving the child the share that he or she would take 
on intestacy. 55 This callous indifference of the American 
legislatures to the welfare of children contrasts sharply with 
the solicitude shown in the civil law "reserved portion," in 
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth decedent's family 
maintenance legislation, and in the ancient custom of Lon-
don. There would appear to be as much if not a greater 
need for protection of the minor children as of the surviving 
spouse. Possibly the omission is based on the supposition that 
the surviving spouse will provide for the children. Normally 
this assumption will be correct; but what if no parent sur-
vives? 56 To be sure, some few states permit the county, in 
civil suit, to recover for the child's support from the estate 
and distributees; and most jurisdictions provide some relief 
in small estates either by way of the infrequent legislation 
that awards the widow and minor children the entire estate 
under a certain sum, or by the common provision for exempt 
housing or chattels, and by allowances pending distribution.07 
Indirect restraints on disinheritance may also be found in the 
legislation invalidating testamentary gifts to charities; in the 
threat of an unnatural will being invalidated for lack of 
testamentary capacity or for undue influence; in the advice 
of the testator's attorney; and in the censure of the com-
munity. The absence of concerted pressure for remedial legis-
lation possibly suggests that most parents are solicitous of 
their children's welfare. But the fact remains: the American 
54 "Our law does not prevent a father from disinheriting his child: 
a circumstance which has been invaluable to our dramatists .... " 
A'Beckett, CoMIC BLACKSTONE 98 (2d ed. 1887). 
55 Atkinson, WILLS §36 and the literature therein cited. 
56 This situation was anticipated by the Florida legislature in 1949. 
See Fla. Stat. §733.20(l)(j) (1957) (court may award support up to age 18, 
limited by the amount of intestate share); note, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 232 
(1950). 
5 7 Note, 53 HARV. L. REv. 465, 470-71 (1940). 
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legislation, for one reason or another, permits disinheritance 
of minor children. 
5. SUMMARY 
It seems clear that the various controls that we have dis-
cussed cannot and do not purport to perform the same func-
tion as the statutory share. It seems clear also that the statu-
tory share itself is not doing a good job. In fact, the entire 
legislation in this field needs revision. The public policy is 
admirable: homesteads, family allowances, the statutory 
share, all evince the traditional American sentiment in favor 
of preservation of the home. But its benevolence is unco-
ordinated. It is doubtful if the American community is using 
the best legislative formulas. The older devices (dower, 
homestead) are of limited efficiency, being geared to real 
estate. The flexible protection (family allowance) is, in gen-
eral, temporary, inadequate; and the main protection (the 
statutory share) is so inflexible that it incites evasion. 
CHAPTER 3 
Basic Policy Considerations: The Cost 
of Restraints on Disinheritance 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
We have seen that effective ,restraints on disinheritance 
necessitate interference with both the power of testation and 
the power to make inter vivos transfers. How important to 
the community is the decedent's liberty of property transfer 
and the donee's security of title? 
From generation to generation there is a continual trans-
mission of wealth. Wealth commands most material things: 
power, position, security. And it is in the nature of man to 
transmit the tokens of wealth to the next generation. N owa-
days these tokens are manifold; and the choice of token is 
dictated by personal convenience, or by expectation of maxi-
mum yield. But human nature is unchanged. Wealth is still 
coveted, used for the same personal ends, and then handed 
to the next generation. Under our modern capitalistic econ-
omy it has long been considered that there should be un-
fettered transmission of all types of property, whether land, 
tangible personalty, or choses in action. This freedom ap-
plies to transfers for consideration and to gifts. Transfers for 
consideration, the life blood of trade, concern us here only 
indirectly. As a general rule a transfer for consideration im-
plies a fair exchange, so that in theory the widow is not in-
jured, property-wise. Widows, of course, can reach this type 
of transfer if they are entitled to inchoate dower; and there 
probably will always be litigation over the adequacy of the 
consideration that has been paid to take a transfer out of the 
gift category. But our chief concern is with the gratuitous 
transaction, whether by way of will, intestacy, gift causa 
mortis, or by one of the many forms of inter vivos transfer. 
37 
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The community derives a variety of benefits from liberty 
of property transfer.1 It expresses a basic democratic notion 
of freedom of individual action; otherwise there would be an 
unhappy citizenry. It stimulates exertion by donors; this pro-
vides an accumulation of investment capital which is neces-
sary for productive enterprise. Basically the motives of the 
donors coincide with the welfare of the community. The 
average husband desires the economic well-being of his wife 
and children. Likewise with charitable contributions: these 
gifts help the community as they reduce the amount of public 
funds that otherwise would be needed for a healthy body 
politic. 
In brief, freedom to transmit wealth is a desirable com-
munity policy. It contributes to the happiness of the citizen 
and helps to increase the total economic product of the state. 
But it is obvious that community welfare requires some re-
striction on liberty of property transmission. The claim of 
the surviving family is but one example.2 
2. FREEDOM OF TESTATION 3 
It is sometimes stated that man has a natural right to 
freedom of testation, and that it is an inevitable concomitant 
1 The literature on theories of inheritance may be found in Cahn, 
"Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 145, note 19 
(1936), and in McDougal and Haber, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 324 
(1948). 
2 Other claims include: 
(a) Taxation of testamentary and inter vivos transfers, os-
tensibly for revenue, but also as a means of promoting social 
harmony by prevention of undue concentration of wealth. 
See pp. 276-278 infra. 
(b) Protection of creditors' rights. 
(c) Control of property by the living, as a curb on the "dead 
hand" and to ensure that wealth remains in reasonable circu-
lation: rule against perpetuities, rules against suspension or 
prohibition of the power of alienation, rule against prolonged 
indestructibility of trusts. 
3 At the outset we must distinguish between testation and inheritance. 
Absolute freedom of testation (or, as it is sometimes called, of bequest) 
implies the unhampered discretion in a property owner to dispose of 
his property at death. Inheritance, though technically limited to in-
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of democracy, of capitalism, of western civilization. There 
is a subtle attractiveness to a generality of this sort. Seeming 
a plausible one, it may beguile the gullible. 
The fact is that over the centuries freedom of testation has 
been the exception rather than the rule. To begin with, in 
primitive times there was little transmission of wealth, either 
at death or inter vivos.4 Inheritance can be of no significance 
when all the wealth is owned by the group or clan or tribe. 
The group never dies. To be sure, the personal trinkets, 
utensils, or weapons belong in a sense to the individual, and 
in many cases go with him to the grave, but the herd and 
the land are owned by the group. The need and urge for 
transmission of wealth comes only with the emergence of 
private property and degrees of kinship. Regulation of trans-
fers at death becomes a social necessity. Rules must be pre-
scribed, if only to prevent family squabbles and internecine 
warfare; and assurance must be given to creditors that debts 
will be paid. But it is significant that the rules of intestacy 
precede the creation of the modern will. 5 The will is not a 
universal institution in the early legal systems; it emerges late 
in the history of the law of succession. 
Eventually we have stirrings of discontent with the rules 
of intestacy. Forerunners of the modern will appear: the 
testate succession, may be described generally as the receipt of a dece-
dent's property, either under intestate distribution or in accordance 
with the will. The continental legitim is an example of an absolute 
"right" of inheritance. Restrictions on inheritance are uncommon. 
Favored by Bentham, they were also used temporarily in the early 
communist regime in Russia. Holman, "The Law of Succession in 
Soviet Jurisprudence, A Survey," 21 IowAL. REv. 487 (1936). For the 
literature on proposals to limit the right of collateral succession, see 
Cavers, "Change in the American Family and the 'Laughing Heir,' " 20 
IowA L. REv. 203, 204, note 2 (1935). For restrictions on aliens in the 
United States, see Atkinson, WILLS 93-95 (2d ed. 1953). 
4 Noyes, THE INsTITUTION oF PROPERTY 550, 551 (1936); Beaglehole, 
"Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe,'' 20 IowA 
L. REv. 304 (1935); Cairns, "The Explanatory Process in the Field of 
Inheritance,'' 20 IowA L. REv. 266 (1935). 
5 For the literature on the history of the English law of intestacy, 
see Gross, "The Medieval Law of Intestacy," in 3 SELECT EssAYS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 723, 724, note 1 (1909). 
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post-obit gift, the early form of irrevocable donationis mortis 
causa, adoption, and the plebian mancipatory will. These 
devices are not sharply differentiated; in many cases they 
blend, the one into the other. And it is of interest that when 
the will does come, it is frequently the result of factors unre-
lated to succession to property. For example, superstition 
may play a part, among the lettered and the unlettered. The 
wishes of the dead may be respected as the command of a 
spirit that, if provoked, may do evil. It is generally assumed 
that the Roman will had a religious origin.6 And in sixteenth-
century England, when the will of realty was finally per-
mitted, the motivation, in part at least, was social: 7 feudal 
insistence on dominance of the male heir was no longer in 
keeping with contemporary family notions. 
Indeed, it is probable that through the centuries freedom 
of testation has been used more as an instrument of family 
protection than as a weapon of disinheritance. 8 Maine 
pointed out long ago that in Roman law "it would rather 
seem as if the Testamentary Power were chiefly valued for the 
assistance it gave in making provision for a Family, and in 
dividing the inheritance more evenly and fairly than the Law 
of Intestate Succession would have divided it." 9 We en-
counter the same phenomenon in modern continental law. 
e McMurray, "Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations 
Thereon," 14 ILL. L. REv. 96, 102 (1919). 
7 The preamble to the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, Chap. I, states 
that for lack of a will of realty Englishmen "cannot . . . conveniently 
keep and maintain their hospitalities and families, nor the good educa-
tion and bringing up of their lawful generations, which in this realm 
(laud be to God) is in all parts very great and abundant, . . ." and that 
personalty is insufficient "to discharge their debts, and after their degree 
set forth, to advance their children and posterity .... " 
Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, Chap. I. For the text of the statute, 
see Reppy and Tompkins, HISTORY AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE 
LAW OF WILLS 188-190 (1928). 
8 Cf. Brissaud, A HisToRY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAw 621-22 (1912), 
3 Cont. Legal History Series. 
9 Maine, ANCIENT LAw 233 (1912 ed.). On the significance of an in-
crease in the proportion of wills in any locality, see Powell and Looker, 
"Decedents' Estates, Illumination from Probate and Tax Records," 30 
CoLUM. L. REv. 919, 927 note 15 (a) (1930). 
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We are told that there are comparatively few wills in France, 
even in connection with the disposable portion. "The small 
proportion of Frenchmen who make wills," say Amos and 
Walton, "is perhaps an indication that the legal rules of suc-
cession are considered satisfactory." 10 And Unger 11 has re-
cently suggested three examples of this thesis in the history of 
English succession law: (a) the custom of London 12 and (b) 
the Statute of Wills in 1540 (both of which aimed at provid-
ing more family protection than was afforded under existing 
rules of intestacy); and (c) the new system of intestate succes-
sion established in the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 
which is stated to have been based on an investigation of a 
large number of English wills.13 
To conclude, there can be no quarrel with the partial re-
straint on testation that is found in the statutory share. But 
it should be more flexible, more sensitive to individual need. 
In some instances the designated fraction may be too small, as, 
e.g.) when the particular widow needs all of the estate. In 
other instances the fraction may be far too liberal. 
3. FREEDOM TO MAKE (AND TO RETAIN) INTER VIVOS GIFTS 
Restraints on a husband's power to make gratuitous inter 
vivos transfers necessarily inconvenience the husband him-
self, the donee, and any transferee 14 from the donee. As far 
as the community is concerned, the inconvenience to the hus-
band is of no moment if the widow's claim is meritorious. 
But regardless of the merits of the widow's claim the incon-
venience to the donee may be a serious matter, both to the 
donee and to society. True, the donee is a volunteer; but a 
volunteer may in some circumstances suffer a real hardship 
10 Amos and Walton, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAw 338 (1935). 
11 Unger, "The Inheritance Act and the Family," 6 Mon. L. REv. 215 
(1943). 
12 See infra, Chap. 5. 
1s Unger, supra note 11, at 222. 
14 In §l(e) of the suggested model statute, Chap. 22 infra, "transferee" 
includes the original transferee (donee) and "any immediate or remote" 
taker therefrom who does not pay value. 
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if the donated property is taken away from him. And the 
mere existence of the widow's potential claim entails certain 
consequences that are harmful to the community. It casts an 
unsettling cloud on the subject-matter of the gift- hamper-
ing its productive use, discouraging improvements, and re-
stricting its marketabilityY When the donee finds a buyer, 
the buyer may have his worries. Did he pay "value," for 
instance; otherwise he is not a purchaser for value without 
notice. 
The uncertainty affects each of the three parties. The 
husband wants to plan his estate with assurance that his 
wishes will be carried out; and the donee and his transferee 
are entitled to a reasonable security of title. The uncertainty 
may not cause a "flight of capital" 16 into another jurisdiction 
that has a more predictable if not a more equitable rule; 
neither can we say that the legal profession will suffer; but 
one thing seems clear - tension between the widow and 
the transferees is all but inevitable. Nor can the uncertainty 
be eliminated merely by clarification of the law. No one can 
predict with complete assurance that any particular wife will 
survive her husband, undivorced. 
Being human, any donee eventually tends to depend upon 
the economic or other advantages occasioned by the gift. The 
greater the dependence, the greater the injury if he is sud-
denly bereft of his benefits. And, as a general rule, we may 
also state that the larger the time-lapse between the date of 
the transfer and the date of the husband's death, the greater 
the infringement on the donee's legitimate "reliance interest" 
when he is called upon to return the subject matter to the 
widow. The "reliance interest" is also stronger where the 
donee had some moral or other claim on the husband's 
bounty. 
The strength or degree of the donee's "reliance interest" 
will also depend on the type of transfer employed by the 
15 Cf. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.3 (1952). 
1a Seep. 87, infra. 
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decedent. Generally speaking, a "reliance interest" based on 
mere lapse of time would be negligible when the property 
was received only at the husband's death, as, for example, in a 
gift causa mortis) or by way of life insurance. Inter vivos gifts 
made sometime before death are in a different category. 
Similarly, the donee who has been receiving the income from 
the property during the decedent's lifetime is more likely to 
be hurt than a donee whose interest commenced only at the 
decedent's death. And the "reliance interest" will normally 
be higher with respect to an irrevocable trust than with re-
spect to a revocable trust. 
To recapitulate, restraints on a husband's inter vivos trans-
fers adversely affect the community's interest in the donee's 
security of title. The harm to the particular donee depends 
on the extent of his "reliance interest." This interest varies 
with the donee. It is affected by a number of factors, includ-
ing lapse of time and the type of transfer. 
CHAPTER 4 
Basic Policy Considerations: Conclusion 
The discussion in the preceding chapters has indicated that 
societal concern for the surviving family justifies complete 
restraint, if necessary, on freedom of testation, and some re-
straint on freedom of inter vivos alienation. We have seen also 
that restraints on inter vivos transfers involve substantial in-
convenience to the community. This means that restraints on 
inter vivos transfers should be tolerated only when the surviv-
ing family is in need and its claim is meritorious 1 and only 
after due regard has been paid to the reliance interest of the 
donee and his transferee. In other words, there must be a 
compromise of these conflicting interests, engineered by flexi-
ble judicial controls. I believe that the compromise can best 
be made by legislation that embodies three related principles, 
set out here in broad outline.2 
First, the restraint on freedom of testation should be re-
stricted to alleviation of demonstrated need during widow-
hood and during the minority or period of dependence of 
children. The equity courts should have discretion to de-
termine the amount necessary for reasonable support 3 of 
each applicant, and to fix the mode of payment. As soon 
as this principle is given legislative sanction part of the eva-
sion problem will disappear. No longer will a husband be 
forced to make inter vivos transfers in order to prevent an 
unworthy widow from taking an automatic statutory share. 
Moreover, reasonable advancements to children will be im-
1 A widow, for example, may be in need but nevertheless be "un-
worthy"; see infra, Chap. 21, text at note 12. 
2 Certain points, marked by footnotes, are explained in detail in 
succeeding chapters in conjunction with the case study. The principles 
under discussion are given formal expression in the suggested model 
statute, infra, Chap. 22. 
3 Chap. 21, passim. 
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mune from attack, regardless of the type of inter vivos trans-
fer that was involved. Evasion litigation will be restricted to 
cases where the equities are in doubt, or clearly in the peti-
tioner's favor. 
Second, the courts should be given discretion to require 
contribution from any inter vivos transferee, and to appor-
tion the amounts payable by the several transferees. If pro-
tection against evasion is to be effective, all types of inter 
vivos "transfer" must be affected.4 No given type of transfer 
should be made immune by statute merely because it is a type 
of transfer that normally induces a strong reliance interest. 
Inter vivos gifts and irrevocable inter vivos trusts, for ex-
ample, must be affected by the statute; otherwise a husband 
could transmit an unreasonably large portion of his assets by 
arrangements of this sort. 
Third, care must be taken to safeguard the community in-
terest in security of title, as well as the reliance interest of the 
individual donee. Complete protection is of course impos-
sible, but the following provisions would remove much of 
the uncertainty: 
(a) No donee should be liable for contribution unless his 
"gift" was unreasonably large,S under the circumstances pre-
vailing at the time of the transfer. The most important cir-
cumstances would, of course, be the relative size of the gift 
and the purpose of the gift. Under this test, for example, an 
advancement to support a child of a prior marriage would 
in most instances be immune from attack. The petitioner 
should have the burden of proving that the transfer was un-
reasonably large. 
(b) The petitioner should be barred from a claim for 
contribution from a particular donee if she signed a waiver 6 
in his favor, with or without compensation. 
4 But cf. Simes, PuBLic PoLicY AND THE DEAD HAND 30 (1955). See 
Chaps. 12-16, infra, for the application of this principle to the indi-
vidual dispositive devices. 
5 See Chaps. 10-11, infra, passim; also see Chap. 22, infra, passim. 
6 See the suggested model statute, Chap. 22, §l7(b), infra. 
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(c) Claims for contribution from a donee should be subject 
to cut-off provisions 7 that bear some relation to the "reliance 
interest." For example, a revocable trust made more than 
three years before the decedent's death should entail liability 
for contribution, whereas suits with respect to an inter vivos 
gift made before that time probably should not be permitted. 
For convenience in expression I shall refer to these general 
principles as the "maintenance and contribution" formula. 
I believe that this formula expresses the ideal reconciliation 
of adequate family protection with the "reliance interest" 
of the donee. Accordingly, it will be used in Part Three as 
the criterion for judging the work of the American courts 
in the evasion cases. The need for corrective legislation is 
less urgent if the courts, despite the lack of legislative direc-
tive, are in substance espousing the principles implicit in our 
formula. 
7 ld. §8. 
PART II 
SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
CHAPTER 5 
The Custom Of London 
Before looking at the case-law, we must delve into the past. 
Some attention must be given to two particular instances 
of restraint on a husband's inter vivos transfers. I refer to 
the custom of London and to inchoate dower. A knowledge 
of both institutions is needed if we are to grasp all the impli-
cations of the case-law. Moreover, it should help to disabuse 
us of any notion that the statutory share is sacrosanct. Rever-
ence for the home and the family naturally inspires affection 
for the legal institutions that protect the family. We should 
guard against these becoming enshrined in their own right. 
Changes in this field cannot and should not be made over-
night; but history reveals that these protective institutions 
may in time lose touch with prevailing realities. 
I. NATURE oF THE CusToM 
The early English will,! which dealt only with personalty, 
was subservient to the claims of the family. I speak of the 
latter half of the 12th century, the time of Glanville, which 
for the layman may roughly be identified with the days of 
chivalry, of Ivanhoe, Robin Hood, Richard the Lion-Hearted, 
and the Third Crusade. By that period the surviving wife 
and children had protection which bears a striking re-
semblance to the modern American statutory share. Some-
1 On pre-conquest institutions, we grope for knowledge. Toward the 
end of the Anglo-Saxon period a union of the post obit gift (gift after 
death) and the verba novissima (death-bed statement) produced an em· 
bryonic "testament" of personalty, called the cwide (written statement). 
Pollock and Maitland doubt its similarity to the modern will; see 2 
Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 319-21 (2nd ed. 1905). 
Page is not so dubious; see I Page, WILLS 23-33 (3rd ed. 1941). The 
pattern is less discernible in restrictions on testation; see Pollock and 
Maitland, op. cit. supra at 394. 
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times known as the "legitim," it is commonly referred to to-
day as the custom of London, having survived in that city 
longer than elsewhere. Under the custom of London a testa-
tor, leaving a surviving wife and children/ could not dispose 
of more than one third of his personal property. One third 
was the "wife's part," one third the "child's part" ("bairn's 
part" in Scotland), and the other third the "dead's part." 3 
One half could be disposed of if the wife was the sole sur-
vivor; likewise if the children alone survived. This protec-
tion to the widow was thoroughly entrenched. At the begin-
ning of the next century it received incidental recognition in 
the Great Charter at Runnymede.4 There is even some 
authority to the effect that if her husband consented the 
widow could dispose of her interest by will.5 
Enforcement originally was by means of- the common-law 
writ de rationabili parte bonorum. In the thirteenth cen-
tury, however, the church obtained jurisdiction over things 
testamentary, an assignment that was to last for some six 
hundred years until its jurisdiction in civil matters was re-
moved in 1856. For all practical purposes the everyday juris-
diction over the "reasonable parts" soon went to the ordinary; 
the common-law writ became a thing of only occasional use.6 
Suit would be brought in the church courts against the 
executor, the man with the "goods." 
Whence came this custom? 7 It is not clear. We are told 
2 Mary Bateson, editor of 21 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY: 
BoRoUGH CusToMs, states (introd. xcvi-ii) that it was not until the time 
of Bracton that the children received a third; until then the heir (eldest 
son) took all of the third. She writes of borough customs, but it is of 
course possible that the "law of the land" in those early times was 
comprised substantially of borough customs and like imitations thereof. 
3 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 348. 
4 MAGNA CARTA Chap. 26 (1215), cited in 2 Pollock and Maitland, 
op. cit. supra note I, at 350. But the common law courts did not always 
feel that the reference in Magna Carta amounted to an express sanc-
tion of the custom, id., at 355. 
5 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 550 (6th ed. 1934). 
6 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note I, at 352. 
7 The child's part was subject to advancements, at least those made 
on the marriage of the child. Jenks v. Holford, I Vern. 61, 2I Eng. 
Rep. I5I (Ch. I682). It could also be barred, if the child was of age, for 
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that it probably has no known Anglo-Saxon or Norman 
antecedents.8 From here on in we have supposition. It is 
easy to generalize on the origin of legal institutions and doc-
trines; but the tracing process too often proceeds from doubt-
ful premises to the attractive conclusion. Whether the custom 
originated solely or in part in local custom, in Roman Law, 9 
in ancient family rights/0 in a notion of community of goods 
between husband and wife,11 or from other sources, we cannot 
be sure. We can only speculate. The significant thing is that 
valuable consideration. Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 272, 22 Eng. 
Rep. 230 (Ch. 1733). The custom did not apply to grandchildren. Fowke 
v. Hunt, 1 Vern. 397, 21 Eng. Rep. 953 (Ch. 1686); Northey v. Strange, 
I.P. Wms. 341, 24 Eng. Rep. 416 (Ch. 1716). A jointure of land would, 
if so stated, have the effect of barring the widow's customary share, as 
well as dower. This was not regarded as "breaking into the custom; for 
the freeman might at any time during his life, even in his last sickness, 
have invested his personal estate in the purchase of land, which would 
defeat the custom and stand good [citing Frederick v. Frederick, 
1 P. Wms. 711 (Ch. 1721)1 though the freeman should at the same time 
have said, that he did this on purpose to defeat the custom. And as this 
(if the purchase was real) would have held good to bar the custom, surely 
the case could not be worse, where such agreement for making the pur-
chase was for a valuable consideration, and part of the marriage articles." 
Parker, L. C., in Babington v. Greenwood, 1 P. Wms. 530, 532-3, 24 Eng. 
Rep. 503 (Ch. 1718); also see Hancock v. Hancock, 2 Vern. 665, 23 Eng. 
Rep. 1033 (Ch. 1710). 
A premarital settlement of personalty, without mentioning the cus-
tom, was held to be in bar of the custom in Lewin v. Lewin, 3 P. Wms. 
15 {Ch. 1727); regarding land, see Hancock v. Hancock, supra. The share 
under the custom was subject to the testator's debts. Rider v. Wagner, 
2 P. Wms. 328, 335 (Ch. 1725). 
"If a Freeman of London dies without issue, his wife is intitled by 
the custom of the moiety of her Husband's personal Estate in value, 
but not in Specie." Kitson v. Robins, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 555, 22 Eng. Rep. 
466-67 (1709). 
8 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 349. But see Bate-
son, op. cit. supra note 2, at xcvi-ii: "That the division in thirds was 
known to the Normans cannot be doubted; it is established on evidence 
more complete than that which vouches for its existence among the 
Anglo-Saxons; the probability, however, is that it was a custom common 
to both races." Miss Bateson was a disciple of Maitland's, and her 
statement was made in 1906, a year after publication of Pollock and 
Maitland's HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. 
9 There appears to be no definite evidence. In general, on the 
Roman institutions, see pp. 279-281, infra. 
10 But cf. notes 2, 8, supra. 
11 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note I, at 349. But we are 
told later in the same volume that English law at an early date refused 
to adopt the custom of community. Id. at 402. 
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it existed, and on a national scale. It continued on a country-
wide basis until early in the fourteenth century 12 and in a 
substantial part of the country until the close of the seven· 
teenth centuryY 
2. REASONS FOR 0BSOLESENCE 
Why did the custom linger longer in some parts of the 
country, and why in the end did it fade away? The answer 
to the first question probably lies in the variations in prac-
tice in the different ecclesiastical courts.14 But the reasons 
for the disappearance of the custom are largely a matter of 
conjecture.15 Our sketchy knowledge of the custom is re-
12 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 552 (6th ed. 1934). AI· 
though its universal application ended in the fourteenth century, it 
would appear that the tripartite arrangement continued as a plan of 
intestate succession for some time thereafter. 
1a It continued in the northern province of York until abolished in 
4, 5 Wm. & Mary, Chap. 2 (1692); see also 3 Anne, Chap. 5 (1703); in 
Wales until 1696 (7, 8 Wm. 3, Chap. 38) and in London in 1734 (11 
Geo. I, Chap. 18). Joseph Gold, in "Freedom of Testation, the In-
heritance (Family Provision) Bill," 1 Mon. L. REv. 296, 298 (1938), says 
that the custom apparently survived in Chester until 1925. But cf. 
Burn, op. cit. infra, note 15, at 584, who states that the custom of York 
did not extend to Chester. And see the remarks of the Master of the 
Rolls in Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. Jr. 332, 337-38, 30 Eng. Rep. 
1038, 1041 (1797), referring to the case of a testator who apparently had 
thought that his wife was entitled to a forced share of his personalty: 
"There may be some reason for it; for he lived in the county of 
Cheshire, which is part of the province of York; and a vulgar error 
prevailed, that the custom of York goes through the whole province. 
The Legislature [i.e., Act of 1692] themselves fell into it by reserving to 
the citizens of York and Chester the customs of those cities; the latter 
of which has no custom. When by another act [Act of 1703] they re-
pealed that as to the city of York, they left Chester just as it was by 
the first act. That custom of York, never attached upon any part of 
the province, that was not so at the time of Henry VIII; and Chester 
was annexed since that period." Also see 1 Bright, HusBAND AND WIFE 
302 (1850). 
14 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 554-56. 
15 We can sympathize with Burn's tongue-clucking over an early text 
WTiter's discussion of the statute that ended the custom in London: 
"But with regard to the city of London, by some fatality, he hath re-
cited the statute-so imperfectly, that if he did understand it himself, it 
is impossible the reader should understand it from his manner of ex-
pressing it; but it is plain he did not understand it. . . ." 4 Burn, 
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 566 (9th ed. 1842). 
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fleeted in the variety of these conjectures. Pollock and Mait-
land 16 refer to the indifference of both spiritual and temporal 
courts, and to the fact that the church would gain legacies 
by restoring freedom of testationY Holdsworth 18 feels that 
the common-law lawyers were concerned with the logical in-
consistency between giving the husband title to the wife's per-
sonalty and restricting the right of testation; and that these 
views would naturally be of more influence in the southern 
province. Bum 19 finds the explanation in the improved posi-
tion of the younger children. Rheinstein speculates on the 
inconvenient delays in settlement of estates that would be 
involved in continuing a forced share for children: in an age 
of colonial expansion and slow communications, this might 
tie up administration for some years.20 Possibly the longest 
view is that taken by Unger, who traces the decline of the 
custom to the "improved system of intestate succession" 21 
available to that part of the country which did not follow the 
custom. The implications of Unger's thesis have been dealt 
with earlier. 22 
Probably each of these circumstances was a contributing 
factor. It would appear that its obsolescence was inevitable. 
Restrictions on wills of personalty were becoming unpopular. 
In particular, the City of London was finding that many men 
of substance, living and doing business in the City, were re-
fusing "to become freemen of the same, by reason of an 
ancient custom with the said city, restraining the citizens and 
freemen of the same from disposing of their personal estates 
by their last wills and testaments." 23 And the spirit of the . · 
16 Op. cit. supra note I, at 355. 
17 And see Dainow, "Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in Eng-
land," 25 CoRNELL L. Q. 337, 342-44 (1940). 
18 Op. cit. supra note 5, at 554-56. 
1 9 Op. cit. supra note 15, at 564-66. 
20 Rheinstein, CASES ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES 59-60 (2d ed. 1955). 
21 Unger, "The Inheritance Act and the Family," 6 MoDERN L. REv. 
215, 220-22 (1943). 
22 Discussed, supra p. 41. 
23 Recited in 11 Geo. I, c. 18 §1(1724). 
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time was intolerant of curbs on the individual.Z4 England 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was on the march, 
economically and politically. The beheading of Charles I was 
but a startling symbol of the new liberty in affairs, in ideas. 
When "England set the world ablaze," the rise of empire not 
only necessitated but also stimulated a free field for the self-
reliant. 
3. CASE LAW 
The cases under the custom of London portray a deter-
mined judicial enforcement of the basic protective policy. 
The plaintiff succeeded in practically all reported cases. The 
grounds for attack were more extensive than under the 
modern statutory share cases. The popular test merely re-
quired the plaintiff to prove that the transferor "had not en-
tirely dismist [sic] himself" 25 of the property in his lifetime. 
Thus in Smith v. Fellows 26 a reservation of the rents and 
profits in a voluntary deed of a leasehold impelled the court 
to declare that the property "still continued in . . . the 
husband, and of consequence is subject to the custom." 27 
We shall see later that such a transfer will usually be upheld, 
as against the widow's claim, under the prevailing American 
24 Cahn, "Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 140 
(1936). Cahn expresses disbelief of the theory that the "continual in-
cursions of the Scots" accounted for the long survival of the custom in 
the province of York. For a' that an' a' that, at least one other legal 
institution may be laid to the blue bonnets that came over the border: 
" ... in the marches of Scotland some hold of the King by cornage, 
that is to say, to winde a horne, to give men of the countrie warning, 
when they heare that the Scots or other enamies are come or will enter 
into England." I Co. Lit.• 106 b. See also Pusey v. Pusey, I Vern. 273, 
23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684). 
25 Turner v. Jennings, 2 Vern. 612, 23 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1708). 
26 Smith v. Fellows, 2 Atk. 62, 26 Eng. Rep. 435 (1740). 
27 Id. at 63; accord, Hall v. Hall, 2 Vern. 277, 23 Eng. Rep. 779 
(1692), where the court stated that if "[the husband] has it in his power, 
as by the keeping of the deed . . . or if he retains the possession of 
the goods, or any part of them, this will be a fraud upon the custom." 
Strong dicta to the same effect may be found in Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, 
2 Ves. Sen. 591, 28 Eng. Rep. 377 (1755); also see Randall v. Willis, 
5 Ves. Jr. 262, 276, 31 Eng. Rep. 577, 586 (1800) (marriage settlement 
case). 
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case-law.28 Factors that help the plaintiff under the modern 
statutory share cases a fortiori received a like or stronger 
emphasis in the cases under the custom. Thus proximity to 
death 29 and the proportion of the total holdings that were 
transferred inter vivos 30 are important, though perhaps not 
decisive,31 criteria. One cryptic case under the custom, City v. 
City/2 purports to say that a voluntary assignment, neither 
possession nor "interest" being retained, would be vulnerable 
to the wife's claim, and has been cited for this startling propo-
sition, without comment, by some American authorities.33 
2s Infra, pp. 184-186. American cases that discuss the custom of Lon-
don, directly or inferentially, include the following: Ford v. Ford, 4 
Ala. 142 (1842); Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 (1860), 32 Mo. 464 
(1862); Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 392 (1853); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 
16 Mo. 242 (1852); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891); 
McCammon v. Summons, 2 Disn. 596 (Ohio 1859); Norris v. Barbour 
188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 
594 (1850); Lightfoot v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813); cf. Crain 
v. Crain, 17 Tex. 80 (1856) (forced share of children). 
29 In Turner v. Jennings, 2 Vern. 612, 23 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1708) the 
court said that a husband's transfer in trust, retaining life estate in 
"the greatest part of his personal estate . . . when he was languishing, 
and but a little before his death, . . . ought to be looked upon as a 
donatio causa mortis [and] that either the custom must be entirely given 
up, or this deed must be looked upon, as made in fraud of the custom 
... "; also see Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, 2 Ves. Sen. 591, 594-95, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 377, 381 (1755) ("Here was a man aged seventy-two, had a dan-
gerous and a flattering distemper [apparently the gout], had a fit of it 
then," and executed "a will and a deed both at the same time (as it 
seems), and dies in two days. This is a case as to the custom of a very 
suspicion~, nature ... " and " ... an act done in illusion of the cus-
tom .... ). 
80 Turner v. Jennings, supra note 29. 
31 Reservation of some "interest" in the property appears to be the 
basic test. No cases were found involving a large outright transfer (no 
"interest" being retained) made shortly before death; but the indica-
tions are that such a transfer would not prevail against the custom. 
See Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, supra note 29, at 595. 
32 City v. City, 2 Lev. 130, 83 Eng. Rep. 483 (K.B. 1675). In Ambrose 
v. Ambrose, I P. Wms. 321, 24 Eng. Rep. 407 (1716), it was held that 
when H bought land in name of X, X giving declaration of trust after 
H's death, this defeated the custom of London. 
88 E.g., Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 392, 31 Atl. 14, 15 (1891); 
see Cahn, "Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 153, 
note 47 (1936). But see Stone v. Stone, IS Mo. 389, 393 (1853) (citing 
Fonblanque); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 (1850); Lightfoot 
v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813). 
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But it is doubtful if the case was ever considered authoritative 
in England. The other cases under the custom stress reserva-
tion of possession or interest, 34 or the testamentary 35 aspect of 
the transfer. Some of the cases contain dicta inferentially re-
pudiating 36 the doctrine in question; and in two cases doubt 
is expressed as to the accuracy of the reporter of the City 
case.37 
Are the precedents under the custom of any value in pon-
dering our latter-day problems, or are they outmoded, to be 
classed with frankalmoign, deodand, and the high-button 
shoe? The question merits careful thought, as the determined 
judicial support 38 of the basic protective policy of the custom 
is in sharp contrast to the legalistic attitude taken by many 
of the modern decisions on evasions of the statutory share. 
The early American courts paid close attention to the case-
law under the custom, but there was a division of opinion as 
to the relevance of that case-law. 39 Some courts distinguished 
34 Turner v. Jennings, 2 Vern. 612, 23 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1708) (court 
also stresses proportion of estate transferred and proximity to death); 
Smith v. Fellows, 2 Atk. 62, 26 Eng. Rep. 435 (1740); also see Randall v. 
Willis, 5 Ves. Jr. 262, 276, 31 Eng. Rep. 577, 585-86 (1800). 
35 Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, 2 Ves. Sen. 591, 28 Eng. Rep. 377 (1755); 
Edmundson v. Cox, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 275, 22 Eng. Rep. 233 (1716); 
Coomes v. Elling, 3 Atk. 676, 26 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1747). See also Faire-
beard v. Bowers, 2 Vern. 201, 23 Eng. Rep. 731 (1690) (confession of 
judgment payable three months after death). 
36 Hall v. Hall, 2 Vern. 277, 23 Eng. Rep. 779 (1692); Coomes v. 
Elling, supra note 35; Turner v. Jennings, supra note 34; see the 
remarks of Macdonald C.B., in Jones v. Martin, 3 Anst. 882, 889-90, 
145 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1072 (1796) (marriage covenant). 
37 Jones v. Martin, 3 Anst. 888, 890, 145 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1072 (1796) 
("The note in 2 Levins is too loose to be much relied on .... ") Cf. 
Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, supra, note 35, at 595: "Levinz, though a good 
lawyer, was sometimes a very careless reporter." The City case was re-
ferred to, but not followed, in Smith v. Fellows, supra note 34. 
38 E.g., Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, supra note 35, at 592. "I must not 
make a decree to defeat that custom." But it is possible, ironically, that 
under the custom, as well as nowadays, the key to successful evasion lay 
in careful draftsmanship: "Indeed if the gift to the wife had been made 
by the husband to trustees, for the separate use of the wife in possession, 
this might have been of a different consideration, and I should be in-
clined to think such gift was good .... " Coomes v. Elling, 3 Atk. 676, 
679-80, 26 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1747). 
39 Compare Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813), 
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it on the dubious reasoning that under the custom the widow 
and children took as creditors.40 To be sure, there are some 
references to the widow and children being in a preferred 
position as "creditors." 41 For that matter, the widow is simi-
larly designated under some of the American cases.42 But dis-
satisfaction may be found even in the older English cases with 
the "creditor" analogy; 43 and it seems safe to say that the 
wife and children took their customary shares only after debts 
had been paid.44 Another more plausible theory stressed the 
more exacting interpretation of the Wills Act to be found in 
the cases under the custom.45 The "testamentary" label 
would strike down many types of inter vivos transfer in the 
days of the custom. Whether the courts would be motivated 
more by concern for the formalities of the Wills Act than for 
the plight of the family is a moot point. 
and Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 (1850) with Walker v. 
Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891). 
40 E.g., see the various opinions in Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. Colgin, supra 
note 39, at 62, 74-76, 81; but cf. the remarks of Brooke, J. at 67. 
41 Cf. Fairebeard v. Bowers, 2 Vern. 201, 202, 23 Eng. Rep. 731, 732 
(1860). 
42 See infra, Chap. 17. 
43 "[I]n some cases the child of a freeman is said to be a creditor: 
but that is only an analogous expression." Tomkyns v. Ladbrooke, 2 
Ves. Sr. 591, 595, 28 Eng. Rep. 377, 379 (1755). 
44 Read v. Duck, Prec. Chan. 409, 24 Eng. Rep. 183 (1715). 
45 Cf. the comment in Jones v. Martin, 3 Anst. 888, 890, 145 Eng. 
Rep. 1070, 1072 (1796), that the custom of London cases "will all be 
found upon examination to have proceeded on the ground that the 
bequests were in their nature testamentary, not absolute and irre-
vocable." For an enlightened approach to the Wills Act today, see 
Gulliver and Tilson, "Classification of Gratuitous Transfers," 51 YALE 
L. J. 1 (1941). On the "testamentary" factor in the American cases, 
see Chap. 7:1. 
Some of the cases under the custom involve successful attempts by 
some of the children to set aside an inter vivos transfer by the father 
to another child, or to grandchildren, e.g., the Tomkyns and Turner 
cases. These cases belong to the "fraud" category, however, and ap-
parently were not considered to be an informal application of the doc-
trine of advancements, or, more appropriately, satisfaction. An "ad-
vancement," under the custom, usually operated to bar any participation 
in the estate. Many of the "advancement" cases may be found in 2 
Eq. Ca. Abr. 263-74, 22 Eng. Rep. 222-32. And see Elbert, "Advance-
ments: 1," 51 MICH. L. REv. 665, 671-73 (1953); Fifoot, HISTORY AND 
SouRcEs OF THE CoMMON LAw, ToRT AND CoNTRACT 30 (1949). 
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And the cases under the custom may be distinguished on 
another count. They were decided under an older economy, 
when interference with inter vivos property transmission 
would not have the drastic consequences that it has today. 
The custom of London endured for some six hundred years -
roughly from 1100 to 1700. Probably not many gratuitous 
inter vivos transfers of personalty were made in the early and 
middle stages of that period. The reported cases that concern 
evasions all occur within the last century of the custom -
most of them in the early eighteenth century. Even under 
the emergent "market pattern" 46 of the latter period the total 
volume of gratuitous alienations would not approach the 
comparative turnover today. The community would suffer 
no particular inconvenience from restrictions on a decedent's 
relatively infrequent gratuitous inter vivos transfers; and it 
would be an easy and natural consequence to subordinate 
the privilege of inter vivos alienation to the claims of the 
family. 
In brief, the harsh inflexible doctrines of the case-law un-
der the custom are ill-suited to modern conditions. As we 
saw in Part I, supra, the same may be said about either the 
custom of London itself or its modern equivalent, the Ameri-
can statutory share. 
46 Cf. Polanyi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION, 56-57 (1944). 
CHAPTER 6 
Inchoate Dower 1 
1. IN ENGLAND 
In the early days of the common law women were disad-
vantaged. "In the camp, at the council board, on the bench, 
in the jury box there is no place for them," say Pollock and 
Maitland.2 The prevailing economy hinged on male tenure 
as a source of feudal dues and fighting men. The dominance 
of the husband ensured the dependence of the wife. As to 
realty, primogeniture made it unlikely that she would own 
any land in her own right. Even if she did, the husband's 
estate during coverture 3 entitled him to the rents and profits 
of all the wife's present freehold estates. The husband could 
sell his interest, and it could be taken by his creditors. She 
was not an heir, as far as the husband's realty was concerned. 
And even under the custom of London 4 she was entitled 
only to one third of what few chattels the husband owned. 
1 For an account of the origin and development of common law 
dower, see Haskins, "The Development of Common Law Dower," 62 
HARV. L. REv. 42 (1948); also see Plucknett, A CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE 
CoMMON LAw 507-8 (1936); Rabinowitz, "The Origin of the Common 
Law Warranty of Real Property and of the Inchoate Rights of Dower," 
30 CoRNELL L. REv. 77 (1945); Sayre, "Husband and Wife as Statutory 
Heirs," 42 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1929). For an account of dowry, dower, 
and morgive (morning-gift) in early German law, see Huebner, A His-
TORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW, 624-26 (1918), 4 Continental Legal 
History Series. A remnant of the Germanic "morning gift" is found in 
the ancient French requirement that the marriage be consummated be-
fore the wife obtains her dower. This apparently was abandoned by 
the sixteenth century, although one custom required that the wife 
should put her foot into the bed. Brissaud, A HISTORY OF FRENCH 
PRIVATE LAw 773, note 5 (1912), 3 Continental Legal History Series. 
2 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 485 (2nd ed. 1905). 
3 This estate terminated on the birth of a child born alive capable of 
inheriting, in which event the husband acquired an estate by the 
curtesy initiate; 2 Bl. Comm. • 126. On the wife's death this would be-
come consummate, a life tenancy. 
4 Discussed, supra, Chap. 5. 
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The husband, as such, was entitled to all her chattels upon 
marriage: he was the owner in law and in fact. 5 And he ob-
tained her chases in action if he reduced them to possession. 
But this very exclusion of the woman meant that the widow 
and, because of primogeniture, also the younger children 
would, on the husband's death, be destitute. And thus, para-
doxically, dower flourished in the face of feudalism. The 
community concern for the economic protection and social 
standing 6 of the surviving family was strong enough to 
counterbalance other powerful factors, including: (a) the 
primary function of land in supplying troops for armies; (b) 
the interest of the heir; (c) the interest of the lord in wardship 
of land where the heir was an infant; and (d) the ancient 
principle that succession to land depended on blood relation-
ship. 
The dower protection, as it finally evolved, was a life in-
terest in one third of the lands 7 of which the husband had 
been seised, in fee or in tail, at any time during the marriage.8 
5 The wife could keep her paraphernalia (personal clothing and 
adornments), but only if the husband had not previously alienated 
them. 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 527 (5th ed. 1942). · 
6 Sometimes the "dowager" was allocated a "dower house," a modest 
home on the estate, where she would live the rest of her days. Haskins, 
supra note I, at 47. 
7 If the husband had no land, it apparently was possible to bar dower 
in any after-acquired realty by endowing the wife in his chattels ad 
ostium ecclesiae (at the church door), 2 Bl. Comm.• 132; Digby, HISTORY 
OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 129 (5th ed. 1897). Dower in chattels 
was in disuse by the reign of Henry IV (1399-1423), a victim of the 
thirteenth century risorgimento in trade. 3 Holdsworth, op. cit., at 190. 
A purely sentimental touch still lingers in the words of the marriage 
service: "With all my worldly goods I thee endow." 
For an explanation of the legislative "bloomer" that inferentially 
established inchoate dower in personalty in Florida, see "Final Report 
of the Probate Committee," 7 FLA. S. B. A. JouR. 7 (1933). The error 
was corrected by subsequent amendment. 
8 For the technical incidents of common law dower, see 2 PoLLOCK 
and MAITLAND 420-26; 3 Holdsworth, op. cit., 189-97; I American Law 
of Property §§5.1-5.49 (1952); Note, "Inchoate Dower Today," 96 
U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1948). The wife's interest was until the husband's 
death a protected expectancy known as "inchoate dower"; and on his 
death it was known as "consummate" dower, although she did not get 
her estate in the land until it was formally assigned. 
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The strength of the widow's interest lay in its immunity to 
the husband's inter vivos transfers, even where the transferee 
had taken for value without notice. It could not be defeated 
by devise, and it could not be reached by the husband's 
creditors. 
It was the feature of interference with inter vivos transfers 
that constituted the early strength of inchoate dower; and 
it was the same feature that led to its ultimate defeat. With 
the economic awakening of the thirteenth century dower 
came gradually into conflict with the burgeoning policy of 
freedom of property alienation. The history of the English 
land law became a tale of ceaseless attrition on direct and 
even indirect restraints on alienation. The persistent effect 
of this policy, in conjunction with the diminishing impor-
tance of land, was eventually to cause dower to fall into 
desuetude.9 Until the advent of decedents' family mainte-
nance legislation, 10 two decades ago, it could be said that 
"The English law leaves everything to the unfettered discre-
tion of the testator, on the assumption that, though in some 
instances, caprice, or passion, or the power of new ties, or 
artful contrivance, or sinister influence, may lead to the 
neglect of claims that ought to be attended to, yet, the in-
stincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind may 
be safely trusted to secure, on the whole a better disposition 
9 The utility of dower was seriously affected by the prevalence of 
conveyances to the use of the husband in the 15th and 16th centuries. 
Equity refused to declare dower in the use. After the Statute of Uses, 
27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535), it was possible to avoid dower by both legal and 
equitable jointures. 2 Bl. Comm.• 136. For an account of these and 
other devices used to defeat dower see 3 Holdsworth, op. cit., 195-97; 2 
Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY, §527 (3d ed. 1939). The end came in 1834 
(3,4 Wm. 4, c. 105) when Parliament declared the wife's dower to be 
defeasible by deed as well as by will, with dower surviving only in estates 
of which the husband died intestate. The latter protection was formally 
eliminated by Lord Birkenhead's legislation in 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, §48 
(1925). 
10 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, I & 2 Geo. 6 Chap. 45, as 
amended by the Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, I Eliz. 2, 
c. 64. This legislation, which is discussed, infra, Chap. 21, affects 
testamentary transfers only. 
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to the property of the dead, and more accurately adjusted to 
the requirements of each particular case, than could be ob-
tained through a distribution prescribed by the stereotyped 
and inflexible rules of a general law." 11 
2. IN THE UNITED STATES 
In this country, however, inchoate dower still permits the 
widow to exact a "stereotyped and inflexible" distribution. 
To be sure, in the last century many states abolished the 
wife's inchoate interest, and restricted dower to the real estate 
owned at death. And there has been other legislative tinker-
ing. Thus we may find in various states that the fraction has 
been upped to one half, that the interest has been changed 
to a fee instead of the common-law life estate, that the interest 
may not extend to lands sold on judicial sale, and that the 
non-resident spouse may be excluded. But the plain fact is 
that in one form or another inchoate dower is still retained 
in a substantial majority of the non-community property 
states.12 
And yet the disadvantages that led to the abolition of in-
choate dower in England over a century ago weigh heavily 
in this country. To begin with, dower is an irritating fetter 
on inter vivos alienation of land. From the viewpoint of the 
seller, his wife's consent must be obtained formally. This 
may be difficult where the wife bears her husband ill-will. 
She may even have left him, with her whereabouts unknown. 
There may be factual and legal doubts as to her mental com-
petence, even though she may not be confined in an institu-
tion. If she is institutionalized, legal proceedings may be 
necessary in order to sell the land to raise money for mainte-
nance. And, from the purchaser's viewpoint, there is always 
the possibility of dower being claimed by the wife of a party 
11 Cockburn, C. J., in Banks v. Goodfellow, (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, 
a case dealing with testamentary capacity. 
12 Simes, MoDEL PRoBATE CoDE §31 (1946); 2 Powell, REAL PROPERTY 
~217 (1950); 3 Vernier, AMERICAN FAMILY LAw §189 (1935); 1 P-H 
WILLS, EsT. & TRUST SERV. ~2731; cf. I Glenn, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES 
AND PREFERENCES 241 (1940). 
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in the chain of title.13 This possibility may exist for an in-
definite time after the death of the husband concerned.14 If a 
wife refuses to release her dower, it may mean court proceed-
ings to compensate the purchaser or possibly loss of the sale. 
The existence of intricate legal questions as to the existence 
of dower, 15 combined with factual and legal doubts as to the 
validity of a particular "marriage" 16 in the chain of title, may 
require costly title searches or title insurance. It is perhaps 
fair to state that inchoate dower adversely affects the price 
of real estate, and to that extent defeats its own protective 
purpose. 
And there are other doubts as to whether or not the pro-
tection is effective. Presumably its chief merit is to prevent 
the husband from selling the land against his wife's will. But 
if the husband takes legal advice, he may in some states de-
feat dower by sleight-of-hand conveyancing, or by taking title. 
in a corporate name. And the wife is in an unenviable situa-
tion if her improvident husband needs her consent in order 
to convey a marketable title. If, for example, he wants to sell 
the farm, the combined pull of sentiment and necessity is 
against her holding out either for (a) no sale or (b) sale with a 
portion of the purchase price set aside immediately for her 
maintenance after his death. 
Finally, inchoate dower is unsatisfactory when tested under 
the maintenance and contribution formula.17 There is no 
criterion of need. In consequence, the infringement on the 
reliance interest of the donee -and also of the bona fide 
1a 2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 377 (3d ed. 1939). 
14 In many states dower must be elected within a prescribed period 
after publication of notice to creditors. Nevertheless, there may be 
instances when no publication has been made or administration ini-
tiated. 
1 5 See, e.g., Melenky v. Melen, 189 N.Y. Supp. 798, 198 App. Div. 66 
(4th Dep't 1921); 21 CoL. L. REv. 821 (1921); 35 HARv. L. REv. 206 
(1921); 8 VA. L. REv. 51 (1921); cf. Note, "Why Not Abolish Dower in 
Ontario?" 17 FoRTNIGHTLY L. J. 242, 245 (1948). 
16 Thus, common law marriages where permitted, marriages occurring 
after one of the parties has secured a questionable divorce, conflict be-
tween a common law marriage and a ceremonial marriage, and the like. 
11 Discussed, supra, Chap. 4. 
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purchaser- may in the individual case be quite unwarranted. 
Under the formula too much protection for the widow is as 
objectionable as none at all.18 
Why does inchoate dower still persist, in spite of these 
drawbacks? Professor Rheinstein 19 views it as a manifestation 
of the tendency of American legislatures to prefer debtors 
to creditors, to subordinate urban interests to rural interests. 
He points out that the dower exemption affects claims against 
a decedent's estate and also judicial sales in the husband's 
lifetime.20 Thus the family is protected as to land other than 
the homestead; and the amount received by the wife at the 
judicial sale (as the equivalent of the present value of her 
dower expectation) can be used by the family to make a fresh 
start. This theory receives additional strength when we con-
sider that realty usually comprises a large portion of the total 
holdings of the average rural family. Moreover, there is 
probably less family disharmony in rural areas, and conse-
quently fewer attempted evasions of the dower interest. On 
the other hand, there are a number of jurisdictions whose 
laws are inconsistent with Professor Rheinstein's thesis. For 
example, inchoate dower apparently is abolished 21 in 
Georgia, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Wyoming; no protection appears to be given against judicial 
sales in Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Nebraska. 
Probably the survival of inchoate dower may be attributed 
to a combination of reasons. Not the least of these reasons is 
the inertia of state legislatures, especially when it comes to 
toppling an ancient institution that purports to protect the 
home and family. 
18 Inchoate dower can co-exist with decedents' family maintenance 
legislation, but the combination is not ideal. See infra, p. 301. 
19 Rheinstein, CASES ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES 68 (2d ed. 1955). 
20 On the problem of present computation and payment of the 
widow's inchoate dower on sale by lien creditor, see Re Lesperance, 
(1927) 4 D.L.R. 391, 61 O.L.R. 94. This case occasioned a mild contro-
versy between "Amicus Curiae" and "Amicus Amici" in 5 CAN. B. REv. 
773 (1927) and 6 id. 176 (1928). 
21 By the same token, inchoate dower is still retained in Ontario, the 
"creditor" province of Canada. 
PART III 
THE CASE LAW 
CHAPTER 7 
Tests Based On Retention Of Control 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
The evasion cases may be examined from several points of 
view. The available literature 1 tends to organize the material 
in terms of underlying rationale: thus the cases are assigned 
to pigeon-holes labelled "illusory," "colorable," "fraud," 
"completeness of the transfer," and the like. But the cases 
may also be organized in terms of (a) the evidentiary factors 
that seem to influence the courts, (b) the type of dispositive 
device that is involved, (c) historical development, either 
country-wide or within a single state, or (d) the apparent 
trend of authority in each individual state. I will look at the 
cases from all of these viewpoints, with stress on the first three. 
Discussion of rationales is imperative; as far as the courts are 
concerned, these rationales purport to be decisive. An en-
quiry into the persuasive evidentiary factors will permit us 
1 Simes, PuBLIC PoLICY AND THE DEAD HAND, Chap. 1 (1955); Cahn, 
"Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936); Sykes, 
"Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving Spouses," 
10 Mo. L. REv. I (1949); Comment, "The Present Status of 'Illusory' 
Trusts," 44 MicH. L. REv. 151 (1945). Also see: Bregy, INTESTATE, 
WILLS AND EsTATES AcTs OF 1947 (1949) (Pennsylvania law); Bensing, 
"Inter Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse," 
42 KY. L. J. 616 (1954); Brewster, "Restriction on Testation in Ken-
tucky," 46 KY. L. J. 133, 144-61 (1957); Hayes, "Illinois Dower and the 
'Illusory' Trust: The New York Influence," 2 DEPAUL L. REv. I (1952); 
King, "A Reappraisal of the Revocable Trust," 19 RocKY MT. L. REv. I 
(1946); Klein, "Recent Developments in the Right of Election of Sur-
viving Spouse," N.Y. L. J. May 13, 14, 15 (1953); Klein, "Recent Devel-
opments in the Right of Election," 17 QuEENS BAR BULL. 109 (1954); 
Rea, "Election to Take the Statutory Share," 29 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 506, 
525-56 (1957); Comments: "Illusory Transfers in New York," 37 CoR-
NELL L. Q. 258 (1952); 5 U. PITT. L. REv. 78 (1939); Notes: 16 BROOKLYN 
L. REv. 229 (1950); 27 N.Y. U. L. REv. 306 (1952) (excellent discussion 
of suggestions for statutory reform); 3 SYRAcusE L. REv. 129 (1951); 
Annotations: 49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1956), 157 A.L.R. 1164 (1944), 112 
A.L.R. 649 (1938), 64 A.L.R. 466 (1930). 
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to determine the extent to which the courts appear to follow 
the principles of the maintenance and contribution formula. 
Do they, for example, pay any heed to the relative size of the 
property transferred? Moreover, any decision on the necessity 
and the practicability of remedial legislation demands analy-
sis in terms of the various dispositive devices that may be 
employed by the practicing attorney. These devices differ 
in social function, in popularity, and in the "reliance inter-
est" normally induced in the donee. Each device poses its 
own problems. 
The evolution of certain rationales will be noted where 
deemed significant. Likewise, the law of a particular state 
may merit separate treatment, as, e.g., where the courts of 
that state have enunciated a distinctive rationale. 
The decisions favoring the surviving spouse frequently 
utilize some variation of the "control" rationale. This ra-
tionale stresses the degree of control retained by the decedent 
over the assets that were transferred. The reasoning is simple: 
the more control exercised over these assets, the more it is 
apparent that the decedent in substance owned the assets at 
his death - hence the forced share should attach. Consider 
a revocable inter vivos trust: if the right to the income for 
life is retained, coupled with such control over administra-
tion of the trust as to constitute the trustee a mere "agent," 
the trust is testamentary; the spouse would win. But if the 
court be disinclined to strike down the entire trust as an in-
valid "testamentary" instrument, the spouse may still win if 
she can persuade the court to declare the trust void or vul-
nerable because it is "quasi-testamentary," or "illusory," or 
"not an absolute transfer," or because it involves retention of 
"dominion," or has some other attribute of the control ra-
tionale. Most of these terms have meanings that change with 
the context. Moreover, the usage may vary with the "tug of 
new equities." 2 
2 Cf. Cardozo, THE GRoWTH OF THE LAW 66, 67 (1924). 
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1. TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS 
The widow's elective rights affect any assets belonging to 
the decedent's estate. It follows that the property involved in 
a testamentary transfer will "feed" the elective share. This 
suggests a twofold enquiry: (a) what constitutes a testamentary 
transfer and (b) to what extent should the "testamentary" 
concept be utilized as a weapon against inter vivos evasions 
of the forced share? Our discussion will center on the re-
vocable inter vivos trust, for there the evasion problem is 
acute. 
The popularity of the trust stems from its suitability for 
flexible, controlled inter vivos benevolence. It is also simple 
in operation. In its most common form the settlor transfers 
property to a trustee, reserves the income for life and the 
power to revoke, designates the persons who are to take the 
principal on the settlor's death, and possibly retains some 
degree of control over administration of the trust. The 
settlor achieves most of the advantages of a will without suf-
fering its accompanying disadvantages. With no appreciable 
loss of control, the settlor can acquire in his lifetime an ad-
visory management service that will be continued after his 
death; he avoids the expense, delay, and publicity of probate 
proceedings; he may provide against emergencies during his 
lifetime, such as practical or legal incapacity to handle his 
own affairs; and the trust is less vulnerable than a will would 
be to successful attack by disappointed relatives. Although 
the tax-collector and the creditor may encroach, the trust is 
still the most useful device in the estate planner's repertory.3 
It is to be expected that we hear much of the trust in the 
evasion cases. 
Under the orthodox approach, a trust becomes testamen-
tary when the settlor reserves "not only a beneficial life estate 
and a power to revoke and modify the trust but also such 
s Shattuck, "Some Practical Aspects of the Problems of the Alterable 
and Revocable Inter Vivos Trust in Massachusetts," 26 B. U. L. REv. 
437-445 (1946). 
70 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW's SHARE 
power to control the trustee as to the details of the administra-
tion of the trust that the trustee is the agent of the settlor, 
••• " 4 As far as the surviving spouse is concerned, it is im-
material that such a trust happens to be formalized as a will. 
If the animus testandi was present at the time of execution, 
she wins qua will. If the animus testandi was lacking, she still 
wins: it would be an invalid testamentary disposition, and 
the property concerned would form part of the decedent's 
estate. 
It will be recalled that under the custom of London the 
English courts felt that the retention of any interest, even that 
of possession, would be sufficient to brand the trust or deed a 
testamentary transfer. This harsh approach may be found in 
many of the older American evasion cases, 5 and its rationale 
has been used, perhaps inadvertently, in some of the more 
modern evasion cases. But our conception of a testamentary 
transfer has changed with the years. An inter vivos trust, 
for example, is no longer considered testamentary (for pur-
poses unconnected with spouses' rights) merely because the 
power to revoke is retained. By the same token, in the eva-
sion cases, we find that it is usually in the older decisions that 
the surviving spouse prevails on the "testamentary" ra-
4 REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS, §57. Two clues are given. We are told that 
"The intended trust is not testamentary merely because the settlor 
reserves power to direct the trustee as to the making of investments 
or the exercises of other particular powers, or power to appoint a substi-
tuted trustee." And apt draftsmanship is considered helpful: "Thus, 
if the transfer to the trustee was by a deed formally executed and 
recorded, the conclusion that the trustee was also the agent of the 
settlor would be less likely to be drawn than if the transfer were less 
formally evidenced." 
·5 Some early cases proceeded on the reasoning that revocability was 
a distinguishing characteristic of a testamentary instrument, i.e., one 
that would thereby be subject to the widow's share. See, e.g., Light-
foot's Ex'rs v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 
Va. (6 Gratt.) 595, 604 (1850): "Two circumstances must concur to 
render the gift testamentary in its nature; one is, that it is not to be 
substantially effective until his death; and the other is, that the hus-
band does not divest himself of the capacity to recall it, ... " Cf. Smith 
v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914); Cochran's Adm'x v. 
Cochran, 273 Ky. I, ll5 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Cochran's Adm'x v. Yeiser, 
294 Ky. 585, 172 S.W.2d 226 (1943). 
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tionale.6 In some of these cases, of course, the purported 
transfer was quite palpably an agency arrangement. But 
there is a disconcerting tendency in some evasion cases to use 
a The "testamentary" attack has been successful, whether as the sole 
rationale or as one of several, in a number of cases: Fleming v. Fleming, 
194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921) (agreement regarding family insur-
ance business); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 
130 S.W.2d 611 (1939) (revocable trust); Hill's Estate, 15 D.&C. 699 
(Pa. 1931) (declaration of trust); Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. 
Bank of Winchester, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955), rehearing denied 
197 Va. 732, 90 S.E.2d 865 (1956) (revocable unfunded insurance trust); 
Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949) (bond payable after 
death). Cf. Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 245 S.W.2d 914, 
(1952) (non-evasive); Bowles v. Rutroff, 216 Ky. 557, 288 S.W. 312, 
(1926) (bank stock; widow barred by statute of limitations); Brown v. 
Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213 (1903) (delivery of personal property 
with power of attorney permitting re-delivery); Walker v. Walker, 66 
N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891) (stock); MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 
435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd without opin. 305 N.Y. 
576, III N.E.2d 445 (1953) (revocable trust); Estate of Brown, 384 Pa. 99, 
119 A.2d 513 (1956) (revocable unfunded insurance trust, under Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.11, discussed infra, p. 138); Vederman Estate, 
78 D.&C. 207 (Pa. 1951) (under same statute); In re Lonsdale's Estate, 
29 Pa. 407 (1857) (bonds); Alexander v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 
2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173 (1954) (revocable trust; antenuptial). 
In the following cases the "testamentary" attack was unsuccessful: 
United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946); 
West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 296 U.S. 633 (1935) 
(trust, revocable only by another with settlor's consent); Ford v. Ford, 
4 Ala. 142 (1842) (irrevocable trust); Burton v. Burton, 100 Colo. 567, 
69 P.2d 307 (1937) (note); Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 
363 (1903) (deed with delayed delivery); Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 
317 (1824) (trust); Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 
(1940) (gift of paintings; facts extreme); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 
559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) (revocable trust); Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 
484, 53 N.E.2d 126 (1944) (joint savings account; facts extreme); In re 
Estate of Sides, ll9 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930) (note, to be can-
celled at death); In re Galewitz' Estate, 206 Misc. 218, 132 N.Y.S.2d 
297 (Surr. Ct. 1954) (option on stock owned at death); In re Kalina's 
Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1945), appeal dismissed,. 
270 App. Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1946) (U.S. savings 
bonds); In re Deyo's Estate, ISO Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 
1943), refusing to follow Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (U.S. savings bonds); In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 
157 (Surr. Ct. 1941) (joint bank account, commercial); Pinckney v. City 
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 249 App. Div. 375, 292 N.Y. Supp. 835 (3d 
Dep't 1937) (revocable trust); Morrison v. Morrison, 99 Ohio App. 203, 
132 N.E.2d 233 (1955) (irrevocable declaration of trust); In re Rynier's 
Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943) (judgment notes); Beirne v. 
Continental Equit. Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932) (re-
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the phrase "testamentary" as a synonym for the popular eva-
sion rationales, as, e.g., "illusory," "colorable," "fraudulent," 
and the like.7 This practice is unfortunate. Taken at face 
value, it would stop the widow from complaining of any 
otherwise valid inter vivos transfer. Moreover, if the court 
in question is motivated more by concern for the widow than 
for the Statute of Wills, its effect is too drastic. The de-
feasance would be total; the trust beneficiaries would lose all, 
not merely the widow's "share" in the trust corpus. Protec-
tion to the surviving spouse would then involve an unwar-
vocable trust); Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, II2 
Atl. 62 (1920) (revocable trust); Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 
Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914) (revocable trust); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 
149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891) (revocable trust); Dickerson's Appeal, ll5 Pa. 
198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887) (revocable declaration of trust); Smith v. Deshaw, 
116 Vt. 441, 78 A.2d 479 (1951) (trust); Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 
Atl. 919 (1933) (joint bank account). Cf .. Harber v. Harber, 152 Ga. 
98, 108 S.E. 520 (1921) (deed); Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 
(Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d 
Dep't 1943), reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 986, 48 N.Y.S.2d 453 
(2d Dep't 1944), aff'd on reargument mem., 268 App. Div. 822, 49 
N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 294 
N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 240 (1945), aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 
N.E.2d 785 (1945) (trust; question left open); Robb v. Washington &: 
Jefferson College, 103 App. Div. 327, 93 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't 1905), 
modified and aff'd, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359 (1906) (charitable trust). 
And see the following nonevasion cases: Church of Jesus Christ v. 
Scarborough, 189 F.2d 800 (lOth Cir. 1951) (contract); DeLeuil's Ex'rs 
v. DeLeuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S.W.2d 474 (1934) (declaration of trust); 
Goodrich v. City Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258 N.W. 
253 (1935) (revocable trust); Hall v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 201 Misc. 
203, 109 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd, 282 App. Div. 203, 122 
N.Y.S.2d 239 (lst Dep't 1953) (life insurance); In re Ford's Estate, 279 
App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd without opinion, 
304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E.2d 87 (1952) (trust). 
An executed transfer of realty is perhaps less vulnerable to attack. 
See, e.g., Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899) (nonevasive). 
1 A line of Missouri cases, for example, brands a transfer as testa-
mentary if made in expectation of death with intent to defraud the 
surviving spouse. Merz v. Tower Grove Bank &: Trust Co., 344 Mo. 
ll50, 130 S.W.2d 6II (1939); Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 
(1902); Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 (1860), 32 Mo. 464 (1862); 
contra, Wanstrath v. Kappel, 354 Mo. 565, 190 S.W.2d 241 (1945), 
356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947), aff'd, 358 Mo. 1077, 218 S.W.2d 
618 (1949) (revocable trust with considerable control retained held 
defeasible by widow but not testamentary). For the Missouri law see 
p. ll4-ll6, infra. 
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ranted interference with the settlor's deliberate benevolence 
to the inter vivos donees. It should not be necessary to burn 
the house down to get heat. 
The community values implicit in protection of the family 
against disinheritance do not coincide with the values in-
volved in the Statute of Wills. We have seen that family pro-
tection is a desirable community goal. But can we say that 
the Statute of Wills is a pillar of democracy? Over a decade 
ago Gulliver and Tilson, in a provocative analysis, suggested 
that the various Wills Act formalities have three functions -
ritualistic, evidentiary, and protective.8 The ritual-function 
is required because some type of ceremony is needed to im-
press the transferor with the significance of his donative ac-
tions and statements, and to justify the court in concluding 
that they were deliberately intended to be operative. The 
evidence-function is to provide a satisfactory guarantee 
against subsequent lapse of memory, fraud, and the like. The 
protection-function- Gulliver and Tilson regard its value 
and effectiveness as dubious - is to safeguard the testator at 
the time of the execution of the will against undue influence 
or other imposition. The not unreasonable conclusion is 
reached that "an intended transfer should be sustained if 
the facts show substantial performance of the ritual and evi-
dentiary functions, whatever may be the particular method 
of securing that performance." Certainly, an inter vivos trust 
should not be defeated solely because it was not formalized 
as a will. And if the Statute of Wills is of doubtful relevance 
in this connection, it is an even cruder weapon when misused 
to protect the surviving spouse.9 
8 Gulliver and Tilson, "Classification of Gratuitous Transfers to Take 
Effect at Death," 51 YALE L. J. I (1941). Cf. Comment, "Trusts Which 
Substitute for Wills," 51 Nw. U. L. REv. ll3 (1956). 
9 An eminent critic has stated that Gulliver and Tilson "under-
estimate . . . the dangers which the elimination of administration pro-
ceedings through substitute transactions implies for creditors, the public 
treasury and forced heirs." Rheinstein, CASES ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES, 
778 (2d ed. 1955). Nevertheless, Professor Rheinstein would probably 
agree that the forced heir would be ill served if her sole chance to reach 
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2. ILLUSORY TRUSTS 
(a) Newman v. Dare. The vicissitudes of the illusory trust 
doctrine in New York form a melancholy commentary on 
the ineptitude of the typical American forced share. The 
New York forced share had an auspicious inception. Enacted 
in 1930,10 it was considered a significant advance in succes-
sion law. In brief, the 1930 reforms abolished dower and 
curtesy,11 made the spouses reciprocal heirs,U and provided 
the surviving spouse with an election to force his or her in-
testate share against the will.13 No election could be made if 
the testator "devised or bequeathed in trust an amount equal 
to or greater than the intestate share, with income thereof 
payable to the surviving spouse for life." 14 On paper the 
scheme appeared to presage a new era of practical protection 
for the surviving spouse.15 A contemporary writer declared 
that "although curtesy and dower are abolished, the act is 
socially significant because of the increased protection which 
it gives to the husband and wife in lieu of their prior 
rights." 16 This statement was technically accurate; but it 
shortly became apparent that the "increased protection" lay 
more in appearance than in actuality. The forced share, by 
completely ignoring the evasion problem, proved itself vul-
nerable to inter vivos depletion of the decedent's estate. One 
of the most effective devices, of course, proved to be the re-
vocable inter vivos trust. Although there was some early 
an inter vivos transfer lay in having it declared totally void as being 
testamentary. 
10 It was the first major revision in 100 years, and was enacted only 
after lengthy deliberation; see The Reports of the Commission to In-
vestigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, N.Y. Legislative Document No. 
69 (1930). 
11 N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§189, 190. 
12 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §83. 
1s N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §18. 
14 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §(l)(b). 
15 Twyeffort, in "The New Decedent Estate Law of New York," 6 
N.Y. U. L. Q. R.Ev. 377, 386-87 (1928-29), suggests that the main con-
cern was for the widow. 
16 Laube, "The Revision of the New York Law of Estates," 14 CoR· 
NELL L. Q. 461, 463 (1929). 
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uncertainty/7 it was thought that the matter was clarified by 
the leading case of Newman v. Dore.18 There the husband 
created a testamentary trust under which his widow was the 
beneficiary of a life interest in one third of all his property. 
By the terms of the new law 19 this prevented the widow from 
electing against the will. Three days before his death, how-
ever, and with the intent to defeat the widow's statutory 
rights,2° he created an inter vivos trust of all his property. He 
retained the power to revoke and the income for life; and 
the powers granted to the trustees were made "subject to the 
settlor's control during his life," and could be exercised "in 
such manner only as the settlor shall from time to time di-
rect in writing." 21 The widow was given no beneficial in-
terest whatever. The Court of Appeals sustained the widow's 
attack. The husband's motive in making the transfer, said 
the court, is immaterial: "the only sound test ... is whether 
it is real or illusory .... [We must ask] whether the husband 
has in good faith divested himself of ownership of his prop-
erty or has made an illusory transfer." 22 By "illusory" the 
court apparently contemplated neither a sham transfer, i.e., 
lacking the animus donandi, nor a testamentary transfer, in 
the orthodox use of that term: 23 "We assume, without decid-
ing, that except for the provisions of section 18 of the De-
cedent Estate Law the trust would be valid." 24 What did 
concern the court, however, was that the settlor retained the 
power to control the trustees, as well as the income for life 
and the power to revoke. Such a conveyance, it said, "from 
the technical point of view ... does not quite take all that 
it gives, but practically it does." 25 In sum, excessive control 
is decisive; intent (motive) is immaterial. 
11 See cases cited in note 92, infra. 
1 8 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). 
19 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law, §18(1)(d). 
2o 275 N.Y. 371, 375, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1937). 
21 I d. at 377, 9 N.E.2d at 968. 
22 I d. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969. 
23 See supra, text at note 4. 
24 275 N.Y. 371, 380, 9 N.E.2d at 969. 
2 ~ I d. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969, quoting from a statement of Chief 
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The illusory trust doctrine, as popularized by Newman v. 
Dore, received a partial setback from the Halpern case in 
1951. As mentioned earlier/6 the New York Court of Appeals 
decided in the Halpern case that a Totten trust is not il-
lusory per se. The Halpern case, which is the cause celebre 
of the "reality" rationale, will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 9.27 There we shall consider whether or not the 
court intended an outright repudiation of the illusory trust 
doctrine. Before the Halpern case had been decided, how-
ever, the illusory trust doctrine had spread to other states.28 
It deserves special study, regardless of its ultimate fate in New 
York. 
(b) The Ohio Cases. The Ohio case law is of special in-
terest, not only as an extreme example of the illusory trust 
doctrine but also as an illustration of changing judicial reac-
tion to the trust device. 
At the tum of the century the Ohio courts apparently con-
sidered the revocable inter vivos trust to be an unwelcome 
usurper of the functions performed by a will.29 Thus, in 
Worthington v. Redkey,30 decided in 1912, the court men-
tioned the power of revocation as one of a number of ob-
jectionable features in a trust that it declared void.31 In 
Justice Holmes in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 461, 63 N.E. 
1068, 1069 (1902). 
26 See supra, Chap. 1, text at note 3. 
27 Infra, Chap. 9:1. 
2s For list of cases, see note 74, infra. 
29 See Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions and the Hawkins 
Case," 3 U. CIN. L. REv. 361 (1929): Goldman and DeCamp, "When Is 
a Trust Not a Trust?" 16 U. CIN. L. REv. 191 (1942). 
30 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 (1912). 
31 The court does not state squarely that the power of revocation is 
sufficient to defeat the validity of the trust. In fact, the court seems 
unwilling to hinge its decision on any single factor, preferring instead 
a pious catalogue of sins: the "ambiguity" of the reference to "my 
trustee," the reser-Ved power of revocation, the probability that the at-
torney was acting merely as "agent" for the donor (so that on the death 
of the principal the agency would terminate, and thus the charities 
could take nothing), and the feeling, hinted but not expressly stated, 
that the transaction was an ungentlemanly attempt to evade the for-
malities of the Wills Act. 
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Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, decided in 1929,32 the adminis-
trator sought to recover the corpus of the decedent's revocable 
inter vivos trust. A degree of discretion had been given to the 
trustee. In the first hearing, unreported, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio set the trust aside, as an invalid testamentary disposi-
tion. This decision was reversed, on the rehearing, by a ma-
jority of the court. Although the reasoning of the Redkey 
case was approved, 33 the court felt itself bound by an amend-
ment to section 8617, Ohio General Code.34 Doubts cast by 
the Hawkins case on the common-law validity of revocable 
trusts in Ohio were not dispelled until 1938, in Cleveland 
32 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389, 73 A.L.R. 190 (1929). 
33 121 Ohio St. 177-78, 163 N.E. at 394. 
34 At the time of the execution of the first trust agreement in the 
Hawkins case this section provided: "All deeds of gifts and conveyance 
of goods and chattels, made in trust to the use of the person or persons 
making them, shall be void and of no effect." 
In 1921 (before the execution of the supplementary agreement in 
the Hawkins case), the section was amended to add the following: 
". . . but the creator of a trust may reserve to himself any 
use or power, beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully 
grant to another, including the power to alter, amend, or re-
voke such trust, and such trust shall be valid as to all persons, 
except that any beneficial interest reserved to such creator 
shall be subject to be reached by the creditors of such creator, 
and except that where the creator of such trust reserves to 
himself for his own benefit a power of revocation a court of 
equity, at the suit or any creditor or creditors of the creator, 
may compel the exercise of such power of revocation so re-
served, to the same extent and under the same conditions that 
such creator could have exercised the same." 
On this amendment see Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions 
and the Hawkins Case," 3 U. CIN. L. R. 361 (1929), referring to it as "es-
sentially a creditors statute." See also King, "A Reappraisal of the 
Revocable Trust," 19 RocKY Mr. L. R. I, 9 (1946). A note in 5 Omo Sr. 
L. J. 269, 271 (1939) states: "At the time of the Redkey decision, the 
trust companies in Ohio were administering a great many living trusts, 
the validity of which would be denied if ever tested in the courts on 
the basis of the Redkey case. To avoid this contingency, the trust com-
panies exerted sufficient pressure on the legislature to secure an amend-
ment to section 8617 of the General Code .... Since this amendment 
made only trusts for the exclusive use of the creator void, if the trust 
provided that the property go to another after the death of the settlor 
it was not for the exclusive use of the settlor and therefore not void, and 
an entering wedge was created whereby the court could modify its 
ruling in the Redkey case." 
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Trust Co. v. White. 35 Further doubts, however, arose from 
dicta in Woodside Company v. Narten, in 1941.36 And the 
uncertainty was heightened by Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 
decided in the same year.37 Here the court split three ways 
on the validity of a trust which reserved the income for life, 
the power to revoke, and the power to veto and to "direct" 
the trustee in matters of investment and management.88 
35 Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 
(1938). But this case is not as strong as it is sometimes considered, as 
the trust concerned could be revoked only with the approval of the 
trustee. Judge Matthias was the only member of the court left of the 
members who had decided the Hawkins case. He had voted to renounce 
the common-law validity of the revocable trust in the Hawkins case, but 
voted for its validity in the White case. 
In Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 
(1939), a trust was upheld in which the settlor reserved the net income 
and right to occupy the real estate, the trustee being relieved from 
payment of taxes and insurance and required to secure the settlor's 
written approval of all sales and purchases. It was also held, however, 
that Section 8617 would permit the plaintiff creditors to revoke the 
trust only in the lifetime of the settlor. Three judges, Weygandt, C.J., 
Williams and Myers, J.J., dissented, presumably on the ground that 
the trust was invalid. This construction of Section 8617 is perhaps 
questionable, but it is in keeping with the confusion surrounding that 
unhappily worded provision. Thus Alexander, "Certain Problems Con-
fronting Creditors When a Revocable Trust Accomplishes Succession," 
31 MICH. L. REv. 449, at 467 (written before the decision in the Scho-
field case): "It is to be noted that the statute (Section 8617) makes no 
reference to the situation after death of the settlor, yet this is the 
statute upon which the court expressly based its decision in Union 
Trust Co. v. Hawkins." 
36 Woodside Company of Nevada v. Narten, 138 Ohio St. 469, 35 
N.E.2d 777 (1941). The court was composed of Weygandt, C.J., and 
Williams, J. (both of whom dissented in the Schofield case), Hart, J. 
(who concurred in the Schofield case), and Turner, Zimmerman, and 
Bettman, J.J. (none of whom were in the court which decided the 
Schofield case). Matthias, J., who had concurred in the Schofield case, 
did not participate. The settlor had reserved the income for life, the 
power to revoke in whole or in part, and the power to withdraw prin-
cipal. In deciding the case on another issue, the court said: "After a 
study of the facts in the instant case the members of this court find a 
difference of opinion among themselves as to whether a valid trust was 
created, and since the ultimate judgment herein will not be affected 
thereby, this question will not be discussed further." 
37 Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio St. 50, 38 N.E.2d 185 (1941). 
38 Hart, J. upheld the trust, explaining that the control was really 
retained for the welfare of the beneficiaries. Zimmerman and Bettman, 
J.J., concurred, as also did Williams, J., in a separate opinion. Wey-
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During this period of judicial unrest over the revocable 
trust there occurred the famous evasion case of Bolles v. 
Toledo Trust Co.39 In that case the husband executed three 
inter vivos trusts. The first trust in point of time (No. 328) 
irrevocably transferred $110,000 in insurance and $1,000 in 
stock, for the benefit of a daughter, with the settlor taking 
in the event of the daughter's incapacity. The second trust 
(No. 331) was revocable and comprised securities worth 
$4,000. The husband reserved the right to the income for 
life, and for payments of principal if required. After the 
settlor's death the trustee was to pay the settlor's wife $500 
monthly for life, with the trustee having discretion to give 
her additional sums if needed. Surplus funds beyond the 
amount needed to provide the widow's payments were to be 
transferred to Trust No. 328. All payments to the widow 
under trust No. 331 were to be cancelled, and the trust 
"terminated," in the event that she elected not to take under 
the will. 
The third trust (No. 520) was made in 1930, and was also 
revocable. It covered securities of an approximate value of 
$80,000. Income (and principal if needed) was payable to 
the husband for life. Upon the husband's death, the corpus 
was to be transferred (partly intact and partly liquidated) to 
Trust No. 331, to be "thereafter treated as a part of that trust." 
In 1928, on the same day on which Trust No. 331 was exe-
cuted, the husband made his will. The wife was given certain 
chattels. The residue of realty and personalty went to the 
Trust Company as trustee of Trust No. 331. The will stated 
that the provisions made for the wife in the will and with the 
Trust Company were to be "in lieu of all her rights, claims 
and estates given to her by law, by way of dower or other-
wise." 
gandt, C.J., Turner and Matthias, J.J., dissented, branding the trans-
action as a "mere agency" (p- 73). The trust instrument in the Watt 
case was executed prior to the amendment to Section 8617, so that the 
amendment played no part in the case. 
39 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 157 A.L.R. ll64 (1944). 
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To summarize: the insurance ($110,000) went to the 
daughter under Trust No. 328. The widow received an an-
nuity of $500 per month (and more, if needed for support) 
from Trust No. 331 ($4,000), as fed by Trust No. 520 ($80,-
000) and the residuary estate under the will. But if the widow 
spurned the will, she would be bereft of her trust interest. 
The background information, as brought out in previous 
litigation/0 indicated that the equities favored the widow. 
The parties were married in 1920, she at the time being a 
widow with two minor children. In 1921 a daughter was 
born, the beneficiary of the trust mentioned above. It ap· 
peared that Mr. and Mrs. Bolles "lived together in a seem-
ingly harmonious relationship until his death." 41 Mrs. Bolles' 
former husband had left her a substantial amount of prop-
erty. In addition, Mr. Bolles had rented a safe-deposit box 
from the Toledo Trust Company, in which he had deposited 
securities, purchased with his own money, worth approxi-
mately $216,215. When the box was opened after his death 
the securities stood in his own name and were contained in a 
folder inscribed with his name. In subsequent probate-court 
proceedings, however, Mrs. Bolles introduced evidence which 
later led the Supreme Court to remark that "there can be 
little doubt that he intended his wife to have the securities 
and thought he had effectuated such desire." 42 Nevertheless, 
the court held that the securities should form part of the 
estate assets for administration purposes, stating that Mrs. 
Bolles had failed to prove a sufficient delivery to constitute a 
valid gift; 43 and, in a later proceeding, the court failed to 
respond to the suggestion that Bolles had held the securities 
in trust for his wife.44 
Finally the widow brought the present suit, arguing that 
the two revocable trusts should be declared void as bogus 
40 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917 (1936). 
41Jd. at 23, 4 N.E.2d at 918. 
42Jd. at 30, 4 N.E.2d at 921. 
43Jd. at 31, 4 N.E.2d at 921. The holding is criticized in note, 4 OHio 
ST. L. J. 134 (1937). 
44Because of res judicata. 136 Ohio St. 517, 27 N.E.2d 145 (1940). 
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testamentary dispositions, or at least held defeasible to the 
extent of the widow's statutory share. The court agreed. Al-
though holding the trusts to be otherwise valid 45 under sec-
tion 8617, it stated that "such trusts may not be used as a de-
vice to deprive the widow of her distributive share of the 
property possessed by her husband at the time of his death. 
To the extent that such an arrangement, if allowed to stand, 
would deprive the widow of her distributive share of prop-
erty, it is voidable at the instance of the widow." 46 And later 
this statement is made: "Trusts No. 331 and No. 520, taken 
in connection with the contemporaneous execution of the 
will and trust No. 331 and the value 47 of the res prior to 
testator's death in the respective trusts are illusory as to the 
widow's rights." 48 Apparently the court felt that Trust No. 
331, although not technically a testamentary disposition, 
gave the settlor such enjoyment of his property during his 
45 Note that the assumption of the court in the Halpern case (infra, 
pp. 122-123) that the trust in Newman v. Dore (supra, pp. 75-76) was 
not "real'' could not be made with reference to the trusts in the Bolles 
case. There are repeated statements that trusts 331 and 520 were valid 
aside from the widow's rights (see, e.g., 144 Ohio St. 226). Such a hold-
ing would of course be expected because of statutory recognition of re-
vocable trusts in Ohio, in §8617. Under the Halpern test, as applied 
to Ohio under present §8617, the widow would have lost. 
46 144 Ohio St. 195, 213, 58 N.E.2d 381 at 390. See also 144 Ohio St. 
at 210-ll, 58 N.E.2d at 389-90. 
47 The court seems impressed with the fact that until Bolles' death 
"trust No. 331 remained, as apparently it was his intention for it to so 
remain during his lifetime, wholly inadequate for the purpose for 
which it was established" (id. at 212, 58 N.E.2d at 390). The point of 
this reference to the inadequacy of Trust No. 331 is not clear. The 
court purports elsewhere to minimize "intent" as a criterion (id. at 
215, 58 N.E.2d at 391); and, in any event, it is apparent from the evi-
dence that if Bolles had any intent at all it was to make generous pro-
vision for his wife. Both the will and trust No. 331 ($4,000) were made 
in 1928, with the residue of the will to "pour over" into the trust in 
order to produce the annuity of $500 per month. Trust No. 520 
($80,000) was executed in 1930. The safety deposit box was opened 
in 1931. Bolles visited the box 48 times before his death on August 
8th, 1933. Certainly he intended to give his wife the $216,000 in 
securities in the box. It also seems to be clear that he was not attempt-
ing to defraud his wife; firstly, because of the safety deposit box epi-
sode, and, secondly, because of the generous annuity from the two 
trusts in question. 
4 8 I d. at 229, 58 N.E.2d at 397. 
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lifetime that it amounted to an unfair deprivation of the 
widow's right to elect against her husband's "will." This 
may be seen from the statement that the Newman case "is 
illustrative of the fact that where a widow is given certain 
rights by statute she may not be deprived thereof by her 
husband," 49 and that "irrespective of the husband's inten· 
tion, if the effect of the device resorted to is such as to cut 
down or deprive the widow of the right given her under [the 
forced share] such device is voidable when challenged by the 
widow." 50 
The actual decision is not unreasonable, in view of 
the peculiar circumstances in the case. The rationale, how-
ever, is no more than a variation of the "control" test, in spite 
of the broad language suggesting that the widow may invade 
any device, the effect of which is to "cut down or deprive" her 
of her elective rights. That language must be read in the 
light of repeated references to the settlor's retention of "do-
minion" over the trust res. 51 Such "dominion," considered 
in connection with the settlor's quasi-testamentary arrange-
ments, renders trusts Nos. 331 and 520 illusory with reference 
to the widow. But "illusory" is a term with new implications. 
It now seems possible to state that an inter vivos trust in 
Ohio, in some undefined circumstances, may be illusory 
merely because of the retention of the power to revoke.52 
The apparent criterion is the quasi-testamentary nature of 
trusts Nos. 331 and 520.53 Also relevant, it would seem, is the 
existence of factual control, whether or not formally re-
served.54 But financial need on the part of the surviving 
spouse, which one would suppose to be all-important, is not 
49 !d. at 214, 58 N.E.2d at 391. 
5o !d. at 215, 58 N.E.2d at 391. 
51 E.g., id. pp. 212, 226, 58 N.E.2d 390, 396. 
52 Very little formal control was retained by the settlor. !d. at 198-99, 
58 N.E.2d at 384-85, and see notes 64 and 78, infra. 
53 See discussion, supra, p. 81. And cf. Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 
273 Ky. 1, 15, ll5 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 406, 
214 s.w. 791 (1919). 
54 See 144 Ohio St. 195, 224-26, 58 N.E.2d 381, 395-96 (1944). Also 
see note 78, infra. 
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mentioned; we know that the widow had been left half the 
stock in her former husband's company, but we do not know 
its value, nor do we know the value of Bolles' estate. 
The indecisive nature of the Bolles case left the legal pro-
fession in a quandary: did the case stand for the proposition 
that all revocable inter vivos trusts were· per se illusory- or 
should the decision be authoritative only with respect to the 
particular facts? 55 These doctrinal uncertainties contributed 
to the furor that attended the later case of Harris v. Harris. 56 
In this case the husband in 1939 transferred in trust 100 
shares of a corporation in which there were but five stock-
holders, each owning 100 shares. At the time of execution 
the res was worth $40,000; at the date of settlor's death, in 
1942, it was worth $75,000.57 The wife was not mentioned. 
The settlor reserved the income for life, the power to revoke, 
and the power to deliver additional securities. The trustee 
was given no authority to sell, invest, or reinvest; and his 
authority to vote the stock was "virtually nullified by a fur-
ther provision authorizing the trustee to enter into a trust 
agreement with the remaining four stockholders whereby all 
of the stock of the corporation was to be surrendered and one 
certificate issued in the joint names of the trustee and the 
four other stockholders, all five to be designated as trustees 
thereof. This was done. "As a result," says the court, " ... 
there no longer was any stock standing in the name of the 
original trustee alone, and, of course, he alone could vote no 
55 Nor was predictability aided by the appearance in the Bolles 
case of some of the usual overworked "evasion" cliches: "not an abso· 
lute transfer," "merely colorable," "made with a fraudulent intent." 
Bolles v. Toledo Tr. Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 213, 215, 58 N.E.2d 381, 390, 
391 (1944). 
56 Harris v. Harris, 79 Ohio App. 443, 74 N.E.2d 407 (1945), afj'd, 
147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1948). The Ohio Fiduciaries Research 
Association filed a lengthy brief as amicus curiae in the Harris case, and 
also participated in that capacity in the oral argument in court. The 
Bolles case had in the meantime received adverse comment: King, 
"Reappraisal of the Revocable Trust," 19 RocKY MT. L. REv. I (1946). 
57 The inventory value of the assets in the estate (excluding the res 
of the inter vivos trust) was $75,186.46. 
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stock in that capacity. In spite of the new trust agreement 58 
the plaintiff's husband continued to serve as the president at 
a salary of $20,000 per year and as director of the corporation; 
and until his death he made the same use of his property as 
he had done previous to the execution of the trust agree-
ments, while the trustee attended no meeting of the stock-
holders, attended no meeting of the board of directors, and 
at no time did he examine the books of the corporation. As 
well stated by the Court of Appeals . . . 'the record shows 
that Harris, the settlor, engaged in the business of operating 
the company, along with the other stockholders, and that the 
activities of his trustee were of a minor character.' " 59 
The husband's will was executed in 1940, and contained no 
provision for the wife other than a sum not to exceed $5,000 
annually. This sum, however, was to be derived from a 
testamentary trust which "obviously could produce income 
amounting to but a mere fraction of the $5,000." 60 
The widow, having elected to take against the will, brought 
action to have the inter vivos trust declared either void or vul-
nerable. The Courts of Appeals reversed the trial court's dis-
missal of the plaintiff's petition. The Supreme Court, by a 
four to three vote, agreed that "the plaintiff's husband re-
tained such dominion and control over the corpus of the trust 
estate as to make the trust ineffective to deprive the plaintiff 
of her interest in the assets thereof as the surviving spouse.'' 61 
Weygandt, C.J., in delivering the majority opinion, led off 
with a sweeping endorsement of the "rule of law" of the 
Bolles case, as exemplified in the first three paragraphs of the 
syllabus in that case.62 Referring to the argument of counsel 
5 8 Entered into on May 15, 1939, three days after the execution of 
the first agreement. Seemingly Harris' wife, the plaintiff, had no 
knowledge of either trust agreement until after her husband's death; 
whereas the wives of each of the remaining four stockholders were 
informed at the time of the execution of the new trust agreement. 
59 147 Ohio St. 437, 441, 72 N.E.2d 378, 380 (1948). 
ao I d. at 437, 72 N.E.2d at 378. 
61/ d. at 442, 72 N .E.2d at 380. 
62 These paragraphs from the syllabus in the Bolles case are as follows: 
"1. A husband may dispose of his personal property during 
his lifetime without the consent of his wife, but a husband may 
TESTS BASED ON RETENTION OF CONTROL 85 
for the defendants that these paragraphs were obiter dicta 
and incorrect, Weygandt, C.J., stated summarily that "it is 
unnecessary to restate the rationale of the court." 63 He con-
cluded that the combination of the right to income, the power 
to revoke, and the other circumstances 64 mentioned above 
was so similar in effect to the facts in the Bolles case as to de-
mand that a similar decision be reached. Turner, Bell, and 
Sohngen, J.J., concurred. 
The dissent of Matthias, J., (concurred in by Hart, J.) turns 
on the proposition that the widow could win only by estab-
lishing that the inter vivos trust was void as "creating an 
agency." He stated that the Hawkins case and the White case 
"are still the law 65 in this state and particularly so in view of 
not bar his widow of her right to a distributive share of any 
property which he owns and of which he retains the right of 
disposition and control up to the time of his death. 
"2. Section 8617, General Code, which provides that a re-
vocable and amendable living trust 'shall be valid as to all 
persons' except creditors, does not deprive the settlor of all 
dominion over the trust res so that a widow electing to take 
under the statute of descent and distribution is barred from 
claiming a distributive share of the property in such trust. 
"3. The transfer of property to a trustee under an agree-
ment whereby the settlor reserved to himself the income dur-
ing his life with the right to amend or revoke, is valid by 
virtue of Section 8617, General Code, but under such a trust 
agreement settlor does not part absolutely with the dominion 
of such property and his widow electing to take under the 
statute of descent and distribution may assert her right to a 
distributive share of the property in such trust at settlor's 
death." 
63 147 Ohio St. 437, 440, 72 N.E.2d 378, 380 (1948). 
64 In the Bolles case little control over administration was formally 
reserved, but the decision stressed failure to relinquish absolute "do-
minion." The majority opinion in the Harris case, naturally, com-
mented on the fact that the settlor in that case did " ... a number 
of additional things that are important in determining the question 
of dominion over the trust res." These "additional things" are analyzed 
in the application for rehearing, beginning at p. 10. 
6 5 Presumably he is referring to the statement in the Hawkins case 
to the effect that §8617, as amended, validated revocable inter vivos 
trusts; surely he cannot be referring to the unfortunate remarks in that 
case regarding the common law invalidity of inter vivos trusts. It will 
be recalled that Matthias, J., voted with the majority that held the trust 
void at common law in the Hawkins case but voted to hold the trust 
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the provisions of Section 8617 .... " 66 He concluded that 
Section 8617 sustained the Harris trust, whereas in the Bolles 
case "the entire plan ... was testamentary in character." 67 
In other words, for Matthias, J., reasoning of this sort assumes 
that an inter vivos trust must be totally black or entirely 
white. And we encounter the same black-white gambit in the 
more closely reasoned dissent by Zimmerman, J.68 Inter vivos 
trusts, he says, are valid because of the Hawkins, White, and 
Watt cases, as well as because of Section 8617; 69 he rejects 
the Bolles view that a trust can be valid and yet voidable by 
the widow.70 
In summation, the questions raised by the decision in the 
Bolles case were left unanswered by the Harris case. The 
majority opinion in the Harris case does little more than 
affirm the Bolles case, but the dissenting opinions reveal a 
fundamental difference of opinion 71 in the Ohio judiciary 
as to whether or not a surviving spouse may set aside the 
decedent's inter vivos transfers. This difference of opinion is 
valid in Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 
(1938). See note 35, supra. 
66 147 Ohio St. 437, 442, 72 N.E.2d 378, 380-81 (1948). 
67 Id. at 444, 72 N.E.2d at 381. 
68 It was also used by the New York Court of Appeals in the Halpern 
case; see infra, Chap. 9, text at note 39. 
69 §861 7, of course, does not preclude the widow from attacking an 
inter vivos trust. Strange that the dissenting judges in the Harris case 
did not urge the "expressio unius" rule, viz., that in singling out cred-
itors rights §8617 inferentially excludes the widow. It will be recalled 
that the court in the Bolles case stated that the widow occupies a 
higher position than a creditor, thus distinguishing the Schofield case, 
supra note 35. 
70 Zimmerman, J., stated that he did not "join with the majority [in 
the Bolles case] a principal reason being that he considered the second 
and third paragraphs of the syllabus incompatible with the expressions 
of this court in previous cases." Cf. discussion on "extent of defea-
sance," infra p. 128. 
71 Apparently it still continues: see In re Estate of Morrison, 159 
Ohio St. 285, 289, 112 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1953). The exact point was not in 
issue in other recent Ohio evasion cases: Guitner v. McEowen, 99 Ohio 
App. 32, 124 N.E.2d 744 (1954) (joint bank account); MacLean v. 
J. S. MacLean Co., Ohio Prob., 123 N.E.2d 761 (1955), appeal dismissed 
in part, 133 N.E.2d 198 (1955) (gift); Morrison v. Morrison, 99 Ohio 
App. 203, 132 N.E.2d 233 (1955) (irrevocable declaration of trust). 
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understandable. The uncompromising severity of either 
viewpoint makes the other all the more intransigent. The 
majority opinion in the Harris case would permit the widow 
to invade any revocable inter vivos trust, regardless of her 
financial need, and (apparently, but we cannot be sure) re-
gardless of her equities. This unrealistic approach, although 
it may not result in a "flight of revocable trust capital from 
Ohio," 72 constitutes an unreasonable fetter on inter vivos 
trusts. On the other hand, the dissenting opinions would 
necessitate rejection of the widow's claim in any instance, also 
regardless of her financial need or other circumstances. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The illusory transfer test, based on excessive control, is 
not without merit. The widow's concern is with testamentary 
transfers, since the election statutes restrict her to the prop-
erty comprising the decedent's estate. Testamentary transfers 
are tested in terms of control. On this criterion, if the widow 
is to be permitted to reach other than testamentary trans-
fers, it would have to be transfers which are quasi-testamen-
tary, i.e., in which an unreasonable (albeit not such as to 
require the "testamentary" label) degree of control was re-
tained.73 The reason is simple: if a husband in substance en-
n This was predicted at pp. 54, 55 of the brief filed by the Ohio 
Fiduciaries Research Association as amicus curiae in the Harris case. 
73 Another popular "weasel word" in the evasion cases is "dominion." 
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954) defines it as "the 
power of governing and controlling; independent right of possession, 
use, and control. ... " "Dominion" appears in the second "Kerr" pas-
sage, infra, p. 99. The older cases tended to identify retention of pos-
session with "dominion": e.g., Smith v. Hines, lO Fla. 258 (1863-4) 
(retention of possession of slaves); Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632, 15 
S.E. 834 (1892); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 595, 604 (1850) (dic-
tum) (retention of possession in a revocable trust would make the 
trust testamentary because the "dominion" over the res continues 
unlimited). Later cases use the phrase, in describing illusory transfers, 
as being synonymous with "control"; see, e.g., Bolles v. Toledo Trust 
Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944); Harris v. Harris, 79 Ohio 
App. 443, 74 N.E.2d 407 (1945), aff'd, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 
(1947); cf. In re Kellas Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Surr. Ct., 1943), aff'd, 267 
App. Div. 924, 46 N.Y.S.2d 884 (3rd Dep't 1944), aff'd on other grounds) 
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joys and "owns" his property until he dies, he is under a 
moral if not a legal obligation to let the widow share. Put in 
other words, if the widow can participate in that property 
which the husband owned "in the eyes of the law," so should 
she be entitled to that which he owned in substance. Or the 
eyes of the law should be opened wider. If testamentary 
transactions are tested by "control," it is only natural that 
the test for quasi-testamentary ("illusory") transfers should 
speak the same language. 74 
293 N.Y. 908, 60 N.E.2d 34 (1944); Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 
786, 135 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1954). 
74 Cases using the illusory transfer doctrine include the following: 
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); 
MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), 
aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953); Application 
of Barasch, 267 App. Div. 830, 45 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't 1944), reargu-
ment denied sub. nom. In re Barasch's Estate, 267 App. Div. 905, 47 
N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d Dep't 1944); President and Directors of Manhattan Co. 
v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939), modified, 
260 App. Div. 174 and 954, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940); Bolles v. 
Toledo Trust Co., supra note 73; Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 
58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926) (also colorable). Cf. Gillette v. Madden, 280 
App. Div. 161, 112 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3rd Dep't 1952); Radecki v. Radecki, 
279 App. Div. 1137, 112 N.Y.S.2d 764 (4th Dep't 1952); Getz v. Getz, 
101 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Cohen's Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 776 
(Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Kellas Estate, supra, note 73; Estate of Rosen-
feld, N.Y. Sur., N.Y. L. J. 9 Feb., 1939, 1 P.H. Unreported Trust Cases, 
~25,275. The same transfer may be "illusory" with respect both to the 
wife's rights under a separation agreement and her rights under sec-
tion 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law. In the former situation 
she sues as a creditor. In re Sanchez' Estate, 58 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Surr. Ct. 
1945). Also see Bitzenberg v. Bitzenberg, 360 Mo. 70, 78-79, 226 S.W.2d 
1017, 1022 (1950) (dictum that an antenuptial transfer was illusory); 
Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941) (antenuptial; 
held "illusory," and other colorful adjectives). 
A recent Virginia case uses "illusory" as a synonym for "testamen-
tary." Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 
889, 895, 897 (1955), rehearing denied, 197 Va. 732, 90 S.E.2d 865 (1956), 
42 VA. L. REV. 256 (1956). 
In the following cases the transfer was held not to be illusory: 
Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952) (joint tenancy; 
Van Devere v. Moore, 243 Minn. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954) (sale at low 
price); Schmidt v. Rebhann, 108 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1951), com-
plaint dismissed on merits, 117 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (transfer of 
apartment building); Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d 764 
(Sup. Ct. 1948), afj'd without opinion, 274 App. Div. 1036, 85 N.Y.S.2d 
917 (1st Dep't 1949) (U. S. savings bonds and joint bank account). Cf. 
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Nor can it be said that the illusory transfer test is open to 
the charge of being too unpredictable. Of course, there are 
various degrees of control over administration of a trust - but 
not too many.75 To initiate or veto investments, sales, and 
the like; to act as co-trustee; to vote stock; to "use, occupy, 
manage, control, improve and lease the land in any manner 
and for any purposes he might desire"; 76 to state that the 
trustees' powers are to be exercised "in such manner only 
as the settlor shall from time to time direct in writing." 77 
These and other phrases constitute reasonably plain guide-
marks on the road to complete ownership. The courts should 
have little difficulty in defining what is permissible. To be 
sure, a settlor may have factual control without its legal 
counterpart; 78 subtleties of conveyancing may disguise actual 
United Building and Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. 
Ark. 1946); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 
N.E.2d 337 (1950); In re Ford's Estate, 279 App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 
-122 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E.2d 
87 (1952); Burtt v. Riley, 260 App. Div. 899, 22 N.Y.S.2d 972 (3d Dep't 
1940), motion for leave to appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 976, 24 
N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d Dep't 1940); Schenectady Trust v. Seward, 21 N.Y.S.2d 
815 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. 
Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (3d Dep't 1939), motion for leave to appeal 
denied, 256 App. Div. 1026, 11 N.Y.S.2d 547, aff'd without opinion, 281 
N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 (1939). Also see Weeks v. Weeks, 265 App. Div. 
942, 38 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1942); In re Barthold's Estate, 171 Misc. 
625, 13 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Surr. Ct. 1939). 
On the illusory trust doctrine in New York since the Halpern Case, 
see pp. 124-127, infra. 
75 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §185 (1935) makes a distinction between 
powers of control retained by the settlor that are of a fiduciary nature-
and therefore subject to enforcement by the court-and those other 
broader powers which are said to be for the benefit of the settlor alone, 
and over which the court has consequently no jurisdiction. In a lead-
ing case in which the settlor was given almost complete powers of con-
trol, Cardozo, J., remarked that "his discretion, however broad, did 
not relieve him from obedience to the great principles of equity which 
are the life of every trust." Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 712, 123 
N.E. 135, 858 (1919). Significantly, no power to revoke had been re-
served in that case. The distinction under discussion has apparently 
never been considered in connection with the problem of deciding 
when a trust becomes testamentary. 
76 Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899). 
77 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 377, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). 
78 A distinction should be made between control as retained and con-
trol as exercised. We are concerned only with the former. Formal re-
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ownership. For instance, an irrevocable trust may by pre-
arrangement be revocable. But that is the job of equity: to 
distinguish the essence from the externals. 
There is, however, a disturbing lack of logic in the control 
rationale, which affects both the Restatement "testamentary" 
test and the illusory trust test. These tests effect an unreal-
istic deemphasis of the power to revoke. Standing alone, or in 
combination with retention of the income for life, this power 
is not deemed to constitute excessive "control." 79 It is only 
when the power to revoke and the retention of income for 
life are combined with extreme control over administration 
that the transfer will be deemed testamentary or illusory. 
And yet of the three factors mentioned, it is the power to re-
voke that gives the settlor the greatest substantial control. 80 
tention of control does not necessarily mean that actual control will 
be exercised. A settlor may retain ironclad control, paper-wise, but he 
may rely utterly on the trustee's experience. That is the trustee's job: 
to administer. Contrariwise, a settlor who has retained only the power 
to revoke and the income may in actuality dominate the trustee. In 
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944), 
apparently the settlor's only formal "control" in trust No. 520 lay in 
the power to revoke and to change or restrict the trustee's powers. The 
trustee was thus in complete administrative control, and in charge of 
investments. We are told, however, that the settlor used this trust as 
"kind of a trading account, giving . . . instructions to sell certain 
stocks or purchase certain stocks." In fact, it was argued for the widow 
that Bolles could control the administration of the trust by a telephone 
call or a mere nod of the head. Transcript of record, p. 19. 
Continued practical control may also be exercised when the grantor 
continues to live in the house that has been conveyed. Cf. Schmidt v. 
Rebhann, 108 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1951), ll7 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 
1952) (transfer of apartment house few weeks before death to decedent 
and another as joint tenants with right of survivorship held not illu-
sory). Also see Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (1896); Goewey 
v. Hogan, 102 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
79 But cf. Newman v. Dore, supra note 77; Bolles v. Toledo Trust 
Co., supra note 78. 
80 The decisive influence of the power to revoke is brought out in 
the following evasion cases: United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 
64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946) (trust); Robertson v. Robertson, 147 
Ala. 3ll, 40 So. 104 (1905) (trust); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 
So. 684 (Fla. 1949) (trust); Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 162 So. 868 
(1935) (trust); Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4) (bill of sale); Smith 
v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944) (trust); 
Smith v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914) (trust deed); 
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Having the power to recapture the assets, to administer the 
coup de grace} it would seem that the settlor has all the con-
trol he needs over both the trust assets and the trustee. Is it 
fair to say, with reference to the trustee, that the possibility 
of loss of business acts as a sword of Damocles suspended in 
the area of the corporate ledgers? 81 Possibly not. Possibly its 
power to coerce can be exaggerated. The trustee's duty is to 
act for the best interests of the beneficiaries, regardless of the 
consequences. In most jurisdictions, upon revocation of the 
trust, the trustee would lose only the future commissions on 
income; he would receive his commission on principal upon 
Radecki v. Radecki, 279 App. Div. II37, 112 N.Y.S.2d 764 (4th Dep't 
1952) (deed); Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 870, 39 N.Y.S.2d 831 
(Sup. Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed by default, 67 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't 
1947) (deed); Krause v. Krause, 171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 
1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), 
modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941) (deed); Morrison v. Morri-
son, 99 Ohio App. 203, 132 N.E.2d 233 (1955) (trust); Bolles v. Toledo 
Trust Co., supra note 78 (trust); Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks, 83 
D.&C. 259 (Pa. 1952) (joint tenancy). Cf. Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 
273 Ky. I, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 
108 N.E.2d 563 (1952); Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650, 4 N.W.2d 737 
(1942); Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 
1954); In re Cohen's Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Surr. Ct. 1949); Harris v. 
Harris, 79 Ohio App. 443, 74 N.E.2d 407 (1945), aff'd, 147 Ohio St. 437, 
72 N.E.2d 378 (1947). 
A line of Virginia cases stresses irrevocability. In Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. 
Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813) the settlor transferred a large part 
of his personalty in trust, reserving a power of sale. The court as-
sumed that the trust was irrevocable and sustained the transfer. Also see 
Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 (1850) (power to sell with ac-
countability for proceeds unless substitute asset purchased); Hall v. 
Hall, 109 Va. ll7, 63 S.E. 420 (1909). But see Bickers v. Shenandoah 
Valley Nat'! Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955), rehearing denied, 
197 Va. 732, 733, 90 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1956). 
81 In re Ford's Estate, 279 App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122, (1st Dep't 
1951), aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E.2d 87 (1952), in 
which a revocable trust was held not to be testamentary although the 
settlor was a co-trustee. Van Voorhis, J., dissented, stating that a 
settlor who was co-trustee could be "assured of having his own way," 
because if thwarted he could revoke the trust. He reiterated the follow-
ing excerpt from the respondent's brief: " ... It is almost a uniform 
practice for a corporate co-trustee, not only to conform to the necessity 
of consulting its individual settlor-co-trustee as to investments, etc., but 
on any difference of opinion between them to abide by the settlor's 
judgment, providing it is within the realm of prudence." Id. at 159, 
108 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
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termination of the trust. 82 And from the settlor's viewpoint, 
in addition to the extra commissions, the cost of revocation 
will be increased by state taxes on the transfer of securities, 
and in isolated instances by a revocation fee. 83 Nevertheless, 
the settlor may by prearrangement with the trustee have the 
commission reduced in order to minimize the cost of revoca-
tion; or he may include a provision that the trustee is to ac-
count only to the settlor. Despite the high cost of revocation, 
the fact remains that "a settlor who has reserved a power of 
revocation ... has an interest which is, in effect, equivalent 
to ownership." 84 Complete ownership is at all times attain-
able by a stroke of his own pen.85 
82 Under a pay-as-you-go scheme, of course, the trustee would lose all 
further commissions on both principal and income. 
8s As in Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 
9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (3d Dep't 1939), motion for leave to appeal denied, 256 
App. Div. 1026, 11 N.Y.S.2d 547, aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 760, 
24 N.E.2d 20 (1939). 
84 Scott, "The Effects of a Power to Revoke a Trust," 57 HARV. L. REV. 
362, 366 (1944). 
85 It is probable that most settlors consider themselves to be in 
actuality the owner of the property in a revocable trust. "A simple ex-
planation of most of this testimony is that Kerwin knew that he had re-
served the power to alter, amend or revoke the trust agreements, and 
concluded that that reserved power left him substantially the master of 
the trust property." Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 570, 59 N.E.2d 
299, 306 (1945). 
There are other areas of the law in which the power to revoke a 
trust may be deemed to equate ownership. The most obvious example, 
which we need not labor, lies in the tax field. Creditors, by statute in 
some jurisdictions, may reach the trust corpus if the power to revoke 
was retained. See Scott, supra note 84, for a list of the statutes. For a 
discussion of the Ohio statute, see Alexander, "Certain Problems Con-
fronting Creditors When a Revocable Trust Accomplishes Succession," 
31 MicH. L. REv. 449 (1933); and see Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 
135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939), decided after Alexander's article 
was written, discussed supra notes 35, 69. In the absence of a statute it 
is doubtful if a creditor could take advantage of the power to revoke, 
unless, of course, the trust was a fraudulent conveyance, or the settlor 
was also the beneficiary. Further, when the settlor of a revocable trust 
consents to a breach of trust, the fact that the settlor has the power to 
revoke prevents the beneficiaries from surcharging the trustee. Scott, 
supra note 84; see City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 
125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943), reargument denied, 293 N.Y. 858, 59 N.E.2d 
445 (1944), aff'g, 264 App. Div. 429, 35 N.Y.S.2d 870, 265 App. Div. 
863, 38 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1942). Presumably the reasoning is that the 
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And there is another unfortunate aspect of the illusory 
transfer doctrine. Most courts, even in jurisdictions that 
purport to follow the doctrine, do not practice what they 
preach. An analysis of the evasion cases reveals a significantly 
high correlation between the result actually reached and the 
result dictated by the apparent "equities" in the case.86 In 
other words, the courts, consciously or otherwise, are in-
fluenced by factors other than mere retention of control. But 
the courts already committed to the "control" rationale 
naturally tend to announce the decision in terms of the con-
trol factor.87 In many cases violence has been done to the 
doctrine in order to square the result with the doctrine. 88 The 
power to revoke puts the settlor in the driver's seat, hence his wishes 
should prevail; otherwise he would be put to the needless expense of 
revocation, and creation of another trust. 
86 See Chap. 11, infra. 
8 7 The New York cases of the pre-Halpern era naturally regarded 
control as a definitive factor. See, e.g., Goewey v. Hogan, 102 N.Y.S.2d 
339 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (deed); Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 39 N.Y.S.2d 
831 (Sup. Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed by default, 67 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d 
Dep't 1947) (transfer of farm); Steixner v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 86 
N.Y.S.2d 747, (Sup. Ct. 1949) (Totten trust); Marano v. LoCarro, 62 
N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 
(1st Dep't 1946) (transfer of shares in realty company); Burns v. Turn-
bull, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 
41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 
986, 48 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't), aff'd on reargument mem., 268 App. 
Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), motion to dismiss appeal 
denied, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 240, aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 
889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945) (trust); Krause v. Krause, 171 Misc. 355, 13 
N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div., 1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 
341 (4th Dep't 1940), modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941) 
(Totten trust); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 176 Misc. 312, 27 
N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 841 
(2d Dep't 1941) (trust); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 
App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (3d Dep't 1939), motion for leave to ap-
peal denied, 256 App. Div. 1026, 11 N.Y.S.2d 547, aff'd without opin., 
281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 (1939) (trust); Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 
371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) (inter vivos trust); cf. Clavin v. Clavin, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1943), afj'd, 267 App. Div. 760, 45 N.Y.S.2d 
937 (1st Dep't 1943) (antenuptial transfer; weird discussion of illusory 
trust doctrine). 
88 Substantial control existed, and was referred to, in the following 
cases in which the transfer was sustained: William v. Williams, 40 Fed. 
521 (C.C.D. Kan. 1889) (transfer of all of husband's property to unlaw-
ful "wife"); Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A.2d 
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ensuing confusion in the case-law certainly does nothing to 
further the basic legislative policy. If anything, it constitutes 
a hazard for the husband who attempts to make an equitable 
inter vivos distribution to his children, particularly if the 
children are of a prior marriage. In other words, the estate 
planner cannot rely on the courts to say what they mean, or to 
mean what they say. 
That courts following the "control" rationale do pay heed 
to other factors is exemplified by the Newman case itself. 
Despite its earlier strong protestations to the contrary, 89 the 
court seems interested in indications of fraudulent intent on 
the part of the husband.90 The ultimate decision to label 
the husband's inter vivos trust "illusory" does not come until 
near the end of the judgment. The final paragraph justifies 
the decision by speaking of the husband's patently fraudulent 
intent. The trust, says the court, was "intended only as a mask 
for the effective retention by the settlor of the property which 
in form he had conveyed." 91 And the concluding sentences 
581 (1939) (transfer of life insurance policies in trust); Rose v. Union 
Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, I N.W.2d 458 (1942) (trust); Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 265 
App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (lst Dep't 1942), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 779, 50 
N.E.2d 106 (1943) (life insurance); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable 
Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932) (trust); Windolph v. Girard 
Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914) (trust). 
Substantial control may also exist when the decedent spouse has 
transferred money into a joint bank account. Thus in Inda v. Inda, 
32 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd without opinion, 263 App. Div. 
925, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 
59 (1942), it was admitted throughout that because the husband kept 
the bank book and drew interest he had retained complete control. 
This type of transfer is usually sustained, however. See infra, Chap. 14:2. 
Evidence of complete control is also irrelevant with reference to U.S. 
savings bonds. In re Kalina's Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 
(Surr. Ct. 1945), motion to dismiss appeal granted by default, 270 App. 
Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1946), discussed infra, p. 226. 
89 275 N.Y. 371, 379, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1937). 
90 See id. p. 378, 9 N.E.2d at 968, to the effect that the reserved 
rights "had no other purpose and substantially had no other effect" 
and also the last two sentences in the opinion, id. p. 381, 9 N.E.2d at 
970: "In this case it is clear that the settlor never intended to divest 
himself of his property. He was unwilling to do so even when death 
was near." 
91 I d. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969. 
TESTS BASED ON RETENTION OF CONTROL 95 
refer to (a) the proximity of the transfer to the date of death 
and semble (b) the fact that the husband transferred all his 
property: "In this case it is clear that the settlor never in-
tended to divest himself of his property. He was unwilling 
to do so even when death was near." 92 
92 Ibid. In 1936 the First Department had used language that placed 
strong emphasis on intent to frustrate the statutory share: Bodner v. 
Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936). The 
husband, a few months before death, had transferred substantially 
all his property, either by way of absolute transfer or by Totten trust, 
and with retention of a life interest. The court stated that husbands 
and wives may not "strip themselves of their property for the sole 
purpose of depriving those that the statute intended to protect of their 
right to inherit" (id. at 122, 286, N.Y. Supp. at 817). Untermyer, J., 
dissented vehemently on the ground that the term "fraud" is meaning-
less "when applied to a disposition by the absolute owner of property 
which is intended to prevent it from benefitting a party who has ac· 
quired no interest therein." Id. at 125, 286 N.Y. Supp. at 821. The 
case apparently was settled before it reached the court of appeals; see 
46 YALE L. J. 884, 885, note 3 (1937); cf. Hellstern v. Gillett, I P.H. 
Unreported Trust Cases, Para. 25, 233 (N.Y. 1937) (decided before the 
court of appeals decision in Newman v. Dore, supra note 89); In re 
Kellas' Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655, 663, aff'd, 267 App. Div. 924, 1006, 46 
N.Y.S.2d 884, aff'd on other grounds, 293 N.Y. 908, 60 N.E.2d 34 (1944). 
Similar emphasis may be found in Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 
176 Misc. 312, 27 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 
N.Y.S.2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941). The resulting confusion in the lower 
courts is indicated by Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 
1942), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), 
reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 986, 48 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't 1944), 
aff'd on reargument mem., 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 
1944), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 240 
(1945), aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945). Here 
the wife executed a trust eleven weeks before death. She designated 
herself as one of the two trustees, retained the power to appoint trus-
tees and remove them, retained the power to revoke, and retained "ex-
clusive control over the management of the trust funds." The trial 
court, in upholding the trust, went to some pains to emphasize that 
motive should be irrelevant, citing Newman v. Dore, but concluded 
by stating that since there was "no proof to show the settlor's state of 
mind at or before the trust's execution. . . . [C]onsequently it cannot 
be decided that her act in setting up the trust was not in good faith." 
The Second Department reversed, holding the trust void as being illu-
sory, with no mention of the intent factor, or of the trial court's tren-
chant remarks on the necessity of preserving freedom of alienation. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. In re Galewitz Estate, 
206 Misc. 218, 223, 132 N.Y.S.2d 297, 302 (Surr. Ct. 1954), speaks also 
of "intent" and "fraud," citing, inter alia, both the Newman and the 
Halpern cases. But the decision of the Third Department in Thomas 
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But the main defect of the illusory transfer doctrine is a 
more serious one than a lack either of logic or consistency.93 
The test is too narrow. To say that the sole criterion of eva-
sion is excessive control is to suggest that we must ignore all 
the other circumstances in the case. But if we ignore the 
other circumstances- the other "equities"- we may end up 
by deciding that a certain transfer is "illusory," and thus an 
evasion, even though common sense tells us it was not an eva-
sion. Assume that H, a husband, is worth $40,000. Is not H's 
widow more seriously injured by an irrevocable inter vivos 
trust of $30,000 (non-illusory) than by a revocable inter vivos 
trust, with retention of control, of $3,000 (illusory)? 94 Should 
v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3rd Dep't 1954), raises 
doubts, not only on the relevance of the "intent" factor to the Newman 
v. Dore doctrine but also on the validity of the doctrine itself. See 
Chap. 9, note 21, infra. 
93 Authority may even be found for the proposition that any reten-
tion of control would be fatal to the validity of the transfer, e.g., 
Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887). The Rabbitt case is 
probably not authoritative today in Maryland; see Maryland cases 
listed in Table E, infra, p. 406. Conversely, some cases hold for the 
widow even though the transfer was irrevocable, e.g., Bodner v. Feit, 
247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936); Lonsdale's 
Estate, 29 Pa. 407 (1857). For an outline of the elements of "control" 
in a transfer of land, cf. Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 
362 (1941) (antenuptial transfer). 
Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 
611 (1939) illustrates the "joint control" that is obtained when the 
settlor appoints himself as a co-trustee. Here the trustees had the power 
to manage, invest and reinvest, and the settlor had the income and the 
power to revoke. The widow was permitted to defeat this trust, but 
the court used the traditional Missouri test of intent to defraud, in 
anticipation of pending death. The court stated that for practical pur-
poses the arrangement was testamentary: "We think it is apparent from 
the evidence that deceased realized he would not be able to exercise 
the power of revocation, use the joint control, nor live to enjoy this 
income." Id. at 1161, 130 S.W.2d at 617. This statement raises a 
question: if a transfer of substantially all a man's assets is made shortly 
before his death, at the expense of his deserving widow, of what rele-
vance is the existence or otherwise of either or all of the income, power 
to revoke, control? Would not the trust in Newman v. Dore have been 
equally flagrant, equally a violation of the spirit of the forced share, if 
it had contained none of these factors? 
94 Under section 8 of the suggested model statute, in Chap. 22, the 
claimant would not be permitted to attack an irrevocable trust if it was 
made more than three years before death. 
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we not consider the size of the transfer, as well as retention 
of control? And why not consider the motive, among other 
factors? In rejecting intent ("motive") the court in the New-
man case quoted Mr. Justice Holmes: "when an act is con-
demned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong 
side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere 
letter of the law."95 What Holmes had in mind, of course, was 
that a transaction that does not infringe the letter of a statute 
may nevertheless be invalidated because it is repugnant to the 
basic legislative policy. Implicit in this notion is the not un-
reasonable assumption that in deciding whether a particular 
transaction is offensive to the spirit (as opposed to the letter) 
of a statute, all relevant circumstances must be considered. 
The court in the Newman case quite properly acknowledged 
that it should interpret legislation 96 so as to effectuate the 
purpose of the legislation (in this case to "increase protection 
of the surviving spou·se"). This does not amount to "judicial 
legislation." But it was unfortunate that the court stressed 
retention of "control" and ignored other important factors 
such as the relative amount transferred, the relationship be-
tween the decedent and the donee, the financial circumstances 
of the widow, and the like. 
· Moreover, fraud should be fought with the net, not with 
the sword. A broad, flexible coverage is preferable to empha-
sis on a single point; for fraud, as the old tag goes, wears 
many faces. To become too specific in defining fraud (or "eva-
sion") serves only to sharpen the wits of the transferor's 
counsel. 
95 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1915). In this case the 
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the Wisconsin inheritance tax 
on an inter vivos transfer of securities to an Illinois trustee. Holmes 
stated that the court below "was fully justified in treating Bullen's 
general power of disposition as equivalent to a fee for the purposes of 
the taxing statute .... " 
96 Involving in the Newman case a liberal interpretation of the word 
"estate." 
CHAPTER 8 
Tests That Stress The Motive For 
The Transfer 
A number of decisions purport to test the validity of the 
transfer by reference to the decedent's "intent." Paradoxically, 
the very elusiveness of the "intent" concept has led most 
of the jurisdictions normally using that rationale to adopt a 
test that in practice pays more attention to the equities of the 
case than to the transferor's intent. The evidentiary factors 
that receive stress vary with the jurisdiction, as also does the 
degree of stress. 
Before turning to the "intent" test and its variations, how-
ever, we will find it useful to examine some concepts that con-
fuse the case-law in general, and the "intent" cases in par-
ticular. I refer to the ubiquitous passage from Kerr on 
Fraud and Mistake, and to the uses that are made of the term 
"fraud." 
1. ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "KERR" PASSAGES 
The groping attempt of an early writer to establish a work-
ing rule in the evasion field is partially responsible for our 
present-day confusion. A note in Kerr on Fraud and Mis-
take,! 1872 edition, had this to say: "There can be no doubt 
of the power of a husband to dispose absolutely of his prop-
erty during his life, independently of the concurrence, and 
exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided the trans-
action is not merely colorable, and be unattended with cir-
cumstances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. If 
the disposition of the husband be bona fide, and no right is 
1 At p. 220. This edition has notes on American cases, by Orlando 
F. Bump. 
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reserved to him, though made to defeat the right of the wife, 
it will be good against her." 
It will be noticed that this passage, which I shall label pas-
sage "A," purports to make four separate points: the transfer 
must be (a) bona fide; and it cannot be (b) merely colorable, 
or (c) attended with circumstances indicative of fraud on the 
rights of the wife, or (d) one in which a right is reserved. As 
we shall see later, the first three points sound very much like 
the modern "reality" test. The fourth point perhaps reflects 
the then prevailing views of the nature of a testamentary 
instrument. The cases cited for passage "A" are all cases in 
which the transfer was upheld. 2 In some of them possession 
was retained; in none was there a retention of the power to 
revoke. 
Immediately following passage "A" is this sentence, which 
I shall call passage "B": "If the disposition of the property 
by the husband is a mere device or contrivance by which, 
not parting with the absolute dominion over the property 
during his life, he seeks at death to deny his widow the share 
in his estate which the law assigns to her, it will be ineffectual 
against her." Passage "B" apparently was intended as a quali-
fication of passage "A." 3 It introduces a fifth notion, to wit, 
2 Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824) (voluntary deed of all hus-
band's realty; rationale: there can be no fraud when wife had no 
right); Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140 (1852) (separate main-
tenance; bill of sale of slaves with payment of consideration and trans-
fer of possession); Cameron v. Cameron, 10 Smedes & M. 394 (Miss. 
1848) (irrevocable deed of trust of slaves and other personalty, but 
retention of possession and control); Holmes v. Holmes, 3 Paige 363 
(N.Y. 1832) (husband purchases realty from his son at a price greatly 
exceeding its value); Lightfoot v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813) 
(irrevocable deed of trust of slaves, retention of possession; dissenting 
judge urges custom of London cases, pointing out that both "control" 
and "intent" present). 
3 The claimant prevailed in all three cases cited by Bump for passage 
"B," viz, Hays v. Henry, 1 Md. Ch. 337 (1848); Reynolds v. Vance, 48 
Tenn. 294 (1870) (intent, as qualified by "reasonableness"); Thayer v. 
Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842) (intent; custom of London cases cited, con-
taining the phrase "contrivances to evade the custom"). The second 
passage appears also in 30 C.J. Husband and Wife 524 (1923); 41 C.J.S. 
Husband and Wife 419 (1944); 13 R.C.L. Husband and Wife 1088 
(1916.) 
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intent ("motive"), as indicated by the phrases "device," "con-
trivance," and "[transfer] by which ... he seeks to deny 
his widow ... [her] share." 4 The phrase "not parting with 
the absolute dominion" tends to reaffirm the caveat expressed 
in passage "A" that any reservation of a "right" would permit 
the widow to have the transfer set aside. Thus we find in the 
few lines of the two Kerr passages all three of today's popular 
rationales: (a) retention of control, (b) motive for the trans-
fer, and (c) the "reality" of the transfer. 
That both passages were influenced by the custom of Lon-
don cases may be seen from Hays v. Henry/ cited by Kerr as 
authority for passage "B." In that case retention of posses-
sion was referred to as a "badge of fraud"; 6 and both passages 
concerned appear in the case almost verbatim. The modern 
courts, as well as the early courts, have utilized these pas-
sages to suit their convenience. Sometimes both will be 
quoted; 1 but usually the cases sustaining the widow's claim 
will quote merely passage "B," 8 and cases rejecting the claim 
will quote merely passage "A." 9 Nor is there any con-
4 Dictum that this notion applies to antenuptial transfer cases: Geiger 
v. Merle, 360 III. 497, 510-11, 196 N.E. 497, 503 (1935), cert. denied, 
296 U.S. 630 (1935). For antenuptial transfers, see Appendix C, infra. 
5 1 Md. Ch. *337 (1848); see also Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 80 (1856) 
(extensive discussion of custom of London cases). 
6 Citing Smith v. Fellows, 2 Atk. 62, 26 Eng. Rep. 435 (1740); Hall v. 
Hall, 2 Vern. 276, 23 Eng. Rep. 779 (1692). 
1 Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 104 (1905) (transfer of 
bonds valid although interest for life retained; both passages quoted); 
Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940) (valid; 
"reality" test); Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905) (valid); 
Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887) (invalid; collusion, re-
tention of possession; both passages quoted, citing Hays v. Henry). 
8 Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963 (Mo. 1919) (invalid: "in-
tent"); Newton v. Newton, 162 Mo. 173, 61 S.W. 881 (1901) (invalid; 
"intent"); Hays v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926) 
(invalid; illusory and colorable); cf. Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 
S.W.2d 509 (1940) (antenuptial transfer by husband to his sister, who 
acted as a "mere depository" of the funds); Manikee's Adm'x v. Beard, 
85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887) (invalid; "intent"); Walker v. Walker, 66 
N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891) (invalid; "intent"; custom of London cases 
cited). 
9 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912) ("bona 
fide" transaction; not colorable because absolute and irrevocable); 
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sistency with respect to the "reservation of a right" phrase. It 
is only in the earlier cases that there is any disposition to 
penalize a mere retention of possession.10 This factor should 
of course be irrelevant under modern conditions. But reten-
tion of the power to revoke was always regarded as signifi-
cant.11 
In summary, the two passages from Kerr appear to stem 
from the cases under the custom of London. Both passages 
contain qualifications, unrealistic by modern standards, on re-
tention of a "right" or of an "interest." Although usually 
quoted separately, the passages were apparently intended to 
be interdependent. Thus the American evasion jurisprudence 
began with a hodge-podge rationale that stressed the "reality" 
of the transfer but which also referred to "control" and to 
the "intent" of the transferor. This wonder-mixture from 
Kerr is the staple fare of many a modern judicial offering. 
Needless to say, we encounter it frequently in decisions using 
the "intent" rationale. 
2. MEANINGS OF THE WoRD "FRAUD" 
As might be expected, the catch-all phrase in the evasion 
cases is "fraud." A representative sampling of the cases in-
dicates that the phrase has almost as many meanings as there 
are sands in the sea. The more common usages are as follows: 
1. "Fraud," as used with relation to antenuptial, or "eve 
of marriage" transfersP Here the phrase is employed in the 
Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. ll6, 84 N.E. 192 (1908); Padfield v. Pad-
field, 78 Ill. 16 (1875) (intimation that power to revoke would make 
transfer "only colorable," apparently with passage "B" in mind); Small 
v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 
260 P.2d 604 (1953) ("reality"); Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 
P.2d 563 (1954); cf. Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935), 
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 630 (1935) (antenuptial agreement); Lines v. 
Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891) ("reality"); Young's Estate, 202 
Pa. 431, 51 Atl. 1036 (1902) (no "intent"). 
10 E.g., Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887). 
11 E.g., Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912). 
12 See Appendix C, infra. 
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more conventional sense of misrepresentations inducing detri-
mental reliance. For example, a prospective husband, having 
informed his fiancee that he owns certain real estate, conveys 
it secretly to another person just prior to the marriage. 
"Fraud," in this more culpable sense, is used also in connec-
tion with (a) transfers to evade alimony, and (b) transfers in 
anticipation of a reconciliation between spouses who have 
been separated. 
2. "Fraud;' meaning a sham transfer. A conveyance that 
is not operative as between the parties thereto will of course 
have no effect on the widow's rightsY 
3. "Fraud," or "actual fraud," as sometimes used to qualify 
the "reality" test.14 Perhaps these expressions refer to shams, 
but usually their meaning is obscure.15 
4. "Fraud," meaning intent to evade the widow's rights. 
Some courts purport to test the validity of a transfer by refer-
ence to evasive intent. If the motive is to deprive the widow 
of her share, it is fraud. But most of these courts qualify this 
test in practice by stating that there is no fraud if the transfer 
was reasonable under the circumstances, regardless of the mo-
tive.16 The cases using this "intent" test will be examined in 
detail later in this chapter. 
5. Fraud on the marital rightY This term is used with 
13 The purported transfer in this situation is also said to be color-
able; infra, p. 133. 
14 Conversely, another popular cliche is there can be no fraud when 
the wife has no "present interest" in her husband's property. An early 
example of this reasoning is found in Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 
(1824); and it appears expressly or by implication in most of the more 
recent cases that deny relief to the surviving spouse. 
15 See, e.g., the Pennsylvania cases, discussed infra, pp. 140-144. And 
the expression may be found in connection with an "intent" rationale. 
Thus in Estate of Sides, ll9 Neb. 314, 324, 228 N.W. 619, 623 (1930), 
the court stated that reasonable gifts would be sustained "[I]n the 
absence of positive fraud (italics supplied). On the Sides case, see infra, 
text at note 33. 
16 "Motive" (described as "fraud") bobs up in individual cases in 
states whose courts purport to reject motive. See, e.g., the New York 
cases, chiefly antedating Newman v. Dore, set out in Chap. 7, note 92. 
17 Cf. MonEL PROBATE ConE §33, infra, Chap. 19:2; Maryland cases, 
Table E, infra. 
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reference both to antenuptial and to postnuptial transfers. 
When it has reference to the postnuptial transfers, the transfer 
may or may not be accompanied by evidence of evasive intent 
on the part of the transferorY In fact, for lack of a better 
term we could say that this expression approximates construc-
tive fraud. 19 Frequently it represents a decision reached by 
a judicial process that is influenced by a variety of evidentiary 
factors, some of which may not even be referred to in the 
opinion. 
3. THE "INTENT" TEST 
(a) Introductory Remarks. As might be expected, the 
courts have not been meticulously exact in referring to the 
"intent" factor. Consider the leading case of Newman v. 
Dare) in which the court tells us that "motive or intent is an 
unsatisfactory test of the validity of a transfer of property," 20 
then announces a new rationale couched in terms both of 
motive and intent. 21 In ordinary usage "intent" denotes de-
liberate design or purpose, i.e., to make a transfer, whereas 
"motive" refers to the incentive that prompts such a trans-
fer.22 Thus the husband may intend to evade the forced share, 
but from a justifiable motive: e.g. that he thought he had 
already made a generous inter vivos provision for his wife, as 
was seen in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.23 Probably all courts 
18 See, e.g., the Kentucky cases, infra, section 3(4). 
19 That "fraud" depends on the reasonableness of the transfer, see 
Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1949); Smith v. 
Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4); cf. Williams v. Collier, 158 So. 815 (1935), 
120 Fla. 248, 162 So. 868 (1935). That it is a relative term, see Smith v. 
Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914); cf. Stice v. Nevin, 344 
Ill. App. 642, 101 N.E.2d 873 (1951); Boyle v. Smyth, 248 Ill. App. 57 
(1928); York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922) ("fraud" not 
defined, but reasonable provisions otherwise for widow mentioned); 
Garrison v. Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916) (transfer upheld 
even though all of husband's separate estate transferred); Farrell v. 
Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 74 Pac. 96 (1903). 
20 275 N.Y. 371, 379, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1937). 
21 "[W]hether the husband has in good faith divested himself of 
ownership of his property or has made an illusory transfer." ld. at 379, 
9 N.E.2d at 969. Also see p. 75, supra. 
22 Webster's New International Dictionary (20th ed. 1949). 
23 See supra, Chap. 7, text at note 39. 
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would concede that no inter vivos transfer would be valid for 
any purpose unless the execution thereof is accompanied by 
a determination ("intent") that is should be legally binding, 
and effective according to its terms. A "sham" transfer is 
objectionable because, being counterfeit or feigned, it lacks 
the requisite donative intent. When there is donative intent, 
the courts disagree, however, as to the relevance of the motive 
of the transferor; and the confusion is accentuated by the 
use in and out of context of such phrases as "intent," "mo-
tive," "fraud," "illusory," "colorable," "good faith," and the 
like. 
Many cases purport to say that intent ("motive") is irrele-
vant.24 Other cases explicitly 25 or by implication 26 use the 
24 "Intent" was given some stress in Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 
529, 530, 54 N.E. 251, 252 (1899). The intent (motive) factor was de-
clared irrelevant, however, in subsequent Massachusetts cases; e.g., 
Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 N.E. 866 (1926); and in Kerwin v. 
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 571, 59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (1945); the Brownell 
case, on the intent aspect, was declared "no longer controlling." See 
also Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E.2d 198 (1956); Redman 
v. Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (1918); Kelley v. Snow, 185 
Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904) (wife puts her property out of husband's 
reach "with grim determination"). Another determined wife was suc-
cessful in the delightful case of Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 
N.E.2d 126 (1944). Said the court: "It is evidence in favor of the 
creation of a present interest in Patrick [a brother in Ireland] that with-
out it the purpose of his sister Mary to keep the deposits out of her 
estate and to defeat any inheritance by her husband ... could not be 
accomplished." The Massachusetts cases are also discussed, in connec-
tion with the "reality" rationale, in Chap. 9, note 3. 
25 Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902); Van Devere 
v. Moore, 243 Minn. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664, (1954); Goewey v. Hogan, 102 
N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 39 
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d 
Dep't 1947); Windolph v. Girard, 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914); Lines 
v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891). 
26 United Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. 
Ark. 1946); Gillette v. Madden, 280 App. Div. 161, 112 N.Y.S.2d 543 
(3d Dep't 1952); Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. C~. 
1948); aff'd without opinion, 274 App. Div. 1063, 85 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st 
Dep't 1949); accord, Hirschfield v. Ralston, 66 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 
1946); cf. Clavin v. Clavin, 41 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd 
without opinion, 267 App. Div. 760, 45 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1943) 
(antenuptial transfer); Inda v. Inda, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941), 
aff'd without opinion, 263 App. Div. 925, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 
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reasoning, popularized in Newman v. Dare, that the only 
"intent" which is revelant is the intent to divest in "good 
faith," and also that "there can be no fraud where no right o£ 
any person is invaded." 27 Less extreme are those cases that 
consider "intent" to be irrelevant unless the transfer is "color-
able," 28 or attended with circumstances indicative of 
"fraud," 29 or coupled with retention of some rights in the 
property transferred.30 Some cases state that "intent," i.e., 
motive, is relevant if coupled with collusive participation by 
the donee; 31 and other cases intimate it would be decisive if 
coupled with collusion.32 
1942), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 315, 318, 43 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1942) (if a valid joint 
tenancy is created, "the actual intent ... makes no difference"); 
Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 103 App. Div. 327, 349, 93 
N.Y.S. 92 (1st Dep't 1905), modified and aff'd, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 
359 (1906); Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941) (ante-
nuptial transfer). 
27 Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940). 
28 See the Colorado cases, infra, p. 135; Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 
81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd without opinion, 274 App. Div. 
1036, 85 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1949). In De Noble v. De Noble, 331 
Pa. 273, 277, 200 Atl. 77, 79 (1938), the court said: "In determining 
the question of intent, actual fraud is the indispensable foundation and 
is not established merely by proving that the husband's purpose is to 
deprive the wife of her distributive share in his estate as widow .... 
Such fraud would exist, for example, if the transfer were a colorable 
one, the husband retaining a concealed interest in the property" 
(italics supplied). 
29 In re Rynier's Estate, 48 LANe. L. REv. 475, aff'd, 347 Pa. 471, 
32 A.2d 736 (1943). 
so Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940); 
Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915); Hays 
v. Henry, I Md. Ch. 337 (1848); MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 
435, 437, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-88, (1st Dep't 1952) (purporting to fol-
low Newman v. Dore, but stating that the reservation of enumerated 
rights "made plain her intention to take away from her spouse his 
contingent expectant estate"; Schmidt v. Rebhann, 108 N.Y.S.2d 441 
(Sup. Ct. 1951), complaint dismissed on merits, 117 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. 
Ct. 1952); Marano v. LaCarro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121, aff'd, 270 App. Div. 
999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946); cf. Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. 
Ch. 140 (1852). 
31 Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109, 131 Atl. 40 (1925) (retention 
of control also mentioned); Potter v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 Atl. 
401 (1928). 
32 Brewer v. Connell, 30 Tenn. 343 (1851); London v. London, 20 
Tenn. I (1839); accord, In re Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215, 28 Atl. 
1113 (1894). 
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As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the courts 
that place formal emphasis on the decedent's motive tend in 
practice to be governed by the equities of the case. Naturally, 
these courts have found it convenient to describe "intent" 
by reference to its objective manifestations. Some or all of 
the circumstances of the transfer will be weighed before 
reaching a conclusion as to the validity of the transfer. The 
conclusion, however, is announced in the language of the 
"intent" factor. We may use as an example the Nebraska 
case, In re Estate of Sides. 33 Here the testator made inter 
vivos gifts of about one half his estate to children of a former 
marriage, in each instance taking a note bearing interest at 
4 per cent, the note to be cancelled at his death. The court 
construed it to be an absolute inter vivos gift, with reserva-
tion of a 4 per cent annuity. As such, said the court, it was 
not testamentary, and would be valid unless "the gift was 
made by the father with the intent to defraud his surviving 
widow and was made under such circumstances as to amount 
to fraud, either actual or constructive, against her under the 
laws ... of Nebraska." 34 As to "fraud," the court stated 
that "substantially all authority is to the effect that the ques-
tion of good faith is controlling. If the transfer of personal 
property by the husband during his lifetime is a mere device 
and means by which he retains to himself the use and benefit 
of the property during his lifetime, and at his death seeks 
to deprive the widow of her distributive share, it is to be re-
garded as fraudulent as to the wife." 35 Similar language oc-
curs in many other cases, 36 and generally has led to a test 
33 ll9 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930); cf. Bestry v. Dorn, 180 Md. 42, 
22 A.2d 552 (1941), and subsequent Maryland cases through Whitting-
ton v. Whittington, 205 Md. I, 106 A.2d 72 (1954). See Table E, infra. 
3 4 ll9 Neb. 314, 321, 228 N.W. 619, 622 (1930). 
35 !d. at 323, 228 N.W. at 622. The court cites Allen v. Henggeler, 
32 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1929). The Allen case, however, is merely a tax 
case in which the cryptic statement is made that a husband may deal 
with his own property without his wife's consent, with some statutory 
limitations " ... and, perhaps, he cannot give away or dissipate prop-
erty in fraud of her." Id. at 72. 
36 See discussion p. 99, supra. 
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centered on "good faith divestment," i.e., excluding questions 
of motive. In the Sides case, however, the court said that on 
the issue of fraud "the burden of proof is upon the surviving 
widow to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, 
in making these gifts to his children, the father was actuated 
by bad motive and fraudulent intent/1 and that the entire 
transaction was a mere device by which he sought to defraud 
her." 38 Scrutinizing the decedent's motive, the court found 
no fraud, in view of "the relationship of all the parties; the 
amount of the Sides estate and its history . . . the value of 
the gifts; the time and manner of making them and the extent 
to which the children participated." 39 
The court in the Sides case, then, would have us look at the 
equities. If the transfer is reasonable (e.g., in this instance, 
37 Italics supplied. 
38 119 Neb. 314, 323, 228 N.W. 619, 622 (1930). The court cites 
Knull v. Annan, 110 Neb. 70 (1923), but the Knull case dealt with evi-
dentiary rules in deciding whether a transfer from testator was a gift 
or a loan and did not refer to the problem under discussion. 
39 119 Neb. 314, 323, 228 N.W. 619, 622-23 (1930). The sympathies 
of the court may be discerned from the following gallantry: "It is 
but natural to assume that in the closing days of his life this old man, 
in memory, returned often to the scene of his early struggles and 
lingered long with the devoted young wife who so willingly surrendered 
herself to every demand of poverty and young romance. Here again, 
no doubt, were rekindled the smoldering fires of parental devotion. 
Inspiration was not lacking, and these gifts appear to have been 
prompted by generous motives arising naturally from the relationship 
of parent and child. Under all the circumstances, it cannot be said 
that these gifts were unreasonable, but rather they appear to have been 
in complete accord with the natural inclinations of the human heart. 
In the absence of positive fraud, such [gifts] will not be disturbed." 
119 Neb. at 324, 228 N.W. at 623. 
In an early Ohio case, McCammon v. Summons, 2 Disn. 596 (Ohio 
1859) the court, making some liberal deductions from the custom of 
London cases (see p. 54, supra) analogized the wife's claim to that 
of a quasi creditor, and held that a husband could not defeat his wife's 
rights by a deed in trust of all his personalty to grandchildren. The 
court intimated the wife would prevail even if the deed has been 
delivered and irrevocable, as the evidence indicated it had been exe-
cuted with intent to defeat the wife's rights. The equities in the 
McCammon case were apparently against the wife, but her claim was 
upheld although the court's sympathy lay with the "heart-broken man 
... separated from his wife." Id. at 600. Compare, however, the 
later Ohio cases, supra, Chap. 7, in text following note 39. 
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to provide for children of a former marriage), there is no 
"intent," no fraud. But if a husband were to give "the other 
woman" a substantial part of his estate, to the detriment of 
a deserving wife, it would appear that on the Sides case ra-
tionale the transfer could be set aside; whereas under the 
"good faith" test of Newman v. Dore it would be valid, un-
less such control was retained as to render it "illusory"; and 
under the "reality" doctrine of the Halpern case it would 
clearly be valid. 
(b) Variations of the "Intent" Test. Emphasis on the equi-
ties of the case in determining the decedent's "intent" ap-
pears in varying form in a number of jurisdictions. Vermont, 
for instance, appears to pay some heed to the equities; but 
New Hampshire seems to have slipped into a more subjec-
tive approach. The Tennessee cases, chiefly older ones, ap-
proximate something like the rule in the Sides case, at least 
with reference to realty. Kentucky raises a presumption of 
"intent" (or "fraud") in certain circumstances; and the Mis-
souri cases speak of "intent" in terms, inter alia, of the 
proximity of the transfer to the date of death. 
(1) The Vermont Cases. The Vermont cases portray a long 
history of judicial indecision on the significance of "intent." 
The earliest case is Thayer v. Thayer, in 1842.40 Here the 
court drew analogies from the custom of London and per-
mitted the widow to prevail against a voluntary transfer of 
the husband's property, made in his last sickness, in trust for 
his children by a former marriage. The husband had taken 
a lease on the property that was conveyed. The rationale is 
not entirely clear, but the court stresses the "bad faith" (mo-
tive) of the husbandY Half a century later, in Nichols v. 
Nichols 42 a transfer for some consideration was held to be 
4o 14 Vt. 107 (1842). 
41 "[I]f her claims to dower are to depend upon the caprice of the 
husband, and to be superseded by his conveyance, concocted and ex-
ecuted mala fide, and without consideration, our statutory provision 
might well receive our severest animadversion." Id. at 119. Cf. Green 
v. Adams, 59 Vt. 602, 10 Atl. 742 (1887) (transfer to avoid alimony). 
42 61 Vt. 426, 18 Atl. 153 (1889). 
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inoperative against the wife's marital rights, the court stating 
that the passage of consideration "is of no importance if the 
deed in fact was made with ... fraudulent intent .... " In 
concluding, the court remarked that "the intent to defeat 
the marital rights of the oratrix by both grantor and grantees 
in the deed in question is necessarily presumed from their 
knowledge that such rights would be defeated by the convey-
ance. Both are presumed to have intended the natural results 
of their acts." In other words, intent to defraud is governing 
and need not be proved - it will be presumed. 
In Dunnett v. Shields/8 however, the court stated that there 
should be no presumption of fraud in these cases. Such a 
rule, it said, "would make the validity of the transfer depend 
upon an implied intent, while the true rule is that it is only 
an actual intent to defeat the wife's rights that vitiates it." 
And this rejection of the Nichols rule was repeated in Patch 
v. Squires,44 the court going so far as to say that "The pre-
sumption is in favor of innocence and not of guilt." 45 Al-
though the Patch case purports to reiterate the "actual in-
tent" rule, there is some indication that the intent to defeat 
the wife's rights will not be considered culpable if the transfer 
is a reasonable one under the circumstances.46 In other words, 
"intent" may well be a mere shorthand symbol for a judicial 
conclusion that in reality has been reached by considering 
other factors in addition to motive. 
(2) The New Hampshire Cases. New Hampshire, of all 
the jurisdictions under discussion, comes the closest to evolv-
ing a purely subjective theory. Oddly enough, an early New 
43 97 Vt. 419, 123 Atl. 626 (1924). 
44 105 Vt. 405, 165 Atl. 919 (1933). 
45 Cf. Tillison v. Tillison, 95 Vt. 535, 116 Atl. 117 (1922). 
46 "The plaintiff had not lived with or supported his wife for over 
twenty-six years. The money came to Mrs. Patch by gift from her 
mother. The donees were her kin who had lived in her household, and 
some, if not all, were caring for her in her illness. The chancellor 
might well, as he probably did, apply to all the facts and circumstances 
this test: Would the ordinary person in Mrs. Patch's situation have 
made the gifts in question?" (citing Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352, 100 
Atl. 671, 672). 105 Vt. 405, 4ll, 165 Atl. 919, 921 (1933). 
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Hampshire case, Walker v. Walker/1 used a subjective test 
that hinged on an enquiry into the reasonableness of the 
transfer. And in Evans v. Evans 48 the court, although using 
a subjective test, qualified it with the statement that the trans-
fer would be illegal, "no matter what his purpose for making 
the gift may have been, if making it when, as, and for the 
purpose he did, was an unreasonable 49 thing to do." But 
this dalliance with "reasonableness" was stopped by !bey v. 
lbey/0 in 1947. In that case a husband bought United States 
savings bonds, payable at death to children and grandchil-
dren. The trial court found intent to deprive the wife of her 
distributive share. The widow was given a constructive trust 
on the bonds, to the extent of the distributive share; and the 
court went out of its way to state that gifts of husbands are 
not "subject to any standard of reasonableness apart from 
the matter of fraudulent intent. In so far as Evans v. Evans 
. . . applied such a separate test, it is overruled." 
(3) The Tennessee Cases. Tennessee is one of the few 
states having a statute affecting our problem. Enacted origi-
nally in 1784, it states that "Any conveyance made fraudu-
lently to children or others, with an intent to defeat the 
widow of her dower, or distributive share, shall be voidable, 
and such widow shall be entitled to dower in the land so 
fraudulently conveyed, as if no conveyance had been made." 51 
An early case intimated that under the Act "every convey-
ance founded merely upon meritorious consideration is as 
much fraudulent and void against the widow as if the fraudu-
lent intention were established by positive proof." 52 This as-
4766 N.H. 390, 395, 31 Atl. 14 (1891). 
48 78 N.H. 352, 100 Atl. 671 (1917). 
49 Italics supplied. 
50 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1945), exceptions overruled, 94 N.H. 
425, 55 A.2d 872 (1947). 
51 Tenn. Code Ann. §31-612 (Williams 1956). §31·613 confers simi-
lar rights on the husband. §31·601 gives the widow dower in the land 
"of which her husband died seized." 
52 Hughes v. Shaw, 8 Tenn. 314, 323 (1827). The Hughes case also 
makes this interesting statement: "The effect of the proof increased in 
proportion to the amount of the estate conveyed, compared with the 
TESTS THAT STRESS THE MOTIVE FOR THE TRANSFER 111 
sertion is akin to the view of the Vermont court, in the 
Nichols case, that intent may be presumed. In Mcintosh 
v. Lad d) 58 however, the court expressly repudiated this notion, 
on the ground that it would force those claiming under the 
transfer to show that it was "fair, and for a valuable considera-
tion." Moreover, the court suggested that the reasonableness 
of the transfer would bear on the question of the decedent's 
"intent." The act of 1784, it said, was not meant to affect 
"bona fide gifts, whereby the husband actually and openly 
divests himself of his property, and the enjoyment of it in his 
lifetime, in favor of children and others, thereby making, 
according to his circumstances and the situation of his family, 
a just and reasonable present provision for persons having 
meritorious claims on him, and with that view, and not with 
the view to defeat, nor for the sake of diminishing, the wife's 
dower." 54 
In Reynolds v. Vance 55 a conveyance of all the husband's 
realty to his children was held, under the test of Mcintosh v. 
Ladd} to be subject to the wife's claim. The deed mentioned 
a consideration of $3,000 but actually was only for $300; 
there was provision for immediate possession by the grantees, 
but the husband retained possession for eight years until 
death; and the deed, although acknowledged for recording, 
was not recorded until after the husband's death.56 
amount retained." Id. at 319. Another early case, Brewer v. Connell, 
30 Tenn. 343 (1851), stated that if the donee participates in the fraud 
the transaction is void as to the wife, even if the donee paid a fair price 
for the land. Cf. London v. London, 20 Tenn. I (1839). As to par-
ticipation by the donee, see infra, Chap. 10:2(e). 
5a 20 Tenn. 445 (1840). 
54 I d. at 451, quoting from Littleton v. Littleton, I Dev. & Bat. 330 
(N.C. 1835), and stating that the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
is "a court of at least equal authority with our own upon the construc-
tion of this statute." 
55 48 Tenn. 294 (1870). 
56 Presumably in Tennessee nowadays retention of possession or life 
income would not prevent a deed from being operative, either as to 
realty or personalty. 
Under the Tennessee statute the objectionable transfer is not void 
in toto but only "void as to the right ... protected .... " Rowland 
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No modern authority appears to exist concerning per-
sonalty in Tennessee. An 1850 case, Richards v. RichardsJ57 
held that the widow is without a remedy. There she was pre-
cluded from alleging the decedent's fraud, even though the 
transfer was made without consideration and for the purpose 
of excluding her. Whether or not the Richards case would 
be followed today is problematical. 
(4) The Kentucky Cases. The Kentucky cases started off 
with stress on "intent," apparently as determined by refer-
ence to the reasonableness of the transfer. In Manikee's 
Adm'r v. Beard 58 the husband left, in contemplation of his 
death, all his personalty to his children. Although the court 
stated that reasonable gifts to children would normally be in 
order, the widow prevailed in this case because of the intent 
to defraud, coupled with or accentuated by proximity to 
death and the secrecy of the transaction. That the widow's 
dower interest in the husband's land would be sufficient to 
support her was deemed irrelevant.59 
In Murray v. 1\Jurray 60 the husband depleted his estate 
with some antenuptial transfers made with the wife's knowl-
edge, and with substantial postmarital transfers made with-
out the wife's knowledge. Both types of transfer were to 
children of the husband's former marriages. The court, in 
holding for the widow, reiterated in substance the test enunci-
ated in the Beard case: "The Court must look to the condi-
tion of the parties and all the attending circumstances in 
judging of the transaction. It should take into consideration 
the amount of the husband's estate, the value of the advance-
ments, the time within which they are made, and all other 
v. Rowland, 34 Tenn. 350, 351 (1855); cf. Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 80 
Tenn. 232 (1883) (decree from bed and board held not to bar widow's 
claim); Mulloy v. Young, 29 Tenn. 198 (1859) (estoppel). 
57 30 Tenn. 294 (1850). 
5s 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887). 
59 But in Weber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S.W. 34 (1912), the 
fact that the wife was adequately provided for in a gift causa mortis 
and in other respects led the court to hold that the gift causa mortis was 
not intended to defeat the wife's rights. 
6o 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890). 
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indicia which will serve to determine the intention ac-
companying the transaction. If, however, a gift or voluntary 
conveyance of all or the greater portion of his property be 
made to his children by a former marriage without the 
knowledge of the intended wife, or it be advanced to them 
after marriage without the wife's knowledge, a prima facie 
case of fraud arises, and it rests upon the beneficiaries to ex-
plain away such presumption." 61 
In Payne v. Tatem 62 the court declared that this "pre-
sumption" might be overcome by evidence of reasonable ad-
vancements to children by a former marriage,63 or of assist-
ance by the first wife in amassing the husband's fortune, 
coupled with a promise by the husband to the first wife to 
provide for the children.64 In short, the Kentucky cases speak 
of "intent" or "fraud" as controlling, but admit that a work-
ing case or presumption is established if substantial gifts have 
been made to children without the wife's knowledge. The 
presumption may be overcome if the equities favor the valid-
ity of the transfer, as, e.g., where the transfer is not unreason-
ably large in view of the moral claim of the donee. 
In Benge v. Barnett 65 the husband gave forty-five per cent 
of his personalty then owned to his brother and sister. There 
was no evidence of his intention or purpose in making these 
gifts. The court purported to find his intention by referring 
to his "acts and deeds," in particular to the fact that his will 
sought to exclude the wife from the remaining personalty. In 
61 The court awarded the widow a fixed sum, out of the money trans-
ferred after the marriage, plus his estate at death, less "what would have 
been reasonable advances to the children." Id. at 9, 13 S.W. at 246. 
Accord, Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 64 S.W. 981 (1901); 
Gibson v. Gibson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 636 (1890). 
6 2 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930) (gift of $4,000 out of total per-
sonal estate of $4600 to daughter by former marriage). 
63 Fennessey v. Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519, 2 S.W. 158 (1886), cited for this 
point, is an antenuptial transfer case in which the first wife had con-
tributed substantially, by her "skill and industry," to the husband's 
fortune. As to antenuptial transfers, see Appendix C, infra. 
64 Cf. Goff v. Goff's Ex'rs, 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917) (ante-
nuptial transfer). 
6~ 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782 (1949). 
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sustaining the widow's claim, the court stated that the pre-
sumption of fraud would not be raised merely by the fact that 
the bulk of the estate was transferred without the wife's 
knowledge: all the facts of the case must be considered. We 
may conclude from the Benge case that the presumption of 
fraud is to be raised automatically only when the donee is the 
decedent's child. This is curious, as one would suppose that 
transfers to persons other than children would normally be 
more reprehensible as far as the widow is concerned.66 
(5) The Missouri Cases. The Missouri legislature has re-
cently enacted the following statute: 67 
1. Any gift made by a person, whether dying testate or in-
testate, in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse 
to share in his estate, shall, at the election of the surviving 
spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition and may be 
recovered from the donee and persons taking from him with-
out adequate consideration and applied to the payment of the 
spouse's share, as in case of his election to take against the will. 
2. Any conveyance of real estate made by a married person 
at any time without the express assent of his spouse, duly 
acknowledged, is deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights 
of his spouse (if the spouse becomes a surviving spouse) unless 
the contrary is shown. 
This statute is almost as vague as the corresponding section 
of the Model Probate Code.68 Undoubtedly the existing case-
66 In Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. I, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938), 
a man of 60 with 5 children by a former wife met a "talented and re-
fined lady" of 40. He was then worth about $100,000. By a series of 
ingenious transfers to the children he managed to die with an estate 
of only $500. Held, a "gross fraud" on the wife's marital rights. Cf. 
Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940) (antenuptial 
transfer). 
67 Mo. Ann. Stat. §474.150 (1955), 21 Mo. L. REv. 151, 165-68 (1956). 
68 Discussed infra, p. 273. On the credit side, the statute makes it 
clear that a device which is "testamentary" as to the widow is not 
void in toto. Some of the early Missouri cases use this term in the same 
sense that it is used in the custom of London cases; thus a mere re-
tention of possession would render the transfer "testamentary," e.g., 
Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 (1860), later hearing, 32 Mo. 464 (1862); 
Brandon v. Dawson, 51 Mo. App. 237 (1892); and there was a finding 
in the Merz case that the trust was "testimentary" [sic] in character. 
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law will be persuasive in interpreting the phrase "fraud of 
the marital rights." The rule of a long line of Missouri cases 
emphasizing motive is set out in Merz v. Tower Grove Bank 
and Trust Co.69 In that case the husband, worth about $400,-
000, shortly before his death transferred $20,000 to his 
brother. He also transferred $330,000 into a revocable trust, 
appointing himself one of the trustees. He reserved the in-
come for life, with $200 monthly thereafter to his wife and 
the same amount to his brother, and the remainder to "other 
persons." The trust was executed with death impending and 
for the express purpose of evading his wife's statutory rights. 
The husband was advised that the trust agreement was 
"bullet proof." 
The trial court permitted the wife to invade the trust to 
the extent of her share, but the higher court held the trust 
void in toto, stating that "The general rule of law (long in 
effect in this state) is that a conveyance of property by the 
husband without consideration and with the intent and pur-
pose to defeat his widow's marital rights in his property, is a 
fraud upon such widow and she may sue in her own right, 
and set aside such fraudulent conveyance, and recover the 
property so fraudulently transferred, to the extent of her in-
terest therein." In repudiation of the "good faith divest-
ment'' rule of Newman v. Dare, the court declared: "We ad-
here to the rule as applied by this court. We hold that the 
general rule with reference to voluntary transfers of property 
in contemplation of immediate death, and with the intent 
and purpose to defeat, and therefore to defraud, the widow of 
her marital rights, applies to the transfer of property by the 
trust instrument in this case." 
Is "contemplation of death" (whatever that means 70) a 
sine qua non in the Missouri cases? Before the Merz case 
But see Wanstraph v. Kappel, 354 Mo. 565, 190 S.W.2d 241 (1945), 
aff'd, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947), reaff'd in part, 358 Mo. 1077, 
218 S.W.2d 618 (1949). 
a9 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939). 
7o See discussion, infra, pp. 148-154. 
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we probably could answer in the affirmative, 71 with the caveat 
that the decedent at the time of the transfer need not neces-
sarily be in "the very article of death." 72 But the court in the 
Merz case seems more concerned with the total picture than 
with any one aspect. In arriving at the decedent's "intent" 
the court weighed a variety of factors, including the amount 
that was transferred, as well as the time before death.73 This 
broad approach is also followed in the recent case of Potter v. 
Winter,14 although the court continues to speak of "contem-
plation of impending death." 75 The new legislation, which 
came into effect after the Potter case, is commendable in that 
it omits any reference to contemplation of death. The prob-
lem remains with the courts. 
n Straat v. O'Neil, 84 Mo. 68 (1884) (expectation of death and intent 
to defraud); Tucker v. Tucker, supra, note 68 (widow prevails when 
transfers made 14 to 18 months before death, in feeble health, in 
anticipation of death, and with intention to defeat wife's rights); Stone 
v. Stone, 18 Mo. 390, 393 (1853) (widow prevails against deed "made 
in immediate anticipation of death, and with a view to prevent the 
widow's right to dower attaching"); Davis v. Davis, 5 Mo. 111, 114 
(1838) (deed of slaves within 2 months of death, made in conjunction 
with will and with intent to defeat widow's rights held by "the deep 
searching justice of the chancellor, with his argus eyes," to be defeasible 
by widow); Brandon v. Dawson, supra, note 68 (must be testamentary 
in character-e.g., retention of possession-and with view to defeating 
the wife's claim); accord, Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 
945 (1949); Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606, 610 (1895) (transfer made 
by husband "in the sere and yellow leaf"); cf. Rice v. Waddill, 168 
Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902); Newton v. Newton, 162 Mo. 173, 61 S.W. 
881 (1901). 
In Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963 (Mo. 1919), the wife 
conveyed land by secret unrecorded deeds delivered almost 5 years 
before death, retaining possession for life. The husband continued to 
care for the lots, even investing some of his own money for that pur-
pose. Held, void as to the widower. 
72 Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902). 
13 After outlining the circumstances in some detail the court declared: 
" ... we cannot presume a fraudulent intent, but it may be inferred 
when it is a legitimate deduction from all the facts and circumstances 
in evidence in a given case." 344 Mo. 1150, 1160, 130 S.W.2d 611, 616 
(1939). 
74 280 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1955). 
75 I d. at 36 
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4. CoNCLUSION 
The utility of the "intent" test depends on the willingness 
of the courts to pay open attention to all the circumstances of 
the case. When the sole criterion is "intent," with no avowed 
enquiry into the objective manifestations of that "intent," 
the test is unsatisfactory. The outcome of litigation is far 
too unpredictable. We are told that "the devil himself 
knoweth not the mind of man." The task is even more diffi-
cult for the secular observer. It is unlikely that there will be 
much reliable evidence. The transferor is dead; the parties 
to the litigation naturally will not have a detached point of 
view. 76 Uncertainty, contradictions, the vagaries of fallible 
memory, the promptings of greed - these may be expected. 
And the confusion cannot entirely be laid to the possible 
self-interest of the witnesses. The desire to evade the statute 
may be praiseworthy or deplorable, depending on the cir-
cumstances. Many motives may inspire an inter vivos gift, in-
cluding the urge to benefit children and the prudent dictates 
of estate planning. In many cases it will be difficult to dis-
tinguish malice to the widow from benevolence to the chil-
dren. To conclude, the desire to evade the statute may be the 
sole motive, may be one of several motives, or may not exist 
at all. 
The unsettling effect on the donee is obvious. Under most 
tests, of course, the donee is subject to eventual attack by 
the widow. Under the strict "intent" test, however, this at-
tack may be made on the basis of evidence to which the widow 
alone had access. Further, the apparent motive at the time of 
the transfer may take on new meaning in the light of later 
events. A particular transfer, apparently quite reasonable in 
the early halcyon state of the marriage, may acquire sinister 
overtones ten years and one hundred marital quarrels later. 
1a Similar problems exist in connection with contracts to leave prop-
erty at death, when self-interest may cause "the expectation of inherit-
ance to ripen into a contract." 
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There is, of course, considerable merit to the "intent" test 
when the courts that use it make avowed enquiry into all the 
circumstances. This is tantamount to deciding the case on the 
"equities"; it comes close to the maintenance and contribu-
tion formula. 77 And these courts are not without some ex-
cuse in using the term "fraud" or "intent" to describe the ul-
timate decision. If "fraud" were not used, it would be neces-
sary to invent another term to take its place. Just as assumpsit 
was a convenient remedy to use in the early actions to prevent 
unjust enrichment, so has "fraud" proven to be a handy 
phrase to connote evasion of the forced share.78 
The real criticism that can be made of the courts using the 
"intent" test is not that they employ "intent" or "fraud" as a 
"verbal formalism," as some writers have complained, but 
that frequently they confuse the label with the contents.79 
Far too often do the courts indicate that their real concern 
is with the decedent's actual intent; far too many courts state 
that reference to the equities of the case is a secondary en-
quiry, to be made only where there is no evidence of "actual 
intent." 80 Perhaps this is only to be expected. Expression of 
the court's decision in terms of the decedent's intent puts an 
unnecessary and misleading emphasis on that factor. The 
decedent's motive should be relevant, but it need not neces-
sarily be essential to the widow's case. Her need may be 
acute even when the husband acted from the best of motives, 
i.e., in the belief that she had already been adequately pro-
vided for. 81 Conversely, when the equities favor the donee 
the widow should lose even though the decedent has openly 
11 Discussed supra, Chap. 4. 
78 Cf. Norwood v. Norwood, 207 Ga. 148, 60 S.E.2d 449 (1950) (undue 
influence). 
79 But cf. In re Sides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930), 
discussed supra, pp. 106-108. 
80 E.g., Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782 (1949). 
81 Cf. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 
(1944), discussed supra, Chap. 7, text at note 39. 
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expressed his intent to "evade" the statutory share. The 
maintenance and contribution formula would assent to the 
finality of no one factor, bttt to the relevance of all factors. 82 
The "intent" test comes close to this ideal, but not close 
enough. 
82 Moreover, it is geared to decedent's family maintenance legislation 
instead of the statutory share. 
CHAPTER 9 
Tests Based On The Reality Of 
The Transfer 
Considerable popularity is being attained by the theory 
that a transfer is immune from the widow's attack if it has 
"factual reality," or "reality," as we shall call it. A transfer 
has "reality," under this theory, if it has inter vivos validity 
aside from any question of the rights of the widow. The only 
transfers subject to the widow's attack, on this reasoning, are 
sham transfers or testamentary transfers. In other words, 
she cannot impugn any transfer that is operative, inter vivos, 
between the parties thereto, or, as it is sometimes said, which 
was "complete," 1 or in which the transferee obtained a "pres-
ent interest" 2 in the subject matter of the transfer as soon 
as the transfer was made. The equities of the case- in 
theory, at any rate- are irrelevant.3 
1 E.g., Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951); 
Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 393, 404, 26 N.E.2d 736, 741 
(1940); see Small v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 15, 42 Pac. 323, 327 (1895); Lines 
v. Lines 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891). A transfer has also been said 
to be valid if it is "absolute": e.g., In re Kilgallen's Estate, 204 Misc. 
558, 561, 123 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (Surr. Ct. 1953); cf. Bolles v. Toledo 
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St., 195, 213; 58 N.E.2d 381, 391 (1944). Likewise 
a case may be said to turn on whether the transferees took a "vested 
interest": cf. Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, I 
N.W.2d 458 (1942). 
2 E.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824); Pruett v. Cowsart, 136 
Ga. 756, 72 S.E. 30 (1911); cf. Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley National 
Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955), rehearing denied, 197 Va. 732, 
733, 90 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1956). The expression "present interest" is not 
accurate: frequently a future interest will pass. 
3 Massachusetts liberally provides the surviving spouse with the first 
$10,000 of the estate, (Mass. Laws Ann. chap. 191, §15) but is apathetic 
about inter vivos evasions. In Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 571, 
59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (1945) the court said that "[I]n this Commonwealth 
a husband has an absolute right to dispose of ... all of his personal 
property in his lifetime, without the knowledge or consent of his wife, 
with the result that it will not form part of his estate for her to share 
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TESTS BASED ON THE REALITY OF THE TRANSFER 121 
I. THE HALPERN CASE 
Of all the "reality" decisions, the cause celebre is the recent 
Halpern 4 case in the New York Court of Appeals. This case 
is significant for two reasons. It condoned the Totten trust as 
a weapon of disinheritance; and it cast disquieting doubts on 
the validity of the entire illusory transfer doctrine. 
In the Halpern case the husband by his will in 1939 made 
his wife executrix and sole beneficiary. He separated from 
her in 1946. During 1946 and 1947 he opened four savings 
bank accounts in his own name in trust for an infant grand-
child. He died in 1948 leaving an estate of about $3,300, ex-
clusive of the Totten trusts. Several deposits had been made 
in the accounts, but no withdrawals; and the balance at his 
death approximated $14,000. The husband had in no way 
disaffirmed or revoked the trusts. There was evidence that 
he had informed several people that he wanted the grand-
. . . by virtue of a waiver of his will. That is true even though his 
sole purpose was to disinherit her. . . . The right of a wife as a dis-
tributee stands no higher than the similar right of a child." 
The ultimate in the "present transfer" reasoning is reached in Red-
man v. Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (1918). Here the husband 
about a year before his death transferred the greater part of his per-
sonalty (at least $50,000) to himself as executor of his mother's will. 
His purpose was to exclude his wife. Presumably he was a substantial 
beneficiary under his mother's will; his own will left the residue of his 
estate "or over which I have, under the will of my mother or otherwise, 
the power of distribution" in trust for his children. The widow re-
ceived by will one-third of the realty and personalty "standing in my 
name," which amounted only to $825.69. Held, the widow could get no 
share of the $50,000, there being no "legal fraud" on her because he 
had the right to dispose of his property during his lifetime without her 
consent; and, since the transfer was "real," it "passed the title" to him-
self as executor. 
On powers of appointment see pp. 252-258, infra. The Massachusetts 
cases are also discussed, in connection with the "intent" rationale, in 
Chap. 8, note 24. 
4 In re Halpern's Estate, 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Surr. Ct. 
1950), modified, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1st Dep't 1950), 
aff'd, 303 N.Y. 33, IOO N.E.2d 120 (1951). The Halpern case occa-
sioned many notes and comments. Some of the better ones include: 
52 CoL. L. REv. 284 (1952); 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 258 (1951) (excellent); 
40 GEO. L. J. 109 (1951); 50 MICH. L. REV. 783 (1952); 27 N.Y. U. L. 
REv. 306 (1952) (suggestions on statutory reform; excellent); 25 N.Y. 
U. L. REv. 920 (1950) (trial opinion); 3 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 129 (1951). 
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daughter to "have his bankbooks." Three of the bankbooks 
were found in his safe-deposit box at his death. The fourth 
was apparently handed to the grandchild's mother before his 
death.5 The widow, as executrix, began discovery proceed-
ings to recover the accounts on the ground that they were il-
lusory transfers. 
The Surrogate Court, stating that there was no proof of 
any act on the part of the testator which made the trusts ir-
revocable,6 held the trusts illusory; and, as Burns v. Turn-
bull7 had said that an illusory transfer is a nullity, the estate 
was thus deemed entitled to all of the accounts. The First 
Department of the Appellate Division affirmed, but pointed 
out that to declare a Totten trust entirely void merely to give 
the widow a portion would amount to overruling the Totten 
trust doctrine. Totten trusts being sui generis} serving a use-
ful purpose, and easily divisible, it was concluded that they 
should be defeasible only to the extent of the widow's share. 
The majority opinion in the Court of Appeals stated, curi-
ously, that both courts below had found the trusts illusory, 
"not on any proof that they lacked actuality or reality, but 
solely because they were made for the purpose of keeping the 
widow from collecting [her] share .... " 8 It then proceeded 
to repudiate the test that actually had been followed by the 
lower courts, declaring that "There is nothing illusory about 
5 303 N.Y. 33, 37, 100 N.E.2d 120, 121 (1951). But cf. concurring 
opinion, id. at 41, 100 N.E.2d at 124. 
6 197 Misc. 502, 504, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (Surr. Ct. 1950). A com-
ment in 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 258 (1951) speculates that the "trusts" could 
have been ruled irrevocable, either because of the statement to the 
child's mother that the bank books were "for" the child or because 
of the apparent delivery of the fourth bank book. 
7 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 448 (2nd Dep't 1943), reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 986, 
48. N.Y.S.2d 453 (2nd Dep't 1944), aff'd on reargument mem., 268 App. 
D1v .. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), motion to dismiss appeal 
denzed, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 240 (1945), aff'd without opinion, 294 
N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945). 
8 303 N.Y. 33, 37, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951). The lower courts 
apparently relied solely on the reasoning that "a Totten trust is an 
illusory transfer," 277 App. Div. 525, 528, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 (lst 
Dep't 1950). 
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a Totten trust as such." 9 Professing to apply the so-called 
Newman v. Dare test of "good faith divestment," the opinion 
stated that Totten trusts are valid if "real and not merely 
colorable or pretended." 10 The Newman, Krause, and Burns 
cases, all cases involving trusts that the Court of Appeals had 
held illusory, were distinguished on the ground that "in each 
of those cases the finding of illusoriness was made on a factual 
showing of unreality, and not solely because the transfers 
operated to, and were intended to, defeat the widow's ex-
pectancy." 11 The Krause 12 case, which courts 13 and com-
mentators 14 had understood to categorize Totten trusts as 
illusory per se, was specifically distinguished on the ground 
that there the decedent "had never intended that his Totten 
trust, made in favor of his daughter who lived in a foreign 
country and from whom he had not heard in years, would 
have any real effect, or that the money should ever go to the 
faraway daughter." 15 
The concurring opinion declared that the rights of the sur-
viving spouse depend upon suit being brought by the surviv-
ing spouse individually and in compliance with the terms 
9 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951). 
1o I d. at 37, 100 N.E.2d at 122. 
11 I d. at 38, 100 N.E.2d at 122. 
1 2 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941). 
13 E.g., Steixner v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 86 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
For other cases see comment, 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 258, 260 (1952); cf. 
Estate of Black, 64 York 166, 73 D.&C. 86 (Pa. 1950). 
14 E.g., Note, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 284, 285 (1952). 
15 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951). This seems a large 
assumption, even though four of the judges in the Halpern case were 
on the court that decided the Krause case: Loughran, C. J., Lewis, Des-
mond, and Conway, J. J. Aside altogether from the Krause case, the 
court in the Halpern case seems on questionable ground when it says 
that "unreality" of this sort existed in Newman v. Dore (remainder of 
trust going to a favorite niece) or in Burns v. Turnbull (remainder to 
a daughter by a previous marriage). The trial court in the Turnbull 
case, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380, 388 (1942), in speaking of the wife's inter vivos 
transfer to a daughter by a previous marriage, stated: "There was 
logic in what she did .... The settlor may have concluded that her 
husband and son would not need her property, whereas [the donee] 
having no other means of support, would. There are many hypotheses 
consistent with the good faith of settlor." 
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of the statute. On this reasoning the widow would lose; she 
had brought the action in her capacity as executor, and with-
out filing a notice of election within the required six months 
period.16 Both opinions stated that the order of the Appellate 
Division would have to be affirmed, since no appeal therefrom 
had been taken by the infant beneficiary. Both opinions, 
then, are dicta. 
The first thing to notice about the Halpern case is that it 
is indecisive.H Nowhere is there an express repudiation of 
the illusory trust doctrine of Newman v. Dare. Instead, we 
have some cryptic references to the Newman case, seemingly 
linking it with the "reality" doctrine.18 Moreover, three of 
the seven members of the court, Judges Lewis, Conway, and 
Froessel, based their opinion solely on procedural grounds. 
This means that the "reality" rationale is found in dicta of a 
bare majority of the court. Technically, this reduces the 
persuasive force of the decision.19 Nor can we rule out the 
possibility of eventual refinement or change in the court's 
views, because of a change in the personnel of the court. 
Nevertheless, the case does much to undermine the "con-
trol" rationale of Newman v. Dare. Both opinions may be 
mere dicta; but their considered, deliberate tone may well 
persuade later courts- in New York and elsewhere- to 
adopt the "reality" rationale.2° For in the Halpern case the 
phrase "illusory" takes on a new meaning. Whereas in the 
Newman case it connotes excessive control, in the Halpern 
16 This is inconsistent with earlier cases permitting suit when the 
surviving spouse had no right to elect-e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 
371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) (widow left required fractional amount of the 
estate); Burns v. Turnbull, supra, note 7 (intestacy); Marano v. Lo-
Carro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opinion, 270 App. 
Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946). 
17 In this respect the Halpern case is similar to other causes celebres 
in the evasion field. Newman v. Dore, for example, was vague in doc-
trine, and expressly declined any attempt "to formulate any general 
test"; but later courts evolved from it a controlling rationale. 
18 E.g., 303 N.Y. 33, 39, 100 N.E.2d 120, 123 (1951). 
19 Cf. Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 39 Iowa 56, 80 (1874). 
20 Infra, text at notes 25-31. 
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case it refers to a lack of animus danandi. 21 Under Newman 
v. Dare an inter vivos device might be valid, aside from the 
widow's rights, and yet still be subject to the widow's share; 
under the reasoning of the Halpern case, if the device is valid 
aside from the widow's claim, the widow has no claim. Says 
the majority opinion: "There is nothing illusory about a 
Totten trust as such." But nothing could be more "illusory," 
in the "control" sense of Newman v. Dare, than a Totten 
trust. The retention of almost complete control earmarks it 
for what it is- a specifically bequeathed bank account. The 
only rational explanation of the statement quoted above is 
that the Court of Appeal is using "illusory" in a fresh sense. 
The bird with a broken pinion never flies as high again; 
similarly, the doctrine of Newman v. Dare, while not spe-
cifically rejected, at least as to devices other than Totten 
trusts, is not as strong as it used to be. 
What influence has the Halpern case had on subsequent 
decisions? To attempt an answer to this question we must 
consider both Totten trusts, and devices other than Totten 
21 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122. This, of course, is not what 
courts and commentators had assumed the "illusory trust" doctrine to 
mean; and, although the matter is not free from doubt, in all prob-
ability it is not what the court in the Newman case had in mind. That 
court stressed the retention of control, stating: "We assume, without 
deciding, that except for the provisions of section 18 ... the trust 
would be valid," 275 N.Y. 371, 380, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1937); cf. Hayes, 
"Illinois Dower and the Illusory Trust: The New York Influence," 2 
DE PAULL. REV. 1, 16 (1952). 
Under the Halpern case reasoning the husband's intent to disinherit 
his wife is relevant, but only insofar as it assists in furnishing proof of 
the animus donandi. Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 786, 135 
N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (3rd Dep't 1954); but cf. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 144 
N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (deed to spouse). Prior to the Halpern 
case the New York courts formally eschewed the "intent" factor, in 
practice often used it as ballast: In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 
284 N.Y.S. 28 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 
697, 289 N.Y.S. 818 (lst Dep't 1936) (mere "constructive fraud" con-
trasted with "an element of fraud which is so blatant that it is impos-
sible to ignore it"); Mottershead v. Lamson, 101 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 
1950) (presumption of fraud if a major portion of estate without 
knowledge of wife goes to children by a previous marriage). In one 
case "intent" was the ratio decidendi: Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 
II9, 286 N.Y.S. 814 (1st Dep't 1936). See also Chap. 7, note 92, supra. 
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trusts. The Totten trust cases are examined in detail in a 
later chapter, 22 but a brief summary will be useful at this 
point. Subsequent lower-court decisions in New York have 
uniformly followed the lead given in the Halpern case. Re-
cent decisions from other states involving bank account trusts 
appear to be restricted to Maryland and Pennsylvania. In 
neither jurisdiction has the Halpern case resulted in any 
change of rationale. Maryland uses what amounts to a "rea-
sonableness" test; 23 and Pennsylvania is now governed by 
legislation that permits invasion of "revocable" transfers by 
the surviving spouse.24 
On transfers other than Totten trusts the outlook is still 
indecisive. It will be recalled that the Halpern case brought 
a new connotation to the phrase "illusory": under the pre-
Halpern decisions it meant real, but voidable because of re-
tained control, but the majority in the Halpern case used it as 
synonymous with "sham," i.e., lacking reality for any purpose. 
At least three subsequent decisions contain language that di-
rectly or inferentially adopts the Halpern version.25 But two 
of these cases are not strictly evasion cases: one deals with 
fraud on inchoate dower/6 the other does not involve a sur-
viving spouse.27 The third case was a trial decision permitting 
a widow to prevail against a contract to make a will, on the 
reasoning that the widow's elective rights would reach such 
an exercise of the "power of testamentation." 28 Conversely, 
the New York Appellate Division, Third Department, has 
22 Infra, Chap. 13:4. 
23 E.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. I, 106 A.2d 72 (1954). 
For a list of Maryland cases see Table E, infra. 
24 Infra, Chap. 9, text at note 74. 
25 Van Devere v. Moore, 243 Minn. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954); In re 
Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954); In re 
Ford's Estate, 279 App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1951), 
aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E.2d 87 (1952). 
2s Van Devere v. Moore, supra, note 25. 
27 In re Ford's Estate, 279 App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 
1951). 
28 In re Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 
1954). 
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not only referred to retention of control 29 as connoting il-
lusoriness, but also has stated that "The doctrine announced 
in Matter of Halpern's Estate ... applies to Totten trusts 
and not to conveyances of real property." 3° Finally, a recent 
lower-court decision 31 dealing with transfer of stock contains 
language broad enough to cover both the Newman version 
("illusory transfers ... during his lifetime are perfectly 
legal") and the Halpern version ("He could either give it 
away ... or he could equally well transfer it to dummies, 
without actually depriving himself of control"). 
Policy-wise, the "reality" rationale (as exemplified by the 
reasoning of the Halpern case) is open to serious criticism. 
This rationale precludes any judicial assistance to the widow, 
even when need is established. Her only hope is to show that 
the transfer was defectively executed, that it was a sham, or 
that it was testamentary. This means that the widow in New 
York has been deprived of effective protection against dis-
inheritance, at least as far as Totten trusts are concerned. 
It is ironic that the new doctrine has specific reference to the 
Totten trust. The "poor man's will" may now be used to 
hurt the poor man's widow. 
For all its shortcomings, the illusory trust doctrine, as 
popularized by Newman v. Dare, has at least the virtue of 
29 Gillette v. Madden, 280 App. Div. 161, 162, 112 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 
(3d Dep't 1952). But mentioned in the same breath was intent not to 
have an "actual change of title until death." The case involved the 
sufficiency of a complaint. Cf. Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 135 
N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1954). Here the court held a deed "illusory," 
citing Newman v. Dore, Krause v. Krause, and Gillette v. Madden; but 
from the context the court may have considered the deed a sham, since 
"the purported transfer was, by agreement of the parties, to be com-
pletely ineffectual until after the death of the grantor, and subject to 
recall or revocation until then." See MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 
435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 
576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953), discussed by Dean Niles in 1952 ANNUAL 
SuRVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 572; In re Kilgallen's Estate, 204 Misc. 558, 
123 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Radecki v. Radecki, 279 App. Div. 
1137, 112 N.Y.S.2d 764, (4th Dep't 1952). 
30 Gillette v. Madden, supra, note 29, at 163, 112 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46. 
a1 Galewitz v. Walter Peek Paper Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404-05 
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, 1955). 
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sympathy with the stated purpose of the statutory share. To 
be sure, the illusory trust doctrine is too narrow: 32 under 
it the widow may recover too much or nothing at all from the 
transferee, depending on the happenstance of retained "con-
trol." But even within those confines there is some slight 
room for the play of judicial discretion. Grossly extreme 
transfers, such as the eleventh-hour trust in the Newman case, 
would not prevail against the judicial philosophy that pro-
tection based on testamentary transfers should extend to 
transfers that are almost, if not exactly, testamentary. Under 
the doctrine of the Halpern case, however, even retention of 
excessive control 33 is irrelevant, provided the transfer is not 
testamentary. 
As in the case of harsh decisions in other fields of the law, 
the reaction to the Halpern case may result in remedial legis-
lation. Bills have already been introduced in New York, 
without success.34 The matter is on the agenda of the New 
York Law Revision Commission, though not presently under 
active consideration. 
2. EXTENT OF DEFEASANCE 35 
A favorite gambit of some courts and commentators is to 
argue the "logical impossibility" 36 of a trust being illusory 
as to the wife but valid for all other purposes. A similar 
judicial ploy is to state that a transfer valid- or "complete" 
32 See supra, Chap. 7, text at note 93. 
33 To be sure, subsequent New York cases involving devices other 
than Totten trusts do refer to "control"; but these references may indi-
cate that Newman v. Dore still governs these devices, rather than that 
"control" or the "equities" may be relevant under the Halpern doc-
trine. 
34 Atkinson, "Succession," 1952 ANNUAL SuRVEY oF AMERICAN LAw, 
599. 
85 The defeasance problem is taken up here because of the strong 
dictum on the point in the Halpern case. Logically the problem should 
be discussed in conjunction with either the control rationale or the 
intent rationale. 
86 Comment, "Illusory Transfers in New York," 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 
258, 259 (1951). 
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or "absolute" 37 - for one purpose must be valid for all pur-
poses. On this reasoning a transfer defeasible by the widow 
is cancelled in toto. But the logic of total defeasance, when 
used in conjunction with the "control" or "intent" theories, 
is open to question. Examples abound elsewhere of instru-
ments that are valid for formal purposes but defeasible, or 
"voidable," 38 at the instance of an aggrieved party, i.e., con-
tracts voidable for fraud in the inducement and inter vivos 
transfers that may be reached by creditors. 
The "all black or all white" reasoning, however, received 
a fresh impetus from the famous dictum in the Halpern case: 
"We see no power in the courts to divide up such a Totten 
trust and call part of it illusory and the other part good." 39 
From one viewpoint, this dictum is quite acceptable. Assum-
ing that the court in the Halpern case was adopting the 
"reality" rationale, there could be no question of partial 
defeasance; indeed, the question cannot arise when the widow 
has no cause of action stemming from her elective share. 
From another viewpoint, however, the dictum is unfortunate. 
From the context it probably was designed to support the 
notion that defeasance should be in toto even when the 
widow does have a cause of action, as e.g., in a jurisdiction 
where the "intent" theory is used, or, as in the Appellate 
Division decision in the Halpern case, where the "control" 
thinking prevails. It must be remembered that until the 
Halpern case was decided the New York courts had been fully 
committed to the "control" rationale, as seen in their espousal 
of the illusory trust doctrine; moreover, the Court of Appeals 
had never before specifically ruled on the defeasance prob-
lem.40 The dictum in the Halpern case thus shuts the damper 
37 Cf., passage "A" of the Kerr "fraud" test, supra, Chap. 7, text at 
note 1. 
38 See an excellent article: Levin, "The Varying Meaning and Legal 
Effect of the Word 'Void,'" 32 MicH. L. REV. 1088, 1108 (1934). 
39 303 N.Y. 33, 40, 100 N.E.2d 120, 123 (1951). 
40 In Newman v. Dore the point was ignored, possibly because the 
disposition under the will and under the inter vivos trust apparently 
was practically identical; see Note, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 378, note 3 
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on flickering attempts in the lower New York courts to adopt 
the partial defeasance doctrineY It would be a pity if this 
dictum were to be followed by other jurisdictions already 
committed to the "control" or "intent" thinking. 
The total defeasance notion misconceives the nature of the 
widow's claim.42 She complains that the transfer prevents her 
from obtaining her statutory share. Although willing to con-
cede that the transfer has "reality," she wants her fractional 
cut. More she cannot use; she is bound by the election 
statute.43 To decree total defeasance results in unnecessary 
(1951). In Krause v. Krause, the lower court had awarded partial de-
feasance. On appeal the question was deferred, since distribution had 
to await the probate of the will. 171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. 
Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), 
modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 33, 32 N.E.2d 779, 781 (1941). In Burns v. 
Turnbull the court affirmed, without opinion, an Appellate Division 
holding which had cancelled an illusory inter vivos trust in its entirety. 
37 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 986, 
48 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't 1944), afj'd on reargument mem. 268 App. 
Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), motion to dismiss appeal 
denied, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 240 (1945), aff'd without opinion, 294 
N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945). Defeasance in toto had the effect of 
thwarting settlor's intent to prefer a child of her first marriage over a 
child of her marriage with the plaintiff husband. 
41 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 
290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939), modified on other grounds, 260 
App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940); Steixner v. Bowery 
Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. Pichurko v. Richard-
son, 107 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Getz v. Getz, 101 N.Y.S.2d 757 
(Surr. Ct. 1950) (both cases following the Appellate Division opinion in 
the Halpern case); Marano v. LoCarro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 
afj'd without opinion, 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 
1946) (transfer set aside "to the extent of her intestate share"). As to 
antenuptial transfers, see Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 
541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't 1935). But cf. Clavin v. Clavin, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 760, 45 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 
1943). 
42 Defeasance of any sort, partial or total, involves difficulties. Par-
tition may not be feasible, as in, e.g., a closely held family business, 
when the widow is inexperienced. And liquidation may not always be 
economically advisable, as with, e.g., potentially valuable paintings. 
These problems point up the wisdom of careful estate planning; if the 
widow is adequately provided for in the will she probably will not 
litigate. 
43 In some jurisdictions her statutory share is a specified fraction, e.g., 
in Florida, one third. In other states she may be entitled to her in-
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loss to the beneficiaries of the inter vivos transfer and a pos-
sible gain for the "laughing heirs." 44 The effect of total 
defeasance on the Totten trust is such as to destroy much of 
its everyday utility as a "poor man's will." To be sure, in most 
instances the beneficiaries of the inter vivos transfer are 
children of the decedent spouse,45 who would probably take 
their intestate share in the excess over and above the widow's 
statutory share.46 But the "total defeasance" cases show no 
disposition to restrict the operation of the doctrine to trans-
fers of this sort. 
A substantial body of cases decree partial defeasance.47 As is 
testate share. If in these other states she is the sole heir, total de· 
feasance would result in any event-a factor that may or may not be 
a subconscious influence on the court concerned with the evasion liti-
gation. 
44 The devastating effect of total defeasance may in practice militate 
against the widow's chances of recovery in close cases when the bene-
ficiaries of the inter vivos transfer are not also heirs of the decedent. 
45 See infra, Chap. 10:2(d). 
46 But the children probably would not participate if the decedent 
left a will which gave the residue to an outsider. See supra, Chap. 2:4(f). 
47 Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 • Pac. 128 (1896); Fleming v. 
Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 264 
U.S. 29 (1924); Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1945), exceptions 
overruled, 94 N.H. 425, 55 A.2d 872 (1947); Baker v. Smith, 66 N.H. 
422, 23 Atl. 82 (1890); Harris v. Harris, 79 Ohio App. 443, 74 N.E.2d 
407 (1945), afj'd, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947); Bolles v. 
Toledo Trust 0)., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944); Estate of 
Black, 64 York 166, 73 D.&C. 86 (Pa. 1950) (under Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, 
§30l.ll (1950) (donees also heirs); cf. Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 
S.W. 641 (1895) (semble; gift causa mortis); Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 
94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887) (dower assigned); Hays v. Henry, I Md. Ch. 337 
(1848). For the Kentucky cases seep. 112, supra. For the Missouri cases 
see p. 114, supra,· also see note 48, infra. 
Many cases use the ambiguous phrase "invalid as to the widow" or 
some similar expression. Seemingly this phrase implies that the transfer 
is vulnerable to attack only by the surviving spouse; but the conse-
quences of a successful attack are not always discernible from the case 
as reported. In some instances we may assume total defeasance. Thus 
in Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107 (1874) a deed was "declared null and 
void so far as wife is concerned, and she may be relieved against the 
same." In the Sanborn case, however, the transfer was probably a 
sham, since a power of attorney was given donor, by donee, to dispose 
of the property. Cf., Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 
54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891). 
Under Tenn. Code Ann. §31-612 (1955) it would seem that assignment 
of dower results merely in partial defeasance, even though the cases 
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to be expected, however, these decisions are pretty well re-
stricted to jurisdictions following the "intent" or "control" 
rationale. Indeed, it is only with reference to "intent" juris-
dictions, e.g., Missouri 48 and Kentucky,49 that we can say with 
assurance that partial defeasance is the weight of authority. 
The sensible approach of these jurisdictions in this respect is 
in keeping with their willingness to seek a working compro-
mise 50 between the respective interests of the widow and 
the transferee, as, e.g., by weighing the "equities" of the case. 
3. "COLORABLE TRANSFERS 
(a) In General. The term "colorable," as employed in the 
evasion cases, means all things to all men. It has been used 
to connote shams; it may signify "real" transfers that are 
made without the knowledge 51 of the surviving spouse; it 
may be a synonym for "illusory," as used with reference to 
"real" transfers in which the decedent retained undue con-
refer to the deed in question as being "void," e.g., London v. London, 
20 Tenn. I (1839) (conveyance "declared void"; wife assigned dower). 
For the Tennessee cases see p. 110, supra. In some cases the expres-
sion "void as to the widow" clearly refers to partial defeasance, e.g., 
Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 113, 67 S.W. 605 (1902); but in many cases 
the point will not be clear one way or the other, e.g., Smith v. Lamb, 
87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908); Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 
54 N.E. 251 (1899); cf. Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 431, 18 Atl. 153, 
154 (1889) ("inoperative as against the oratrix and her rights of dower"; 
presumably results in partial defeasance). 
48 See cases discussed, supra, p. 114. In Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & 
Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939), the trial court decreed 
partial defeasance, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Missouri or-
dered defeasance in toto. The judgment does not purport to change 
the Missouri "partial defeasance" rule, but intimates that the equities 
may dictate total defeasance. In the Merz case the conduct of the 
trust company was considered reprehensible. 
4 9 See cases discussed, supra, p. 112. 
50 A parallel compromise is exemplified in actions to set aside trans-
fers by the decedent in fraud of creditors. The creditors prevail only 
if the estate assets are insufficient, and then only to the extent of the 
claim. As was pointed out by the Appellate Division in the Halpern 
case, defeasance in this instance is partial, not total. Cf. the example 
of partial defeasance under the civil law, infra, p. 284. 
51 See the early Colorado cases, infra, pp. 135-136. 
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trol,52 or merely the power to revoke; 53 and ofttimes it is 
tossed in for makeweight effect, with no ascertainable mean-
ing- a bit of harmless garbage from the law digests.54 For 
most men, on most occasions, however, a "colorable" trans-
fer signifies a sham: either no transfer at all, or one ac-
companied by some secret agreement between the parties 
that negates any animus donandi on the part of the donor.55 
52 Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952) (joint 
tenancy); Van Devere v. Moore, 243 Minn. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954); 
cf. Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4) (bill of sale for slaves, secrecy, 
possession retained until death); In re Leiman's Estate, 116 N.Y.S.2d 
658 (Surr. Ct. 1952), aff'd without opinion, 281 App. Div. 764, 118 
N.Y.S.2d 750, (2d Dep't 1952) motion for leave to appeal denied, 119 
N.Y.S.2d 230, 112 N.E.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1953); Courts v. Aldridge, 190 
Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941) (antenuptial transfer). But see Harber v. 
Harber, 152 Ga. 98, 108 S.E. 520 (1921). 
A transfer that is a nullity is sometimes referred to as being "illusory"; 
cf. In re Kellas' Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655, 663 (Surr. Ct. 1943), afj'd, 267 
App. Div. 924, 1006, 46 N.Y.S.2d 884, 293 N.Y. 908, 60 N.E.2d 34 
(1944); Estate of Rosenfeld, N.Y. L. J., 9 Feb. 1939, I P-H Unreported 
Trust Cases, ~25,275 (Surr. Ct. 1939); see Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. 
Div. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3rd Dep't 1954). 
53 E.g., Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953) (deed). In 
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944) a 
revocable inter vivos trust of all the husband's property, with consider-
able control retained, was held both colorable, (citing Martin v. Martin, 
282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940)), and illusory, (citing Newman v. 
Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937)). The court did not purport to 
distinguish between colorable and illusory. See Padfield v. Padfield, 78 
Ill. 16, 18-19 (1875); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 634-5, 187 
N.W. 750, 752-53 (1922). But see Bestry v. Dorn, 180 Md. 42, 22 A.2d 
552 (1941). 
54 E.g., Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 71, 100 
N.E. 1049 (1913), rehearing denied, 55 Ind. App. 40, 102 N.E. 282 
(1913) (gift causa mortis held "colorably absolute," therefore testa-
mentary); McGee v. McGee, 26 N.C. 77 (1843) (continued enjoyment of 
land after conveyance; held, colorable, and "express fraud" under the 
then prevailing statute). A note in 16 BRooKLYN L. REV. 229, 246 
(1950), discusses the term "colorable" in connection with antenuptial 
transfers. 
55 Mendez v. Quinones, 78 F. Supp. 744 (D.C.P.R. 1948) modified 
sub. nom. Mendez v. Mendez, 176 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1949) (transfer of 
assets to purported business); Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 
662 (1940) (deed to aunt, reconveyance to husband on condition that if 
the land should go to the wife or children, by agreement or "by any 
legal proceedings or order of court," it would revert to the aunt's es-
tate); Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940) (antenup-
tial transfer of bank deposits, donee acting as a "mere depositary" of 
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Thus, colorable transfers are transfers that have no "reality," 
and can best be discussed in conjunction with the reality 
doctrine. 
A typically colorable ("sham") arrangement would be a 
secret deed, handed over by the husband to the obliging 
friend or relative whose name appears as "grantee." The 
parties have previously agreed that the husband may demand 
the return of the deed at his pleasure, in particular if his wife 
should predecease him. If also it is agreed that the deed in 
the money and issuing checks on request); Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 
56 Atl. 213 (1903) (gift, with donee redelivering the property to the 
husband and signing power of attorney giving the husband power to 
manage, sell, and use it "as though it were his own property"). Cf. 
Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. I, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Murray 
v. Murray, 90 Ky. I, 13 S.W. 244 (1890); Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 
282, 108 So. 483 (1926); Wellington v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Mani-
toba Ry., 123 Minn. 483, 144 N.W. 222 (1913); Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, 40 
Miss. 718 (1866); Lusse v. Lusse, 140 Mo. App. 497, 120 S.W. 114 (1909); 
Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 123, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814, 818 (1st 
Dep't 1936) (dissenting opinion). 
A line of Kansas cases states that the only restriction on the husband 
is that the transfer be not "merely colorable." From the context the 
courts in these Kansas cases probably have "shams" in mind; literally, 
they say that any reservation of an interest in the property concerned 
renders the transfer colorable: e.g., Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 90-91, 
150 Pac. 592, 595 (1915); also see Williams v. Williams, 40 Fed. 521 
(C. C. D. Kan. 1889); Small v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); 
Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918). The Osborn case 
stresses retention of the power to dispose of the property. Quaere: 
what about the power to revoke? 
Massachusetts seems committed to the reality test, supra note 3; and 
a recent case used "colorable" in the sense of lacking reality: Kerwin 
v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945). Earlier usage was 
ambivalent but probably referred to lack of reality. Roche v. Brickley, 
254 Mass. 584, 150 N.E. 866 (1926); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 
N.E. 89 (1904). 
"Colorable" was assured longevity if not lucidity by its appearance 
in passage "A" of the Kerr test, supra, p. 98. Probably it was there 
intended to denote a sham. At any rate, this seems to be the usage of 
modern courts that regurgitate the Kerr phraseology: Cheatham v. 
Sheppard, 198 Ga. 254, 31 S.E.2d 457 (1944); Haskell v. Art Institute 
304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940); Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 
116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908). Cf. Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 91 F.2d 
250 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (antenuptial); Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632, 15 
S.E. 834 (1892); Blodgett v. Blodgett, 266 Ill. App. 517 (1932), trans-
ferred, 343 Ill. 569, 175 N.E. 777 (1931) (confession of judgment); 
Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. ~07 (190!lt 
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no circumstances is to be legally effective, the transfer is 
clearly "colorable." If the deed is to become effective only 
at the husband's death, it probably is still a nullity,56 unless 
it can be sustained as a will, in which event the wife, if she 
survives, may claim her elective share. 
Hayes v. Lindquist 57 illustrates a colorable transfer of 
personalty. In that case the husband caused shares in the 
family corporation to be transferred to his sister. She rede-
livered the securities to her brother, who kept them until his 
death in a safe-deposit box to which they both had access. 
Holding for the widow, the court labelled the transfer to the 
sister "colorable and illusory." It pointed out that "The 
manifest plan of her brother and herself was to have this 
property so held that it could be claimed by either as cir-
cumstances required, and the gift to her was not complete."58 
(b) The Colorado Cases. As Holmes has said, "a word is 
the skin of a living thought." Its meaning will change with 
the generations. This is exemplified by the Colorado cases 
on "colorable" transfers. 
The Colorado cases start in 1896 with Smith v. Smith. 59 In 
that case the husband transferred all his realty by deeds made 
about four years before death. The husband and the grantees 
contrived to keep the wife in ignorance of the deeds, and they 
were not recorded until the day before death. The aged 
widow was left penniless. The court castigated the husband 
for his "heartlessness and inhumanity." The transfers, it said, 
were "merely colorable"; and it quoted with approval passage 
"A" of the "Kerr" test. We noted in an earlier chapter that 
this passage purports to exclude "intent." 60 In the Smith 
case, however, the stress on the collusive nature of the transfer 
indicates partiality to the intent rationale.61 It is significant 
56Jnfra, Chap. 12: I. 
57 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926). 
sBJd. at 64, 153 N.E. at 271. 
59 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (1896), reconsidered, 24 Colo. 527, 52 
Pac. 790 (1898). 
so Supra, Chap. 8, text at note I. 
61 Because of the husband's flint-hearted conduct it is of course pos-
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also that there was no agreement between the parties that 
would deny "reality" to the transfer; "colorable," for this 
court, merely connotes secrecy. That this secrecy must in-
volve collusion, that there must be "participation in fraudu-
lent conduct by the grantee," is reiterated in Phillips v. 
P~illips.62 In that case a father prepared deeds giving prop-
erty to his daughters, but he retained the deeds for several 
years. He delivered them about seven or eight months be-
fore his death, and the deeds were recorded at the time of 
delivery. Counsel for the widow claimed that the conduct of 
the daughters in permitting their father to retain possession 
was indicative of a "fraudulent or collusive compact." The 
court agreed, but said that the "suspicious circumstances" 
could be explained in this case as a natural transaction be-
tween father and children. In Grover v. Clover 63 the court 
endorsed and followed the "colorable" test of the Smith case. 
No mention was made of the collusion aspect of the Smith 
case rationale, but the "intent" factor apparently still re-
mained an essential ingredient.64 
The change in emphasis comes with Ellis v. ]ones, in 1923.65 
Although formally retaining the "colorable" test, the court 
made it clear that intent to defraud is irrelevant. "How can 
one fraudulently deprive another of that of which he may 
lawfully deprive him?" asks the court. Thus "colorable" has 
now nothing to do with collusion, with participation by the 
donee, with motive; it concerns shams, mere pretenses-
"counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth (Web-
ster) -not really intended as a deed." 66 The death blow 
to secrecy as a factor corr.es with Wilson v. Lowrie/1 where, 
sible that the transfer would have been labelled colorable even if there 
had been no collusion. 
6 2 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363 (1903). 
63 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (1917); see comment, 26 RocKY MT. L. 
REV. 180, 183 (1954). 
64 69 Colo. 72, 75, 169 Pac. 578, 579 (1917). 
65 73 Colo. 516, 216 Pac. 257 (1923). 
66 /d. at 517, 216 Pac. at 258; see also Hammond v. Hammond, 91 
Colo. 327 (1932); Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 247 Pac. 174 (1926). 
a1 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925). 
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in line with the Ellis case's repudiation of intent, the court 
said it was irrelevant that the widow neither knew about nor 
consented to the transfers. 68 
To summarize, the Colorado cases reflect a gradual change 
in the meaning of the term "colorable." Originally denoting 
a secret transfer with intent to disinherit, it now signifies a 
sham, a transfer that is not "real," no transfer at all. A "real," 
i.e., non-colorable, transfer is valid against the surviving 
spouse regardless of secrecy or retention of a life estate.69 
To all this we add a caveat: when the equities strongly favor 
the surviving spouse, perhaps she may be permitted to defeat 
a "real" transfer.70 A reluctance to divorce the equities from 
the evasion cases may be sensed from the recent case of Thuet 
v. Thuet.11 In that case, although the inter vivos transfer 
was sustained, 72 the court not only reiterated passage "A" of 
the "Kerr" test- which, as we have seen, may mean any-
thing, but at least it mentions "circumstances indicative of 
fraud upon the rights of the wife"- but also made specific 
inquiry as to whether the declared intent of the decedent 
"was her true intent, or whether it was merely a scheme by 
which to make disposition of the property after her death 
contrary to the provisions of our statute concerning wills . 
. . . " The court concluded that "Such intent, as would ap-
pear from the circumstances, was equitable .... " 73 
68 Accord, Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953). 
69 Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956); Cf. Moedy v. 
Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 P.2d 563 (1954) (divorce); Bostron v. Bostron, 
128 Colo. 535, 265 P.2d 230 (1953) (divorce); Million v. Botefur, 90 
Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932). But a deed of land must not be subject 
to revocation or "recall." Thuet v. Thuet, supra, note 68; see discussion 
of deeds, infra, Chap. 12: I. 
7° Cf. 26 RocKY MT. L. REv. 180 (1954). The writer of this comment 
frequently uses "colorable" and "illusory" (in the "excessive control" 
sense of Newman v. Dore) as synonyms. 
n 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953). 
12 The equities in the Thuet case favored the transferee. 
78 128 Colo. 54, 59, 260 P.2d 604, 606 (1953); cf. Burton v. Burton, 
100 Colo. 567, 570, 69 P.2d 307, 309 (1937); Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 
594, 597, 45 P.2d 638, 639 (1935) (dictum that transferee's participation 
in the fraud would be relevant). 
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4. THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES 
Pennsylvania has an important new statute 74 dealing with 
our problem. It states, in part: 75 
"(a) In general. A conveyance 76 of assets by a 
person who retains a power of appointment by 
will,77 or a power of revocation or consumption over 
the principal thereof, shall at the election of his sur-
viving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposi-
tion so far as the surviving spouse is concerned to 
74 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §30l.II (1950) (Estates Act of 1947), as 
amended 1956, Feb. 17, P.L. (1955) No. 347, §4. 
75 Material added in 1956, in addition to the last sentence of sub-
section (a), includes the following: 
"(c) Election against other conveyances. A spouse electing 
under this section also must elect to take against the will, if he 
is a beneficiary thereunder, and against all other conveyances 
within the scope of subsection (a) of which he is a beneficiary." 
(d) Procedure. The election to treat a conveyance as testa-
mentary shall be made in the same manner as an election to 
take against the will. If there is a will, such election shall 
be made within the same time limitations as an election to 
take against the will. If there is no will, such election shall be 
made within one year of the conveyor's death, and the orphan's 
court, on application of the surviving spouse made within such 
period, may extend the time for making the election. It can be 
made only if there has been no forfeiture of the right to make 
an election. The court having jurisdiction of the deceased 
conveyor's estate shall determine the rights of the surviving 
spouse in the property included in the conveyance." 
76 §301.1 defines a conveyance as "an act by which it is intended to 
create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is in-
tended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation." 
71 The widow prevailed against such a device, In re Trust of Diede!, 
32 D.&C. 685 (Pa. 1938). 
A statutory note to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.11 (1950) explains that 
the phrase "power of appointment" was used, instead of "general power 
of appointment," to prevent the section being evaded "by creating 
special powers giving the right to appoint to a class including every-
one but the spouse or some other designated individuals." A com-
panion statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §180.8 (c) (Wills Act of 1947) 
states: "The surviving spouse upon an election take against the will, 
shall not be entitled to any share in property passing under a power 
of appointment given by someone other than the testator whether or 
not such power has been exercised in favor of the surviving spouse and 
whether or not the appointed and the individual estates have blended." 
On powers of appointment generally, see pp. 252-258, infra. 
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the extent to which the power has been reserved, 
but the right of the surviving spouse shall be subject 
to the rights of any income beneficiary whose inter-
est in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to 
the death of the conveyor.78 The provisions of this 
subsection shall not apply to any contract of life 
insurance purchased by a decedent, whether payable 
in trust or otherwise." 
As far as the designated types of transfer are concerned, the 
statute represents a distinct change in policy. Before the 
statute was enacted the widow had little, if any/9 protection 
against such transfers. Now she may invade transfers in 
which the specified degree of "control" has been retained. 
And the Pennsylvania courts have conceded the influence of 
the statute in determining the validity of a particular trans-
fer (of a type covered by the statute) made prior to the effec-
tive date of the act. Thus, in Black's Estate 80 a lower court 
had to consider the validity of Totten trusts created by a 
husband before the act came into effect. Noting that there 
had been no previous evasion case in Pennsylvania clearly 
ruling on Totten trusts, and that the Restatement of Trusts 
had recently taken a stand in favor of spouses' rights, the 
court implemented "the policy evidenced by the new ... 
act" by holding for the widow. "By such circuity of legal 
ratiocination it was possible to confer upon the widow the 
full benefits of the new statute while at the same time hold-
ing that the statute did not apply." 81 A dictum in a recent 
78 A statutory note explains that the proviso favoring income bene· 
ficiaries was "included for two reasons: (1) It might prove harsh to 
withdraw income from persons who have been receiving it. (2) It 
seemed proper to permit the surviving spouse to share in property of 
which the decedent had the beneficial enjoyment at his death, but not 
to permit a sharing in property over which the decedent retained con· 
tro1 but which he did not enjoy beneficially." 
79 Infra, text at note 83. 
8o 73 D.&C. 86 (Pa., 1950). 
81 Note, by Judge E. L. Van Roden, "Rights of Surviving Spouse to 
Share in Assets Transferred by Decedent in His Lifetime," 58 DICK. L. 
REv. 70, 77 (1953). Judge Van Roden wrote the decision in Black's 
Estate. See also In re Graham's Estate, 3 D.&C. 2d 218, 42 Del. Co. 9, 4 
Fiduc. 467 (1954); Del Conte v. Luca, 2 D.&C. 2d 130 (1954). 
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Supreme Court case substantiates the not unreasonable as-
sumption that Totten trusts are covered by the statute.82 
As far as the devices not affected by the statute are con-
cerned, the Pennsylvania case law strongly favors the "reality" 
test. As one writer has said, "It is only the stupid husband, 
who, against his wishes, would be forced to allow his wife to 
share in his personalty." 83 The motive for the transfer is, 
it would seem, quite irrelevant; all that is required is a "good 
faith" divestment. Frequently cited in that connection is the 
following: "The good faith required of the donor or settlor in 
making a valid disposition of his property during life does 
not refer to the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent 
to divest himself of the ownership of his property." 84 
But even in the Pennsylvania cases we find vague caveats 
about "intent," "fraud," and "actual fraud." It is unclear 
whether or not these refer to (a) sham transfers, 85 (b) transfers 
in evasion of the widow's inchoate dower rights, or (c) some 
primordial power of equity to punish excessive guile or vin-
dictiveness, or to prevent the widow from being left destitute. 
The classic early example of this phraseology is in Hummel's 
Estate, where the court declared that "no case has gone so 
far as to sustain a voluntary obligation given and received 
with intent to defraud the wife's rights." 86 At one time it 
s2 In re Iafolla's Estate, 380 Pa. 391, 396, 110 A.2d 380, 382 (1955). 
It was also intimated that the statute might catch pre-1947 Totten 
trusts when the settlor dies after the effective date of the statute. In a 
Totten trust, said the court, the beneficiary obtains no "vested" in-
terest, merely an expectancy; consequently the transfer was not "effec-
tive" until after the date of the statute. 
83 5 U. PnT. L. REv. 78, 87 (1939). 
84 Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 112 Atl. 62 
(1920). 
85 Supra, Chap. 9:3(a). 
8 6 161 Pa. 215,217,28 Atl. 1113, 1115 (1894). See Windo1ph v. Girard, 
245 Pa. 349, 366, 91 Atl. 634, 639, (1914) (motive of wife was "not to 
defraud"); In re Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 50 Atl. 943 (1902) (no 
fraud if the transaction reasonable); Potter v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 
Atl. 401 (1928) (stressing collusion); In re Davies' Estate, 102 Pa. Super. 
326, 330, 156 Atl. 555, 556 (1931); (gift several years before death held 
valid "provided collusion to defraud the wife was not established"); 
cf. Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 55 Atl. 1067 (1903) (collu-
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was thought that doubts as to the relevance (or otherwise) 
of the decedent's motive or of participation by the donee had 
been dispelled by Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust 
Co., 87 which was decided in 1932; but those doubts have been 
somewhat revived by a series of recent cases involving obli-
gations payable at death. 
In Rynier Estate88 the wife executed sealed judgment 
notes, payable to her brother, and delivered them to a third 
party. The notes were "not to be exercised until after my 
death." The seal in Pennsylvania imports consideration; but 
lack of consideration would apparently be irrelevant.89 What 
counts is that in Pennsylvania this type of transfer is not 
deemed testamentary.90 The lack of consideration, combined 
sive judgment); Young's Estate, 202 Pa. 431, 441, 51 Atl. 1036 (1902). 
But see, e.g., Benkart v. Commonwealth, 269 Pa. 257, 259, 112 Atl. 62 
(1920), which, curiously, cites Young's Estate; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa; 149, 
165, 21 Atl. 809 (1891). 
87 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932). A revocable inter vivos trust with 
income reserved for life was sustained against the widow, although it 
was made with the "declared purpose" of excluding the wife. The 
trustee had "exclusive control" of the assets. The majority of the court 
said that the fraudulent intent stressed in Young's Estate is not shown 
merely by proving a purpose to exclude the widow (citing the Win-
dolph case); nor is the matter affected by retention of the income for 
life or the power to revoke. Kephart, J., in a strong dissent, id. at 580, 
161 Atl. at 724, stated that to remove the wife's protection is "against 
the best interests of society." Distinguishing earlier cases either on the 
ground that irrevocable gifts or transfers with no intent to defraud were 
involved, he lamented: "Indeed, unless such facts as those outlined in 
this case are sufficient to show fraudulent intent, then that intent 
cannot be shown, and such expressions as 'It is true a fraudulent intent 
will defeat a gift,' and 'Good faith is essential,' are mere words and 
mean nothing." ld. at 588, 161 Atl. at 727. The view of the majority 
in the Beirne case was approved in DeNoble v. DeNoble, 331 Pa. 273, 
277, 200 Atl. 77, 79 (1938), with the caveat that "fraud" might exist 
if "the transfer were a colorable one, the husband retaining a con· 
cealed interest in the property." 
88 In re Rynier's Estate, 48 LANe. L. REv. 475, aff'd, 347 Pa. 471, 32 
A.2d 736 (1943). 
89 Proof of consideration would strengthen the case for the trans-
feree; proof of lack of consideration merely indicates a gift which under 
the "reality" theory would prevail against the widow. 
90 The decedent of course can thwart the ultimate collection of the 
note by becoming insolvent, or by giving away his property before his 
death. Quaere: would this make the note "revocable" under the 1947 
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with postponement of collection until death, makes the mo-
tive blatantly in evidence; but the court in the Rynier case 
brushed aside any question of "fraud" or motive, apparently, 
but not specifically, relegating these concepts to transfers that 
are not intended to be operative, i.e., sham.91 
In Cancilla v. Bondy 92 the husband executed a bond for 
$10,000, payable at death and secured by a mortgage on 
realty valued at $7,500. He later executed another 93 bond 
and mortgage for $3,000 on the same property. Both trans-
actions were in favor of a grandson, who gave no considera-
tion. After the husband's death the mortgages were assigned. 
The assignees then foreclosed, having given the widow ap-
propriate notice. It was not until over a year later that the 
widow elected against her husband's will and brought a bill 
in equity to enforce her dower rights. The court refused 
her claim, on the ground that she should have raised her 
defence in the foreclosure proceedings; but it stated that 
otherwise she would have prevailed, since the execution of 
the mortgages was "a patently crude attempt to destroy 
plaintiff's dower rights in the property and was a poor subter-
fuge for a will .... " 94 
The Cancilla case is of course quite consistent with the 
legislation? As to the validity of the transfer of the husband's own note, 
payable at death, see infra, Chap. 16: I. 
91 347 Pa. 471, 474, 32 A.2d 736, 738 (1943) (citing the Windolph, 
Beirne, and DeNoble cases). Cf. Mornes Estate, 79 D.&C. 356 (Pa. 1951). 
In an earlier hearing in the Mornes litigation the court sustained, 
apparently with reluctance, an inter vivos revocable trust expressly de-
signed to disinherit the wife. The trust, having been enacted prior to 
the 1947 legislation, was not affected thereby. Mornes v. Lawrence Sav. 
& Trust Co., 8 LAWRENCE L. J. 163 (1949). 
9 2 353 Pa. 249, 44 A.2d 586 (1945). 
93 The second bond and mortgage stated that "should the mortgagor 
at any time during his lifetime make sale of the mortgaged premises so 
that he may use the proceeds thereof for his own maintenance and 
support, that [the bond and mortgage] ... shall be absolutely void." 
If the transaction had been entered into subsequent to the 1947 legis-
lation, would not the widow have had an alternative ground of attack, 
i.e., that this was a revocable transfer? 
94 353 Pa. 249, 253, 44 A.2d 586, 588 (1945). But cf. Estate of Donald 
C. Kerr, 38 Del. Co. Rep. 205 (Pa. 1951); Note, 58 DICK. L. REv. 70, 
71 (1953). 
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Rynier case, because of the wife's inchoate interest in realty.95 
Of significance, however, is the court's statement, after hav-
ing rejected "motive" as a factor in gifts of personality,96 
that "in the case of his personal property, he cannot make a 
fraudulent gift of it in contemplation of death, and thereby 
defraud his wife's statutory rights as his widow" (citing 
Hummel's Estate and Young's Estate). 97 In brief, it is not yet 
entirely clear that Pennsylvania is fully committed to the 
"reality" test, with reference to inter vivos devices not affected 
by the 194 7 legislation. 98 
Before closing this review of the Pennsylvania law, tribute 
must be paid to the framers of the 1947 statute. This statute 
is a great step in the right direction, and undoubtedly affords 
a real measure of protection to the widow. 
I doubt, however, that this type of statute is the best solu-
tion to the evasion problem.99 It diverges too sharply from 
95 In Pennsylvania the widow's inchoate dower may be defeated by 
judicial sale of the husband's bona fide creditors. Bridgeford v. Groh, 
306 Pa. 566, 574, 160 Atl. 451, 453 (1932). One would expect this en-
croachment on the dower interest to come not from the courts but from 
the legislatures, but the Pennsylvania approach has also been followed in 
Florida. In re Hester's Estate, 28 So.2d 164 (1947), 21 FLA. L. J. 152 
(1947). 
For a case in which the wife was permitted to intervene during the 
husband's lifetime, see Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 55 Atl. 
1067 (1903); cf. Howard v. Flanigan, 320 Pa. 569, 184 Atl. 34 (1936). 
96 353 Pa. 249, 252, 44 A.2d 586, 588 (1945). 
97 I d. at 253, 44 A.2d at 588. It will be recalled that Hummel's 
Estate requires participation by the donee. Smigell v. Brod, 366 Pa. 612, 
614-15, 79 A.2d 4II, 413, (1951), has a dictum that a husband can dis· 
pose of his personalty in Pennsylvania, without joinder, except for 
"actual fraud," citing the Cancilla case. Cf. Overbeck v. McHale, 354 
Pa. 177, 179, 47 A.2d 142 (1946) (antenuptial transfer); Estate of Kerr, 
1 Fiduc. 239, 38 Del. Co. 205 (Pa. 1951), commented on in Note, 58 
DICK. L. REv. 70, 71 (1953). 
98 Bregy offers some cold comfort to the widow: perhaps Hummel's 
Estate is still the law in determining (as against the next of kin) the 
spouse's share in what is left after the notes have been paid. Bregy, 
INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcTS OF 1947, 5858 (1949). See Note, 55 
DICK. L. R. 69, 72 (1950) (referring to Hummel's Estate as "a more 
satisfactory statement of the law"); comment, "Gifts of Personal Prop-
erty as Limited by the Rights of the Wife," 5 U. PITT. L. REv. 78, 89 
(1939). 
Feeser Estate (No. 2) 88 D.&C. 241 (Pa. 1954) followed the Cancilla 
case without dealing specifically with our problem. 
99 On suggestions for legislative reform, see Part IV, infra. 
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the maintenance and contribution formula outlined in 
Chapter 4. Flexibility is lacking. In one respect, the statute 
provides inadequate protection; in another respect, it pro-
vides too much protection. On the first count, the statute 
assumes that the natural reluctance of husbands to surrender 
control of their assets will preclude most non-revocable "eva-
sions." But is a stony-hearted husband apt to eschew these 
devices, particularly in the later years of life? Such a man has 
a fairly wide selection of permissible transfers.100 He may con-
tinue to enjoy his property by retaining the income for life; 
and it has been suggested that "even principal can be kept 
available by giving a disinterested trustee power to use it for 
the settlor's benefit."101 Moreover, there undoubtedly will be 
occasions when the claim of the particular surviving family 
will be more persuasive than that of an income beneficiary 
whose interest is protected under the present Pennsylvania 
statute.102 The family need should supersede the normal "re-
liance interest" of a stranger. On the second count, the 
present combination of Pennsylvania statutes may give a 
particular widow unwarranted protection. She may be 
financially independent because of her own wealth or be-
cause of the inter vivos or testamentary benevolence of the 
decedent; nevertheless she is permitted to invade the desig-
nated types of transfer. These transfers are subject to an un-
necessary fetter. 
100 Bregy, op. cit. supra, note 98, 5855-5883. The 1956 amendment 
excluding life insurance, "whether payable in trust or otherwise," was 
foreshadowed by Estate of Brown, 384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956); cf. 
In re Auch's Estate, 70 Montg. 370, 68 York 137 (Pa. 1955). On United 
States savings bonds, see In re Graham's Estate, 42 Del. Co. 9, 4 Fiduc. 
467, 3 D.&C.2d 218, (Pa. 1954); but see infra, Chap. 15: I. 
The act clearly affects revocable inter vivos trusts; cf. Ballantyne 
Estate, 1 Fiduc. 445, 67 Montg. 314, 65 York 148 (Pa. 1951); McKean 
Estate 71 D.&C. 429 (1950), aff'd, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951), 24 
TEMP. L. Q. 488 (1951) (trust executed before the statute); Vederman 
Estate, 78 D.&C. 207, 210 (Pa. 1951). In Longacre v. Hornblower & 
Weeks, 83 D.&C. 259 (Pa. 1952) a lower court permitted the widow to 
treat as testamentary (as to one half thereof) her husband's declaration 
of joint tenancy with right of survivorship. 
1o1Bregy, op. cit. supra, note 98, at 5882. 
102 See note 78 supra. 
CHAPTER 10 
The Individual Equities 
1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
This chapter is concerned with the factual circumstances 
that the courts appear to find persuasive.1 Some jurisdictions, 
for example, stress the proximity of the date of the transfer 
to the date of death. For convenience, I shall call these cir-
cumstances "equities." The main purpose of the chapter is 
to describe the part played in the case-law by each particular 
equity. How many cases, for example, have stressed "proxim-
ity to death," and to what degree? This quantitative analysis 
should give us a clearer picture of the case-law. It will be ac-
companied, wherever appropriate, by a discussion of the 
wisdom of placing emphasis on a particular factor, either by 
the courts or in remedial legislation. 
Even the casual reader of the evasion cases cannot fail to 
notice that some courts have been influenced- avowedly or 
otherwise- by the equities. This phenomenon, of course, is 
observable chiefly in cases decided in "intent" jurisdictions, 
where stress is laid on such factors as the proportional amount 
of property that was transferred and the proximity of the 
transfer to the date of death. But it may also be found- to 
a lesser degree, and certainly with less conscious stress- in 
cases using the "control" rationale. And even in the "reality" 
jurisdictions the decision on whether or not the decedent had 
the requisite animus donandi may sometimes be colored by 
the equities of the case. 
The task of pinpointing the equities is not an easy one. 
The temptation to overgeneralize is ever present. The diffi-
1 In Chapter 11 I will attempt to determine the extent to which the 
decisions actually reached coincide with the decisions that would have 
been dictated by the individual equities. 
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culty is that the courts are not in the habit of careful delinea-
tion of all the facts. This reluctance to particularize seems 
odd in a body of law dealing with "fraud." But the explana-
tion is simple. Being committed to a doctrinaire emphasis on 
a given single factor, as, e.g., the decedent's "intent," the 
degree of "control" retained, or the "reality" of the trans-
fer, many courts probably feel, with some justification, that 
the equities are in theory irrelevant. Under the illusory trust 
doctrine of Newman v. Dare, for example, the sole inquiry is 
as to retention of excessive control. In theory, it matters not 
that the decedent transferred the bulk of his estate or that 
his widow has been left destitute. And even in the "intent" 
jurisdictions the reluctance to particularize makes it difficult 
for those coming later to find a pathway. Although several 
evidentiary factors are admittedly relevant, the necessity of 
expressing the final decision in terms solely of the "intent" 
factor undoubtedly causes a tendency to slight the other 
factors. 
I use the term "major equities" to denote those factors that 
at one time or another, in one jurisdiction or another, have 
been considered a necessary part of the claimant's case- by 
way of proof or disproo£.2 No one "minor equity" is particu-
larly significant per se. But the combined effect of the known 
minor equities may be decisive when they all tug in the same 
direction. Then it is that we may find aberrations in formal 
doctrine. And, absent a long-standing judicial sanctification 
of the particular doctrine, the chances of predicting the result 
of a case increase with the weight of the equities. In Seder-
lund v. Sederlund,a for example, in which the husband trans-
ferred some nine tenths of his personal property, the decision 
to sustain the transfers appears quite proper in view of the 
following circumstances: (a) moral obligation of the decedent 
to nine children by a former marriage, (b) the widow had 
2 In Kentucky, for example, the size of the transfer and the relation-
ship of the donee are relevant. See supra, Chap. 8:3(b)(4). 
3 Wis. (1922). In Chaps. 10 and 11, as well as in Tables A, B, and C, 
each evasion case is mentioned so frequently that the citations therein 
will include only the state and date. 
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been married to the decedent for only two years, and (c) "the 
property distributed [comprised] ... the earnings of the 
deceased and his former wife and their children." 4 
The cases that were analysed include all cases involving 
postnuptial transfers in which a decision was reached on the 
merits. Also analysed were those cases decided on points of 
procedure or pleading- e.g., whether the plaintiff has stated 
a sufficient cause of action- in which the court takes a stand 
on the evasion question.5 The last-mentioned factor also 
justified inclusion of several cases involving fraud on inchoate 
dower. No case was included that dealt solely with spouses' 
rights in contracts to make a will, 6 with antenuptial trans-
fers, 7 or with transfers in evasion of the privileges entailed 
in alimony,8 maintenance,9 or community property.10 These 
excluded cases are referred to as related cases; the cases under 
analysis are described simply as evasion cases. Two hundred 
and sixty-three evasion cases were found. They are set out in 
Table C, 11 in which each case is classified according to the 
holding and to the apparent state of the equities. They are 
also set out in Table E, 12 in which the cases are classified ac-
cording to states. Table E also contains a list of important re-
lated cases. 
2. THE MAJOR EQUITIES 
(a) Proportion 13 of Decedent's Property Included in the 
Transfer. As is to be expected, this factor receives more 
4 The opinion does not divulge the widow's financial circumstances. 
She had one child by the decedent. 
5 On this criterion about a dozen cases were excluded as having no 
significant content, although obviously involving inter vivos evasions; 
e.g., Blush v. McQuade, 47 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Waterhouse 
v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 55 Atl. 1067 (1903). 
a See Appendix D, infra. 
7 See Appendix C, infra. 
s See text, Chap. 17, at note 13. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Chap. 20, at note 21. 
11 Infra, p. 387. 
12 Infra, p. 406. 
13 The proportion is determined as of the date of death instead of at 
the time of the transfer. In all but a few cases it made no difference 
which date was chosen. 
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stress than any other. In fact, it is so important that we can 
do justice to it only by examining each individual evasion 
case from that particular viewpoint. To avoid a duplication 
of effort that examination will be made in Chapter II, in con-
junction with the inquiry into the over-all influence of the 
equities. 
(b) Proximity of the Transfer to the Date of Death. The 
date of the transfer is stated, or may be deduced, in only one 
hundred and sixty-seven cases. In other words, approximately 
one third of the two hundred and sixty-three evasion cases 
fail even to mention this factor. The cases mentioning the 
factor are set out in Table A.14 The breakdown is as follows: 
Probably within few days, 
although not clear ................. Invalid 
Valid 
Within one week .................... Invalid 
Valid 
One week to one month ............. Invalid 
Valid 
One to three months ................. Invalid 
Valid 
Three to six months ................. Invalid 
Valid 
Six to twelve months ................. Invalid 
Valid 
One to two years ................... Invalid 
Valid 
Two to three years .................. Invalid 
Valid 
Three to four years .................. Invalid 
Valid 
Four to five years .................... Invalid 
Valid 
Five to ten years .................... Invalid 
Valid 








































14 Infra, p. 379. A few cases concern several transfers effected by dif-
ferent inter vivos devices, e.g., Krause v. Krause, N.Y. (1941) (deed and 
Totten trust). These cases are identified with the transfer that received 
the most attention in the judgment. Some cases also involve several 
transfers effected by the same inter vivos device. These cases are identi-
fied with the transfer occurring the longest time before death. To that 
extent these multiple-transfer cases are weaker or stronger than por-
trayed, depending on the point of view. As mentioned earlier, "invalid" 
or "valid" does not necessarily mean a decision on the merits. See 
supra, text at note 5. 
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SUMMARY 
Cases Examined .............•................................ 263 
Cases in which factor mentioned ............................... 176 (67%) 
Total invalid .... , ....... , ................................ 66 (37.5%) 
Total valid ............................................... 110 (62.5%) 
Total transfers within three years .............................. 118 (67%) 
Total invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 (36%) 
Total valid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 (64%) 
Total invalid transfers ......................................... 66 
Within three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 (64%) 
Over three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 (36%) 
Total valid transfers ......................................... 110 
Within three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 (69%) 
Over three years. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34 (31 %) 
Total transfers within ten years ................................ 165 (94%) 
The "proximity to death" factor is doctrinally irrelevant 
in jurisdictions that do not use the "intent" rationale; pos-
sibly this may explain why the factor is not even mentioned 15 
in a little over a third of the cases. As far as the cases mention-
ing the factor are concerned, the over-all picture reveals no 
particular stress on proximity to death. This p~int may be 
proved by reference to the grouping of the "invalid" cases. 
These cases are by no means clustered in the time-periods oc-
curring close to death. Forty-four per cent of these cases 
concern transfers made more than two years before death. 
Moreover, the time-periods in which the "invalid" transfers 
outnumber the "valid" transfers follow a capricious pattern, 
showing an inconsistent relationship to the proximity factor. 
We are not surprised to find that the spouse wins as often as 
she loses when the transfer is made within one week of death. 
Oddly enough, however, she wins almost as often as she loses 
when the transfer is made between five and ten years before 
death. This inconsistency is even more pronounced in the 
cases in which the donee has prevailed. The donee wins more 
often than he loses in all time-periods from one week up to 
1 5 It receives occasional stress; see, e.g., Poole v. Poole, Md. (1916) 
(14 years); cf. West v. Miller, Fed. (1935) (transfer not in "contempla-
tion of death"). 
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one year before death; 16 but the figures are equal in the one 
to two year period. 
The plain fact is that the proximity factor plays a relatively 
minor role in the case-law. In this respect the case-law follows 
the maintenance and contribution formula. Under the 
formula the proximity factor is relevant, but by no means 
decisive; the main enquiry is whether the transfer was un-
reasonably large under the circumstances. Obviously, a trans-
fer made close to death might be quite reasonable, e.g., a 
modest gift to children of a former marriage. On the other 
hand, an unreasonably large revocable trust should be vulner-
able even though made five years before death. In brief, we 
are concerned more with amount than with time. 
The foregoing discussion may throw some light on the 
test proposed in Section 33 (b) of the Model Probate Code: 
"Any gift made by a married person within two years of the 
time of his death is deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights 
of his surviving spouse, unless shown to the contrary." 17 Dis-
regarding for the time being the difficulties raised by use of 
the word "fraud," our figures show that the time limit of two 
years is unrealistic as applied to the existing case-law. Further, 
the emphasis on the proximity factor is unfortunate from the 
viewpoint of both the donee and the widow. For the donee, 
it means that he is prejudiced by the mere fact that the trans-
fer occurred within two years of death - a circumstance that 
should be of minor relevance in determining liability to the 
widow. For the widow, it means that she is prejudiced with 
reference to transfers occurring prior to the two-year period. 
She may still prove "fraud" - whatever that may be - but 
the implications are that she would have a more difficult job 
on her hands. The figures indicate that she would have been 
16 Of the sixteen cases involving transfers that clearly or probably 
were made within a week of death, six favored the donee. 
17 §5(a)(l) of the statute recommended by the 1939 Report of the 
Commission on Revision of the Laws of North Carolina Relating to 
Estates utilizes a one year period; see p. 334, infra. 
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under this handicap in forty-four per cent of the decided 
cases.18 
To be sure, we find a correlation between the proximity 
factor and the result of the case in the "intent" jurisdictions. 
The Missouri courts/9 for example, usually state that the 
transfer must be in "contemplation" or in "apprehension" of 
death; and most of the "invalid" transfers in that state were 
made within a few months of death. We concluded earlier 20 
that intent to defraud the surviving spouse is an unsatis-
factory test, since it is provable only by reference to objec-
tive factors - of which the most important is the relative size 
of the transfer. Thus the emphasis on "intent" serves to con-
fuse the issue. But even when intent to defraud is the sole 
criterion of liability it is unrealistic to stress proximity to 
death, or "contemplation of death" as indicative of fraudu-
lent intent. A husband intending to defraud his wife will 
normally put his plan into execution before he has any 
acute awareness of impending death. In point of fact, the 
more recent evasion cases usually deal with transfers that 
occurred some time before death. This phenomenon may 
be due in part to the rising popularity of estate planning, 
which encourages deliberate lifetime giving. At any rate, 
most of the cases involving transfers made within a few 
months of death are, in the main, older cases. Moreover, as 
pointed out above, the figures set out above indicate that 
the transfer occurred more than two years before death in 
forty-four per cent of the cases. 
Further, the phrase "contemplation of death" is ambigu-
ous. It could mean any one of, or a combination of, the fol-
lowing: (a) mere proximity to death, without awareness 
thereof; (b) awareness of impending death; and (c) testamen-
tary intent, in connection with an inter vivos transfer made 
in good health but designed to have post-mortem effect; for 
1s To extend the presumptive period to three years would help the 
widow, harm the donee. 
19 See supra, Chap. 8:3{h)(5). 
20 I d., sec. 4. 
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example, an inter vivos trust with income retained for life. 
The fact that the transfer occurred in proximity to death 
does not necessarily indicate awareness of death,21 or, for that 
matter, testamentary intent.22 Probably the phrases "con-
templation of death" and "apprehension of death" have pri-
mary reference to either or both of the latter two factors. 28 
But neither of these two factors necessarily entails subjec-
tive intent to defraud the widow. The transfer may have 
been inspired by a variety of motives, whether or not includ-
ing malevolence to the surviving spouse. The most obvious 
of these motives are sheer benevolence to the donee; a sense 
of responsibility to the donee, e.g., when the donee is an in-
fant child by a prior marriage, or a person who has been 
financially dependent on the transferor; and a feeling of 
obligation to the donee, stemming from past injuries to the 
21 The state of the transferor's health is mentioned with some fre-
quency: e.g., Re Wrone's Estate, N.Y. (1941) (transferor in good 
health for a man of his years; held, valid); see Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. 
(6 Gratt.) 594, 606-607 (1850). In Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, Md. 
(1927), the transfer was made about five years before the decedent was 
killed in an accident; held, valid. 
22 The "apprehension of death" phrase has received little judicial 
analysis. Apparently it functions more as a vague cut-off test than as a 
criterion of intent, i.e., no suit may be brought by the widow if the 
transfer was made at a time when there was no apprehension of death, 
whatever that means. See Wahl v. Wahl, Mo. (1947). As far as trans-
fers occurring in apprehension of death are concerned, the courts seem 
to have been interested more in the size of the transfer than in the 
"apprehension" factor. In Missouri most of the "invalid" transfers 
occur within a few months of death, and they are accompanied both by 
awareness of death and testamentary intent. But cf. Resch v. Rowland, 
(Mo. 1953) in which there was fraud on inchoate dower, the court stat-
ing that "a conveyance does not necessarily have to be made in con-
templation of death if it in fact be made to defraud the wife of her 
dower"; and see the following Kentucky cases in which the transfer 
was held invalid: Payne v. Tatem (1930) (2 years before death); Coch-
ran's Adm'x v. Cochran (1938) (a little over three years); Wilson v. 
Wilson (1901) (eight years). 
23 Note that these two factors are independent. True, if the trans-
feror was aware of death he probably made the transfer with testa-
mentary intent. But the converse does not hold; indeed, many inter 
vivos transfers, made in good health, are concerned with the contin-
gencies of death. On parallel difficulties in the tax field see Lowndes 
and Rutledge, "An Objective Test of Transfers in Contemplation of 
Death," 24 TExAs L. REV. 134 (1946). 
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donee by the decedent. A transfer made with any of these 
motives may quite conceivably be made in awareness of death 
or with testamentary intent, with no concomitant intent to 
defraud the widow. 24 The transfer may of course have the 
incidental effect of pauperizing the widow; and only a dullard 
could fail to be aware of that fact. But here again the sig-
nificant factor is the relative size of the transfer. To say that 
a man will be presumed to know that large inter vivos trans-
fers will harm his widow is only another way of saying that he 
should not be permitted to make unreasonably large trans-
fers to her prejudice. To phrase this thought in terms of his 
assumed intent is but to add an unnecessary and confusing 
factor. 
The proximity factor is, of course, not entirely irrelevant. 
A large transfer has more serious consequences to the widow 
if made in close proximity to death than if made at an earlier 
time. The wife's standard of living normally depends on the 
capital and income of her husband; and when the transfer 
occurs close to death the drop in her standard of living (as a 
widow) is that much more sudden, more cruel.25 The 
proximity factor is thus of some relevance, particularly under 
a family maintenance legislative scheme. But the relatively 
greater significance of the size of the transfer - and, to single 
out another equity, the reliance interest of the donee- makes 
it unwise to place special emphasis on the proximity factor. 
Although unsuitable as a criterion, the proximity factor 
has another and more useful significance. The reliance in-
terest of the donee requires a cut-off period. In other words, 
transfers occurring more than a specified number of years be-
fore the decedent's death should be immune to the widow's 
24 Probably most inter vivos transfers are made in the last decade or 
so of the transferor's life. But this indicates an awareness of the con-
tingencies of death, not necessarily an awareness of impending death, or 
intent to defraud the widow. 
25 Likewise, the closer to death the transfer was made, the longer the 
lifetime ownership by the transferor; and the longer the lifetime 
ownership, the greater the quasi-testamentary nature of the transfer, 
particularly if income or control was retained. See pp. 87-88, supra. 
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claim. The greater the lapse of time between the transfer and 
the date of death, the more the donee should be justified in 
relying on the security of his title. The drop in the widow's 
standard of living, occasioned by a large transfer in close 
proximity to death, has its counterpart - perhaps less poign-
ant, but nevertheless real - in the hardship to the donee, 
years after receipt of the property, if he is forced to return it 
to the widow or to contribute to her support. From the 
donee's viewpoint, there comes a time when he should be 
able to consider the property to be free of the widow's claim. 
This reliance factor is recognized in the model statute 26 by 
provision for a cut-off period of three years when no beneficial 
interest is retained in the property that was transferred, and 
of ten years when such an interest was retained. Transfers 
occurring within the stated periods before death are tested 
by the maintenance and contribution formula, with the 
proximity factor being relevant but not decisive. Transfers 
occurring prior to the cut-off dates entail no liability for 
contribution. 
The practicality of the stipulated cut-off dates is of course 
a matter of opinion. The figures set out above, however, sug-
gest that the contemplated dates should not cause undue 
hardship. Sixty-seven per cent of all cases in which the 
proximity of the transfer to the date of death may be deduced 
concern transfers made within three years of death; and 
ninety-four per cent concern transfers made within ten years 
of death. 
(c) Provision by the Decedent for the Surviving Spouse. 
This factor is mentioned in many decisions, whether with 27 
26 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute §8, 
infra, Chap. 22. 
27 Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1896); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, Fla. 
(1949); Williams v. Collier, Fla. (1935); Smith v. Hines, Fla. (1863); 
Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, Ill. (1945); Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., Ill. 
(1928) (semble); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, Ill. (1912); Benge 
v. Barnett, Ky. (1949); Weber v. Salisbury, Ky. (1912); Wilson v. Wil-
son, Ky. (1901); Whittington v. Whittington, Md. (1954); Mushaw v. 
THE INDIVIDUAL EQUITIES 155 
or without 28 conscious stress. In the cases that emphasize 
the factor the decision usually turns on the "reasonableness" 
of the transfer, with the size of the provision made for the 
spouse being quite persuasive. The number of these cases is 
greater than might be suspected from perusal of the evasion 
literature, in which the usual methodology is to analyze the 
cases by rationale or by the type of transfer. Even Sykes, who 
tacitly assumes that a variety of factors may influence the 
Maryland courts, states of this factor that it "seldom appears 
explicitly in other jurisdictions." 29 
It is probable that the factor occurs in cases other than 
those noted below, and that it is not alluded to by these courts 
because it is not generous enough to be meaningful, or be-
cause the court is committed to an approach that in theory 
Mushaw, Md. (1944); Whitehill v. Thiess, Md. (1932); Rose v. Union 
Guardian Trust Co., Mich. (1942); Trabbic v. Trabbic, Mich. (1905); 
Potter v. Winter, Mo. (1955); Wahl v. Wahl, Mo. (1947); Merz v. Tower 
Grove Bank & Trust Co., Mo. (1939); In re Sides' Estate, Neb. (1930); 
Evans v. Evans, N.H. (1917); Hart v. Hart, N.Y. (1949); President and 
Directors of Manhattan Bank v. Janowitz, N.Y. (1940); Marine Midland 
Trust Co. v. Stanford, N.Y. (1939); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Miller, N.Y. (1938); McGee v. McGee, N.C. (1843); MacLean v. J. S. 
MacLean Co., Ohio (1955); York v. Trigg, Okla. (1922); Mornes v. 
Lawrence Sav. & Trust Co., Pa. (1949); Reynolds v. Vance, Tenn. (1870); 
Mcintosh v. Ladd, Tenn. (1840); Hughes' Lessee v. Shaw, Tenn. 
(1827); Lightfoot's Ex'ors v. Colgin, Va. (1813); cf. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Baker, 107 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. N.D. Texas 1952) (com-
munity property); Matter of Schacter, N.Y. (1944). Contra: Fleming v. 
Fleming, Iowa (1921) (factor deprecated); !bey v. !bey, N.H. (1945) 
(standard of "reasonableness" rejected). 
28 Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944); De Leuil's Ex'ors v. De Leuil, 
Ky. (1934); Allender v. Allender, Md. (1951); Bullen v. Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., Md. (1939); Poole v. Poole, Md. (1916); Roche v. Brickley, 
Mass. (1926); Wanstrath v. Kappel, Mo. (1949); Stone v. Stone, Mo. 
(1853); Sanborn v. Goodhue, N.H. (1853); Schmidt v. Rebhann, N.Y. 
(1952); Harris v. Harris, Ohio (1947); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Ohio 
(1944); Dunnett v. Shields, Vt. (1924); Hall v. Hall, Va. (1909); Seder-
lund v. Sederlund, Wis. (1922); cf. Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 
91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (antenuptial transfer); Cooke v. Fidelity 
Trust and Safety-Vault Co., Ky (1898); Mark v. Mark, 145 Ohio St. 301, 
61 N.E.2d 595, 160 A.L.R. 608 (1945). 
29 Sykes, "Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviv-
ing Spouses," 10 Mo. L. REv. I, 13 (1949). 
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precludes any consideration of the reasonableness of the 
transfer. A glance at the footnoted cases reveals that the fac-
tor is referred to with some frequency even in the so-called 
"reality" jurisdictions, e.g., Massachusetts and Kansas. A 
court that denies recovery to the widow on doctrinaire reason-
ing may wish to salve its conscience by allusion to this factor, 
without committing itself to the proposition that the break 
of the equities should determine the decision. 
To be significant for purposes of our discussion, the pro-
vision need not necessarily have been large: just what was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 30 And it may have been 
testamentary 31 or inter vivos. In most cases it was inter vivos; 
a husband who is disposed to evade his marital obligations 
will normally employ inter vivos devices in order to circum-
vent the wife's right of election. In the usual evasion case 
the pecuniary value of the widow's testamentary share is 
slight. In large estates, for which legal advice has probably 
been obtained, the comparative value is higher, perhaps be-
cause the legal profession is coming to realize that the only 
completely foolproof bar to evasion litigation is to give the 
widow enough to make it not worth her while to attack the 
inter vivos transfers. 
(d) Relationship of the Donee. One hundred and eighty-
five (70%) of the two hundred and sixty-three evasion cases 
mention the relationship, if any, between the donee and the 
decedent. The cases are set out in Table B,32 in which the 
cases favoring the surviving spouse are italicized. As used 
here, the term "donee" excludes both the decedent and the 
surviving spouse when either spouse was given a life estate 
in the subject matter of the transfer. It also excludes the 
decedent in the several cases in which he purchased an an-
nuity. "Children" includes grandchildren. The breakdown 
is as follows: 
so E.g., Kernan v. Carter, 132 Md. 577, 104 Atl. 530 (1918). 
31 Kernan v. Carter, supra, note 30. 
32Jnfra, p. 383. 
THE INDIVIDUAL EQUITIES 
Favoring Favoring 
Spouse Donee 
(a) Decedent's children by a prior marriage .. 30 33 
(b) Decedent's children, not clear whether of 
his last marriage or a prior marriage. . . . 11 20 
(c) Decedent's children, of the last marriage.. 2 9 
(d) Close relatives (parent, brother, nephew) .. 15 30 
(e) Distant relatives (uncle, cousin, in-law, 
etc.) ......... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 
(f) Non-relatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 13 
(g) Non-relatives (semble) . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 1 6 
(h) Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 
----












These figures indicate that the motivation for an inter 
vivos "evasion" is likely to be concern for children.34 The 
largest single group of cases deals with transfers to children 
of a prior marriage: of the one hundred and eighty-five 
cases in which the relationship factor appeared, ninety-four, 
or slightly more than one half, involve transfers to children 
who clearly or presumably were children of a prior mar-
riage.35 If we include the eleven cases involving children of 
the last marriage, we find one hundred and five cases, or fifty-
seven per cent, involve transfers to the decedent's children, 
whether of his last marriage or of a prior marriage. In "eva-
sions" of this sort the motive is natural, and humane; indeed, 
not to "evade" would be abnormal.36 Consider the personal 
equation whenever a man with children of his own makes a 
33 The cases in Table B total one hundred and eighty-five, but two 
cases appear twice: Aybar's Estate, N.Y. (1952), and Leiman's Estate, 
N.Y. (1952). In these two cases the transfers were to several donees, 
falling in separate categories. 
34 The relationship factor does not have a decisive bearing on the 
result of the case. For example, we would expect the children of a prior 
marriage, in category (a), to win most of their cases: but they lost 
almost as many cases as they won. Ten of the thirty cases in which they 
lost were decided in Kentucky and Missouri, where the courts openly 
consider the equities. See Table B, infra. 
35 In other words, categories (a) and (b). 
36 In Williams v. Collier, Fla. (1935), the court referred to a trust for 
grandchildren by a previous marriage as being for a "laudable purpose." 
Although children in this country receive little protection against dis-
inheritance, it is a curious anomaly that in many states the widow's 
forced share is cut down if children survive. See supra, Chap. 2, text at 
note 12. 
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second marriage. Usually it will be a marriage of conveni-
enceY Would not the normal husband so situated consider 
himself obligated merely to provide his widow with mainte-
nance for life or until remarriage? Would he not prefer that 
the bulk of his property- including the remainder after 
the widow's life estate- go to his own flesh and blood? 38 
Surely he would. And surely he would attempt an inter vivos 
"evasion." 
These figures also support 39 our working hypothesis that 
the relative increase in American family disharmony presages 
an increase in "evasions" of the statutory share.40 They in-
dicate that the property affected by the widow's elective share 
will frequently be more than she deserves, and that in many 
cases "evasion" should be condoned, not censured. We need 
a fresh approach to the over-all problem of family protection. 
From the legislative viewpoint, the widow's elective rights 
should be tailored to her individual need; the statute should 
ar Remarriages are by no means the sole cause of "evasions." By way 
of a spot check on the cases involving transfers to donees other than 
children of a prior marriage, consider category (d) (close relatives). In 
only eight of the forty-five cases do we know for certain that either or 
both of the parties had been married more than once. Most of these 
cases are fairly recent: Van Devere v. Moore, Minn. (1954); National 
Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, Mass. (1950); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. 
Koon, Fla. (1949); Hastings v. Hudson, Mo. (1949); Rynier's Estate, 
Pa. (1943); Murray v. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, N.Y. (1939); Kelley v. Snow, 
Mass. (1904); and Hummel's Estate, Pa. (1894). 
38 Children of a prior marriage probably have a more persuasive 
equity as against the claimant stepmother than have children born of 
the marriage between the decedent and the claimant, although this 
generalization is of small consequence if the equities in the individual 
case favor the widow. In Burton v. Burton, Colo. (1937) the court 
stressed the pull of blood relationship (children of former marriage) 
over "a wife in name only, of some twenty months, whom [decedent] 
did not greatly trust." Also see Williams v. Collier, Fla. (1935) ("the 
decedent being under no obligation to arrange the disposition of his 
personal property so as to benefit his widow's heirs to the detriment 
of his own"); Sederlund v. Sederlund, Wis. (1922); cf. Dickerson's Ap-
peal, Pa. (1887). 
as But not overwhelmingly so. Of the ninety-four cases in groups (a) 
and (b), forty-two have occurred during or since 1930, twenty-seven dur-
ing or since 1945. For a chronological analysis of all evasion cases see 
p. 9, supra. 
40 Supra) p. 10. 
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contain a policy directive to the courts on the problem of 
inter vivos evasions; and the directive should require the 
courts to consider all the circumstances of the case. Until this 
is done, the widow in the remarriage cases may receive too 
much or too little under the "control" doctrine (depending 
on the circumstances), and will get nothing (which may or 
may not be what she deserves) under the "reality" doctrine. 
(e) Participation by the Donee. A number of cases have 
made a curious restriction on the widow's claim: she must 
prove that the donee 41 participated in the fraud. This 
peculiar requirement probably stems from the cases under 
the statutes of Elizabeth, dealing with conveyances in fraud 
of creditors.42 No doubt in the typical evasion case the 
donee does "participate"; but the circumstance, when it oc-
curs, usually occasions no judicial commentY The decisions 
that require the participation factor generally use the "intent" 
rationale,44 and they tend to rely on other cases that involve 
41 By "donee" is meant, of course, the ultimate beneficiary. Thus in 
the trust cases we are concerned with participation by the beneficiary, 
not the trustee. In at least one case, however, the court went out of its 
way to condemn the part taken by the corporate trustee in arranging an 
allegedly "bullet-proof" transfer, Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust 
Co., Mo. (1939). 
4 2 Speaking of the grantee in the creditor cases, Glenn says that 
"notice of an evil purpose may differ from participation. Notice may 
mean carelessness only .... " (Glenn, 1 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND 
PREFERENCES, §251 (1940). If the purchaser for value had mere knowl-
edge he may be guilty only of "constructive fraud," as distinguished 
from "actual fraud." Although he will still lose the property to the 
creditor he may in some instances receive compensation for maintain-
ing the property while it was in his hands. The donee, however, having 
paid no consideration, will lose the property to the creditor even 
though he took it in good faith. 
43 E.g., Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944); In re Kilgallen's Estate, 
N.Y. (1953); Marano v. LoCarro, N.Y. (1946); cf. Goewey v. Hogan, 
N.Y. (1951); Bodner v. Feit, N.Y. (1936) (mentioned in both majority 
and dissenting opinions, as bearing on "intent"). But cf. Clavin v. 
Clavin, 41 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 760, 45 
N.Y.S.2d 937 (lst Dep't 1943), an antenuptial transfer in which the 
court intimated that "participation" is an essential factor in the illu-
sory trust doctrine. 
44 But it is not required in Kentucky and Missouri, the two main "in-
tent" jurisdictions; e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, Mo. (1862) (jury finds no 
collusion yet widow wins on "intent" test). 
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either alimony or antenuptial transfers.45 It seems to be im-
material whether or not the participation benefitted the 
donee. In the normal case the donee will of course derive 
some benefit.46 
The great majority of the evasion decisions do not require 
participation by the donee. Indeed, the requirement seems 
out of place in the evasion field. If adequate consideration 
has been paid for the transfer the widow has no claim of any 
sort; the husband having received a fair exchange, the widow 
is not injuredY Absent inchoate dower, the community's 
45 The Colorado cases have flirted with the requirement; see p. 136, 
supra. In Rabbitt v. Gaither, Mo. (1887) a minority of the court stated 
that participation is necessary. The majority stated that there was 
participation, without ruling on the necessity therefore. The court 
cited Fei~hley v. Feighley, 7 Md. 537 (1855) (alimony); see also Jawor-
ski v. Wisniewski (1925). Later Maryland cases (see Table E, infra) 
ignore the requirement, but "participation" factually was not pres-
ent in these cases. The most recent Maryland case leaves the point 
open: Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 12, 106 A.2d 72, 77 
(1954). The factor was stressed in Hummel's Estate, Pa. (1894); cf. 
Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 55 Atl. 1067 (1903) (collusive 
judgment bill); Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Braum (1928); Divilbiss 
Estate, 13 Pa. Dist. R. 503 (1904) (purchase of realty in name of chil-
dren); In re Davies Estate, (1931). Hummel's Estate was cited with 
approval in a recent lower court dictum: Elias v. Elias, 16 Fayette Leg. 
Jour. Pa. (1953). 
Dicta favoring the requirement may also be found in Dorrough v. 
Grove, 257 Ala. 609, 610, 60 So.2d 342, 343 (1952) (antenuptial); Wright 
v. Holmes, Me. (1905); In re Sides' Estate, Neb. (1930); cf. Maruska v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 21 F. Supp. 841 (D. Minn. 
1938) (alimony, husband died before suit). 
46 In some cases the widow may be able to have the transfer set aside 
as being "colorable"; see supra, Chap. 9:3. 
47 But cf. Brewer v. Connell, Tenn. (1851), which seems to say that a 
widow may even upset conveyances for consideration. There appears 
to be no authority for this proposition in the Tennessee statute dealing 
with fraud on dower, discussed p. 110, supra; see Reynolds v. Vance, 
Tenn. (1870). The real explanation of the Brewer case lies in the facts, 
which smack of the Little Orphan Annie comic strip. Brewer "became 
exasperated" at his wife, threatened to "inflict stripes" on her, and was 
"addicted to intoxication," in consequence of which he was jailed. The 
widow filed a bill for divorce and alimony, and secured an injunction 
"to prevent the transfer of his property in fraud of the rights of his 
wife." The defendant Connell was a magistrate who knew the facts 
and had announced that Brewer ought to be put in jail, and that "if 
he was brought before him, he should go to jail without bail." Not-
withstanding this, and knowing of the alimony suit, Connell went bail 
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interest in the donee's security of title precludes the widow 
from choosing to inherit one type of property (that which the 
husband sold) instead of another type (the consideration re-
ceived by the husband). As far as voluntary transfers are 
concerned, the widow is hurt whether or not the donee par-
ticipates. The gravamen of her complaint is that the husband 
has failed to provide post-mortem support. He injures her to 
the same extent whether he burns his ,money, makes a collu-
sive transfer, or gives it to a person who is unaware of his 
design. In each instance the widow's need is the same. She 
should be able to recover without being subjected to the diffi-
cult and irrelevant task of proving the donee's state of 
mind. The donee cannot complain, as he was receiving a 
handout in any event. 
3. THE MINOR EQUITIES 
(a) For the Claimant: 
(1) Moral Claim of Widows in General. Some of the older 
cases urge the moral claim of widows. Thus Thayer v. 
Thayer 48 states that "the husband is bound, by the law of God 
and man, to provide for her a support during his own life, 
and, upon his death, the moral duty does not end. He should 
provide for her so long as she lives." And in Stone v. Stone 49 
it was said of the widow's claim to her husband's personalty 
that "The principle is an important one, and, however harsh 
its application in the present instance may be, we deem it 
too essential to the preservation of the right of dower of 
widows in their deceased husband's estates, to suffer it to be 
overthrown, even in a case which has no merit to commend 
it." 50 But nowadays counsel for the widow would be better 
for Brewer, took a deed of trust for indemnity and then purchased the 
res of the trust from Brewer, paying a fair price. Brewer, who all this 
time had been declaring his intent to disinherit his wife, then hung 
himself. 
48 14 Vt. 104, 118 (1842). 
49 18 Mo. 389, 391 (1853). 
50 Italics supplied. See also Grover v. Clover, Colo. (1917); Smith v. 
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advised to stress some equity of the individual client, as, for 
example, that she helped the decedent to accumulate his 
property, 51 and that she is now destitute. True, the statutory 
share implies a moral obligation of the husband to provide 
support for his widow; but a moral obligation is easy to 
invoke, hard to enforce. Cases like the Thayer case and the 
Stone case are offset by decisions adopting a strict interpreta-
tion of the election statutes. For example, a line of Kansas 
and Massachusetts cases states that the courts cannot venture 
beyond the bare words of the statute: a share in the decedent's 
"estate" means what it says.52 
(2) Whether or not Claimant Helped Accumulate De-
cedent's Estate. 
"Many a wife", said an Iowa court a generation ago, 
"has been a faithful helper in the building of great 
fortunes. Many a wife, by economy and self-denial, 
has been a strong factor in the building. Yet we are 
asked to say that this wife, who has done faithful 
service and practiced self-denial for 36 years, that 
something might be left for declining years, must be 
left penniless. These are some of the features that 
bring Qoint tenancy] into disfavor, and show that it 
Smith, Colo. (1896); Beck v. Beck, Iowa (1884); Bolles v. Toledo Trust 
Co., Ohio (1944) quoting Doyle v. Doyle, Jr., 50 Ohio St. 330, 34 N.E. 
166; Sanborn v. Lang, Md. (1874); cf. Smith v. Northern Trust Co., Ill. 
(1944); Blankenship v. Hall, Ill. (1908); Headington v. Woodward, Mo. 
(1919); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932) (dissent of 
Kephart, J.); Krause v. Krause, N.Y. (1941) (dissent of Harris, J.). For 
strong views on the subject, at a time when the husband acquired the 
wife's personalty upon marriage, see Hughes' Lessee v. Shaw, Tenn. 
(1827); and, emphasizing baser motives, see Walker v. Walker, N.H. 
(1890): "Marriage is the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration .... 
The plaintiff's right to her distributory share of her husband's large 
estate, and which is quite likely to have been one of the inducements 
to her marriage with him, is therefore in the nature of an actual pur-
chase of that right. . . ." 
51 See infra, text at note 53. 
52 In Small v. Small, Kan. (1895), the unsuccessful widow had a strong 
moral claim, ha-ving brought up the five children of husband's previous 
marriage during 29 years of marriage; cf. Osborn v. Osborn, Kan. (1918); 
Kerwin v. Donaghy, Mass. (1945). In Poole v. Poole, Kan. (1915), the 
court differentiated evasion cases from cases involving transfers in 
fraud of alimony and separate maintenance. 
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cannot be made to defeat a wife's claim undu the 
statute." 53 
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Similar views have been expressed in other cases.54 The 
factor also receives indirect emphasis in those cases that char-
acterize the widow as a volunteer, as contrasted with the con-
tribution of the donee.55 On the other hand, some claimants 
have succeeded even though the court has commented on the 
fact that the claimant did not contribute to the decedent's 
estate.56 
(3) Abandonment of Claimant by Decedent. In many cases 
the parties were separated before the inter vivos transfer was 
effected. The question of fault is as a rule not mentioned, or, 
if it is mentioned, has not been determined.57 In point of 
53 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 81, 174 N.W. 946, 950 (1921). 
The widow prevailed. The dissenting judge retorted, at p. 102, 174 
N.W. at 958, "But even the best wife is entitled to no more than such 
provision as the legislature has seen fit to make for her. Conceding 
everything to the quality of the plaintiff as the wife, that throws no light 
on whether this contract signed by her husband is or is not enforce-
able." See infra, Chap. 15, text at note 46. 
54 Williams v. Williams, Fed. (1889); Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930); In 
re Sides Estate, Neb. (1930); cf. Murray v. Murray, Ky. (1890); Beirne 
v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932) (dissent of Kephart, J.). 
55 E.g., In re Sutch's Estate, Pa. (1902), in which the court stressed the 
moral claim of children by first marriage who had helped build up 
family truck farm, and who "saw the new wife step into their mother's 
place, and a possible new family about to enjoy the fruits of their 
labor." 
On the independent wealth of the donee, as an equity in the claim-
ant's favor, cf. Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930); but cf. Osborn v. Osborn, 
Kan. (1918). 
56 Osborn v. Osborn, Kan. (1918); Brown v. Crafts, Me. (1903). In 
Hastings v. Hudson, Mo. (1949) (a paralyzed widower prevailed against 
the transferees of his wife's property, practically all of which the wife 
had obtained by her own exertions and by inheritance from her 
"closely-knit" family. Other "chimney-corner" equities that were dis· 
regarded: marriage late in life, bad blood between wife and daughter 
of husband; fact that donees had provided money for wife when she 
was ill). 
57 In re Halpern's Estate, N.Y. (1951) (separation late in the marriage, 
fault not clear; widow loses); Newman v. Dore, N.Y. (1937) (separation 
shortly before death; fault disputed; widow wins); Beirne v. Conti-
nental-Equitable Title and Trust Co., Pa. (1932) (desertion, fault dis-
puted; widow loses). 
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fact, desertion 58 by the decedent, or a threat of desertion,59 
is certainly not an essential part of the claimant's case; prob-
ably it is not even relevant. Of course, if the transfer com-
plained of is in fraud of the wife's potential alimony claim, 
the wife- suing as a widow - will have a much stronger 
case.60 
It is possible that a transfer by a deserted wife would have 
greater chances of being sustained, although there is no clear 
statement to this effect in the cases. 61 
(4) Reprehensible Conduct by Decedent. Decedent's rep-
rehensible treatment of the claimant (other than desertion) 
is mentioned frequently.62 In the main, the factor is inde-
cisive. It does, however, constitute a popular makeweight 
argument. 
58 In re Lorch's Estate, N.Y. (1941) (separation for 9 years before 
death apparently without sufficient fault on wife's part to bar her from 
election; widow loses); cf. Wooton v. Keaton, Ark. (1925) (widow and 
three children lose out to mistress with whom husband had lived for 
thirty-six years before death); Roche v. Brickley, Mass. (1926) (thirteen 
year separation; widower loses); Williams v. Evans, Ill. (1895). But see 
Smith v. Hines, Fla. (1863-4) (husband deserts, leaving wife destitute; 
widow wins); Brownell v. Briggs, Mass. (1899); Hays v. Henry, Md. 
(1848); cf. Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 55 Atl. 1067 (1903). 
59 Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, N.Y. (1939) (unhappy marriage; 
husband threatened desertion: widow loses); Brewer v. Connell, Tenn. 
(1851) (threat of desertion: widow wins). 
60 Presumably she should sue also as a creditor: see p. 259, supra; 
Haskell v. Art Institute, Ill. (1940) (separation late in marriage, wife's 
suit for separate maintenance pending at husband's death; widow 
loses). 
61 Cf. Roche v. Brickley, Mass. (1926). 
62 Claimant wins: Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1896) (aged infirm widow 
left "absolutely penniless"); Lonsdale's Estate, Pa. (1857) ("mania a 
potu"); Brewer v. Connell, Tenn. (1851) (emphasis on coarse, brutal 
conduct of husband to wife, personal violence, intoxication, unjust ac-
cusations). For dogged determination, consider the husband in Merz 
v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., Mo. (1939), who, seeking a 
"bullet-proof" plan, had to be given whiskey on one of his visits to the 
trust company, to "brace him up." Claimant loses: Blankenship v. Hall, 
Ill. (1908) (husband disinherits mentally incompetent wife; she loses as 
to personalty); Malone v. Walsh, Mass. (1944); cf. Lines v. Lines, Pa. 
(1891). 
On the other hand, there is no particular consistency in the cases in 
which the decedents' conduct was blameless. Claimant wins: Wilson v. 
Wilson, Ky. (1901); Mushaw v. Mushaw, Md. (1944); Bolles v. Toledo 
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(b) For the Donee 
(1) Moral Claim of Donees. The cases abound with refer-
ences to the superior moral claim of the donee over the 
widow. These references deal not only with donees in gen-
eral,63 but also with particular classes of donee, e.g., chil-
dren,64 and with the individual donee concerned in the liti-
gation. Allusions to the equities of a particular donee 65 are 
quite common. These equities include the circumstance that 
decedent had always "preferred" 66 the donee, or that the 
donee had cared for, 67 or given financial support, or its equiv-
alent,68 to the decedent. In some of the cases the donee is a 
bigamous second wife,69 usually with the equities in her 
Trust Co., Ohio (1944); Reynolds v. Vance, Tenn. (1870). Claimant 
loses: Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Md. (1939); cf. Thuet v. 
Thuet, Colo. (1953). 
63 The superior claim of any donee is of course implicit in the "re-
ality" doctrine. 
64 Smith v. Hines, Fla. (1863-4); Samson v. Samson, Iowa (1885); Na-
tional Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, Mass. (1950) ("strong family ties"); 
In re Estate of Sides', Neb. (1930); Sanborn v. Goodhue, N.H. (1853) 
("tender and almost helpless offspring"); Matter of Halpern, N.Y. 
(1951); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, N.Y. (1939); Lightfoot's 
Ex'rs v. Colgin, Va. (1813); cf. Jones v. Jones, 213 Ill. 288, 72 N.E. 695 
(1904) (antenuptial); Daniher v. Daniher, 201 Ill. 489, 66 N.E. 239 (1903) 
(antenuptial); Crain v. Crain, Tex. (1856) (children as "forced heirs"). 
65 Poole v. Poole, Md. (1916) ("The child will be more benefitted by 
this arrangement than if ... the deed set aside"). 
66 E.g., Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, Fla. (1949); Wahl v. Wahl, 
Mo. (1947). Cf. Hummel's Estate, Pa. (1894). 
67 E.g., Ellis v. Jones, Colo. (1923); Patch v. Squires, Vt. (1933). 
6B Thuet v. Thuet, Colo. (1953); Whitehill v. Thiess, Mo. (1932); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, N.Y. (1943); Re Wrone's Estate, N.Y. (1941); 
Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Braum, Pa. (1928); In re Sutch's Estate, 
Pa. (1902); cf. Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 203, 16 A.2d 47 (1940) (antenuptial). 
On the widow's right to set aside contracts to make a will, see Appendix 
D, infra. 
69 Williams v. Williams, Fed. (1889) (parties had lived together twelve 
years, the woman helping the "husband" to accumulate his property); 
Ford v. Ford, Ala. (1842) (imputation of fraud countered by "a high 
moral obligation" to provide for bigamous second wife and child by 
her); Holmes v. Mims, Ill. (1953) (donee a bigamous wife, who helped 
build up joint earnings in undertaking business, taking care of " ... 
the bodies of the ladies and babies"); cf. In re Leiman's Estate, N. Y. 
(1952). But cf. Hays v. Henry, Md. (1848) (transfer to mistress set 
aside). 
For a discussion of a shift in the legal concept of the family under 
the British family maintenance legislation, see p. 294, infra. 
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favor. Cases in which the court sets aside the transfer in the 
face of attractive equities in the donee are relatively infre-
quent.70 
(2) Source of Decedent's Property. Some cases draw at-
tention to the fact that the property transferred to the donee 
came originally to the decedent from the family or ancestors 
of the donee.71 In the absence of extraordinary equities in the 
donee, as, e.g., the fact that the donee supplied a substantial 
proportion of the consideration with which the decedent 
acquired the property, there appears to be no reason why this 
factor should have any bearing in the evasion cases. The 
factor does not receive undue emphasis, even in those cases 
sustaining the validity of the transfer. Nevertheless, it is in-
consistent with the improved property position of the modern 
wife. The statutory share legislation, in conjunction with the 
Married Women's Property Acts, announces a community 
preference for the claim of the wife - and widow - over that 
of the relatives of the original owner of the property con-
cerned. What if no transfer had been made by the decedent? 
Would the original donor's relatives have an enforceable 
claim against the decedent's estate, a claim not possessed by 
the donor himself? Surely not. 
It is of course a different matter if the property concerned 
can be proven to have been owned by the donee, or to have 
been acquired by the decedent with consideration supplied 
1o But see, e.g., Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930); Hastings v. Hudson, Mo. 
(1949). In the Hastings case the court sustained the wife's transfer of 
her own property to her "closely-knit" family of brothers and sisters 
who had provided money when she was ill and who had "worked like 
thunder in the hot summer time" to accumulate what was considered 
"community" property. 
n In re Estate of Sides, Neb. (1930) (claimant loses); Patch v. Squires, 
Vt. (1933) (claimant loses); cf. Murray v. Murray, Ky. (1890); Morrison 
v. Morrison, Ohio (1955). An 1826 Georgia statute, referred to in 
Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632, 15 S.E. 834 (1892), stated that a husband 
could defeat the wife's dower right by conveyance during marriage 
"except such lands as the husband may have become possessed of by his 
intermarriage ... "; also see Harber v. Harber, Ga. (1921); Pruett v. 
Cowsart, Ga. (1911). But see Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, Ky. (1938); 
Wilson v. Wilson, Ky. (1901); Stone v. Stone, Mo. (1853). 
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by the donee. The outright ownership cases give little 
trouble. 72 Likewise the donee should win his case if he can 
prove that he supplied a substantial part of the considera-
tion. 73 In the latter circumstances the transfer may perhaps 
also be said to acknowledge and carry out a purchase money 
resulting trust. 
(3) Remarriage of Claimant. Under the British Common-
wealth family maintenance legislation 74 this factor is of 
course quite relevant. The claimant's case being based on 
need, her payments will cease upon remarriage. Under the 
American scheme of automatic statutory shares we are con-
cerned w:ith the claimant's remarriage only if it takes place 
before the evasion litigation has been decided; and in the 
rare case in which this occurs it seemingly is quite irrelevant. 
Thus in Smith v. Hines 75 the widow prevailed even though 
she had already remarried. The court stressed the fact that 
no provision had been made for her by the decedent. No in-
quiry was made into her financial need. 
The four cases in which this factor was noticed were, oddly 
enough, 76 all older cases. In three of them the widow lost, 
but this is probably mere coincidence. In each of these three 
cases the donees were children of a prior marriage.77 
(4) Miscellaneous. Several cases sustaining the validity of 
the transfer have referred to the fact that the property trans-
ferred by the decedent wife was accumulated from her own 
72 Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa (1912) (gift causa mortis of "cow money" 
that donee had previously given decedent; held, valid); In re Cohen's 
Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (donee's money in decedent's 
bank account; "what I got here belongs to Hymie"; transfer valid). 
73 Holmes v. Mims, Ill. (1953) (undertaking business); Hoeffner v. 
Hoeffner, Ill. (1945) (apartment building); Bestry v. Dorn, Md. (1941) 
(leasehold); Whitehill v. Thiess, Md. (1932) (realty); Melinik v. Meier, 
Mo. (1939) (joint bank account); cf. Harmon v. Harmon, Ark. (1917); 
Thuet v. Thuet, Colo. (1953); Gentry v. Bailey, Va. (1850). But cf. 
Hays v. Henry, Md. (1848). 
74 See infra, Chap. 21. 
75 Fla. (1863-4). 
76 See discussion on remarriages, supra, Chap. I, text at note 19. 
1 
77 Sanborn v. Goodhue, N.H. (1853); Mcintosh v. Ladd, Tenn. (1840); 
Lightfoot v. Colgin, Va. (1813). 
168 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
savings.78 The courts have noted in some cases that the de-
cedent transferred the property to children of his first mar-
riage in furtherance of a promise made to his first wife. 79 
(c) General 
(1) Claimant's Financial Position. The American "forced 
share" legislation awards the surviving spouse an automatic 
share of the decedent's estate, regardless of the claimant's 
financial position. It is immaterial that the claimant possesses 
independent means.80 The evasion decisions, however, make 
frequent references to the claimant's poverty or need,81 in 
sustaining the claim; and, less frequently, to her independent 
means, 82 in refusing the claim. This phenomenon is of course 
to be expected in the "intent" jurisdictions, where the claim-
ant's independent means would have some bearing on the 
78 E.g., In re Kilgallen's Estate, N.Y. (1953); cf. Moyer v. Dunseith, 
N.Y. (1943); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932) 
(dissent of Kephart, J., at p. 586, 161 Atl. at 726). 
79 E.g., Estate of Sides, Neb. (1930); but cf. Rice v. Waddill, Mo. 
(1902). 
so Cf. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Ohio (1944) (transfer invalid); 
Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, Md. (1927) (transfer valid); see 
Patterson v. McClenathan, Ill. (1921). 
s1 E.g., Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1896). 
82 Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Md. (1939); Dunnett v. Shields, 
Vt. (1924); cf. Williams v. Williams, Fed. (1889); In re Aybar's Estate, 
N.Y. (1952); Mitchell v. Mitchell, N.Y. (1943); Whitehill v. Thiess, Md. 
(1932) (referring to antenuptial transfers). Contra, Manikee v. Beard, 
Ky. (1887). See Ala. Code Ann. tit. 34 §42 (1940): "If any woman 
having a separate estate survive her husband, and such separate estate, 
exclusive of the rents, incomes, and profits, is equal to, or greater in 
value than her dower interest and distributive share in her husband's 
estate, estimating her dower interest in his lands at seven years' rent of 
the dower interest, she shall not be entitled to dower in, or distribution 
of her husband's estate." §43 states that "If her separate estate be less 
in value than her dower, as ascertained by the rule furnished by the 
preceding section, and her distributive share, so much must be allowed 
her as, with her separate estate, would be equal to her dower and 
distributive share in her husband's estate, if she had no separate estate." 
These sections apply to antenuptial transfers, Anderson v. Lewter, 232 
Ala. 375, 168 So. 839 (1936); and they also apply even if the wife is 
the sole distributee, Chambless v. Black, 250 Ala. 604, 35 So.2d 348 
(1948); Quaere: what about postnuptial evasion cases? See also Miss. 
Code Ann. §670 (1942), supra, Chap. 2, note 14. 
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reasonableness of the transaction.83 The factor is usually not 
mentioned in cases decided under the "control" or "reality" 
rationales. For that matter, the average widow does not 
possess independent means.84 Regardless of rationale, how-
ever, counsel for the donee may be expected to urge the inde-
pendent means of the claimant, if only to distinguish cases 
that intrinsically may have been based on the hardship that 
otherwise would occur to the claimant.85 Certainly the claim-
ant with independent wealth 86 does not present as appealing 
a case as the indigent widow and particularly so when the 
family allowance statute is limited in scope.87 
(2) Claimant's Treatment of Decedent. It might be sup-
posed that the claimant's treatment of the decedent would 
be irrelevant, aside from the limited grounds for disqualifica-
tion found in the statutory share itsel£.88 Surprisingly enough, 
the relationship between the claimant's conduct and her 
chances of success appears to be closer than might be ex-
pected.89 Seemingly the factor has some sort of haphazard in-
83 But cf. Manikee v. Beard, Ky. (1887). 
84 See supra, Chap. 2:3. 
85 In Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 156, 21 Atl. 809 (1891) costs were 
awarded to the unsuccessful claimant. The state reporter furnishes the 
following excerpts from the master's report: 
"My personal opinion is that this is a case of hardship upon 
this plaintiff, and the eloquent addresses of her counsel upon 
the fiarbarity of the law which permits a man to deprive his 
family upon his decease of a fair allowance for their support, 
were unanswered and are unanswerable. All through this re-
port I have been restrained from the doing of equity by reason 
of the rigid rules of law, which equity in this case must follow; 
and now, as the costs can be disposed of upon equitable princi-
ples, I will avail myself of the opportunity and save the plain-
tiff from their payment." 
(p. 156). And see the dissenting judgment of Kephart, ]., in Beirne v. 
Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932), passim. 
86 This factor would preclude relief under a "family maintenance" 
type of statute, see infra, Chap. 21. 
87 See supra, Chap 2:4(b). 
88 See supra, Chap 2, text at note 18. 
89 Claimant's conduct reprehensible; loses: Speaker v. Keating, Fed. 
(1941) (wife, separated from, and apparently not supported by husband 
for 30 years, disinherits him); Ford v. Ford, Ala. (1842) (husband 
abandons wife forty years before his death, gives property to woman 
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fluence. Certainly counsel for the plaintiff does not harm 
his case- even in "reality" jurisdictions- if he directs the 
court's attention to any benevolence extended to the decedent 
by the claimant. 
(3) Unpleasantness between the Spouses. As might be ex-
pected, the cases contain frequent references to unpleasant 
relations between the spouses. These references generally 
are made without conscious stress, usually by way of explana-
tion of why the transfer was made. Evidence of this sort 
plays little part in influencing the decisions.90 Nonetheless, 
it seems to be an unavoidable concomitant of evasion litiga-
who married him in ignorance of previous marriage; court stresses high 
moral claim of second "wife" and fact that real wife had since had two 
illegitimate children); Schmidt v. Rebhann, N.Y. (1952) (court stresses 
fact that husband, separated, had made no "show of attempt of re-
establishment of the home"); Patch v. Squires, Vt. (1933) (fact that 
widower had not lived with or supported wife for twenty-six years 
prior to her death considered relevant); cf. Holmes v. Mims, Ill. (1953) 
(transfer to bigamous "wife" sustained); York v. Trigg, Okla. (1922) 
(obstreperous wife loses). 
Claimant's conduct good; wins: Fleming v. Fleming, Iowa (1922) 
("faithful service and practiced self-denial for 36 years"); Sanborn v. 
Lang, Md. (1874) (comment on widow's faithful performance of duties; 
"no moral justification or excuse" for decedent's conduct); cf. Burns 
v. Turnbull, N.Y. (1945). 
In some cases the claimant lost in spite of exemplary conduct. These 
cases may generally be explained on doctrinal grounds, the equities 
being considered completely irrelevant; e.g., Small v. Small, Kan. (1895); 
Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., Pa. (1914). And cases are not lacking in 
which the claimant has prevailed even though not litigating with "clean 
hands": Smith v. Northern Trust Co., Ill. (1944); Jaworski v. Wis-
niewski, Md. (1925); Rabbitt v. Gaither, Md. (1887); London v. London, 
Tenn. (1839); cf. Thayer v. Thayer, Vt. (1842); and see Guitner v. 
McEowen, Ohio (1954) (widow had "fulfilled all her obligations as a 
dutiful consort"; loses). 
90 E.g., Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944) (husband transfers family 
home; widow alleges husband's sister poisoned his mind against her; 
widow loses); Leonard v. Leonard, Mass. (1902) (spouses lived in same 
house but not on speaking terms; husband furnished wife with no 
supply of food, refused to let her help him in his serious illness; widow 
loses); Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. Colgin, Va. (1813) (husband "had an un-
favorable opinion of his wife, and she having also displeased him by 
refusal to relinquish her dower right in some lands"; widow loses); 
cf. Moedy v. Moedy, Colo. (1954); Manikee's Adm'r v. Beard, Ky. (1887); 
Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa (1912); Bestry v. Dorn, Md. (1941); Walker v. 
Walker, N.H. (1914). 
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tion. The threat of open air linen-washing has strategic ef-
fect; the actual washing conceivably may influence the judi-
cial process. And the existence of disharmony is not always ap-
parent from the written opinion. In Rose v. Union Guardian 
Trust Co., 91 for instance, the opinion makes no mention of 
this factor; 92 but the record contains numerous- and con-
flicting - references. 98 
Bitterness between the parties may also serve to bolster 
proof of intent to defraud, in jurisdictions in which the latter 
factor is relevant. In Dyer v. Smith 94 the court admitted di-
rect evidence that the husband "would rather see his house 
in ashes" than see the widow take it, and also commented 
on evidence of inharmonious relations. The widow pre-
vailed.95 
The fact that the spouses became reconciled after the trans-
fer was made seems to have no particular weight.96 
(4) Disparity in Age between the Spouses. This factor, 
which is mentioned in many cases, often contributes to the 
unpleasantness that sparks the inter vivos transfer. The 
younger party in these "disparity" cases appears always to be 
91 Mich. (1942). 
9 2 Similarly in the leading case of Newman v. Dore, N.Y. (1937), the 
opinion is silent as to this factor but the record reveals bitter feeling 
between the parties-with neither party being entirely blameless. 
93 For example, at p. II the widow alleged that she "well and faith-
fully performed the duties of a wife"; that "their married life was happy 
and free from misunderstandings and disagreements"; and that she 
nursed him solicitously before death. On the other hand, at p. 33 et 
seq., the donee testified that the widow and her daughter constantly 
quarrelled with and verbally abused the husband, making his life 
miserable and unhappy, that plaintiff's daughter once threw a glass of 
water at donee, the wife berating the husband when he attempted to 
intervene. 
94 Mo. (1895). 
95 Cf. Flowers v. Flowers, Ga. (1892). Here the court stated that in-
tent is irrelevant, then promptly ruled that evidence as to family dis-
turbances between the husband and wife is admissible as "tending to 
show a motive for endeavoring to defeat dower without parting with 
dominion and real ownership." 
96 Sturgis v. Citizen's National Bank, Md. (1927) (ten year estrange-
ment, five year reconciliation; widow loses); DeNoble v. DeNoble, Pa. 
(1938); cf. Jaworski v. Wisniewski, Md. (1925) (ten year reconciliation 
after quarrel leading to transfer by wife; widower wins). 
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the woman.97 The more clearly the young widow seems to 
have been a "gold-digger," the more appealing of course are 
the equities for the donee, particularly if the donee is the 
child of a former marriage.98 
(5) Duration of the Marriage. In a number of cases the 
claimant prevailed, although she had married the decedent 
but a short time before his death.99 Some of these cases may 
be explained on doctrinal grounds, e.g., that retention of 
control is all-important.100 And it is possible in any given case 
that on balance the equities may favor such a claimant.101 In 
a jurisdiction in which the equities play any part, however, 
it is probable that the shorter the marriage, the more un-
favorable are the claimant's chances of success.102 When the 
parties have not long been married the claimant has had no 
time to help accumulate the decedent's estate,103 and an inter 
97 Widow younger, prevails: Brown v. Crafts, Me. (1903) (forty year 
disparity); Wanstrath v. Kappel, Mo. (1949) (thirty years); Rice v. Wad-
dill, Mo. (1902) (thirty-four years); Newman v. Dore, N.Y. (1937) 
(plaintiff young, husband slightly under eighty); Widow younger, loses: 
Harber v. Harber, Ga. (1921) (twenty-one years); Poole v. Poole, Kan. 
(1915) (twenty-two years); cf. Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, N.Y. 
(1939). 
98 As in, e.g., Poole v. Poole, Kan. (1915). 
99 Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, Ky. (1938) (three years); Rudd v. 
Rudd, Ky. (1919) (two years); Brown v. Crafts, Me. (1903) (late in hus-
band's life); Marano v. LoCarro, N.Y. (1946) (seven months); Bodner 
v. Feit, N.Y. (1936) (one year); cf. Goewey v. Hogan, N.Y. (1951) (fact 
that marriage kept secret for many years held irrelevant). 
100 E.g., Marano v. LoCarro, supra, note 99. 
1o1 E.g., Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, supra, note 99. 
1 02 In Burton v. Burton, 100 Colo. 567, 569 (1937) the court stated: 
"The true explanation of Burton's transfers is presumably furnished by 
the facts that he married this woman late in life, that the relationship 
had existed for but twenty months, that she had never been a wife to 
him, ... " In Potter v. Braum, Pa. (1928) a sixteen year old girl mar-
ried a widower "well advanced in age." They lived together only three 
months. Held, transfers valid. In Sederlund v. Sederlund, Wis. (1922) 
the court sustained the husband's transfer of most or all of his per-
sonalty. Mentioned as one reason for the decision was the fact that he 
had been married to the claimant, his second wife, "but a short period 
of time" (although time enough to have a child by her). Also see 
Wright v. Holmes, Me. (1905). 
1oa See p. 162, supra. 
THE INDIVIDUAL EQUITIES 173 
vivos transfer seems more reasonable, especially if it is to 
children of a prior marriage.104 
(6) Sex of Claimant. We have seen that the election 
statutes appear to favor the widow.105 In states in which both 
spouses have election privileges, however, the evasion cases 
appear to make no distinction between widows and widowers 
as claimants. On the other hand, there is no such inclination 
to exalt the moral claim of the widower as it exists with refer-
ence to the widow.106 
(7) Whether Decedent was Testate or Intestate. It is pos-
sible that the Halpern case of 1951 has tolled the bell for the 
illusory trust doctrine in New York. But there was a warn-
ing bong of the gong a decade before that. In 1939, only two 
years after Newman v. Dore,107 the First Department decided 
in ~Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank 108 that illusory trusts 
could be attacked only if the decedent died testate. If the 
husband died intestate, said the court, the widow takes under 
the intestacy statute (Section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law) 
with no more right to set aside inter vivos transfers than any 
other distributee. And as for her rights under Section 18, that 
section permits her to renounce, i.e., gives her a forced share, 
only as against a will. There being no will, she is no better 
off than the other distributees; there is "no distinction in the 
quality of their expectancies .... " 109 
The restriction developed in the Murray case is rare, and it 
has since been repudiated in New York.110 This is fortunate, 
1o4 In re Sutch's Estate, Pa. (1902). 
105 See p. 23, supra. 
106 Cf. Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa (1912); Malone v. Walsh, Mass. 
(1944); Wright v. Holmes, Me. (1905); Moyer v. Dunseith, N.Y. (1943); 
In re Aybar's Estate, N.Y. (1952) (claimant a disabled war veteran; 
loses). For figures on the claimant's sex, p. 174, infra. 
107 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). 
1 o8 169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd 258 App. Div. 
132, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939). 
1 09 258 App. Div. at 134, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 918. 
no The leading cases are discussed in Steixner v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 
86 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See also Schneider and Landes-
man, "'Life, Liberty-and Dower'-Disherison of the Spouse in New 
York," 19 N.Y. U. L. Q. REv. 343, 353-60 (1942); Note, 16 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 229, 233-39 (1950). 
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because the widow's privileges should not depend on whether 
or not the husband died testate. It should be immaterial 
that the jurisdiction concerned gives the widow no power to 
renounce her intestate share.U1 
Parenthetically, the cases indicate that the husband bent 
on "evasion" shows no partiality for either testacy or in-
testacy. A check on one hundred and fifty evasion cases, 
chosen at random, provides the following figures: 112 
Decedent testate, or probably so............................. 73 (48.66%) 
Decedent intestate, or probably so........................... 70 (46.66%) 
Not clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ( 4.66<Jfo) 
150 
111 Some states permit the widow to renounce her intestate share: e.g., 
Fla. Stat. §731. 34 (1957). This is also the legislative tendency under 
the British Commonwealth "family maintenance" jurisdictions; see p. 
292, infra. Cf. Note, 58 DICK. L. REv. 70, 74 (1953). 
112 I. Decedent died testate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
2. Point not clear, but decedent probably was testate. . . 1 
3. Decedent died intestate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
4. Point not clear, but decedent probably was intestate. 19 
5. Point not clear, one way or the other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
150 
These figures indicate a higher proportion of testacy in the evasion cases 
than in the usual run of decedents' estates. The reason may lie in the 
frequency with which legal advice is sought before deciding on the 
appropriate "evasive" device, which in turn would lead to a will for 
the remaining property. Intestacy is of course more likely to occur 
where no lawyer is consulted. 
CHAPTER 11 
Role Of The Equities In The 
Judicial Process 
My purpose in this chapter is to estimate the influence of 
the equities in the evasion cases. In this inquiry I am not con-
cerned with theories put forward in the cases themselves. My 
interest lies in the actual judicial process, not in the formally 
announced ratio decidendi. The courts purport to be guided 
by the decedent's "intent," or by the "illusoriness" or "real-
ity" of the transfer. My working hypothesis is that these 
terms have a broader, more flexible connotation than might 
be suspected at first glance. I am interested in the possibility 
that these terms or criteria are not decisive per se; that they 
relate to or are governed by the equities of the case; and that 
the decision in each case, ostensibly based on motive, reten-
tion of control, or "reality," actually is based on the equities. 
To test this hypothesis I examine the facts of each case to 
ascertain the result that in my opinion would have been 
reached on a balancing of the equities. The suggested result 
on this approach is compared with the reported result. I find 
a significantly high correlation between the decisions actually 
reached and the decisions that would be dictated by the equi-
ties. 
The term "equity" is of course more significant in the 
plural than in the singular. The strength of a given factor or 
"equity" may be found only in the interplay of all the cir-
cumstances. We must examine, for example, the claimant's 
need, the size of the transfer, and the moral claim of the 
donee. If this examination indicates that the inter vivos trans-
fer was a reasonable one, it may be said that the "equities" 
favor the donee - in other words, that the fair decision, on 
the particular facts, would be for the donee. 
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Admittedly, the "reasonableness" of a given inter vivos 
transfer is a matter of opinion. The human variable cannot 
be eliminated from the selective process. What seems reason-
able to A may appear unreasonable to B; what A would 
choose as an "equity," B might dismiss as a mere irrelevancy. 
It depends on the point of view. My point of view was 
the maintenance and contribution formula.1 Under the 
formula the widow cannot be heard to complain about the 
inter vivos transfer unless first she persuades the court that 
the decedent did not make reasonable provision for her. If 
she clears this hurdle she may then ask the court to require 
contribution from the donee of any transfer that was un-
reasonably large under the circumstances prevailing at the 
time of the transfer. The more important circumstances are 
the relative size of the transfer and the moral claim, if any, 
of the donee. 
Considerable difficulty was encountered in attempting this 
factual analysis. The courts are not in the habit of making 
a careful delineation of the facts. Rarely is there a statement 
of the financial position of the surviving spouse, the rela-
tive size of the transfer, or other material circumstances. 
Usually the reference to these factors is by way of window-
dressing, for make-weight effect. 
Two hundred and sixty-three cases were found to be rele-
vant.2 These cases were divided into two groups, according to 
whether the actual result in the particular case favored the 
surviving spouse or the donee. Each group was split into five 
subgroups, found below, based on my judgment as to the 
result that would be dictated by the equities. "Unreasona-
ble" 3 means that in my opinion the transfer should not have 
1 See pp. 4~6, supra. See also suggested model statute, infra, p. 299. 
2 The criteria for determining the relevance of a case are outlined, 
supra, p. 147. 
3 A transfer may be "unreasonable" even though made from laudable 
motives. Thus a transfer that seemed reasonable when made may turn 
out to be unreasonably large if some provision for the surviving spouse 
fails to have legal effect, e.g., when an inter vivos gift to the surviving 
spouse is invalid for lack of delivery, as in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 
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been sustained, i.e., that the equities favored the surviving 
spouse. "Reasonable" means just the opposite. "Probably 
unreasonable" or "probably reasonable" indicates some in-
decision on my part as to the state of the equities, with the 
balance of probability pointing one way or the other. "Not 
clear" means that I could not make up my mind, in most cases 
because of insufficient facts. The cases as classified are set out 
in Table C.4 
A. Cases Favoring Spouse 
I. Unreasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
2. Probably unreasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
3. Reasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
4. Probably reasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
5. Not clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Consistent with the "equities," or not clearly inconsistent .. 
Inconsistent ......................................... . 
Sharply inconsistent •................................. 
B. Cases Favoring Donee 
88 (90%) 
10 (10%) 
2 ( 2%) 
I. Reasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
2. Probably reasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
3. Unreasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
4. Probably unreasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
5. Not clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Total .................................... 165 
Consistent with the "equities," or not clearly inconsistent.. 138 (84%) 
Inconsistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 (16%) 
Sharply inconsistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ( 4o/0 ) 
SUMMARY 
Total cases .......................................... . 
Consistent with the "equities," or not clearly inconsistent .. 
Inconsistent ......................................... . 




8 ( 3%) 
Admitting again that these figures are derived from my 
own classification of the cases, and that another person using 
Ohio (1944). A decision for the spouse in these circumstances may frus-
trate the expectations of the decedent; but the decedent should be en-
titled to rely on his transfers being immune from the widow's claim 
only when she has been effectively provided with adequate support. 
Aside from this unusual situation, however, the "reasonableness" of a 
transfer is determined from the circumstances prevailing at the time of 
the transfer. 
4 lnfra, p. 387. 
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the same criteria might reclassify any given case, the figures 
suggest several interesting conclusions. 
First, notice that the correlation between the actual deci-
sions and the equities is more sensitive when the surviving 
spouse wins (90%) than when she loses (84%). In other 
words, there are more cases in which the surviving spouse 
loses when she should win than in which she wins when she 
should lose. This means that most decisions that do not fol-
low the equities are inimical to the surviving spouse. This 
phenomenon is not unexpected. The legislatures have not 
yet clearly indicated that the policy of ensuring financial sup-
port for the surviving spouse is strong enough to encroach on 
freedom of inter vivos alienation. Assuming the validity of 
our policy conclusions, as expressed in the maintenance and 
contribution formula, this points to the advisability of a 
policy directive to the courts by the legislatures. 
Second, jurisdictions that use or have used the "reality" 
doctrine show a relatively high proportion of decisions at 
variance with the equities. These decisions are found under 
the following classifications: "unreasonable" and "probably 
unreasonable" (when the actual decision favors the donee), 
and "reasonable" and "probably reasonable" (when the ac-
tual decision favors the spouse). Here is the breakdown: New 
York, nine; Pennsylvania, seven; Ohio, four; Massachusetts, 
three; Illinois, Kansas, and Mississippi, two each; and Con-
necticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, and Virginia, one each. Notice that nineteen of 
these thirty-four atypical decisions were decided in but three 
states, namely New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. 
The 1951 Halpern case decision in New York means that 
there will probably be more of these inequitable decisions in 
that jurisdiction, particularly if the "reality" doctrine is ex-
tended to transfers other than Totten trusts. The outlook is a 
little better in Pennsylvania, however, where the 1947 legis-
lation openly recognizes the evasion problem and attempts 
to cope with it. 
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Third, one receives the over-all impression that the courts 
are muddling through to sensible results. The high correla-
tion between actual decisions and sensible decisions suggests 
-if we exclude the possibility of a phenomenal coincidence 
- that the courts do place great emphasis on the equities 
of the case. With some courts, e.g., Kentucky and Missouri, 
the emphasis is openly acknowledged; with others it is in-
articulate, perhaps subconscious. To the reader, it is de-
ducible from the facts - not observable in the ratio decidendi. 
Let us concede 5 that the courts do a fair job, under the 
circumstances. But can we be sure that the community values 
implicit in the statutory share are being achieved? Sometimes 
yes; sometimes no. It depends on the court concerned. Courts 
using the "intent" rationale seem in general to follow the 
equities; but there is confusion as to the significance of the 
decedent's motive and of the proximity of the date of the 
transfer to the date of death. Courts using the "control" 
rationale occupy a medium position: they have some room 
for exercise of discretion, but it is not enough and is unre-
lated to the equities. Courts using the "reality" rationale 
have no room for maneuver; as far as the surviving spouse 
is concerned, an inter vivos transfer is sacrosanct. Notice 
from our figures on the atypical decisions that few are 
rendered by courts using the "intent" rationale, but many oc-
cur in courts that have been or are using the "reality" ra-
tionale. Accordingly, the need for legislative reform seems 
more acute in "reality" jurisdictions, less pressing in "intent" 
jurisdictions. 
Nor should the need for legislation be deprecated because 
the atypical decisions are few in number. The litigated trans-
fers are probably but a fraction of the unlitigated transfers. 
No doubt many actual evasions remain unchallenged. Liti-
gation is expensive, regardless of jurisdiction or of prevailing 
doctrine. And the possibility of undesirable publicity on 
5 The fairly large proportion of cases in the "not clear" category de-
tracts somewhat from the value of the figures. 
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family matters may militate against litigation in a few cases, 
probably stimulates settlement in many more cases. More-
over, cases not appealed are in most instances not reported. 
Individuals in the community conduct their affairs in re-
liance on, and in deference to, the apparent state of the case-
law. In a jurisdiction that uses the "reality" rationale an in-
digent widow faced with an otherwise valid but unreasonably 
large inter vivos transfer will be deterred from litigation and 
probably barred from a settlement.6 To that extent, the 
statutory share, as interpreted by the courts, is not doing its 
community job. As a corollary, we also may criticize decisions 
that permit a widow, who has no financial need, to set aside 
a transfer merely because too much "control" was retained. 
Decisions of this sort unduly minimize the values implicit in 
freedom of alienation (looking at the transfer from the view-
point of the transferor), and in security of title (looking at it 
from the viewpoint of the transferee). 
In summation, the equities appear to play a leading role 
in the judicial process. That role is more decisive when it is 
openly acknowledged, as in most "intent" jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictions employing the "control" and "reality" ration-
ales are in more urgent need of remedial legislation. The 
inarticulate judicial tendency in these jurisdictions to fol-
low the equities is too haphazard a phenomenon to ensure 
that community values in this field are realized. There should 
be a legislative endorsement of the principles of the mainte-
nance and contribution formula. 
6 The relatively high rate of litigation in such "intent" jurisdictions 
as Kentucky and Missouri may be explained in part by the fact that 
the equities are relevant, and thus meritorious claims have a better 
chance of success. 
CHAPTER 12 
Deeds And Gifts 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Chapters 12 through 16 deal with the individual disposi-
tive devices. No study of the evasion cases would be com-
plete unless the cases are considered from this viewpoint. 
The significance of a given decision depends in large part on 
the device under litigation. These devices differ in function 
and in social and economic utility. Thus we should expect a 
gift causa mortis to be more vulnerable to the widow's claim 
than would be an irrevocable trust; the "reliance interest" 
of the transferee is slight in the first example, normally 
higher in the latter example. Similarly, the donee of an 
inter vivos gift is more likely to be harmed by "invasion" by 
the widow than is the beneficiary of a United States savings 
bond payable on death. Each device poses its own problems. 
Those problems must be investigated before we can decide 
on the precise language of statutory reform. 
Chapters 12-16 are concerned with postnuptial devices. 
Antenuptial transfers are dealt with in Appendix A, infra. 
Contracts to make a will are covered in Appendix B, infra. 
There is, of course, an affinity between postnuptial trans-
fers, antenuptial transfers, and contracts to make a will. 
Each of these transactions operates to deplete the amount of 
property available for the support of the widow; litigation 
over widow's rights in each transaction usually concerns 
second or third marriages; and each transaction raises ques-
tions about the community values implicit in protection 
against disinheritance of the surviving family. Nevertheless, 
separate treatment seems to be warranted for the two latter 
transactions. Antenuptial transfers involve fraud in the tra-
ditional sense of active or implied representations inducing 
181 
182 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
reliance. The question of spouses' rights in contracts to make 
a will invariably concerns antenuptial contracts; and, even 
when the contract is postnuptial, the transaction is not a vol-
untary one: consideration is needed. Accordingly, neither 
transaction is affected by the provisions of the model statute 
in Chapter 22. 
l. DEEDS 
Probably most practicing lawyers at one time or another 
have had to consider the legality of a deed that actually is 
not to take effect until death. The following skeletal fact 
situation illustrates the problem as it usually arises in the 
evasion field. A husband, living with his second wife, makes 
a voluntary conveyance of all his realty to his children by a 
former marriage. The husband reserves a life estate and con-
tinues to deal with the land as if he still owns it. The deed is 
kept secret from the wife and is not recorded by the children 
until after the father's death. Omitting the question of 
homestead protection (where the family home is involved) or 
inchoate dower (where still in effect), does the widow have 
any rights in the land? 
Such a deed may really be a sham transaction, depending 
on the remaining facts. As we saw in Chapter 9,1 to establish 
that it is a sham (or "colorable"), the widow would need to 
show that the grantor and grantee did not consider the deed 
to be effective between themselves. Such a situation would 
arise, where the husband might say, in effect, to the children: 
"Well, if the old girl survives me, this is it- record it right 
after my death; but if she dies before I do then I'll take it 
back." The deed would have inter vivos validity, however, 
if the arrangement was so stated: "You take this, and it's 
yours whether my wife predeceases me or not: but, to save 
trouble, let us keep it quiet- don't record it until I die." 
Here the parties intend the deed to have immediate effect. 
1 See supra, Chap. 9:3(a). 
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The deed will probably be deemed testamentary 2 when-
ever the power to revoke is formally retained. Nor is it ma-
terial that the power to revoke was retained in substance only. 
For example, in one case the surviving spouse prevailed when 
the decedent spouse procured a power of attorney from the 
donee. The power of attorney was signed in advance of the 
deed, and authorized the decedent "to sell and convey, 
mortgage or otherwise dispose of the property." 3 In many 
evasion cases, however, the evidence is inconclusive as to 
whether or not the power to revoke or recall was retained, or 
whether or not the deed was intended to have inter vivos 
effect between the parties. This may perhaps explain the con-
fusing tendency of the courts to describe these transactions 
as being both "colorable" (meaning void) and "illusory" 
(meaning, in most instances at least, valid for ordinary pur-
poses but defeasible by the widow).4 
The evasion decisions are not as numerous as might be 
expected.5 As with the cases involving other inter vivos de-
vices, they exhibit an inarticulate tendency to balance the 
equities.6 
2 When a deed is to take effect on delivery it generally will not be 
deemed testamentary, in the absence of a clause stating that the deed 
covers all property owned at death, or (perhaps) in the absence of a 
revocation clause. Atkinson, WILLS, §43 (2d ed. 1953); 3 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY §§12.65, 12.66. As to the effect of a clause stating that a 
deed is not to take effect until death, see notes: 17 MicH. L. REv. 413 
(1919), 32 VA. L. REv. 148 (1945), Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 533 (1953). 
3 Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107, 117 (1874); accord, Jaworski v. Wis-
niewski, 149 Md. 109, 131 Atl. 40 (1925) (deed to straw man, reconvey-
ance of life estate, with power to sell both life estate and remainder); 
Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N.E. 251 (1899); cf. Thomas v. 
Louis, infra, note 4. 
4 E.g., Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953); cf. Thomas 
v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3rd Dep't 1954); see 
also Hoffman v. Hoffman, 144 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (deed to 
spouse). 
5 Possibly because counsel for the surviving spouse considers the im-
munity of most deeds to be self-evident. The existence of inchoate 
dower serves also to narrow the field. 
6 The following cases are in addition to those otherwise noted. (a) 
Cases favoring the surviving spouse. Newton v. Newton, 162 Mo. 
173, 61 S.W. 881 (1901); Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895); Mot-
tershead v. Lamson, 101 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Brewer v. Con-
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A deed that has "reality" would be effective against the 
widow in any jurisdiction that purports to employ that ra-
tionale.7 Retention of possession or of a life estate would thus 
be immaterial,8 provided, of course, delivery has been ef-
fected.9 
The widow may prevail, of course, under either the "con-
trol" or "intent" rationales. Indeed, she may win even 
though the decedent did not formally reserve the power to 
revoke, either explicitly or in substance. For example, in 
Gillette v. Madden/0 a widower alleged that four months be-
nell, 30 Tenn. 343 (1851); London v. London, 20 Tenn. I (1839); 
Hughes' Lessee v. Shaw, 8 Tenn. 314 (1827); cf. Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, 40 
Miss. 718 (1866) (widow prevails as to dower because of inadequate 
consideration, under unusual Mississippi dower statutes); Weeks v. 
Weeks, 265 App. Div. 942, 38 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1942) (mem. 
opin.); Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 80 Tenn. 232 (1883). See also Rowland v. 
Rowland, 34 Tenn. 350 (1855) (extent of defeasance); Crain v. Crain, 
17 Tex. 80 (1856), 21 Tex. 790 (1858) (children's forced share). (b) 
Cases favoring the donee: Cheatham v. Sheppard, 198 Ga. 254, 31 
S.E.2d 457 (1944); Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 III. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 
(1945); Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 At!. 347 (1932); Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050, 1051, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 
265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd without 
opinion, 290 N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943); In re Huntzinger's Estate, 
48 Sch. L. R. 18 (Pa. Orph. 1952); cf. Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 
9 P.2d 284 (1932); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 162 Ga. 734, 134 S.E. 767 (1926) 
(transfer to avoid alimony, husband dying before litigation); Pruett v. 
Cowsart, 136 Ga. 756, 72 S.E. 30 (1911); Feighley v. Feighley, 7 Md. 537 
(1855) (alimony); Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 
(1902) (not a voluntary deed); Radecki v. Radecki, 279 App. Div. 1137, 
112 N.Y.S.2d 764 (4th Dep't 1952) (mem. opin.); Neville v. Sawicki, 
44 O.L. Abs. 408, 64 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio App. 1945), aff'd, 146 Ohio St. 
539, 67 N.E.2d 323 (1946). 
7 Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918); Garrison v. 
Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916); Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 
159, 75 Pac. 96 (1903); cf. Moedy v; Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 P.2d 
563 (1954); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922) 
(delivery two years before husband meets second wife). 
8 Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908) (recorded just 
before death); Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 216 Pac. 257 (1923). But a few 
older cases intimate that retention of any right, even of possession, 
would invalidate the deed, e.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632, 15 S.E. 
834 (1892) (deed valid); cf. McGee v. McGee, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 77 (1843) 
(deed invalid). 
9 Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824). 
10 280 App. Div. 161, 112 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3rd Dep't 1952); see Goewey 
v. Hogan, 102 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341, (Sup. Ct. 1951); cf. Courts v. Aldridge, 
190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941) (deeds of all husband's realty three 
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fore death his wife had conveyed away her realty, and that 
the transfer was illusory because she had thereafter continued 
to exercise dominion and control, and also because the deed 
was not intended to take effect until death. The New York 
court held that a cause of action was stated. The Halpern 
case was distinguished on the ground that it applies only to 
Totten trusts; and Krause v. Krause 11 was distinguished on 
the ground that in the Krause case "no retention of power 
appeared on the face of the deeds." And in Hastings v. 
Hudson a Missouri court invalidated a deed when, although 
no life estate had been retained, the property had been "dealt 
with in the same manner after the transfer as it had been be-
fore." 12 Decisions like the Gillette case and the Hastings 
case defy analysis. Certainly the mere retention of a life 
estate is not the critical factor. All we can say is that in cases 
of this sort the widow's chances are good, but not a sure 
thing, if any two or more of the following factors are in her 
favor: (a) the equities are on her side/3 (b) the decedent re-
tained practical control or management of the realty in-
volved, and (c) if the transaction was kept secret. These three 
factors are stated in the order of their probable importance. It 
might be supposed that secrecy would be irrelevant,14 as being 
the normal thing when there is bad blood between the 
spouses. But some courts regard secrecy, particularly lack 
of recordation, as reprehensible. Said a Missouri court: 
"The lack of courage to submit a matter involving 
weeks before second marriage; court delineates the factors constituting 
undue retention of control); but cf. Harber v. Harber, 152 Ga. 98, 108 
S.E. 520 (1921) (life estate reserved, grantor to have full "control" and 
receive rents and profits; held, valid). 
11 171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 
1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 
779 (1941). 
12 359 Mo. 912, 924, 224 S.W.2d 945,.950 (1949); see Smith v. Smith, 
22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (1896) (actual control; recordation one day 
before death); but cf. Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363 
(1903), discussed supra, Chap. 9, text at note 62. 
13 Cf. Schmidt v. Rebhann, 108 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1951) com-
plaint dismissed on merits, 117 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1952). 
14 E.g., Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269, 28 So. 940 (1900); also see 
Glass v. Glass, 86 So.2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1956) (separate maintenance). 
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mutual interest to mutual consideration is an index 
to the state of mind of the grantor to which the 
maxim that secrecy is a badge of fraud has peculiar 
application." 15 
2. GIFTS 
(a) Preliminary Remarks. In our discussion of inter vivos 
gifts it is doubly important that we have a clear appreciation 
of the basic policy behind the statutory share. In the first 
place, the difficulty of using the traditional evasion theories 
to carry out that policy is accentuated in the gift cases. A 
mechanical application of those theories may unduly preju-
dice the widow. The "reality" test, for example, which bars 
the widow from any recovery, has had a long association with 
the gift cases. "Who so ignorant," said a judge well over one 
hundred years ago, "as not to know that a husband may dis-
pose of his chattels during the coverture without his wife's 
consent, and freed of every post mortem claim by her; . . ." 16 
And the "control" test (as best exemplified in the illusory 
transfer doctrine) is illogical when applied to gifts. Excessive 
retention of control 17 is not possible (in form, at least), be-
cause the donor lacks the power to revoke.18 The gift, to be 
valid, must be "outright," or "absolute," to use terms fre-
quently found in the cases to denote a transfer that will defeat 
the widow. 
15 Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963, 967 (Mo. 1919); also see 
Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107 (1874); Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 
529, 54 N.E. 251 (1899); Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 
945 (1949); Gillette v. Madden, 280 App. Div. 161, ll2 N.Y.S.2d 543 
(3rd Dep't 1952); Goewey v. Hogan, 102 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1951); 
Reynolds v. Vance, 48 Tenn. 294 (1870). 
On secrecy as an element in the Colorado cases, see supra, Chap. 
9:3(b); Note, 45 MICH. L. REV. 914, 916 (1947). 
1 6 Gibson, J., in Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts 89, 91 (Pa. 1835). 
17 If the gift is made close to death the donor has of course, retained 
"control" of the property concerned during most of his lifetime. As 
used in the evasion cases, however, "control" refers to powers formally 
retained in the instrument effecting the gift. See Chap. 7, supra at 
note 4. 
18 Except in certain limited situations, e.g., engagement rings. Cf. 
Note, 12 MoDERN L. REv. 380 (1949). 
DEEDS AND GIFTS 187 
The requirements for making a gift are not onerous. There 
must be a donative intent; and there must be delivery, either 
of the subject matter or of a deed of gift. Retention of a life 
estate, or of possession, is permissible. For the husband who 
is determined to thwart his wife, the inter vivos gift involves 
the minimum in formalities, in legal fees, in taxes.19 In 
brief, the only practical restraint on gifts appears to lie in 
the cupidity of mankind, in the natural reluctance to sur-
render title beyond recall. 20 But when death looms, when the 
husband is "in the sere and yellow leaf," 21 even this instinct 
fails. Then it is that transfers are made solely with a view 
to post-mortem distribution. In the words of a Missouri 
court: 
"Counsel . . . argue . . . that these deeds and 
gifts were not testamentary in their nature, but 
when we consider the age of Columbus T. Rice, that 
he had been stricken already with paralysis, and his 
numerous other afflictions, and his own declaration 
that he did not expect to live a year; that he was 
constantly in the care of physicians and that within 
less than six months before his death he had given 
his children and son-in-law practically the whole of 
his estate, whereas previous to that time he was 
known to be parsimonious and close-fisted and had 
been exceedingly meagre in his gifts to his children, 
we cannot avoid the conclusion that this sudden and 
unusual exhibition of generosity was the result of 
1a Epstein, "Inter Vivos Transfers: Gifts, Joint Ownerships, and 
Contemplation of Death," 1949 U. ILL. L. FoRUM 18 (1949). 
20 In some cases the claimant prevailed simply because the alleged 
donor failed to observe the requirements for making a gift; e.g., In re 
Waggoner's Estate, 5 Ill. App. 2d 130, 125 N.E.2d 154 (1955); In re 
Kellas' Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Surr. Ct. 1943); aff'd, 267 App. Div. 
924, 1006, 46 N.Y.S.2d 884 (3rd Dep't 1944), aff'd on other grounds, 
293 N.Y. 908, 60 N.E.2d 34 (1944); In re Youngerman's Estate, 38 
N.Y.S.2d 646 (1942). 
If the husband gives away an excessive amount of property the wife 
-if she moves fast enough-may have the transfers set aside in the hus-
band's lifetime as being in fraud of her potential maintenance or ali-
mony claim. Cf. Comment, "Donations Omnium Bonorum (Article 
1497)" 6 LA. L. REV. 98 (1944). 
21 Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606, 610 (1895). 
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his expressed conviction that his days were num-
bered, and being thus warned of the approach of 
death he determined to distribute the estate which 
he could not hope to enjoy much longer." 22 
And there is another reason for emphasizing basic policy 
factors. In a jurisdiction committed to either the "reality" 
or the "control" theory, a court may be tempted to assist a 
needy widow by tinkering with the rules concerning delivery. 
The very flexibility of those rules makes this solution an easy 
but an unfortunate one.23 Our concept of delivery is now 
broader, more sophisticated than the early materialistic 
insistence on physical transfer.24 Transfer of a deed of gift, 
or of a symbol, as indicative of the animus donandi, affords 
22 Gantt, J., in Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, liS, 67 S.W. 605, 609 
(1902). 
23 In Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55, 59 (1929), a 
decedent procured two certificates of deposit payable "to the order of 
myself or Carrie Kern [a child of a former marriage] or the survivor of 
them on the return of this certificate properly endorsed." He retained 
the certificates in his own possession until death. In sustaining the 
widow's claim, the court stated: "Under the circumstances of the case 
it is wholly immaterial whether it was an attempted gift or whether it 
was the result of a contractual relation. In either event it was an 
attempted transfer without consideration and apparently for the pur-
pose of defeating the marital rights of the widow. We are of the 
opinion that the transaction was not a perfect gift nor was it the crea-
tion of a joint tenancy." It is cases of this sort that make the evasion 
jurisprudence so tantalizing. Is the court enunciating an "intent" test? 
Or are we to assume (a) that the transfer was an unreasonable one, and 
(b) that the court is deciding the case on the reasonableness factor? 
Or are we to assume that the transfer was ineffective, entirely aside from 
the rights of the widow? The law on this last point is not clear. One 
would expect that a valid joint tenancy was created: see Hemingway, 
"Joint Tenancy in Bank Accounts," 10 CHI-KENT L. REV. 37, 44 (1931); 
but there is authority, in the non-evasion cases, refusing recovery to the 
survivor when a certificate of deposit provides for payment in the al-
ternative to two or more payees; Annot., 171 A.L.R. 522 (1947). As to 
the evasion cases on joint tenancy and joint bank accounts, see pp. 
212-220, infra. 
24 Holdsworth, 3 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 354-58 (5th ed. 1942); 
Mechem, "The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of 
Chases in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments," 21 ILL. L. R. 
341, 457, 568, (1926); New York Law Revision Commission Act, Rec-
ommendation and Study Relating to Gifts of Personal Property With-
out Delivery, Reports, 1943, pp. 95-126. 
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room for professional ingenuity. 25 And delivery may be made 
to a third party, to be handed over to the donee at the donor's 
death. Here the court may sustain the transaction, as a trust, 
or nullify it, as an agency.26 And if delivery of the res is 
effected, but operation of the gift postponed until the death 
of the donor, its validity may hinge on the court's willingness 
to describe the contingency as a condition subsequent instead 
of a condition precedent, 27 or to apply the label of gift causa 
mortis instead of gift inter vivos. What must be kept in 
mind is that the policy concerning widow's support has 
nothing to do with the policy that is concerned with the rules 
on the normal validity of gifts. The modern concept of de-
livery expresses a community decision that gifts may be made 
with a maximum of convenience, provided there be a clear 
manifestation of donative intent. That concept should not 
be narrowed merely to assist the widow. What is needed is a 
reconsideration of the rules dealing with widow's rights. 
(b) Evasion Cases. A list of evasion cases dealing with in-
ter vivos gifts may be found in Table D, where the cases are 
classified as to the party that prevailed and also as to the type 
of property involved. 28 As far as the "reality" test is con-
cerned, an inter vivos gift is of course valid 29 even though a 
25 As to future interests in personalty, see Simes and Smith, LAw oF 
FuTURE INTERESTS, §§351-71; Uniform Property Act, §3 (UNIFORM 
LAWS ANN., Vol. 9A, 252 (1951)). 
26 Gulliver and Tilson, "Classification of Gratuitous Transfers," 51 
YALE L. J. 1, 21 (1941). 
2 7 Ibid. 22, 23. 
28 Infra, p. 401. 
29 Harris v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 41 Atl. 773 (1898); Whidden v. 
Johnson, 54 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1951); Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 
393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940); Samson v. Samson, 67 Iowa 253, 25 N.W. 233 
(1885); Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915); Small v. Small, 
56 Kan. I, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 
507 (1905); Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99 Atl. 551 (1916); Redman v. 
Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (1918); Leonard v. Leonard, 
181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902); Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230 
(1856); In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. 
Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. Supp. 
818 (1st Dep't 1936); York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922); 
Garrison v. Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916); Sederlund v. 
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life estate be retained. Likewise it matters not that a deed of 
gift 30 was employed, with retention of possession 31 or of a life 
estate.32 Similarly, motive is irrelevant.33 To be sure, many 
cases purporting to utilize the "reality" theory add the caveat 
that there must be no "fraud." 34 But "fraud," in this context, 
may be a will-o'-the-wisp.35 Probably most courts using the 
word have in mind a sham transaction, lacking reality. Even 
the word "illusory" is used with some frequency to denote a 
sham.36 
The surviving spouse has prevailed against an inter vivos 
gift in a substantial body of cases.37 Some of these cases use 
the illusory transfer theory, despite the seeming lack of logic 
in applying the "control" reasoning to inter vivos gifts. The 
cases favoring the surviving spouse may be placed in two 
groups: 
Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922); cf. Sanborn v. Goodhue, 
28 N.H. 48 (1853) (trust). 
Note that the purchase of real estate may be used as a device for 
transferring personalty: Holmes v. Holmes, 3 Paige 363 (N.Y. 1832) 
(purchase of son's real estate at a price far beyond its value, with mort-
gage back not to be collected until death; held, valid). 
30 York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922); Garrison v. 
Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916). Cases in which a deed of 
gift was held invalid as against the surviving spouse include the fol-
lowing: Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389 (1853); Davis v. Davis, 5 Mo. 111 
(1838); cf. Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 (1860), 32 Mo. 464 (1862) 
(trust); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 Atl. 153 (1889). 
31 E.g., Garrison v. Spencer, supra, note 32. 
32 Wahl v. Wahl, 200 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1947), appeal transferred, 
357 Mo. 89, 206 S.W.2d 334 (1947); cf. Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 
311, 40 So. 104 (1905); In reSides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 
(1930). 
33 E.g., In re Kilgallen's Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Surr. Ct. 1953); cf. 
Sawyer, "Gifts of Personal Property as Limited by the Rights of the 
Wife," 5 U. PITI. L. REV. 78, 88-90 (1939) (urging a return to the 
"intent" rationale in Pennsylvania). 
34 Sawyer, supra, note 18. 
35 Supra, pp. 140-143. 
36 Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926), discussed 
supra, p. 135; also see Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 
(1902). 
37 The burden is on the claimant to show that the subject-matter of 
the gift was the decedent's own property; Lindsey's Executor v. Lind-
sey, 313 Ky. 171, 230 S.W.2d 441 (1950). 
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(a) Decisions acknowledging frankly that the claimant 
wins because of the "unreasonableness" of the gift. For ex-
ample it may be recalled that a line of Kentucky cases utilizes 
the following doctrine: 
"If ... a gift or voluntary conveyance of all or 
the greater portion of his property be made to his 
children by a former marriage without the knowl-
edge of the intended wife, or it be advanced to 
them after marriage without the wife's knowledge, a 
prima facie case of fraud arises, and it rests upon the 
beneficiaries to explain away such presumption." 38 
(b) Decisions purporting to emphasize one or more of 
the following factors: 
(i) intent, i.e., motive 39 
(ii) secrecy 40 
38 Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. I, 13 S.W. 244 (1890). For discussion of 
the Kentucky cases, see pp. 112-114, supra. See also the following cases: 
(a) Transfer Invalid: Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4); (b) Trans-
fer Valid: Smith v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914); Wahl 
v. Wahl, 200 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1947); appeal transferred, 357 Mo. 
89, 206 S.W.2d 334 (1947); In reSides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 
619 (1930); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922); 
cf. Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952). 
In sustaining the claim of the surviving spouse, some of the Missouri 
cases comment on the fact that all of the decedents' property was trans-
ferred; e.g., Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895); Newton v. Newton, 
162 Mo. 173, 61 S.W. 881 (1901); cf. Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 
S.W. 605 (1902) (all but a "mere pittance"). In general, seep. 114, supra. 
39 See discussion of the Missouri cases, pp. 114-116, supra; also see 
Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908) (four days before death; 
some evidence of consideration); Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 
1229, 64 S.W. 981 (1901); cf. Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. l, 
115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); 
Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215, 28 Atl. 1113 (1894); Nichols v. Nichols, 
61 Vt. 426, 18 Atl. 153 (1889). But see In reSides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 
228 N.W. 619 (1930); cf. Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 
750 (1922). 
40 Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949); Rice v. 
Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902). But see Sederlund v. Seder-
lund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922). For a discussion of the se-
crecy factor, in connection with the early Colorado cases, see p. 135, 
supra. 
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(iii) proximity to death 41 
(iv) retention of possession, or of a life estate.42 
The cases stressing retention of possession usually involve 
a continuation of active management or control.43 To il-
lustrate, we shall consider two cases involving a gift of an 
interest in a business. In Marano v. Lo Carro 44 the husband 
transferred ninety-nine of the one hundred shares in his own 
real estate company. Nevertheless, he continued to sign 
corporate checks, and drew some for his own use; managed 
the business; represented the company in negotiations; re-
tained the corporate books and documents, and rendered no 
accounting to the donee, who in point of fact did not actually 
arrange for the issuance of shares to himself until after de-
cedent's death. The inter vivos transfer- presumably valid 
aside from the widow's claim- was effected in a "written 
contract" that had been executed either just prior to or just 
subsequent to the marriage. The transfer was held "illusory." 
41 See the line of Missouri cases set out in Chap. 8, note 68, supra; 
Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908). 
42 Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4); Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 
(1860), 32 Mo. 464 (1862). In Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 
(1891) the decedent surrendered his stock certificates and took new cer-
tificates in the name of his sons. He informed them of the "gift," with-
out particularizing as to the securities or the amount, and took a 
power of attorney from them enabling him to collect the dividends, 
some of which he retained for his personal use. Two years before his 
death he transferred the certificates to a lawyer to hold in trust for the 
sons, but on the same terms as before. Held, invalid as to the widow, 
because a "mere device or contrivance" to "have the enjoyment and 
control of it for life." But see Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 
393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940) (gift of paintings to art institute upheld 
though made 3 months before death with possession retained for a year 
under a "lease," and with blatant intent to cut out wife); Allender v. 
Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952); Estate of Sides, 119 Neb. 
314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930) (gift of money, taking back negotiable notes 
to be cancelled on donor's death). 
43 See Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 924, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949); 
cf. Mendez v. Quinones, 78 F. Supp. 744 (D.C.P.R. 1948), modified sub. 
nom. Mendez v. Mendez, 176 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1949); Rudd v. Rudd, 
184 Ky. 400, 214 S.W. 791 (1919) (transfer of money and notes, "subject 
to the control and demands of decedent"; held, invalid). 
44 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), afj'd without opinion, 270 App. 
Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946). 
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In Allender v. Allender,45 however, a Maryland court upheld 
a gift in which comparable control was retained. Here the 
husband surrendered his shares in a close corporation, and 
had them reissued in the joint names of himself and his 
children by a former marriage. The donees were unaware 
of the transfer until his death; and in the meantime he voted 
the stock and drew dividends. After flirting with the "degree" 
test, i.e., "reasonableness," although not so-called, the court 
stated that "the fact that the joint interest in the key stock 
of the decedent and his children was by law severable . . . 
was not such a reservation of dominion or title to the key 
stock as amounted to a violation of the widow's rights." 46 
The gift cases are an illogical lot, inexplicable in terms of 
prevailing rationales. As mentioned earlier, a semblance of 
order may be discerned if we scrutinize the apparent equities 
in each case. From that viewpoint the Allender case makes 
sense, as the transfer was probably reasonable in the light of 
known circumstances. On the other hand, the state of the 
equities in the Marano case is not clear: the transfer was sub-
stantial in amount, but the claimant married the decedent 
only seven months before his deathY 
The model statute suggested in Chapter 22 affects all types 
of transfers, including inter vivos gifts, with avowed attention 
to the equities. The reliance interest of the donee, normally 
quite substantial in the gift cases, has salient recognition in 
the "cut-off" provisions. A three year cut-off date applies to 
transfers in which the decedent retained no substantial bene-
ficial interest in the subject matter of the transfer; otherwise, 
the period is ten years. 48 
45 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952). 
46 I d. at 550-51, 87 A.2d at 612. See TableD, infra, for further cases 
on a gift of an interest in a business. 
4 7 For an analysis of the equities in the evasion cases as a whole, see 
Chap. 11, supra. 
48 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, §8, infra, 
Chap. 22. 
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3. GIFTS CAusA MoRTIS 49 
A gift causa mortis is a revocable 50 inter vivos gift of 
personalty, made in apprehension of death 51 and for testa-
mentary purposes. Under any solution to the evasion prob-
lem this juridic hybrid is peculiarly vulnerable to the widow's 
claim. It is very like a will, not only in its revocability but in 
other respects. The property passing by gift causa mortis is 
subject to the creditor's claim- assuming an insufficiency 
of assets in the estate 52 without any need to prove intent to 
defraud creditors. Also, on a perhaps questionable analogy to 
the doctrine of lapse, the gift causa mortis fails if, as is un-
likely, the donee does not outlive the donor. 
And yet the prescribed formalities pertain to the law of 
gifts; thus delivery is required. The orthodox view is that 
title passes immediately, subject to defeasance by subequent 
acts and conditions such as claims of creditors, revocation, re-
covery of the donor, prior death of the donee. This notion as 
49 In general, see Pomeroy, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE §§1146-51 (4th ed. 
1918); Schou1er, "Oral Wills and Death-bed Gifts," (1886) 2 L. Q. REV. 
444; Mechem, "Delivery in Gifts of Chattels," 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 356 
(1926). 
Gifts causa mortis (donationes causa mortis) were well known in 
Roman law. Delivery was required in the early law. Later on, how-
ever, this requirement was relaxed in some respects; and Justinian 
enacted that donationes causa mortis should be classified as legacies for 
almost all purposes. Inst. 2, 7, 1, translated 2 Scott, CIVIL LAW, 49 
(1932). In general, see Buckland, TEXT BooK OF RoMAN LAW 253-58, 
(2d ed. 1932); Buckland, MANUAL OF RoMAN PRIVATE LAW 150-52, 
(1925); Radin, RoMAN LAw 392-95, (1927); Scrutton, RoMAN LAW AND 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND, 92 (1885); Bordwell, "Testamentary Disposi-
tions," 19 KY. L. J. 281, 286 (1931). 
50 The notion of revocability is in most cases academic, since changes 
of heart are unlikely before death; and if the donor recovers the gift 
is automatically rendered inoperative. 
51 Sports note: a Missouri court labelled a certain transfer a gift causa 
mortis even though the decedent went fishing several times after making 
the transfer. This, said the court, merely shows that "the ruling passion 
is strong in death." Kerwin v. Kerwin, 204 S.W. 925, 926 (Mo. App. 
1918). 
5 2 The property transferred may be of considerable value, and need 
not be of tangible personalty. Thus the doctrine has been applied to 
commercial paper, securities, insurance policies, bank books and the 
like. 
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to the time of passage of title is a corollary of the view that the 
applicable formalities are those of gifts, not wills. Other-
wise, if title passed at death, the formalities of the Wills Act 
would apply. 
As far as cases dealing squarely with spouses' rights are con-
cerned, the courts show no over-all bias in favor of either the 
surviving spouse or the donee. Cases favoring the spouse 53 
tend to stress the resemblance to a will. Cases favoring the 
donee 54 emphasize the niceties of property law. Thus we 
find this statement in Vosburg v. Mallory: 55 
The donor at his decease is held to be already di-
vested of his property in the subject of the gift, so 
53 Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121 (D. C. D. Col. 1939) (only to 
extent that estate funds insufficient to meet widow's claim); Hatcher v. 
Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641 (1895); Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. 
Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N.E. 1049 (1913); rehearing denied, 55 
Ind. App. 75, 102 N.E. 282 (1913); Baker v. Smith, 66 N.H. 422, 23 Atl. 
82 (1891) (partial defeasance); Kerwin v. Kerwin, 204 S.W. 925 (Mo. 
App. 1918); cf. Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908) (bill 
of sale four days prior to death; gift causa mortis theory not mentioned 
in case); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887) (factual situ-
ation similar to that of a gift causa mortis); Dunn v. German-American 
Bank, 109 Mo. 90, 18 S.W. 1139 (1891); Jones v. Brown, 34 N.H. 439 
(1857); Huber's Estate, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 370 (1901), aff'd, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 
34 (1902) (gift causa mortis not proven; strong dicta in original hearing 
regarding wife's rights). 
In some cases the surviving spouse has prevailed against transfers that 
closely resembled gifts causa mortis, without any judicial comment on 
the resemblance; e.g., Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 
N.E.2d 736 (1940); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); 
Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 Atl. 153 (1899); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 
Vt. 107 (1842). 
There is a line of Missouri cases that stresses the "contemplation of 
death" factor, apparently without insisting on the technical require-
ments of a gift causa mortis. The Missouri cases are discussed, supra, 
p. 114. Note particularly Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 390 (1853); but cf. 
Brandon v. Dawson, 51 Mo. App. 237 (1892) (caveat regarding proof of 
intent to defraud). 
54 Vosburg v. Mallory, 155 Iowa 165, 135 N.W. 577 (1912); Weber v. 
Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S.W. 34 (1912) (surviving spouse otherwise 
reasonably provided for); Lambert v. Lambert, 117 Me. 471, 104 Atl. 
820 (1918) (quaere if "fraud"); Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen (Mass.) 43 
(1866); Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray 418, 422 (Mass. 1859); cf. Wilson v. 
Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925); In re Clark's Estate, 149 
Misc. 374, 376, 268 N.Y. Supp. 253, 255 (1933) (tax case); Brunson v. 
Brunson, 19 Tenn. 627 (1838) (advancements). 
55 155 Iowa 165, 135 N.W. 577 (1912). 
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that no right or title in it passes to his personal 
representatives ... that the wife may thereby 
evade the provision of the statute, which disables 
her from depriving her husband of more than half 
of her personal estate by her will . . . may be 
equally urged against any disposition of it in her 
lifetime. . . . If the legislature intended that the 
wife should be restricted in this respect, it would 
have been so declared. 
In the Vosburg case the equities favored the donee; and the 
court stated that it reached its "satisfactory conclusion," be-
cause "no fraud was intended .... " The saving clause "no 
fraud being intended" is found in a few other cases.56 Here 
again we usually have no clue as to whether fraud refers to 
shams, to malicious transfers, or to some other sort of transfer. 
It should not be assumed from the foregoing that the courts 
are indifferent to the quasi-testamentary nature of the gift 
causa mortis. There are a number of additional cases in 
which the donee prevailed on the apparent reasoning that 
the transfer concerned was a gift inter vivos instead of a gift 
causa mortis. 57 One senses from these cases that many of the 
courts concerned were quite willing to concede that a gift 
causa mortis would per se be vulnerable to the widow's claim. 
It is possible that the cases in the last-mentioned group are 
decided essentially on the equities of the individual case. 
Certainly the distinction between a gift inter vivos and a gift 
causa mortis is a thin one. But we cannot be sure. The neces-
sary factual data are not always given; and the alleged ra-
tionale tends to evade the issue. 
56 E.g., Lambert v. Lambert, ll7 Me. 471, 104 A. 820 (1918); Brandon 
v. Dawson, 51 Mo. App. 237 (1892). 
57 In some cases the surviving spouse lost because the instrument was 
deemed not to be a gift causa mortis. West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th 
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 633 (1935) (inter vivos trust); Harmon 
v. Harmon, 131 Ark. 501, 199 S.W. 553 (1917) (equities against surviv-
ing spouse); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912) 
(inter vivos trust); cf. Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky. 376, 113 S.W. 498 (1909) 
(gift by bachelor); In re Kilgallen's Estate, 204 Misc. 558, 123 N.Y.S.2d 
827 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Sanborn v. Goodhue, 28 N.H. 48 (1853) (inter 
vivos trust); York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922) (deeds 
and contracts). 
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A similar criticism may be made of some of the cases di-
rectly favoring the spouse. We find an unrealistic stress on 
the time at which "title" is said to pass. As was said by an 
Indiana court: 
There is authority for the statement that a gift 
causa mortis vests title in the donee conditionally at 
the time of delivery and that where the doner dies 
without revoking such gift, the vesting of the prop-
erty relates back to the time of the delivery thereof; 
but on the other hand, there is abundance of au-
thority to the effect that a donor who makes a gift 
causa mortis remains seized or possessed of the prop-
erty until death, within the meaning of a statute 
giving dower in personal property of which he dies 
seized. 58 
Policy-wise, gifts causa mortis should receive just about the 
same treatment as gifts inter vivos. Certainly the gift causa 
mortis, of all transfers, should not be immune to the widow's 
claim. As was said in Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 
"we do not think that 'modern business' will have to do very 
frequently with gifts made in extremis by a donor who gives 
because he knows and fully realizes that he is affected with a 
disease from which he cannot recover, the gift being condi-
tioned on the event of his death . . . because the donor . . . 
learns that his widow may defeat the [will] to the extent of 
her one third interest therein." 59 Nor has the donee any jus-
tifiable complaint. His reliance interest is thin, as his "owner-
ship" is conditional and necessarily of short duration. In-
deed, if other things are equal the lack of any reliance interest 
should militate against such a donee. Under an equitable 
marshalling of the assets he could be called on for contribu-
tion to the widow in advance of other inter vivos transferees. 
But other things may not be equal. There may be situa-
tions when the donee of the gift causa mortis should prevail 
Gs Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 70, 100 N.E. 
1049, 1060 (1913); but most of the cases cited for this proposition did 
not involve a surviving spouse. Cf. Jones v. Brown, 34 N.H. 439 (1857). 
59 55 Ind. App. 40, 78, 102 N.E. 282, 283 (1913). 
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even over the spouse, as where the decedent thereby ef-
fected reasonable settlement on dependent children of a 
prior marriage. And in no event should the spouse win if 
she has no need. In a word, the gift causa mortis cases should 
be decided by the maintenance and contribution formula. 
The equities should be the avowed basis of decision. On this 
approach there would be no excuse for employing the "title" 
phraseology to describe the result; nor would it be possible 
to defeat a meritorious claim by calling the transfer a gift 
inter vivos, instead of a gift causa mortis. 
By way of postscript, may an irrevocable trust be con-
sidered a gift causa mortis? The problem stems from the 
fact that in some jurisdictions an irrevocable trust is virtually 
impregnable, as far as the widow is concerned.60 A gift causa 
mortis may, of course, be made in trust, in which event the 
rules as to gifts causa mortis would apply.61 But could an 
irrevocable trust, when made in contemplation of death, 
possibly be characterized as a gift causa mortis? Fonblanque, 
in discussing the custom of London cases, felt that a deed 
made while the grantor is languishing "ought to be looked 
upon as a donatio causa mortis." 62 Lacking the power tore-
voke, however, or an arrangement that the trust be subject to 
a condition subsequent of termination upon the recovery of 
the settlor, it would appear that the widow would not get far 
on the gift causa mortis analogy.63 Indeed, in a cryptic 
6o See infra, Chap. 13:3. 
61 Bogert, 1A TRusTs AND TRuSTEES, §142, note 17 (1951); and see 
Baker v. Smith, 66 N.H. 422, 23 Atl. 82 (1891). 
62 Quoted in Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 390, 392 (1853). 
63 Reservation of the income for life and any degree of control over 
administration would also tend to negative consciousness of impending 
death. 
In Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912), a trans-
fer of shares of stock, in trust for a granddaughter, was taxed as being 
in contemplation of death. In holding that it was not a gift causa mor-
tis, the court stated that "a gift, although made in contemplation of 
death, is a gift inter vivos, if the donor manifests an intention that the 
gift shall be absolute, irrevocable and effective in praesenti, cannot be 
questioned." Cf. Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 104 (1905) 
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Colorado decision the court sustained a transfer in trust 
"causa mortis" that had been made with intent to deprive the 
widow of her inheritance.64 
(irrevocable trust of bonds, made while husband allegedly "in a low state 
of health," sustained against widow). 
64 Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925); but there is 
no discussion of the sense in which "causa mortis" was used. 
CHAPTER 13 
Trusts 
1. REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS IN TRUST 
Forty-two cases were noticed that appear to be directly 
in point. In a little more than one half of these cases (to wit, 
twenty-three) the decision favors the trust beneficiary over 
the surviving spouse.1 
1 Favoring spouse. Grover v. Clover, 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (19I7); 
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (I944); 
Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. I, 115 S.W.2d 376 (I938); Hays 
v. Henry, I Md. Ch. 337 (1848); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 354 Mo. 565, 
I90, S.W.2d 24I (1945), 356 Mo. 210, 20I S.W.2d 327 (I947), aff'd, 358 
Mo. 1077, 2I8 S.W.2d 6I8 (1949); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust 
Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939); MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. 
Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd without opinion, 305 
N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953); Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 
(Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd mem., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 
I943), reargument granted, 267 App. Div. 986, 48 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't 
1944), aff'd on reargument mem., 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 
(2d Dep't 1944), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 
N.E.2d 240 (1945); aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 
(1945); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 176 Misc. 3I2, 27 N.Y.S.2d 270 
(Sup. Ct. 1941), 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 84I (2d Dep't I941); 
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, I72 Misc. 290, 
I4 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939), modified on other grounds, 260 App. 
Div. 174, 954, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940); Newman v. Dore, 275 
N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Darrow v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co., 
139 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954); Harris v. Harris, 79 Ohio App. 
443, 74 N.E.2d 407 (1945), aff'd, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947); 
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, (1944); Es-
tate of Brown, 384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956) (unfunded life insurance 
trust); In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953); Vederman 
Estate, 78 D.&C. 207 (Pa. 1951); Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bank, 
197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955), reh. denied, 197 Va. 732, 90 S.E.2d 
865 (1956) (unfunded life insurance trust); cf. In re Ford's Estate, 279 
App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd without opinion, 
304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E.2d 87 (1952) (nonevasive); Blush v. McQuade, 
47 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1944); O'Brien v. City Bank Farmers Trust 
Co., Sup. Ct., N.Y. L. J. (15 Dec. 1936), 1 P-H Unreported Trust Cases, 
~25,244. 
Favoring trust beneficiary. Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 12 Ill. App. 2d 
514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (I957); Stice v. Nevin, 344 Ill. App. 642, 101 N.E.2d 
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Detailed analysis of these revocable trust cases may be 
found under the general discussion of evasion rationales. 2 
When the court adheres strictly to the "reality" rationale, as 
in the Massachusetts cases, 3 the trust beneficiary will prevail. 
Under the "illusory trust" rationale ("real," but vulnerable 
to the spouse's claim), the result is not entirely predictable. 
In theory, the spouse must demonstrate that the decedent re-
tained excessive control; in actuality, the equities play a large 
part in the decision-making process. Under the "intent" ra-
tionale the equities are avowedly relevant, usually decisive. 
Under the proposed model statute/ revocable trusts are 
treated exactly as any other revocable transfer. 
873 (1951); Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57 (1928); 
Wheelock v. Wheelock, 97 Ind. App. 501, 187 N.E. 205 (1933); De 
Leuil's Ex'rs v. De Leuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S.W.2d 474 (1934); Brown v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915); Ascher v. Cohen, 
333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E.2d 198 (1956); National Shawmut Bank of Bos-
ton v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950); Kerwin v. 
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945); Kelley v. Snow, 185 
Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904); Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 
N.E. 866 (1926); Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, 78 N.E. 301 (1906); 
Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858); Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 
27 (Mo. 1955); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1891); Marine 
Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (3rd 
Dep't 1939), motion for leave to appeal denied, 256 App. Div. 1026, 
I I N.Y.S.2d 547, afJ'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 
(1939); Ballantyne Estate, I Fiduc. 445, 67 Montg. 314, 65 York 148 (Pa. 
1951); McKean Estate, 71 D.&.C. 429 {1950), afJ'd, 336 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 
447 (1951); Mornes v. Lawrence Sav. & Trust Co., 8 LAWRENCE L. J. 163 
(Pa. 1949); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 
Atl. 721 (1932); Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 
(1914); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891); Dunnett v. Shields, 
97 Vt. 419, 123 Atl. 626 (1924); In re Steck's Estate, 275 Wis. 290, 81 
N.W.2d 729 (1957); cf. Exchange National Bank of Winter Haven v. 
Smith, 4 So.2d 675, 676 (Fla. 1941) (amendable insurance trust); Pond v. 
Sweetser, 85 Ind. 144, 150 (1882) (conflict of laws); Matter of Fields, 193 
Misc. 777, 84 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1948), modified, 276 App. Div. 835, 1082, 93 
N.Y.S.2d 267 (1949), modified and afJ'd, 302 N.Y. 262, 97 N.E.2d 896 
(1951); Hochster v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 260 App. Div. 712, 24 
N.Y.S.2d I 10 (1st Dep't 1940), afJ'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 588, 42 
N.E.2d 600 (1942); Stefano v. First National Bank, 29 WESTMORELAND 
Co. L. J. 49, exceptions overruled, id., 191 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1947) (50 year 
trust). 
2 See supra, Chap. 7:2. 
3 Supra, note I. 
4 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, infra, 
p. 299. 
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2. REVOCABLE SELF-DECLARATIONS OF TRUST 
Seemingly there has been very little litigation concerning 
spouses' rights in this type of transfer. Two cases were 
noticed, in both of which the beneficiary prevailed.5 
Lack of litigation does not necessarily mean that malevo-
lent husbands shun such a device. In "reality" jurisdictions,6 
for instance, it may or may not be in common use. 7 Techni-
cally impervious to the widow's claim, it has the added ad-
vantage of great control and secrecy. Where the jurisdiction 
concerned purports to follow the "control" or "intent" ra-
tionales, however, the revocable self-declaration of trust 
would be a risky transfer for the husband to employ. Prob-
ably most counsel would advise against it, particularly when 
the equities run in favor of the potential widow. 
3. IRREVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUSTS 
Most of the evasion cases involving this type of transfer 
favor the trust beneficiary, whether the decedent makes a self-
declaration of trust or a transfer in trust. In cases where the 
trust is not clearly irrevocable the cases are fairly well bal-
anced.8 Where the trust is clearly irrevocable, however, the 
5 United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W. D. 
Ark. 1946); Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887). But cf. 
Application of Cerchia, 279 App. Div. 734, 108 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1st Dep't 
1952) (semble surviving spouse not involved). 
The spouse prevailed in Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. 
Supp. 814 {lst Dep't 1936), but the dissenting judge pointed out 
(p. 123) that "The complaint does not allege that the trusts were 
revocable .... " 
6 Pennsylvania could be so classified, at least at the time of Dicker-
son's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887). 
7 Cf. Farkas v. Williams, 3 Ill. App.2d 248, 121 N.E.2d 344, (1954) 
rev'd, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) (no surviving spouse). 
s (a) Favoring spouse. Kratli v. Booth, 99 Ind. App. 178, 191 N.E. 
180 (1934) (semble irrevocable, but decided on basis of fraud in non-
disclosure of all facts before securing wife's concurrence); Stone v. Stone, 
18 Mo. 390 (1853); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842) (semble ir-
revocable). 
(b) Favoring beneficiary. Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 
1004 (1925) (transfer in trust "causa mortis"; semble irrevocable); 
Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824); Small v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 42 
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spouse has prevailed in relatively few cases. 9 
"\\Te may presume that counsel for the transferor will be 
quick to advise use of the irrevocable trust, once it has re-
ceived judicial sanction as an evasive device. It may be more 
than coincidence that the cases favoring the beneficiary tend 
to cluster in a few states, and that in two of those states-
Pac. 323 (1895); Estate of Sides, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930); cf. 
Pond v. Sweetser, 85 Ind. 144 (1882). 
9 (a) Favoring spouse. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 
Misc. 459, 297 N.Y. Supp. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd without opinion, 253 
App. Div. 707, I N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1937), motion for leave to ap-
peal granted, 253 App. Div. 880, 2 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1st Dep't 1938), rev'd, 
278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553 (1938) (with power of appointment); Bod-
ner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936) (ap-
parently irrevocable: see dissent, id. at 123, 286 N.Y. Supp. at 818; cf. 
46 YALE L. J. 884, note 1 (1937); 50 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1937)); Hill's 
Estate, 15 D.&C. 699 (Pa. 1931) (one day before death); cf. Peterson v. 
Anderson, 218 Minn. 383, 16 N.W.2d 185 (1944) (conveyance by trustee 
in fraud of dower of beneficiary's wife); McCammon v. Summons, 2 
Disn. 596, 600 (Ohio 1859) (statement that immaterial whether revo-
cable or irrevocable); Appeal of Miskey, 107 Pa. 611, 629 (1883) (undue 
influence, drunkenness; absence of a power of revocation "is a circum-
stance which throws the burden of proof upon the party taking the 
benefit, and in the absence of proof of a distinct intention to make the 
gift irrevocable, if the other circumstances of the case require it, the 
conveyance will be set aside"); Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 
334 (1949). 
(b) Favoring beneficiary. Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 
So. 104 (1905); Ford v. Ford, 4 Ala. 142 (1842); Richard v. James, 133 
Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 So.2d 
684 (Fla. 1949); Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 162 So. 868 (1935); 
Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 Ill. 475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921); Delta & 
Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912) (informal irrevocable 
trust, semble income reserved for life, held not a gift causa mortis); 
Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895); Ginn's Adm'x v. 
Ginn's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 217, 32 S.W.2d 971 (1930) (imperfect gift en-
forced as a trust); Smith v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914); 
Cameron v. Cameron, 10 Smedes & M. 394 (Miss. 1848); Morrison v. 
Morrison, 99 Ohio App. 203, 132 N.E.2d 233 (1955) (self-declaration 
of trust); Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S.E. 420 (1909); Gentry v. Bailey, 
47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 (1850); Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 
42 (1813); cf. West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 
296 U.S. 633 (restricted power of revocation); Haulman v. Haulman, 
164 Iowa 471, 145 N.W. 930 (1914) (antenuptial transfer); Robb v. 
Washington & Jefferson College, 103 App. Div. 327, 93 N.Y. Supp. 92 
(1st Dep't 1905), modified and aff'd, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359 (1906) 
(amendable inter vivos trust held not to contravene New York statute 
prohibiting certain testamentary gifts to charity). 
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Florida and Virginia 10 - most of the evasion litigation is 
concerned with irrevocable trusts. 
There is some justification for protecting the beneficiary of 
an irrevocable trust. ·when a transfer has been made beyond 
hope of recall, it can truly be said to have an "absolute" 
quality, an air of finality; the beneficiary's reliance interest is 
greater than if the power to revoke had been retained. 
But the irrevocable trust is not sacrosanct: it is a creature 
of equity. An unreasonably large transfer should not attain 
automatic immunity simply because it is irrevocable. The 
emphasis should be on the relative size of the transfer, not on 
its form. For example, an unreasonably large transfer made 
shortly before death flouts the forced share whether it be 
revocable or irrevocable. When death looms, of what avail is 
the power of revocation? What cared the settlor inN ewman v. 
Dore 11 that he had this power, having made a definitive 
transfer in his last mortal days? Would not any Ohio lawyer, 
for example, under similar circumstances, guard against in-
sertion of a revocation clause? The control rationale, which 
is unrealistic regardless of the time of the transfer,12 becomes 
mere pedantry when applied to transfers made close to death. 
Moreover, the trappings of irrevocability may cloak a secret 
arrangement that the trust be revocable at will, 13 or rev-
ocable- or even automatically terminated- in the event 
the wife predeceases the husband. We must remember that 
the "trustee" may well be one of the inter vivos donees, not a 
corporate fiduciary; and the acquiesence of the beneficiaries 
may be secured by money, or the glimmer thereof. These 
arrangements lie in the borderland between revocable trusts 
and "colorable" transfers; and, if the facts can be proven as 
stated, the widow should prevail.14 But how to get the proof? 
1o See cases cited, supra, note 2. 
11 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E.2d 966, 970 (1937) discussed, supra, 
pp. 74-76. 
12 See Chap. 7:3, supra. 
13 As to the revocability of an "irrevocable" power of attorney, see 
MacGregor v. Gardner, 14 Iowa 326 (1862). 
14 Irrevocable trusts made in close proximity to death of course invite 
a charge of undue influence; e.g., Burton v. Burton, 100 Colo. 567, 69 
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The widowed stepmother may face a wall of conspiracy. Hu-
man nature is not always pretty: some of the evasion cases 
show degrees of Legree. Difficulties of this sort point to the 
advisability of putting irrevocable trusts under our statutory 
formula.15 
4. BANK AccouNT TRusTs 
The best known type of bank account trust is the Totten 
trusU6 This device received its baptism, if not its birth,11 in 
the celebrated dictum in Matter of Totten: 18 
"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his 
own name as trustee for another, standing alone, 
does not establish an irrevocable trust during the 
lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust 
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies 
or completes the gift in his lifetime by some un-
equivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the 
pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the 
depositor dies before the beneficiary without rev-
ocation, or some decisive act or declaration of dis-
P.2d 307 (1937) (irrevocable transfer seventeen days before death, while 
"seriously ill," sustained; marriage late in life; nature of transfer not 
clear); see Appeal of Miskey, 107 Pa. 611 (1883); cf. Hill's Estate, 15 
D.&C. 699 (Pa. 1931). 
1 5 Revocability is relevant, however, under the "cut-off" provisions 
in § 8, Chap. 22, infra. 
16 Variations of the Totten trust, involving no presumption arising 
from the mere form of the deposit, are described in Clark, "Totten 
Trusts in Connecticut," 29 CoNN. B. J. I (1955). 
1 7 For the early history of the Totten trust see Scott, TRUSTS §58.2 
(2d ed. 1956); 87 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1939). In general, see Larremore, 
"Judicial Legislation in New York," 14 YALE L. J. 312 (1905); Moyni-
han, "Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts," 22 B. U. L. REv. 
271, 286 (1942); Oleck, "Bank Account Trusts: Should They Be Pre-
sumed to be Fraudulent?" 91 TRusTs AND EsTATES 39 (1952); Slusser, 
"Recent Developments in the Tentative Trust Doctrine; Influence of 
Civil Code s.2280 on the California Law," 28 CALIF. L. REv. 202 (1940); 
J. Vaughan, "Developments in Totten Trusts," 130 N.Y. L. J. 160, 166; 
Williams, "Totten Trusts and the Test of the Validity of a Challenged 
Transfer," 126 N.Y. L. J. 374 (6 Sept. 1951). On Totten trusts in the 
Chicago area, see Hayes, "Illinois Dower and the 'Illusory' Trust," 2 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 23 (1952). 
18 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. ll2, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752, 70 
L.R.A. 7II (1904). 
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affirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute 
trust was created as to the balance on hand at the 
death of the depositor." 19 
This device is more often found in savings bank accounts 
than in commercial bank accounts and is also known as a 
"savings bank trust," a "bank account trust," or a "tentative 
trust." It is a judicial compromise. The poor man can dis-
pose of his modest account without hiring a lawyer; and his 
estate will not incur liability for withdrawals made after the 
"trust" is established. There is a rebuttable presumption of 
intention to establish a revocable "trust" for the designated 
beneficiary, arising from the mere form of the deposit. 20 If 
the donee can prove intent to create an irrevocable trust, he 
will be entitled to recover withdrawals before death.21 Other-
wise, he is entitled to the balance at the depositor's death, 
provided the trust was not revoked. 
The bank account trust is said to have originated in some 
states because of limitations on the size of accounts. 22 This 
stimulated the opening of further accounts in the same bank 
in "trust" for another party. Other motives are to conceal 
assets, to avoid rules restricting interest rates, to attempt to 
avoid taxation, or to make an avowedly testamentary disposi-
tion. The figures indicate that it is a popular substitute for 
the expense, delay, and publicity of testamentary trans-
mission. 23 As Surrogate Wingate remarked in the Reich 24 
10 On how the beneficiary establishes his case, see Oleck, supra, note 
17, at 39. On revocation, see Annot. 38 A.L.R.2d 1244 (1954). 
20 Scott, p. 478; Restatement, Trusts §58, comment a (1935). On the 
necessity for notice see Day Trust Co. v. Malden Sav. Bank, 328 Mass. 
576, 105 N.E.2d 363 (1952); Brucks v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
36 Cal.2d 845, 228 P.2d 545 (1951); 50 MICH. L. REV. 1124 (1952). 
21 Scott, p. 483. Semble notice to the beneficiary of the mere existence 
of the trust will not make it irrevocable; Moran v. Ferchland, 113 Misc. 
1, 184 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1920); In re Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A.2d 
881 (1952), noted in 26 TEMP. L. Q. 468-70 (1953), 14 U. PITT. L. REv. 
627-29 (1953); cf. Restatement, Trusts, §58, comment a (1935). Delivery 
of the passbook may make the trust irrevocable, unless explained other-
wise: Matter of Totten, supra, note 18, at 126, 71 N.E. at 752; Matter 
of Smith, 177 Misc. 601, 31 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Surr. Ct. 1941). 
22 Note, 39 DICK. L. REv. 37-42 (1934). 
23 It is also said to be popular with women, ibid. 
24 Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 618, 262 N.Y. Supp. 623, 626 (1933). 
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case, "its enunciation is but another evidence of the attempt 
of the courts to conform the law to the customs of the com-
munity." 25 The great practical advantages of the device in-
dicate a social and business utility that ensures its continued 
use. Savings accounts are becoming of increasing importance 
in the estate of the average person, perhaps secondary only to 
the family home and insurance. 
If any inter vivos device appears to be testamentary, it is 
the Totten trust. Its everyday utility absolves it from the re-
quirements of the Wills Act, but it is subservient to the claim 
of the undertaker/6 the creditor,27 the personal representa-
tive.28 As far as the surviving spouse is concerned, until the 
Halpern case came along, it was popularly and not unrea-
sonably understood that a Totten trust was illusory per se. 29 
This thinking was reflected in the addition of a comment to 
the Restatement of Trusts in 1948, permitting the surviving 
spouse to "reach" a Totten trust.30 In view of the recent 
New York Court of Appeals decision in the Halpern case,31 
however, it is not at all clear that the Restatement view repre-
sents prevailing judicial opinion. Under the Halpern test 
we are concerned merely with the "reality" of the Totten 
2s For figures on the use of the device in Massachusetts, see Moyni-
han, "Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts," 22 B. U. L. REv. 
271, 272 (1942); Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956). 
2a Matter of Reich, supra, note 24. 
2 1 Scott, §58.5; Oleck, "Bank Account Trusts: Should They be Pre-
sumed to be Fraudulent?" 91 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 39 (1952); see "Matter 
of Workmen's Compensation Board of State of New York" (Furman), 
126 N.Y. L. J. 8 (2 July 1951). 
28 Scott, §58.5, In re Aybar's Estate, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 
(Surr. Ct. 1952). 
29 E.g., Krause v. Krause, 171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 
1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), 
modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941). Also see text, supra, 
Chap. 9:1. 
30 Restatement, Trusts, §58, comment cc (1935); cf. Gulliver and 
Tilson, "Classification of Gratuitous Transfers," 51 YALE L. J. I, 36-37 
(1941). 
31 Discussed, supra, Chap. 9: l. 
208 FRAUD ON THE WIDow's SHARE 
trust, i.e., whether it was intended to be legally operative.32 
The widow is relegated to the status of a mere legatee.33 
Looking at the entire group 34 of bank-account trust eva-
s2Jn re Leiman, 116 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (Surr. Ct. 1952), affd without 
opinion, 118 N.Y.S.2d 750, 281 App. Div. 764 (2d Dep't 1952), leave to 
appeal denied, 119 N.Y.S.2d 230, 112 N.E.2d 288 (1952); also see Gul-
liver and Tilson, supra, note 30, at 38. 
sa Cf. In re Zero's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1954). In matter of Nel-
son's Will, 200 Misc. 3, 106 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1951) a husband and wife, 
pursuant to " contract or agreement," executed joint and mutual wills 
which gave the survivor a life estate, and which also provided that 
after the death of both the balance would go to designated legatees. 
It was held that Totten trusts made by the surviving husband, after his 
wife's death, would be set aside in favor of the designated legatees under 
the joint and mutual wills. The court stated that the survivor had be-
come a "trustee" for the beneficiaries: but surely the case for the lega-
tees sounded in contract, not in trust? On contracts to make a will, see 
Appendix D, infra. 
84 Transfer Valid: Maryland: Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 
I, 106 A.2d 72 (1954) (to A in trust for A and B, subject to withdrawal 
by either, survivor to take all); Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 5ll, 39 
A.2d 465 (1944). New York: In re Zero's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Surr. 
Ct. 1954); In re Friesing's Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 207, (Surr. Ct. 1953); 
In re Phipps' Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Aybar's 
Estate, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Surr. Ct. 1952); Matter of 
Leiman, 116 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Surr. Ct. 1952), aff'd without opinion, 281 
App. Div. 764 (2d Dep't 1952), leave to appeal denied, 119 N.Y.S.2d 230, 
112 N.E.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1953); In re Freistadt's Will, 104 N.Y.S.2d 510 
(Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 278 App. Div. 962, 105 N.Y.S.2d 995 (2d Dep't 
1951), rev'd, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1951) (re-
versal of earlier stand, in view of the Halpern case; case sent back to the 
surrogate for further evidence); In re Halpern's Estate, 197 Misc. 502, 
96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Surr. Ct. 1950), 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1st 
Dep't 1950), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); In re Naydan's 
Estate, 107 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In re Prokaskey's Will, 109 
N.Y.S.2d 888 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Matter of Ward, 279 App. Div. 616 (2d 
Dep't 1951); Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S.2d 
227 (Sup. Ct. 1939); rev'd, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939); In re 
Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. 28 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd without 
opinion, 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. 818 (1st Dep't 1936); In re Yarme's 
Estate, 148 Misc. 457, 266 N.Y. Supp. 93 (Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd without 
opinion, 242 App. Div. 693, 273 N.Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dep't 1943); cf. In re 
Shortie's Estate, 206 Misc. 35, 130 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1954); In re Purcell's 
Will, 200 Misc. 643, 107 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In re Cohen's 
Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (money in account earned by 
beneficiary; dictum that a Totten trust as such is illusory and that any 
revocable transfer is illusory); Matter of Schacter, 1 P-H Unreported 
Trust Cases, ~25,451, N. Y. L. J., 13 Jan. 1944 (Surr. Ct. 1944); In re 
McCann's Estate, 155 Misc. 763, 281 N.Y. Supp. 445 (Surr. Ct. 1935); 
In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 268 N.Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933) 
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sion cases, we find that most decisions are from New York. 
This is to be expected in view of the popularity of the Totten 
trust in that important jurisdiction, as well as the doctrinal 
confusion in its courts. Until Newman v. Dare was decided, 
in 1937, the New York courts sustained the Totten trust 
against the claim of the surviving spouse.35 In fact, the opin-
ion of Surrogate Henderson in Matter of Schurer (in 1935) 36 
reads not unlike the majority opinion in the Court of Appeals 
in the Halpern case. The Halpern case appears to have 
killed any chance of a Totten trust in New York being "il-
lusory" in the Newman v. Dare sense. Although technically 
dictum, the Halpern case has been followed consistently in 
subsequent lower-court decisions involving Totten trusts.37 
Under the Halpern doctrine the burden is on the personal 
representative to "make a factual showing of unreality." 38 
A recent lower court decision calls attention to the fact that 
the court in the Halpern case mentioned "proof that the 
transfers were intended only as a mask for the effective reten-
tion by the settlor of the property which in form he had 
conveyed." 39 This ambiguous phrase, however, was bor-
(tax case). Transfer Invalid: New York: Pichurko v. Richardson, 107 
N.Y.S.2d 365 (1951) (before Court of Appeals decision in the Halpern 
case); Getz v. Getz, 101 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Steixner v. Bowery 
Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Application of Barasch, 
267 App. Div. 830, 45 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't 1944), reargument denied, 
267 App. Div. 905, 47 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d Dep't 1944); Krause v. Krause, 
171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 1057, 
21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 
(1941); Hellstern v. Gillett, I P-H Unreported Trust Cases, -,r25,233, 
N.Y. L. J. 7 April 1937 (Sup. Ct. 1937); cf. Matter of Nelson, supra, 
note 33; Matter of Barthold, 171 Misc. 625, 13 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Surr. Ct. 
1939). Pennsylvania: In re Krasney's Estate, 7 Fiduc. 403 (Pa. Orph. 
1957); Del Conte v. Luca, 2 D.&C. 2d 130 (Pa. 1954); In re Graham's 
Estate, 42 Del. Co. 9, 4 Fiduc. 467, 3 D.&C. 2d 218 (Pa. 1954); Estate of 
Black, 64 York 166, 73 D.&C. 86 (Pa. 1950); cf. In re Iafolla's Estate, 380 
Pa. 391, IIO A.2d 380 (1955). 
35 See cases, note 34, supra. 
86 Note 34, supra. 
81 Ibid. 
38 In re Zern's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Surr. Ct. 1954). 
39 I d., at 895; In re Shortie's Estate, 206 Misc. 35, 130 N.Y.S.2d 233, 
234 (Surr. Ct. 1954). 
210 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
rowed from Newman v. Dore/0 and probably stems from the 
second passage of the Kerr testY Certainly the court in the 
Halpern case had no thought of espousing the intent ration-
ale. What it had in mind was shams. As far as intent (motive) 
is concerned, the very intent to defeat the widow's inheritance 
is now exalted: the more vindictive the husband's conduct 
the greater the likelihood that the husband intended to bene-
fit the donee, i.e., that the transfer was "real." 42 Nor would 
the secrecy of the transaction appear to be relevant: a bank 
account trust may quite naturally be a matter solely between 
the depositor and the bank.43 
It is difficult to envisage the equities playing any part in a 
case decided on the Halpern test. To be sure, the court in 
Naydan's Estate 44 referred to the reasonableness of the pro-
visions made for the widow, as bearing on the decedent's in-
tent "to make [the] transfer completely effective." But it 
would be rash to assume that the unreasonableness of the pro-
visions for the widow would dictate a finding of lack of factual 
reality.45 
The possibility of hardship 46 to the surviving spouse may 
be sensed from two recent lower-court decisions. In In re 
Leiman's Estate 41 the beneficiaries of several Totten trusts 
40 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951). 
41 See supra, Chap. 8, text at notes 3 and 4. 
42 Vindictiveness toward the wife could also, of course, stimulate a 
"colorable" arrangement between the decedent and the donee. In other 
words, the "minus" from the widow does not always result in a "plus" 
to the donee. The transfer is not real if there is no "plus" to the 
donee. 
43 The fact that the intended beneficiary was not notified of the 
existence of the account would be relevant in determining the existence 
of the animus donandi, as in the case of any gift or trust, but would cer-
tainly not be decisive. Geographical remoteness of the "faraway" bene-
ficiary, alluded to by Desmond, J., in the Halpern case, seems of ques-
tionable relevance. 
44 107 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703 (Surr. Ct. 1951). 
45 But cf. Note, 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 258, 267 (1951). 
46 But cf. Scott, p. 360, note 3. 
47 In re Leiman's Estate, ll6 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Surr. Ct. 1952), aff'd with-
out opinion, liS N.Y.S.2d 750, 281 App. Div. 764 (2d Dep't 1952), leave 
to appeal denied, ll9 N.Y.S.2d 230, ll2 N.E.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1953). 
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were the husband's mother, his sister, and the woman with 
whom he had been living for some fifteen years before his 
death. The Surrogate commented that "In every Totten trust 
the depositor has indicated his intent that the beneficiary 
have the fund at his death by the very act of making the desig-
nation." The result in the instant case, he continued, "is un-
fortunate because the surviving spouse is thereby deprived 
of her statutory share in over $8,000 which the decedent had 
an absolute right to use for his own benefit throughout his 
lifetime, and the estate subject to administration is virtually 
nil." 48 In In re Aybar's Estate 49 two Totten trusts were up-
held against the surviving husband, a disabled war veteran 
who had been declared incompetent. To be sure, in each of 
these cases the equities were not entirely with the claimant; 50 
but under the Halpern dogma the surviving spouse IS re-
buffed, though she may be an indigent saint. 
48 II6 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1952). 
4 9 In re Aybar's Estate, 203 Misc. 372, ll6 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Surr. Ct. 
1952). 
50 In the Leiman case, a separation fifteen years before death; fault 
not stated. In the Aybar case the incompetent surviving spouse had an 
estate of $7000, and a government pension "which adequately provides 
for his needs." 
CHAPTER 14 
Survivorship Devices 
1. JOINT TENANCY IN REALTY 
In the few cases involving this arrangement, the transfer 
was sustained.1 In these cases the equities favored the trans-
feree. In Hoeffner v. Hoeffner/ for instance, there were 
factors militating against the widow as well as points in favor 
of the surviving joint tenant. At the time the spouses were 
divorced, the wife had received a substantial sum from her 
husband. After the divorce, the husband sold an apartment 
building, taking back a purchase money mortgage. The 
couple again married each other. Subsequently, the mortgage 
was foreclosed, with the deed being made out to the husband 
and his daughter as joint tenants. In sustaining this trans-
fer against the widow's claim, the court stressed the fact that 
the transferee (the daughter) had furnished the money with 
which the husband had originally purchased the property. 
Likewise, in Schmidt v. Rebhann 3 the equities appeared to 
be against the claimant, in this case a widower. He had sepa-
rated from the decedent after a year of marriage and had not 
attempted a reconciliation for the more than nine years that 
preceded her death. The transferee was a woman friend who 
had cared for and performed services for the decedent. 
Survivorship devices such as joint tenancy are in great 
general use. Creation of a joint tenancy with right of sur-
1 But see Mottershead v. Lamson, 101 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (Sup. Ct. 
1950). Here the court held that the surviving husband had stated a 
cause of action to have the wife's transfer of her realty into joint ten-
ancy set aside as illusory "since, by the joint tenancy created, the dece-
dent had an undivided half interest in the premises which could be 
alienated, together with a potential right to the entire estate .... " 
See also the cases concerning partnership interests, infra, pp. 231-235. 
2 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945). 
s 108 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1951), 117 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1952). 
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vivorship is still possible in most states; 4 and there are indica-
tions that such an arrangement has mushroomed in popu-
larity 5 in recent years, especially in its personal property 
manifestations.6 One great advantage of joint tenancy, for 
example, is that the property concerned passes to the surviv-
ing tenant free of the requirements of probate and admin-
istration. 
Policy-wise, however, the popularity of this device for "non-
evasive" purposes should not excuse its occasional use as a 
weapon for evasion of the widow's share. The "reliance in-
terest'' of the surviving tenant is normally insufficient to 
preclude application of our statutory formula. The donee 
does not obtain the decedent's interest until the decedent's 
death; and the donee may predecease the decedent, with the 
entire interest accruing to the decedent. This uncertainty as 
to the potential "double or nothing" interest of the donee 
tends to discourage improvements and sales by the donee in 
the lifetime of the decedent. 
Under our statutory formula the surviving tenant would be 
4 Joint tenancy has not always been popular. The early common law 
favored it "because the divisible services issuing from land (as rent, etc.) 
are not divided, nor the entire services (as fealty) multiplied, by joint 
tenancy, as they must necessarily be upon a tenancy in common." (2 Bl. 
Comm. * 193). With the passing of feudalism joint tenancy fell into dis-
favor. The hardship to heirs and creditors of the joint tenant en-
gendered a presumption of tenancy in common. Most American states 
adopted a presumption against the jus accrescendi, the right of sur-
vivorship; and some state legislatures abolished joint tenancies. See in 
general, Atkinson, WILLS 164-72 (2d ed. 1953). 
5 But joint tenancy is no longer regarded with starry-eyed approval 
in estate planning. It does not necessarily decrease death duties or 
post-mortem publicity. Basye, "Joint Tenancy, a Reappraisal," 30 
CALIF. S. B. J. 504 (1955); Knecht, "Joint Ownership Reappraised," 88 
TRusTs & EsTATES 416 (1949); Marshall, "Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and 
Otherwise," 40 CALIF. L. REv. 501 (1952); Rudick, "Federal Tax Prob-
lems Relating to Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by 
the Entireties," 4 TAx L. REv. 3 (1948). 
6 Stephenson, "Joint ownership of property" (Study No. 7, Third 
series-Studies in Trust Business), 25 TRusT BuLL. 25 (1945). See dis-
cussion, supra, pp. 16-17. Cf. Report of the Committee on Community 
Property and jointly Held Titles to Real Property, 1952 Proceedings 
of the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law, p. 40. 
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liable for contribution up to the value of the entire property.7 
The donee's contribution would, of course, first be gauged 
on the value of the property passing by survivorship; then, 
if that proves insufficient, on the value of the entire property. 
Where land was purchased jointly by the decedent and the 
surviving tenant, the widow's claim would be restricted to the 
amount of property attributable to the consideration paid 
by the decedent spouse. 8 
2. JoiNT BANK AccouNTS 
The failure of the American courts and legislatures to de-
velop a coordinated approach to the evasion problem is 
clearly apparent from the cases dealing with joint bank ac-
counts. The joint bank account, like the Totten trust, is a 
"poor man's will"; 9 yet it has proved well-nigh invulnerable 
to attack by the poor man's widow. 
Most states have legislation authorizing transmission of 
funds, free of probate and administration, by means of a joint 
bank deposit with appropriate words of survivorship.10 Ab-
7 A statute that merely affects revocable transfers would restrict the 
widow's claim to the decedent's interest in the property. In Longacre 
v. Hornblower & Weeks, 83 D.&C. 259 (Pa. 1952) the 1947 statute Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.11 (1950) discussed supra, p. 138, was held ap-
plicable to a joint tenancy established by the husband even though no 
power of revocation was formally reserved. The court said that such 
power inheres at common law; and the widow was held entitled to treat 
the joint tenancy as testamentary to the extent of one half thereof. 
8 The widow's claim catches only voluntary transfers. See Suggested 
Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute §l(d), infra, Chap. 22. 
9 On the substantive law aspects, see Havighurst, "Gifts of Bank De-
posits," 14 N.C. L. REv. 129 (1935); Katzenstein, "Joint Savings Bank 
Accounts in Maryland," 3 Mo. L. REv. 109 (1939); Kepner, "Joint and 
Survivorship Bank Account," 41 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954); Rutledge, 
"Joint Tenancy in Washington Bank Accounts," 26 WASH. L. REv. 116-
24 (1951); Slater, "Joint Accounts and Trusts Created by Bank Depos-
its," 2 BRooKLYN L. REv. 27 (1932); Willis, "Nature of a Joint Account," 
14 CAN. B. REv. 457 (1936); Notes, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 103 (1953); 3 
CHITIY's LAW J. 17 (1953). 
10 Stephenson, "Joint Ownership of Property with Right of Survivor-
ship, 25 TRuST BuLL. No. I, 25 (1945); I P-H Wills, Estates, and Trusts 
Service -Jl014; 45 BANK. LAw J. 733, 813, 897; Note, 32 ILL. L. REv. 57, 
63 (1937). 
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sent such legislation, there is no presumption that a deposit 
by a spouse in the name of himself and a third party will 
constitute the third party a joint owner; in fact, there is some 
uncertainty 11 as to the doctrinal basis of the survivor's claim. 
It is hard to find an inter vivos gift when there has been no 
delivery of the pass book. And the lack of clear intent to cre-
ate a trust militates against use of the trust doctrine. Never-
theless, a few courts have validated the transaction on one or 
the other, or a combination/2 of these two theories. A more 
plausible rationale is that the privilege of survivorship springs 
from a contract between the two parties concerned and the 
bank, whether or not a joint estate be created thereby. 
The printed form usually states that A or B may make 
withdrawals during A's lifetime; but there may be a written 
or oral understanding that only A may withdraw, that only 
B may withdraw, or that neither A nor B may withdrawP 
Frequently, the joint bank account is merely an arrangement 
of convenience to enable the donee to withdraw the funds of 
the account from time to time for the benefit of the dece-
dent.14 Probably the normal case, however, is one in which 
the depositor has access to the account and intends to retain 
access until death.15 
u Due in part to lingering vestiges of the real property origin of the 
device. 
1 2 In Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank of Pocomoke, 152 Md. 654, 
137 Atl. 378 (1927), the language used was "John T. M. Sturgis and 
Montrue B. Faulke, in trust for both, joint owners, subject to the check 
of either, balance at the death of either to go to the survivor." No sig-
nature card was ever procured for the donee. Held, valid as against the 
widow. Also see cases cited in Atkinson, WILLS, 167-69 (2d ed. 1953). 
13 See discussion of these alternatives in comment by Austin W. Scott, 
Jr., "Joint Bank Accounts-Gifts and Transfers in Trust," 24 RocKY 
MT. L. REV. 133 (1951). 
14 Thus in Estate of Dean, 68 Cal. App. 2d, 155 P.2d 901 (1945) the 
object of the depositor was to have a representative who would have 
access to the box during her illness, and also in the event of her death; 
see also Note, 37 ILL. B. J. 212 (1948). 
15 "Dearie, I have opened a joint account in the Morristown Trust 
Company with you and you may draw on it to the full amount, but if 
you do, I will give you hell." Morristown Trust Co. v. Capstick, 90 
N.J. Eq. 22, 24, 106 Atl. 391, 392 (1919). 
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Regardless of theory - and sometimes in spite of theory -
the courts have been tolerant of the joint bank account. We 
may expect this attitude to continue as long as the device per-
forms a useful and popular function.16 This may explain, al-
though it cannot justify, the judicial reluctance to permit in-
vasion of the account by the surviving spouse. 
The widow's chances are slim, unless she can demonstrate 
that the account lacked "reality," or that it was testamentary.U 
1a See p. 16, supra. It is a common practice for banks to encourage 
the use of this device when new accounts are opened, particularly when 
a husband and wife are concerned; and the bank clerks concerned may 
be unaware of the legal implications of a joint bank account; see Com-
ment, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 301, 310 (1944). It is possible that many people 
have the mistaken notion that they gain immunity from inheritance 
taxation or post-mortem publicity; see note 5, supra. 
17 Favoring the surviving "tenant," as against the surviving spouse: 
Holmes v. Mims, I Ill. 2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953) (joint account 
accumulated by earnings of husband and "bigamous" second wife); 
Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N.E.2d 126 (1944); Whittington v. 
Whittington, 205 Md. I, 106 Atl.2d 72 (1954) (husband transfers ac-
counts in trust for himself and donee, as joint owners, with equal with-
drawal privileges and right of survivorship; passbooks retained); Stur-
gis v. Citizens National Bank of Pocomoke, 152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 
(1927) (terms of the account similar to terms in the Whittington case, 
supra); Stewart v. Barksdale, 63 So.2d 108 (Miss. 1953) (savings and 
loan association; either party given right to withdraw in whole or in 
part); Melinik v. Meier, 124 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1939) (evidence that 
the donee had deposited some of his own money); Lorch's Estate, 33 
N.Y.S.2d 157, 168, (Surr. Ct. 1951); Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 165, 
81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd without opinion, 274 App. Div. 
1036, 85 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1949); In re Sturmer's Estate, 277 
App. Div. 503, 101 N.Y.S.2d 25 (4th Dep't 1950) (commercial accounts); 
Inda v. Inda, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941) aff'd without opinion, 
263 App. Div. 925, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 
315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942); Matter of Glen, 247 App. Div. 518, 288 N.Y. 
Supp. 24 (1st Dep't 1936) (joint bank account between husband and 
husband's brother sustained as against widow, claiming under contract 
by husband to will her four-fifths of his estate); Guitner v. McEowen, 
99 Ohio App. 32, 125 N.E.2d 744 (1954); Orth v. Doench, 309 Pa. 240, 
163 Atl. 450 (1932); Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 Atl. 919 (1933) 
(equities strongly in favor of validity); cf. Milewski v. Milewski, 351 Ill. 
App. 158, 114 N.E.2d 419 (1953) (maintenance proceeding); Estate of 
Morstatt, N. Y. L. J. I Feb. 1952, 4 P-H Wills, Trust, & Estates Service, 
~2885.35 (Surr. Ct. 1952); Matter of Perlmutter, 199 Misc. 330, 98 
N.Y.S.2d 968 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Estate of Jagodzinska, 52 N.Y.S.2d 341 
(Surr. Ct. 1945) modified, 272 App. Div. 660, 74 N.Y.S.2d 628 (4th Dep't 
1947) (commercial account; no surviving spouse); Matter of Kalina, 184 
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The New York case of Inda v. Inda 18 is typical. Here the hus-
band died leaving a wife and ten children. Five years before 
death he had opened two savings bank accounts: one in the 
name of a fictitious person and his daughter-in-law, entitled 
"joint account, either or the survivor may draw"; the other 
in the names of a fictitious person and the son, "pay to either 
or the survivor of them." The trial court found that the 
husband "always treated these accounts as his own sole prop-
erty," that he retained the pass books and that he never in-
tended to divest himself of ownership. Nevertheless, the 
provisions of the New York banking law were held to gov-
ern; 19 the deposit in the statutory form was deemed con-
Misc. 367, 370, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775, 778 (Surr. Ct. 1945) appeal dismissed, 
270 App. Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1946) (dicta). 
There appears to be no case permitting the spouse to set aside or 
invade an otherwise valid joint bank account. Whenever the spouse 
does prevail, it is on the ground that the account lacked "reality." 
Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55, 59 (1929) (certificates of 
deposit; see Chap. 14, note 17, supra); Inda v. Inda, infra, note 18 
(widow prevails as to joint account in commercial bank; no appeal); 
Matter of Mooney, infra, note 24. 
18 Inda v. Inda, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd without opin-
ion, 263 App. Div. 925, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'd, 288 
N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942), noted in 27 CoRNELL L. Q. 569 (1942), 
52 YALE L. J. 656 (1952). 
19 The New York statute dealing with joint deposits in savings banks 
in the stipulated form declares that on the death of one of the parties 
the presumption of joint tenancy is conclusive. N.Y. Banking Law, 
§239(3). No such presumption exists for deposits in commercial banks; 
id. §134(3); see also id. §394(1). "[T]he husband must be careful 
whether he deposits his account in the bank with the brass doors or 
in the bank with the bronze doors." Note, 27 CoRNELL L. Q. 569, 573 
(1942). Frequently state legislation of this sort has been passed at the 
instance of banks, merely to protect them in the event of payment to 
the survivor. But these statutes tend to buttress the judicial predilection 
in favor of the right of survivorship; cf. Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics 
Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 435, 229 N.W. 865, 867 (1930). Notwith-
standing the provisions of the local Banking Act equity could impose a 
trust, in the widow's favor, on the donee of any unreasonably large 
inter vivos transfer; cf. cases dealing with United States savings bonds, 
infra, p. 227; also see note, 52 YALE L. J. 656, 659 (1943). 
In the Inda case, note 18, supra, the widow prevailed as to a third 
account, not in a savings bank. There being no "conclusive" presump-
tion here, the decedent was deemed not to have intended to establish a 
joint account-probably because he retained the passbook. But cf. In re 
Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Surr. Ct. 1941), where a similar transfer 
was sustained against attack by the surviving spouse. 
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elusive evidence of the intention of both depositors to vest 
title in the survivor. 
Unreasoning application of the "reality" doctrine to joint 
bank accounts is found even in jurisdictions that avowedly 
use the "control" rationale when dealing with revocable inter 
vivos trusts. It will be recalled that the highest court in Ohio 
has twice permitted a widow to reach such transfers, even 
when the decedent had not made excessive formal retention 
of control over administration of the trust. 20 In each case 
the power to revoke, coupled with the income for life, was 
deemed to give the decedent such "control" and "dominion" 
over the trust res as to bring the transfer within the policy 
ambit of the elective share. But it would seem that the policy 
underlying the Ohio elective share varies with the type of 
transfer concerned. Where the joint bank account is em-
ployed, the emphasis shifts to the "reality" of the transfer, 
not to retention of control. A case in point is the recent Court 
of Appeals decision in Guitner v. McEowen. 21 Here the de-
cedent husband established a joint savings account in the 
name of himself and his sister, with right of survivorship. The 
account was sustained against the widow, seemingly on the 
reasoning that a device effective for other purposes is effective 
against the widow. The court noted that the account was 
"irrevocable," and that "the delivery of the passbook was 
further evidence . . . that decedent did not retain any con-
trol or interest in the account at variance with the terms 
under which it was opened." Nevertheless, evidence was also 
admitted that the decedent said to the donee "you or I, any 
one, can draw that money"; and the president of the bank 
testified that the decedent could have withdrawn the funds 
without presentation of the passbook. In these circumstances, 
the distinction between a revocable trust and a "poor man's 
20 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944) 
(discussed pp. 79-83, supra); Harris v. Harris, 79 Ohio App. 443, 74 
N.E.2d 407 (1945), aff'd, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947) (dis-
cussed pp. 83-87, supra). 
21 99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E.2d 744 (1954). 
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will" seems a thin one. In either instance the decedent has 
effective controi.22 
The widow may of course have the account set aside as 
being testamentary if no interest is created in the donee until 
death. This result has been reached where the co-tenant had 
no right of withdrawal until the death of the depositor. 23 
And, even if the right of withdrawal is granted, the widow 
may still be able to prove that the arrangement lacked "real-
ity" - that there was no intent to confer a benefit on the 
other party.24 "We cannot close our eyes," said a judge over 
half a century ago, "to the well-known practice of persons 
depositing in savings banks money to the credit of real or 
fictitious persons, with no intention of divesting themselves 
of ownership." 25 In considering intention, the relation and 
dealings between the parties will be relevant, as well as evi-
dence indicating a purpose other than to benefit the claim-
ant co-depositor. 26 The merits of the widow's claim- qua 
widow - should be irrelevant; any heir has a like privilege 
of demonstrating lack of "reality." 
Nashua Trust Co. v. Heghene Mosgofian/1 although not 
involving a surviving spouse, is instructive. Here the bank's 
form indicated that both parties were to sign the signature 
22 In the Guitner case the decedent did not have the exclusive power 
to "revoke"; both the decedent and the surviving joint tenant could 
have withdrawn the funds in the decedent's lifetime: whereas in the 
Bolles case the trust could have been revoked only by the settlor. This 
distinction, however, does not seem material enough to preclude appli-
cation of the "control" doctrine to joint bank accounts. But cf. In re 
Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 157, 168 (Surr. Ct. 1941). 
23 Cf. Onofrey v. Wollifer, 351 Pa. 18, 40 A.2d 35, 155 A.L.R. 1074 
(1944) (surviving spouse not involved). 
24 E.g., Matter of Mooney, N.Y. L. J. 9 Oct. 1950, 2 P-H Wills, 
Estates, & Trusts Service, ~1282, appl'n for rehearing denied, 102 
N.Y.S.2d 416 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (savings account and checking account). 
25 Andrews, J., in Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 430, 22 N.E. 940, 
942 (1889). 
26 For citations to cases involving these factors, see Note, 53 CoLuM. 
L. REv. 103, 107, note 34 (1953). 
27 Nashua Trust Co. v. Mosgofian, 97 N.H. 17, 79 A.2d 636 (1951), 
noted in 25 TEMPLE L. Q. 388 (1952); also see Cournoyer v. Monadnock 
Savings Bank, 98 N.H. 385, 102 A.2d 910 (1953) (survivor living in 
Canada). 
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cards. But the decedent supplied neither the signature nor 
the address of the co-depositor, nor did he inform the co-
depositor of the existence of the account. The co-depositor, 
his brother, lived in Turkey, and was left a part interest in 
the account by the decedent's will. It was held that the 
brother did not receive any inter vivos interest in the ac-
count.28 
3. JOINT SAFE-DEPOSIT Box 
There appears as yet to be no case involving this device as 
a means of defeating the widow's share, either as an extra-
legal and unsanctioned substitute for a will, or on the doubt-
ful theory that a survivorship interest is created.29 We may 
attribute the dearth of litigation to prudence on the part of 
the decedent spouse. If legal advice is taken, the opinion is 
likely to be that the joint safe-deposit box is neither "bullet-
proof" 30 nor even worth the risk, in view of the variety of 
28 Kenison, J., dissenting, urged inter vivos validity on a third party 
contract basis. With unusual candor, he remarked: 
"Joint bank deposits payable to the survivor are in exten-
sive use today by persons of small means who wish a desig-
nated relative or a member of the family to own the deposit 
at their death although the donor retains the bankbook, and 
makes all the deposits and withdrawals. In most cases where 
there is litigation, the results show the common denominator 
to be one of frustrated intention .... Either the deceased de-
positor has not done enough to satisfy the classical doctrine 
of a gift inter vivos or, if he has, he is charged with violating 
the Statute of Wills. Refreshing exceptions to this result have 
been few and far between. . . . One reason for this situation is 
that the doctrine of gifts inter vivos is not flexible enough to 
work effectively when applied to the modern joint bank ac-
count as used today. The only successful surviving depositor 
is very apt to be the one that this court does not get its hands 
on." 
97 N.H. 17, 21, 79 A.2d 636, 639 (1951). See also Murray v. Gadsen, 
197 Fed. 2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (extensive discussion of the joint bank 
account device); Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45, 44 L.R.A. 
208 (1899). 
29 But cf. Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926) 
(colorable transfer). 
30 As was mistakenly said of the revocable trust by the corporate 
fiduciary in Merz v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 
130 S.W.2d 611 (1939). 
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other expedients that achieve the desired result with a mini-
mum of loss of control or income. The device merits a brief 
examination, however: it may be a battleground of the fu-
ture; and it exemplifies the strain placed on the statutory 
share by the development of new social usage, new substitutes 
for the will. 
The joint safe-deposit box has come into use only in the last 
century. It has probably displaced the "strongbox" as a 
repository of valuables. But legal doctrine has not yet ad-
justed t.o this new phenomenon. 31 Does the fact that articles 
are found in a safe-deposit box shared by the decedent and 
another indicate that title is in the survivor? Probably not: 
but can we be sure? The relationship between the co-deposi-
tors and the bank smacks of a bailment or a rental arrange-
ment. Nevertheless, the banks and other institutions in the 
business of "renting" these boxes usually require the ap-
plicants to sign a card loosely referred to as a "joint tenancy" 
card.32 The object, of course, is to protect the bank from 
liability when it releases the contents, particularly in the 
event of death of one of the "tenants." The card generally 
provides for access by either party and by the survivor, and 
may in addition contain language of joint tenancy. The cases 
to date have been reluctant to find a joint tenancy, even when 
the language of joint tenancy is used.33 This is sensible, as it 
is likely that in the usual case neither the co-lessees nor the 
bank clerk fully appreciate the significance of the fine-print 
terminology on the card. 34 And serious difficulties occur if the 
incidents of joint tenancy are to be applied to property that 
was in the box for a short period, then withdrawn and pos-
81 In general, see an excellent annotation in 14 A.L.R.2d 948 (1950) 
by R. F. Martin; Atkinson, WILLS, 160, {2d ed. 1953). 
82 See Comment, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 301 (1944) distinguishing between 
"joint access" cards, joint tenancy cards, and cards merely stating the 
parties are "co-renters." 
88 See cases cited in Atkinson, op. cit., supra, note 31, pp. 166-67. 
84 "An inquiry as to the ideas of safe deposit clerks in various banks 
in the Bay area was undertaken by the writer. Not one of them could 
tell the incidents of a joint tenancy." Comment, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 301, 
310 (1944). 
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sibly sold to third parties. The chief doctrinal difficulty lies 
in finding the requisite element of "delivery" in creating a 
gift to the co-lessee; but a few cases have held that the ar-
rangement is evidence of a gift to the surviving co-lessee.35 
There is little legislation on the topic.36 
The case of Lowry v. Florida National Bank of ]ackson-
ville,S7 although not involving a surviving spouse, shows how 
the evasion problem might arise. The decedent, a man in his 
sixties, wished to give property to the daughter of a friend, 
without the publicity attendant on giving her a legacy. Stat-
ing that he thought he could "work something out," he later 
handed to the claimant daughter an envelope containing a 
number of coupon bonds. He then rented a safety-deposit 
box in the name of the claimant. He was deputized to enter 
the box, and both parties had a key. The envelope, bearing 
the claimant's name, was placed in the box, and the claimant 
did not again enter the box until decedent's death seven years 
later. In the meantime, decedent had used the box for other 
purposes and had clipped the coupons. The court held that 
the claimant's title to the bonds had been established.38 
The ultimate judicial reaction to this everyday practice is 
not yet known. Strong and strange medicine it is that de-
clares a joint tenancy solely on the basis of the language in 
the card supplied by the banks.39 To condone defeasance 
of the widow's share on that doctrinal basis would be even 
less defensible. 
35 See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 948 (1950). Further difficulties may ensue 
if the parol evidence rule is applied to prevent the parties concerned 
from explaining their actual understanding of their conduct. 1944 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 839; 1949 id. 741; Kahn, "joint 
Safe Deposit Boxes," 37 ILL. B. J. 212 (1949). 
36 Cf. Mich. Stat. Ann. §23.1123 (title to contents is unaffected; 
either "renter" may remove contents). 
37{2 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1949). 
38 In this case the language of the rental card does not appear to 
have been a factor. The trial court, although "impressed with the 
frankness and sincerity of the witness," had held the physical delivery 
of no consequence since not intended to be effective until the death of 
the donor. 
39 Cf. Annot. 14 A.L.R.2d 948, 954 (1950). But cf. Atkinson, 167. 
CHAPTER 15 
Contractual Devices 
1. UNITED STATES SAVINGS BoNDS 
United States savings bonds/ introduced only two decades 
ago/ constitute a convenient "evasive" device. The Treasury 
Regulations provide that the bonds may be registered in the 
names of natural persons in three forms: (a) in the name of 
one person as sole owner; (b) in the name of two, but not 
more than two, persons as co-owners; and (c) in the name of 
one person payable on death to one, but not more than one, 
other designated person as beneficiary.3 These last two forms 
are effective substitutes for a will. 4 
Under the co-ownership form either co-owner may secure 
payment of the bond on his separate request without the 
signature of the other co-owner; and upon payment to either 
co-owner "the other person shall cease to have any interest 
in the bond." 5 A bond may be reissued during the joint lives 
of both co-owners only upon their joint request and under 
designated circumstances.6 This prevents a husband from 
defeating his wife's rights by reissuance when the bond was 
issued originally in their joint names. On the other hand, he 
can still achieve his purpose by cashing the bond. Moreover, 
he can always buy bonds in the name of himself and a person 
t Known also as Baby Bonds, War Savings Bonds, Defense Savings 
Bonds, and Security Bonds. 
2 A 1935 amendment to the Second Liberty Bond Act authorized the 
Secretary of the Treasury to issue savings bonds in such manner and 
subject to such terms and conditions as he may prescribe. 49 Stat. 21, 
Chap. 5, §6, Feb. 4, 1935, 31 U.S.C.A. 757 C. 
8 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.4 (Supp. 1958). 
4 But see Knecht, "Joint Ownership Reappraised," 88 TRUSTS & 
ESTATES 416, 418 (1949). 
5 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.60(a) (Supp. 1958). 
6 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.60(b) (Supp. 1958). 
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other than his wife, whether he uses the co-ownership form or 
the beneficiary form. On the death of either co-owner, the 
survivor "will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner 
of the bond." 7 
When the bond is issued in beneficiary form, it may be 
cashed by the registered owner "as though no beneficiary had 
been named in the registration." 8 But the bond may not be 
reissued so as to eliminate or change the beneficiary without 
her consent.9 Similarly, under this form the only way to de-
feat the interest of a beneficiary without her consent is to cash 
the bond. 
Some of the early cases on savings bonds adopted a narrow 
construction of the Treasury Regulations, and held against 
the surviving beneficiary. The Deyo case 10 is instructive in 
this regard because it also involved the right of the surviving 
spouse. In the Deyo case the husband had some four years 
before marriage invested $7000 in savings bonds, the bene-
ficiary at death being his sister. The widow, suing as 
executrix, claimed the bonds as estate assets. The court held 
that the complaint stated a good cause of action, reasoning 
that the Treasury Regulations were merely for the conveni-
ence of the federal government in determining "to whom the 
government may make payment of the bonds and thereby 
relieve the government of suits and claims or controversies." 11 
Accordingly, under the laws of New York, the bonds were 
deemed invalid as a gift because of lack of delivery, and in-
valid as a will because of lack of testamentary formalities. On 
this view, of course, it was unnecessary to rule on the widow's 
rights under the New York forced share. 
To remove doubts caused by this decision, and acting on 
1 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.61(c) (Supp. 1958). 
8 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.65(a) (Supp. 1958). 
o 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.65(b)(2) (Supp. 1958). 
10 In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943), 
refusing to follow Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. 
Ct. 1942). 
11 178 Misc. 859, 861, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736 (1942). 
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the recommendation of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, 12 the New York Legislature passed the following 
statute: 
•'Where any United States savings bond is payable 
to a designated person, whether as owner, co-owner 
or beneficiary, and such bond is not transferable, 
the right of such person to receive payment of such 
bond according to its terms, and the ownership 
of the money so received shall not be defeated or 
impaired by any statute or rule of law governing 
transfer of property by will or gift or an intestacy. 
" 13 
In a later proceeding in the Deyo litigation Surrogate 
Foley referred to the new legislation and ruled that "the 
form of registration of the bonds is sufficient to vest title of 
the proceeds in the surviving beneficiary .... " 14 Stating 
that public policy should encourage recognition of the rights 
of the designated beneficiary, he found a "present interest" 
in the beneficiary at the time the bonds were purchased. This 
"present interest," he said, "may rest in contract,15 and is ... 
somewhat analogous to the rights of a beneficiary under an 
insurance policy, a beneficiary under a trust agreement or a 
beneficiary of a Totten trust." 16 The suggestion that the 
Regulations relate solely to protection of the government 
was castigated as a "mere play on words," producing a result 
that "certainly was never contemplated either by the Treasury 
Department or by the millions of purchasers of these 
bonds." 17 Most courts now recognize the binding effect of the 
Treasury Regulations, either on the contract theory or on the 
1 2 1943 Leg. Doc. No. 65(N); 1943 REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
STUDIES, P· 636. 
13 L. 1943, Chap. 632, §1, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law. §24. Similar statutes 
have been enacted in California, Michigan, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. See Note, 1947 W1sc. L. REv. 447. 
14 180 Misc. 32, 35, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 387, 383 (1943). 
1 5 /d. at 40-1, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88 (1943). 
16 I d. at 42, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 388. 
17 Id. at 42, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 387. For later proceedings in the Deyo 
litigation, see 182 Misc. 459, 48 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
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power of the federal government to borrow money and to 
control the terms of its obligations.18 
Many of the cases involving spouses' rights are from New 
York; and the New York cases uniformly deny the widow's 
claim.19 We should notice that these cases do not always 
involve a direct attack by the widow under Section 18 of the 
Decedent Estate Law; and, in general, the equities are either 
not referred to or not clearly with the widow.20 In Matter of 
Kalina,21 however, the widow raised the issue squarely, in a 
1s Jones, ·"United States Savings Bonds, Series E, F, and G," II Mn. 
L. REv. 265, 266 (1950); Note, 52 YALELJ. 917 (1943). In general, see 
Gammon, "War Savings Bonds and State Succession Laws," 17 TENN. 
L. REv. 928 (1943); 1943 ANNUAL SuRVEY OF AMERICAN LAw 604; Notes, 
48 MicH. L. REv. 1038 (1950); 32 MINN. L. REv. 158 (1948); 4 MoNT. L. 
REV. 61, 70 (1943); Annots. 173 A.L.R. 550 (1948); 168 A.L.R. 245 
(1947). Most, but not all, courts have followed the regulations in pro-
hibiting attempted transfers of the bonds either by way of gift inter 
vivos or gift causa mortis. For the view that the regulations do not 
in spirit prohibit a gift causa mortis, see Notes, 61 HARV. L. REV. 542 
(1948); 38 MINN. L. REv. 401, 403 (1954). As to gifts inter vivos, see 
Note, 6 ALA. L. REv. 104 (1953). 
1 9 Estate of Morstatt, N.Y. L. J. I Feb. 1952, 4 P-H Wills, Trusts & 
Estates Service (Surr. Ct. 1952); Matter of Sturmer, 277 App. Div. 503, 
101 N.Y.S.2d 25 (4th Dep't 1950); Superat v. Dylawski, 196 Misc. 707, 93 
N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd without opinion, 277 App. Div. 969, 
99 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1st Dep't 1950) (widow loses on alimony claim also); 
Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd with-
out opinion, 274 App. Div. 1036, 85 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1949); Mat-
ter of Kalina, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1945). appeal 
dismissed by default, 270 App. Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 
1946); Matter of Deyo, supra, note 10; Matter of Karlinski, 180 Misc. 
44, (Surr. Ct. 1943), noted in 56 HARV. L. REv. 1006 (1943), 43 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 260 (1943); cf. In re Staheli's Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185, (Surr. Ct. 
1945), aff'd without opinion, 271 App. Div. 788, 66 N.Y.S.2d 271 (2d 
Dep't 1946) (nonevasive); Matter of Amols, 184 Misc. 364, 47 N.Y.S.2d 
636 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Matter of Hager, 181 Misc. 431, 45 N.Y.S.2d 468 
(Surr. Ct. 1944) (not clear whether or not surviving spouse involved). 
20 In the Deyo case, supra, note 10, for example, the bonds had been 
purchased a few years before the marriage and the marriage took place 
less than a year before the husband's death. Surrogate Foley also noted 
that the beneficiary was the decedent's sister, and stated that contracts 
for the benefit of third parties are recognized by the courts nowadays, 
"especially ... where the beneficiary is a close relative." 180 Misc. 32, 
40, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379, 387 (1943). In Hart v. Hart, supra, note 19, reason-
able provision had been made by the decedent for the claimant spouse. 
21 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1945), appeal dismissed by 
default, 270 App. Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1946). The Kalina 
case was followed in Graham Estate, 3 D.&C.2d 218 (Pa. 1954). 
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case where her husband had given her the bare minimum in 
a small estate. The bonds were held not to be "illusory," on 
the ground that a "present interest" passed to the bene-
ficiary. This "interest" was analogized to the interest passing 
in a joint savings account, as distinguished (in those pre-
Halpern days) from that which passes under a Totten trust. 
Likewise, said the court, savings bonds are not testamentary; 
and it refused to read into the 1943 legislation 22 "a legislative 
intent to make a further exception in favor of a surviving 
spouse." Significantly, the court remarked that it was "natu-
rally aware that the result here reached gives judicial approval 
to another medium by which the expectant rights of a spouse 
may be curtailed or even destroyed. It is only the latest to re-
ceive judicial consideration. . . . The remedy lies with the 
Legislature alone." 23 
But authority may be found in other jurisdictions for im-
position of an in personam decree against the beneficiaries, 
in favor of the surviving spouse. In !bey v. !bey 24 the de-
cedent husband purchased savings bonds payable at death to 
a son and two grandsons. The widow claimed that this was a 
fraud on her marital rights. Said the court: "The widow is 
entitled to what she has lost, but otherwise the bonds are 
payable in accordance with their terms. The measure of 
damages is what the widow would have gained if the bonds 
had been made payable to the decedent's estate. To this ex-
tent the bonds or their proceeds are subject to a constructive 
trust in favor of the plaintiff, if fraud is found." 25 Oddly 
22 See note 13, supra. 
23 184 Misc. 367, 372, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1945). 
24 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1945), exceptions overruled, 94 N.H. 425, 
55 A.2d 872 (1947). 
25 I d. at 436, 43 A.2d at 159, 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.20(a) (Supp. 
1958) states that no judicial proceeding will be recognized if it "would 
defeat or impair the rights of survivorship conferred ... upon a sur-
viving co·owner or beneficiary." Is imposition of a trust in favor of the 
widow consistent with this regulation? Presumably so; certainly the 
court in the Ibey case made that assumption, since it referred in passing 
to the section as it appeared in 1938. 93 N.H. 434, 436, 43 A.2d 157, 
159 (1945). 
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enough, the !bey case is one of the few evasion cases in which 
the standard of "reasonableness" is categorically rejected.26 
For this court, the decedent's motive is the touchstoneY 
Authority for the widow may also be found by analogy in 
the cases dealing with inter vivos transfers in evasion of a 
contract to make a will. 28 In Union National Bank v. ]essell 29 
the spouses executed a joint will providing for changes by 
mutual consent and stating that on the death of the survivor 
all the property of both of them should accrue to a trust cre-
ated under the will. When the wife died the husband in-
vested $30,000 in savings bonds (Series G), naming his three 
children as beneficiaries. The husband's executor requested 
a declaratory judgment. The court declared that the children 
must surrender the bonds for redemption, and pay the pro-
ceeds over to the husband's executor to become part of the 
trust. The Treasury Regulations, said the court, "do not pre-
vent the declaration of a resulting trust in bonds purchased 
in fraud of marital rights." 30 
26 At the new trial the bonds were again "adjudged to have been 
purchased in fraud of the plaintiff's marital rights," 94 N.H. 425, 55 
A.2d 872, 873 (1947). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire then 
overruled exceptions by the defendants. I d. at 425, 44 A.2d at 872. The 
!bey case seems to be cited as holding entirely against the widow in I 
Scott, TRUSTS §57.5 (2d ed. 1956) and in Scott, "The Law of Trusts, 
1941-1945," 59 HARv. L. R. 157, 176 (1945). 
27 The court admitted evidence that at various times from a month 
before the purchase of the bonds to within six months afterwards the 
decedent said in substance "I will fix it so that you, Maude, won't get 
any part of my estate." 93 N.H. 434, 437, 43 A.2d 157, 159 (1945). 
28 See Appendix D, infra, p. 366; cf. Petersen v. Swan, 239 Minn. 98, 
57 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. 1953). In the Petersen case the decedent wife, 
entrusted by her husband with the joint marital savings, had purchased 
savings bonds for her mother. The court placed the burden on the 
mother to show that the bonds had been purchased with funds belong-
ing to the wife. 
As to bonds other than savings bonds, see Robertson v. Robertson, 
147 Ala. 3ll, 40 So. 104 (1905) (state bonds; valid); Lonsdale's Estate, 20 
Pa. 407 (1857) (bonds secured by mortgages; invalid); Norris v. Barbour, 
188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949) (delivery, eleven years before death, 
of a bond for $20,000 payable one year after death; invalid). 
2 9 358 Mo. 467, 215 S.W.2d 474 (1948). 
30 I d. at 475, 215 S.W.2d at 477. Accord, Anderson v. Benson, ll7 F. 
Supp. 765 (D.C. Neb., 1953); Chase v. Leiter, 96 Cal. App. 2d 439, 215 
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A commentator has stated that the chief goals of the sav-
ings bond program are "to halt inflation through encourag-
ing private savings and to spread ownership of the national 
debt." 31 But pursuit of these worthy goals does not and 
should not necessitate the denial of a deserving widow's claim 
for support. 32 The point is vital, because savings bonds are 
obviously designed for the small investor.33 Undoubtedly 
P.2d 756 (1950); cf. Olsen v. Olsen, 189 Misc. 1046, 70 N.Y.S.2d 838 
(1947); Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953), cert. 
denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 68 (1953); Makinen v. George, 19 Wash.2d 340, 142 
P.2d 910 (1943) (resulting trust in favor of the real purchaser). 
In Katz v. Driscoll, 86 Cal. App.2d 313, 194 P.2d 822 (1948) the 
rights of creditors were involved. The court stated that the Treasury 
regulations "are not intended to confer on the beneficiary the right to 
retain permanently the proceeds from the bonds irrespective of fraud 
or any illegality in the manner in which the bonds were obtained. To 
hold otherwise would, in effect, say that the treasury regulations not 
only guarantee payment to the named beneficiary, but, thereafter, when 
he receives the proceeds, follow him around indefinitely, and, like a 
protective halo, render him completely immune from any ordinarily 
legitimate claims thereto." Id. at 322, 194 P.2d at 828. Cf. Estate of 
Lundwall, 242 Iowa, 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951) (confidential relation-
ship; noted, on the evidentiary questions involved, in 37 IowA L. REv. 
299 (1952)); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 325 Mass. 257, 264, 90 N.E.2d 338 
(1950); In re Laundree's Estate, 195 Misc. 754, 91 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1949), 
rev'd, 277 App. Div. 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d Dep't 1950); In re Di-
Santo's Estate, 142 Ohio St. 223, 231, 51 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1943) ("There 
is no question in this case of a transfer in fraud of creditors or the 
widow"). 
In Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So.2d 118 (1947) in which the 
widow was given judgment for the amount of her community property 
interest in savings bonds, the court stated: "In modern times, when 
movable property may and often does constitute the great bulk of 
the wealth, the husband should have no more right to dispose of mov-
ables gratuitously without the consent of his wife than he has to dis-
pose of immovables. It appears to be a matter of sufficient importance 
to warrant the Legislature's giving this provision of our law serious 
consideration." Id. at 599, 33 So.2d at 126. A useful note in 22 TuL. 
L. REv. 650 (1948) contrasts this decision with decisions denying the 
widow's rights against the beneficiaries of her husband's life insurance. 
Also see Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So.2d 18 (1951); Com-
ments, 9 LA. L. REv. 147, 184-86 (1949); 8 LA. L. REV. 571 (1948). 
81 Note, 38 MINN. L. REv. 401, 402 (1954). 
32 See discussion of community values, supra, pp. 24-29. 
83 "In planning this security a primary objective was to avoid a re-
currence of one of the unpleasant aftermaths of the first World War. 
Then, you will recall, many who had purchased Treasury Bonds to help 
finance the war found their bonds sinking well below par on the 
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they comprise a significant portion of the holdings of the 
average man of modest means, perhaps ranking next to the 
family home, life insurance, and the joint bank account as a 
medium for holding and transferring family wealth.34 
Under existing Treasury regulations the widow cannot 
attach the bond before payment or reissuance.35 The model 
statute suggested in Chapter 22, however, would permit the 
widow to seek contribution from the surviving beneficiary or 
co-owner. The court would also have the power to enjoin 
transfer of the bond or dispersal of its proceeds.36 
market. To prevent this from happening again a non-marketable bond 
was offered-one that would not be subject to the vagaries of specula-
tion. To emphasize non-marketability and insulate further against 
market fluctuations the new bonds were also made non-transferable 
and their use as collateral was prohibited. At the same time, the bonds 
were made easily redeemable by their owners at fixed and readily as-
certainable values. The result was a security which was safe for the 
inexperienced investor .... " Lynch, "Legal Problems Affecting the 
Use of Saving Bonds in Estate and Trust Planning," PROCEEDINGs OF 
THE SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, AMERICAN 
BAR Assoc. 13 (1948). 
34 In predicting that savings bonds are not as likely to be employed 
as an evasive device as the Totten trust, a recent writer refers to them 
as "cumbersome," and states that "[T]he amount of government savings 
bonds that one person may purchase in any one year is limited by 
statute and this method again involves tying up money in a device 
which is not as liquid as a Totten trust." Comment by Norman Penney, 
37 CoRNELL L. Q. 258, 268, note 60 (1952). It is true, of course, that 
with the Totten trust the husband is not vulnerable to ex parte deple-
tion of the fund, as is the case with savings bonds held in co-owner-
ship, and to that extent the Totten trust, in jurisdictions where it is 
autborized, affords more control to the "fraudulent" spouse. But to 
pursue the comparison further is as unprofitable as the enquiry into 
whether it takes more mental capacity to make a contract than to make 
a will. It all depends on the circumstances. Five thousand dollars looms 
large in a small estate. Given the desire to evade the statutory share, 
there is nothing particularly "cumbersome" about savings bonds, either 
in buying them or in cashing them; and the limitations on holdings are 
not oppressive. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.10 (Supp. 1958). 
35 A legislature that adopted the Suggested Model Decedent's Family 
Maintenance Statute, see Chap. 22, could also clarify the rights of the 
surviving spouse by amending any existing legislation that protects the 
rights of beneficiaries of the bonds. For instance, §24 of the New York 
Personal Property Law (supra, note 13) would need the same exemption 
for the surviving spouse as is now provided for payment of creditor's 
claims and estate taxes. 
36 See §13. 
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2. PARTNERSHIP 
At common law the deceased partner's interest in the 
partnership assets passed to the surviving partners. They took 
as quasi-fiduciaries, however, for purposes of winding up the 
partnership. Any surplus after payment of partnership lia-
bilities was returned to the estate of the deceased partner, 
and the widow then took her distributive share.37 These pro-
visions of the common law appear, in substance, in the Uni-
form Partnership Act, adopted in two thirds of the states.38 
Let us assume that the decedent partner had entered into 
an arrangement with the other partners that on the death of 
any partner the survivors would be entitled to the interest 
of the decedent.39 Seemingly the decedent's widow has no 
complaint if this arrangement was on a bona fide "buy and 
sell" 40 basis; the consideration paid by the surviving partners 
would enure to her benefit. Occasionally, however, the part-
ners provide that they hold the partnership assets as joint 
tenants with the right of survivorship; or they may agree that 
on the death of any partner his interest in the partnership 
37 Crane, PARTNERSHIP, §§83, 86 (2d ed. 1952). The widow's right to 
inchoate dower, where such an interest still exists, depends on whether 
the jurisdiction concerned follows the "pro tanto" theory of equitable 
conversion of partnership realty into personalty-in which event the 
realty would be considered personalty only for settlement of partnership 
affairs, and thereafter would be considered realty for purposes of ad-
ministration of the decedent's estate, the widow then taking dower-
or the English "out-and-out" theory of equitable conversion, in which 
event the widow would be denied dower. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoP-
ERTY, §14.16 (1952); Edmonds, "Problems in Administration of Partner-
ship Assets," [1951] U. ILL. L. FoRuM 507. 
as Uniform Partnership Act, §25(2)(d) and (e); id., §26. 
39 These agreements are generally held not to be testamentary. See 
cases cited in Atkinson, WILLS, 166 (2d ed. 1953). But cf. Thomas v. 
Byrd, 112 Miss. 692, 73 So. 725 (1916). 
4° Frequently this arrangement is funded with insurance on the lives 
of the partners; and it may have complicated administration and tax 
consequences. Blackwell, "Contracts for the Purchase of Property or an 
Interest in a Business from a Decedent's Estate," 27 N.C. L. REv. 81 
(1948); Darlington, "Buy and Sell Provisions of Partnership Agree-
ments," 29 ORE. L. REv. 286 (1950); Edmonds, supra, note 37, 519-22; 
Matthews, "Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements for the Sale of a 
Partnership Interest Effective at the Partner's Death," 26 TEXAS L. REv. 
729 (1948). 
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assets will "belong" to the surviving partners.41 An arrange-
ment of the first type is exemplified in Hirsch v. Bartels.42 In 
that case the decedent, while a bachelor, formed a partnership 
in 1933 with two others, to deal in merchandise. The articles 
stipulated that the partnership would "continue until the 
death of two of the members . . . and at the death of the 
second of these . . . the business [should] belong to the 
surviving one ... "; also that "should one die and two re-
main, then the two survivors [should] each receive a half and 
upon the death of two, the third [should] receive the 
whole .... " The decedent married in 1941, and he died 
in 1949. The court ruled that the partners had intended a 
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. "Appellant has 
asked," said the court, "whether the articles of partnership 
were void as contrary to public policy where they will in 
effect preclude the widow from taking her dower interest. It 
seems to us the act of the legislature making such an agree-
ment legal, hence such a situation possible, is a complete 
answer." 43 The Hirsch case is significant, as the Florida 
legislature and courts have in the main displayed solicitude 
for the widow.44 To be sure, the "transfer" in the Hirsch case 
41 Arrangements of this sort are usually found in close family rela-
tionships, e.g., husband and wife (where permitted); father and son; but 
not normally between brothers, as in the Fleming case, infra, note 46. 
42 49 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1950). 
43 I d. at 532. 
44 The other Florida evasion cases stress, inter alia, the reasonable-
ness of the financial provisions for the widow, e.g., Smith v. Hines, 10 
Fla. 258 (1863-4), (widow wins: not reasonably provided for); Williams 
v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 162 So. 868 (1935), (widow loses: "apparently 
ample provision" made for her); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 
So.2d 684 (Fla. 1949), (widow loses: reasonably provided for). By way 
of statutory protection, the widow has inchoate dower in addition to 
her forced share in the husband's personalty owned at death, Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §731.34 (1957); her dower and forced share take precedence over 
her husband's creditors and the expenses of administration, Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §731.34 (1957); and all accident and life insurance policy proceeds 
payable by reason of an insured's death are free of debts and claims 
against him if the insured is survived by either his spouse or child or 
both, unless these proceeds are actually assigned or bequeathed to a 
creditor or creditors, Fla. Stat. Ann. §222.13 (1957). Unlike the rule 
prevailing in all but nine or ten states, this last-mentioned benefit 
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took place some ten years 45 before the marriage: but the 
language of the opinion seems broad enough to cover post-
nuptial transfers. 
Fleming v. Fleming/6 an Iowa case, is unusual both in 
length 47 and in the spirited - if not acidulous - opinions 
rendered by a divided court. The litigation concerned the 
following agreement made by four brothers carrying on an 
insurance business: 
"2d. That upon the death of either one of the un-
dersigned, the property then owned by the said part-
nership, including all property standing in the 
names of the individual partners which embraces 
said stock 48 in Fleming Brothers, Incorporated, 
shall be and become the property of the surviving 
brothers of the said partnership . . . ." 49 
Upon the death of one of the partners, his widow claimed 
her distributive share in the partnership assets. The majority 
opinion sustained the widow's claim. "In view of the legal 
status of the wife," it said, "in view of the relationship which 
she sustains to her husband, in view of those provisions of 
applies even if the insurance is made payable to the insured's estate 
(ibid.). 
45 But it did not obtain legal sanction until just before the marriage. 
At the time the partnership was formed Florida did not permit survivor-
ship in joint tenancies. In 1941, however-approximately two months 
before the marriage-Florida restored the privilege of survivorship if 
"the instrument creating the estate shall expressly provide for the right 
of survivorship .... " Fla. Laws Chap. 20954 (1941). The court con-
curred in the view of the chancellor "that the agreement was ratified 
by the partners after the amendment was enacted, when they continued 
to operate under it, before and after the marriage ... for many years 
until the former's death." 49 So.2d 531, 532 (Fla. 1950). . 
46 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946, ISO N.W. 206, 184 N.W. 296 (1921) 
writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924). 
47 The proceedings in the Supreme Court of Iowa occupy fifty-three 
pages of the state reports. The usual evasion case rarely runs over four 
or five pages. 
48 ". • • This corporation issued to each of the brothers stock in 
equal parts . . . and each undertook to assign his stock by writing his 
name on the back thereof, without naming the assignee, and deposited 
it in a receptacle which it is claimed was under the control of all four 
of the brothers." 194 Iowa 71, 84, 174 N.W. 946, 951 (1919). 
49 Id. at 78, 174 N.W. at 948-49. 
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statute that protect and guard her interest during his life and 
after he is dead, it would seem to be against the policy of the 
law, expressed in the statutes, to permit men to legally get 
together and agree with each other that, upon their death 
their wives and children shall receive no portion of the estate 
which they spent their lives in accumulating. It is a clear 
fraud on the marital rights of the wife." 50 At first glance 
these sentiments seem admirable, but somewhat later, as 
stated by the dissenting judge, "one finds a qualm of unrest 
suggested, such as sometimes follows too enjoyable a ban-
quet." 51 The court takes it for granted that "the policy of 
the law" may be defeated by apt draftsmanship on the part of 
the decedent. The opinion slithers like a serpent to avoid 
labeling the partners' agreement a joint tenancy: it is assumed 
that a survivorship device will defeat the widow. In holding 
for the widow the court thus feels obliged to announce these 
curious propositions: 
(1) No joint tenancy can arise out of a commercial enter-
prise.52 
(2) The partner's agreement was in any event not a joint 
tenancy, because only the four original partners were in-
volved: there was no transfer to a fifth party, nor was there 
any grant to the brothers by a fifth party.53 
(3) If anything, it is a contract to make a will; the widow 
can prevail against a will, likewise with a contract to make a 
will.54 Moreover, the widow's need, although referred to 
5o !d. at 81, 174 N.W. at 950. 
51 /d. at 90, 174 N.W. at 953. Salinger, J., dissenting, took the oppo-
site-and equally arbitrary-view that the partners had entered into a 
joint tenancy and that the resulting right of survivorship would defeat 
the widow's claim. 
52 /d. at 82, 174 N.W. at 950. But cf. Hirsch v. Bartels, 49 So.2d 531 
(Fla. 1950) discussed, supra, p. 232. 
53 /d. at 104, 180 N.W. 206, 207 (1920). 
54 !d. at 107, 180 N.W. at 208. As to spouses' rights in contracts to 
make a will, see appendix D, infra, p. 366. In Matter of Karlinski, 180 
Misc. 44, 43 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Surr. Ct. 1943) the surrogate stated that "in 
the absence of proof that the contract was intended to operate as a 
substitute or subterfuge for a will, and made for the purpose of de-
feating the right of the widow under section 18 of the Decedent Estate 
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obliquely, 55 is not examined with care; in consequence, the 
decision may have been unduly favorable to the widow. As a 
corollary, it may have been unnecessarily harsh on the sur-
viving partners. The court awarded the widow an interest in 
the partnership business, in spite of an offer of generous 
support by the partners.56 Ten years later the parties were 
still litigating the nature of the widow's interest.57 
The difficulties occasioned by the mechanical jurisprudence 
of the Fleming case could be avoided by application of the 
maintenance and contribution formula. The result would 
hinge on the widow's need and the "reasonableness" of the 
transfer,S8 not on the label applied to the transfer. The sur-
viving partners might well be called upon to contribute to the 
widow's maintenance, but there would be no unwarranted 
interference with the partnership business. 
3. LIFE INSURANCE 
Life insurance may be described as a contract to pay a 
named or ascertainable sum on the death of a person. As 
such, it is not considered testamentary; 59 and neither is the 
Law, the interest of the decedent in the partnership belongs to the sur-
viving partner." The case involved $150 in war savings bonds. On 
reargument the beneficiary's right to the bonds was sustained, on 
similar (but more meandering) reasoning to that used in Matter of Deyo, 
180 Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943), refusing to follow Deyo 
v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942) discussed, 
supra, pp. 224-226. But see Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N.E. 
539 (1920) (widow permitted to invade partnership assets). 
55 It is hinted at in 194 Iowa 71, 81, 174 N.W. 946, 949-50 (1919), 
but receives no detailed attention. 
56 ld. at 107, 108, 180 N.W. 204, 208 (1920). 
57 211 Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1931). 
58 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, §§2-4, 
infra, Chap. 22. 
59 Vance, INSURANCE 673 (3rd Ed. 1951 ). Legislation was enacted re-
cently in New York to dispel doubts caused by a lower court decision 
labelling as testamentary a supplementary contract arising out of an 
optional mode of settlement in a matured policy. Hall v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. of New York, 201 Misc. 203, 109 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1952), 
rev'd, 282 App. Div. 203, 122 N.Y.S.2d 239 (First Dep't 1953). On the 
lower court opinion see 1952 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW, 329. 
See also Land, "Life Insurance Option Settlements-Trusts or Debts," 
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insurance trust, an arrangement in which the policy itself or 
its proceeds is held in trust.60 Life insurance may function as 
a form of investment, aided by options which permit the 
insured to surrender the policy for its cash value and also to 
obtain loans either for cash or for payment of premiums. 
Primarily, however, it is a device for achieving family secu-
rity. In the vast majority of cases life insurance owned by the 
husband 61 will be used for family support - payable to the 
widow, to the widow and children, to the children alone, or 
to the estate. And the goal of family protection is furthered 
by the statutes which exempt life insurance proceeds from 
the claims of creditors.62 These statutes, to be found in all 
states, were passed originally to protect the wife and family. 63 
Most of them impose no monetary restriction on the amount 
of exempt insurance that may be carried. 
When we look at the evasion cases, however, life insurance 
is revealed as a potential weapon of evasion.64 The decedent 
may take out a policy for that express purpose, or he may 
42 CoLUM. L. R. 32 (1942); cf. White v. White, 212 S.C. 440, 48 S.E.2d 
189 (1948) (life insurance not part of husband's estate under South Caro-
lina "mistress" statute); Bynum v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 77 
F. Supp. 56 (E.D.S.C. 1948). 
6o Smith, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS, 73-82 (1950). But see 
Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 
889 (1955), rehearing denied, 197 Va. 732, 90 S.E.2d 865 (1956), noted 
in 31 N.Y. U. L. REv. 697 (1956); 42 VA. L. REv. 256 (1956); also see 
Note, "The Testamentary Nature of Revocable Inter Vivos and Life 
Insurance Trusts-Liberalizing Legislation in Wisconsin," 1956 Wise. 
L. REv. 313. 
61 As distinguished from business insurance taken out by others on 
the life of the husband. 
62 Vance, INSURANCE, §124 (3rd ed. 1951); cf. Arnold, "Life Insurance 
as an Asset Available to Creditors in Maryland," 6 Mo. L. REv. 275 
(1942). 
63 The legislative tendency has been to extend the protection to in-
clude any beneficiary. In some states it even includes insurance pay-
able to the insured's estate, annuities, and the disability benefits under 
insurance policies. 
64 The insured may designate as payee one who has no insurable in-
terest in the insured's life, provided the beneficiary was not an active 
and moving party in securing the issuance of the policy. In Texas, how-
ever, the beneficiary must have an insurable interest. Cf. Patterson, 
"Insurance Law During the War Years," 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 345, 360-62 
(1946). 
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assign or change beneficiary rights on existing policies. Two 
fairly recent cases are illustrative of the general problem. 
In Mitchell v. Mitchell 65 the husband changed the bene· 
ficiary rights on his insurance policies, aggregating $48,000, 
from his estate 'to his mother. The trial court invalidated 
the transfers as being illusory and also as constituting a 
"fraud" on the wife. The "fraud" lay in the finding that she 
had become reconciled with him on the strength of his state-
ment that he had not made any change in his insurance. In 
holding life insurance illusory the court compared it with 
the Totten trust, stating that when the assured can change 
beneficiaries, the rights of those beneficiaries "are contingent 
and revocable; they do not vest until the death of the as-
sured or settlor." 66 Needless to say, this opinion was of 
interest to the insurance business; and the New York State 
Association of Life Underwriters, as amicus curiae, filed a 
brief on the appeal. The First Department reversed. It found 
that the insurance had nothing to do with the reconciliation; 
and there was nothing illusory about the change in benefici-
aries, it said, since the assured had an "absolute right" to do 
so under his contract of insurance. Moreover, the court drew 
attention to the reasonableness of the transaction. The de-
cedent had given the widow $7,000 in cash on the day of 
his suicide; he left a net estate of $9,000; and the donee had 
supported the decedent as a child. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed without opinion. 
In Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company,61 the decision 
was also against the spouse, and likewise the equities ran 
against her.68 The husband had made a revocable declaration 
of trust involving a substantial amount of life insurance. He 
retained control of the policies, including the power to 
65 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 265 App. Div. 
27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't 1942), afj'd without opinion, 290 N.Y. 
779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943). 
66 177 Misc. 1050, 1052, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (1942). 
61 177 Md. 271, 9 A.2d 581 (1939). 
68 The insurance aggregated $146,000; the widow received by gift or 
operation of law $150,000. 
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change beneficiaries. Said the court: "the wife has not a 
statutory interest in her husband's life insurance merely by 
reason of his retaining the right to change the beneficiary, 
and the right to exercise complete dominion and control 
over it .... " 
The surviving spouse has prevailed in several instances, 
but these cases have some distinguishing factors. In a New 
York case, Weisman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,S9 
the decedent named his wife as beneficiary and gave her the 
policies. Later, he recovered the policies from her to obtain 
a loan thereon; and in contemplation of a reconciliation with 
her, he agreed in writing to make her the beneficiary "un-
reservedly." Subsequently he assigned the policies to another. 
The widow's claim was upheld. Likewise, in Reiss v. Reiss/0 
a lower court in New York ruled in the widow's favor when 
the husband had changed beneficiaries in violation of a settle-
ment agreement. In denying a motion to dismiss the wife's 
action the court made the interesting statement that the de-
cedent's conduct was "a violation of Section 18 of the Deced-
ent Estate Law." Neither the Weisman case nor the Reiss 
case was specifically overruled in the Mitchell case.71 But the 
Weisman case (and possibly the Reiss case) may be distin-
guished on its facts; and certainly the dictum in the Reiss case 
has little weight in view of the later holding in the Mitchell 
case.72 
On the whole, then, we may say that the courts appear to 
take it for granted that life insurance is immune to the 
widow's attack; 73 and, aside from the Mitchell and Bullen 
69 7 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd without opinion, 256 App. Div. 
914, 10 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1939). 
1o 166 Misc. 274, 2 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1937). 
n Supra, note 65. 
72 But cf. Application of Barasch, 267 App. Div. 830, 45 N.Y.S.2d 790 
(2d Dep't 1944), motion for reargument denied without opinion, 267 
App. Div. 905, 47 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d Dep't 1944) (favoring widow, but 
facts obscure, and no discussion). 
73 Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Mos-
kowitz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 252 App. Div. 
75, 297 N.Y.S. 45 (1st Dep't 1937); Estate of Kerr, I Fiduc. Rep. 239, 
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cases, the point has excited little judicial discussion. But it 
would be unwise to assume that the matter is settled. It hap-
pens that no case has as yet arisen in which the equities clearly 
favor the surviving spouse. Doctrine, in the evasion cases, 
ofttimes will defer to the exigencies.74 Moreover, in some of 
the insurance cases the "transfer" was by way of an assign-
ment or pledge as collateral for a loan.75 This circumstance 
38 Del. Co. Rep. 205 (Pa. 1951); Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 
269 Pa. 257, 112 Atl. 62 (1920); cf. Exchange Nat. Bank of Winter 
Haven v. Smith, 4 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1941); Milewski v. Milewski, 351 Ill. 
App. 158, ll4 N.E.2d 419 (1953); Matter of Smith, N.Y. L.J. 20 Dec. 
1939, I P-H Unreported Trust Cases, ~25,288 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Auch's Es-
tate, 70 Montg. 370, 68 York 137 (Pa. 1955); American Trust & Banking 
Co. v. Twinam, 187 Tenn. 570, 216 S.W.2d 314 (1948). But cf. Estate of 
Brown, 384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956) (unfounded life insurance trust). 
In Wissner v. Wissner, 89 Cal. App.2d 759, 201 P.2d 874 (1949), rev'd, 
338 U.S. 655 (1950), 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1950), the widow lost 
to her husband's mother, the designated beneficiary of a National 
Service Life Insurance Policy. But other types of family claims have 
prevailed against veteran's benefits: In re Guardianship of Bagnall, 
238 Iowa 905, 29 N.W.2d 597 (1947) (disability compensation, war risk 
insurance, and bonus paid to mentally incompetent veteran held vul-
nerable to alimony claim); Gaskins v. Security-First National Bank of 
Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d 681 (1939) (mentally in-
competent veteran's war risk insurance and compensation; children's 
support); Hodson v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 243 
App. Div. 480, 278 N.Y. Supp. 16 (1935) (maintenance for abandoned 
wife and minor child); Rallis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 687 (1932) 
(disability compensation, alimony); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 
130 A.L.R. 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (alimony); Annots. 130 A.L.R. 1014 
(1941), 106 A.L.R. 669 (1937), II A.L.R. 123 (1921). But cf. Brewer v. 
Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 84 S.W.2d 1022 (1933) (incompetent vet-
eran's compensation and war risk insurance; support and maintenance). 
74 But not always in accord with the maintenance and contribution 
formula. And insensitivity to the criterion of need may also be ob-
served in those cases that perhaps award the widow too much. For 
example, life insurance payable to the widow is usually not charged 
against her statutory share. In re Schulman's Will, 115 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 
(1952); In re Perlmutter's Will, 199 Misc. 330, 98 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Surr. Ct. 
1950); cf. In re Weil's Estate, 73 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Surr. Ct. 1947). But cf. 
Johnson v. Remy, 220 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1955); Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 
Ill. 589, 126 N.E. 539 (1920). 
75 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa, 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921); Cham-
berlin v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 172 Misc. 472, 15 N.Y.S.2d 168 
(Sup. Ct. 1939); Matter of Kelley, 160 Misc. 421, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1079 
(Surr. Ct. 1936); aff'd, 251 App. Div. 847 (2nd Dep't 1937). In general, 
see a valuable comment, "The Assignment of Life Insurance as Col-
lateral Security for Bank Loans," 58 YALE L.J. 743 (1949); Bloys, "Col-
lateral Assignments of Life Insurance Policies," I C. L. U.J. 61 (1946). 
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should militate against the widow's chances, as the husband's 
"estate" would have been augmented by the loan. 
Life insurance as a method of disinheritance is not entirely 
practicable. It involves loss of immediate income; 76 and, as 
time goes by, the medical restrictions tighten, and the rates 
increase. Nevertheless, a husband may use this device tore-
move property from his estate, while retaining the right to 
liquidate or borrow on the policy and to change beneficiaries. 
The statutory share is no better off in this respect than is the 
civil law legitime. "The weedy growth of the law of insur-
ance," says Daggett, "really emasculates some of the ancient 
provisions for forced heirship .... The jurisprudence of 
France and Louisiana has maintained the right of the indi-
vidual to defeat the laws of forced heirship upon the theory 
that the insured never possessed the death benefit himself, 
and consequently, that it was not part of his succession, except 
when made payable to his estate." 77 
The arguments for protecting life insurance from the 
widow's claim are not entirely convincing. To urge the 
"functional nature" or "social utility" of the device seems in-
appropriate; the primary function of life insurance is to 
76 As to annuities, see p. 242, infra. 
77 Daggett, "General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law," 
I I TULANE L. REv. 399, 405 (1937). Several views are followed when the 
husband pays for the premiums out of community property and desig-
nates someone other than the widow as beneficiary. In California, and 
probably in Washington, the widow can recover one half the proceeds. 
In Louisiana the widow apparently has no remedy. In Texas and other 
community property states she can recover the proceeds if the evidence 
discloses that the beneficiary had no moral claim on the decedent, and 
that the amount of community funds expended for premiums was un-
reasonably out of proportion to the remaining community funds. Cf. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 107 F. Supp. I (D.C. N.D. Texas 
1952), in which the widow's claim was rejected, in the absence of 
"fraud." The opinion is indecisive as to whether or not "fraud" would 
require misrepresentation, but it is significant that the court noted that 
the widow was beneficiary on another policy and "received the home 
and other property." In general, see I DeFuniak, CoMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY, §123 (1943); Huie, "Community Property Laws as Applied to 
Life Insurance," 18 TExAs L. REv. 121 (1940); notes, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 
608 (1954); 18 TuLANE L. R.Ev. 487 (1944); Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 1 Il8 
(1951) 
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provide an estate to take care of the widow and family.78 Nor 
should there be any legitimate fear that if the widow be per-
mitted to invade, so should "creditors": the basic purpose of 
the statutes exempting insurance from creditors is to protect 
the family. Moreover, life insurance forms a substantial pro-
portion of the total holdings of many decedents, especially 
among decedents of modest means. 79 In many instances life 
insurance proceeds will be the only property left. 
Occasionally the suggestion is made that life insurance be 
amenable to the widow's claim to the extent that the insur-
ance is includible in the decedent's gross estate for federal 
estate tax purposes. 80 Some writers have advocated restricting 
her recovery either to the extent of the premiums paid by 
the husband,81 or the cash surrender value at death.82 I be-
lieve that my statutory formula is preferable, because it does 
a better job of reconciling the opposing interests. For one 
thing, the reliance interest of the insurance beneficiary will 
be weighed. Normally, of course, his reliance interest will be 
low, since he does not receive the insurance proceeds until 
the decedent's death. 83 For another thing, the "need" cri-
terion should help the decedent to plan his estate. He can 
78 Inconvenience to the insurance companies could be alleviated by 
legislation similar to that which permits banks to pay with impunity 
to the survivor in a joint bank account-or even legislation permitting 
payment of the insurance proceeds into court if the company should be 
served with a notice of pending maintenance application. Cf. Gross-
man, "Problems Of The Insurer When Attempted Change Of Bene-
ficiary Is Incomplete, Irregular Or Of Doubtful Validity." 13 B. U. L. 
REv. 391 (1933). 
79 It has been estimated that insurance proceeds constitute nearly 
four-fifths of the property left by decedents. Stephenson, LIVING TRUSTS, 
64 (2d ed. 1937), cited in Smith, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS 9 
(1950). 
8o Under this plan the widow would be defeated if the husband paid 
the premiums but retained none of the "incidents of ownership." Int. 
Rev. Code of 1954, §2042. 
81 E.g., Note 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 306, 315, note 63 (1952). 
82 Note, 16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 229, 244 (1950). 
sa In some instances it might be more equitable to exact contribution 
from another inter vivos transferee. The insurance beneficiary's con-
tribution would in any event be measured by the widow's need, not by 
some predetermined fraction of the insurance proceeds. 
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preclude invasion of his insurance by the widow if he leaves 
her adequate support. Under the plans suggested above, how-
ever, the widow could invade regardless of need, and regard-
less, indeed, of other inter vivos benefits, including insurance, 
already given her by the decedent. 
4. ANNUITIES 
Annuities involve payment of a lump sum to the insurance 
company in return for annual payment by the company of a 
definite sum to the annuitant or to a designated beneficiary, 
payable during the life of the annuitant.84 The contract may 
or may not provide for minimum aggregate payments, to be 
made to a designated beneficiary in the event of the prior 
death of the annuitant. When the consideration paid by the 
annuitant was based on a recognized annuity table the con-
tract will be sustained even though the annuitant did not live 
to receive the first payment. 
It is apparent that the average annuitant is thinking of him-
self, not of his family. Nevertheless, annuities have played a 
very minor part 85 in evasion litigation - the leading roles 
being taken by popular substitutes for the will. The widow 
should have a justifiable complaint if her husband, as an-
nuitant, contracted for death benefits in an amount that was 
unreasonably large.86 Absent any death benefits, however, 
84 But there are variations: the annuitant may pay in premiums in-
stead of a lump sum; the company may make payments monthly (not 
yearly) and over a stated period of years (not for life); the annuity may 
be for one person or the contract may provide annuities for a group. 
Group annuities ordinarily make no provision for death benefits. 
Vance, INSURANCE §200 (3rd ed. 1951). 
8 5 Annuities have become popular only in the last quarter-century, 
beginning with the depression of the thirties. 
86 But cf. Penn. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fields, 81 F. Supp. 54, 57 note 2, 
(S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1949). The comedian, 
W. C. Fields, purchased a single premium insurance policy "in the 
nature of an annuity," with death benefits payable to his brother and 
sister. His widow, having established that the premium had been paid 
with community property while he was domiciled in California, was 
awarded one half of the proceeds on Field's death. Much of the judg-
ment is occupied with the question of domicile. The trial judge stated, 
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the widow's rights, qua widow, are questionable. She should 
have attacked the annuity in the husband's lifetime, in con-
junction with divorce or maintenance proceedings. 
But what if the wife had no knowledge of the annuity, or 
her husband died before suit could be brought? The latter 
contingency occurred in Maruska v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society. 87 Here the purchase price was obtained partly from 
the decedent's personalty and partly by sale of the homestead. 
The wife's consent to sale of the homestead was procured by 
fraud. She brought suit in her own name, and also as ad-
ministratrix, to recover damages against the insurance com-
pany and another for conspiring to defraud her of her marital 
interest in her husband's property. In granting the widow's 
motion to have the case remanded to a state court the Federal 
court was careful to point out that it was not concerned with 
the "real merits" of the suit. It did intimate, however, that 
although the widow might have the transfer of the home-
stead set aside, she had no real case as to the transfer of the 
personalty, as "the husband has absolute power to dispose of 
his personal property, providing that no fraud be committed 
against his wife's marital rights. See Smith v. Wold, 125 
Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067." 88 The word "fraud" in this 
dictum is equivocal; but the references to Smith v. Wold 89 
may have some significance. That case used the word "fraud" 
to connote an unreasonably large inter vivos transfer of per-
sonalty, stating that "a court cannot say with minute exactness 
just how much the husband may give away without subject-
ing himself to a just charge of fraud." 90 We may speculate 
that a widow would have some chance of prevailing against an 
parenthetically: "I am convinced that, absent actual fraud, a gift of the 
character here involved, could be made, under the common law by a 
husband legally domiciled in a common law state." 
87 21 F. Supp. 841 (D. Minn. 1938). 
88 I d. at 842. The court indicated that the widow was not a "creditor" 
because she had not instituted a suit for divorce or separate maintenance 
before her husband's death. 
89 This case is also reported sub. nom. Smith v. Corey. 
90 125 Minn. 190, 192, 145 N.W. 1067, 1068 (1914). 
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unreasonably large annuity purchased close to the husband's 
death, particularly if the insurance company was aware of the 
circumstances at the time the contract was made. 
5. EMPLOYEE DEATH BENEFITS 
There is very little authority on the power of a surviving 
spouse to set aside or invade beneficiary rights under retire-
ment plans, pension schemes, profit-sharing and stock-pur-
chase agreements, and other types of employee benefits. These 
devices originated, for all practical purposes, with the entry of 
the insurance companies into the employee benefit field in 
the last few decades; and they have achieved enormous popu-
larity in the last few years.91 
In Moyer v. Dunseith 92 a surviving husband contended 
that his wife's designation of her mother as beneficiary under 
the Teachers' Retirement Fund was an illusory transfer. The 
wife had taught for a good portion of her life. Sixteen days 
before death she changed the beneficiary rights from her 
mother to her sister. The court stated that retirement bene-
fits resemble neither the Totten trust nor life insurance, 
and rejected the widower's claim. 
Since the Moyer case was decided the New York legislature 
has enacted Section 24a of the Personal Property Law.93 This 
91 ". : • upwards of 10 million people are now covered by privately 
supported pension plans which hold funds totaling about $17 billion." 
Dunckel, "Pension Trusts for Millions," 93 EsTATES &: TRusTs 284 
(1954). 
92 180 Misc. 1004, 46 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 1943), a!f'd without opin-
ion, 266 App. Div. 1008, 45 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1943). 
In Gristy v. Hudgens, 23 Ariz. 339, 203 Pac. 569 (1922), the husband, 
a member of an employees' benefit association, changed beneficiary 
rights about a year before his death from his wife to a twelve-year old 
girl, not a member of his family. The transfer was sustained even 
though the benefits had been purchased out of community property, 
because no "fraud" had been shown. See Chap. 20, note 21; cf. Calla-
han v. Mooney, 190 Misc. 736, 72 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (fraud, 
undue influence); Fischer v. Fischer, 24 N.J. Super. 180, 93 A.2d 788 
(1952) (wife held not entitled to invade husband's policemen's pension 
fund for alimony). 
93 New York Laws, Chap. 820 §I (1952). 
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provision purports "to remove any uncertainty which may 
exist as to the validity of a designation of a beneficiary . . . 
under a pension, retirement or employee profit-sharing plan 
or under an annuity or a contract supplemental to an annuity 
or life, accident or health insurance policy." 94 As was the 
case with its companion Section 24, dealing with United 
States savings bonds, Section 24a makes no mention of the 
rights of the surviving spouse. Undoubtedly Section 24a will 
also be construed to preclude any attack by the surviving 
spouse.95 The need for corrective legislation is apparent. 
94 New York Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. (1952) No. 65 C; 
1952 Report, Recommendations and Studies, p. 166. 
95 See In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 
1943), refusing to follow Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 
(Sup. Ct. 1942), discussed, supra, p. 224. 
CHAPTER 16 
Miscellaneous 
I. OBLIGATIONS OF THE DoNOR PAYABLE AT ms DEATH 
Transfers of this sort, unless supported by consideration, 
are usually unenforceable per se, entirely aside from the 
question of "evasion" of the widow's rights.1 Suppose that a 
husband, wishing to disinherit his wife, executes a sealed note 
for $1,000. The note is payable at his death, and he delivers 
it to the named payee. It would appear that no enforceable 
inter vivos right or "interest" passes to the donee unless (a) 
there is consideration, or (b) the state concerned is one of the 
relatively few jurisdictions that considers a seal to be con-
clusive evidence of consideration,2 or that has adopted the 
Model Written Obligations Act, which sanctifies a mere in-
tention to be bound. 3 Lacking consideration, no contract 
right or enforceable chose in action is created. The law of 
1 Reinhart v. Echave, 43 Nev. 323, 185 Pac. 1070, 187 Pac. 1006 
(1920); Tissue's Estate, 64 Pa. Super. 141 (1916) (notes given a "short 
time" before death); cf. Jones v. Westcott, 150 Atl. 50 (N.J. 1930); Snay-
berger's Estate, 62 Pa. Super. 390 (1916) (payable six months after 
death); BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 548 (7th ed. 
1948); Atkinson, WILLS, 198 (2d ed. 1953); Note, 25 CoRNELL L. Q. 119 
(1939). 
2 E.g., Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N.E. 578, (1891) (covenant 
to pay a certain sum six months after death); cf. Patterson v. Chapman, 
179 Cal. 203, 176 P. 37, 2 A.L.R. 1467 (1918) (instrument acknowledg-
ing a debt); Uniform Commercial Code, §3-ll3 (1952). §28 of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law might prevent enforcement of the sealed note 
even in jurisdictions in which the seal is conclusive on the matter of 
consideration. See BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 
298 (7th ed. 1948). 
3 "A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the 
person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for 
lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express 
statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally 
bound." Model Written Obligations Act, §I. This act was proposed in 
1925 but to date has been adopted only by Pennsylvania, in 1927. 9A 
Uniform Laws Annotated, 419 (1951); cf. Uniform Commercial Code, 
§§1-107, 2-209 (1952). 
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gifts is no help; the chose being a nullity, of what effect is 
physical delivery? Nor could the note be considered an in-
formal deed of gift of a future interest in the money, unless a 
definite amount was set aside or earmarked.4 It is possible, 
of course, to create a future interest in money; 5 but the 
common practice is to use a trust, and here also segregation of 
the funds would be required.6 
A note or obligation that is valid between the parties con-
cerned may nevertheless be invalid as to the widow. 7 Litiga-
tion on the latter point would be decided in accordance with 
the governing "evasion" rationale. 8 As far as jurisdictions 
using a "control" or "intent" test are concerned, the obliga-
tion payable at death may be a risky device for the husband 
4 Smith v. Peacock, 114 Ga. 691, 40 S.E. 757 (1901); 38 C.J.S. Gifts 
(1943); cf. Woodward v. Woodward, 222 Iowa 145, 268 N.W. 540 (sun-
dry "papers"); Ferry v. Bryant, 19 Tenn. App. 612, 93 S.W.2d 344 
(1935) (attempted trust). A gift of the decedent's own check would also 
be unenforceable against his estate. 
5 In future interests parlance, if not in workaday experience, money 
is not a "consumable." Cf. Simes and Smith, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§369, note 89 (2d ed. 1956). 
6 Cf. Bregy, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcTS OF 1947, 5857 (1949). 
7 The principles that govern the substantive law validity of a note 
payable at death, as well as its vulnerability to the widow, would also 
appear to be applicable to a note payable at a certain time, executed 
by the decedent spouse in anticipation of death. Cf. Note, 25 CoRNELL 
L. Q. 119 (1939). 
8 (a) Favoring spouse: Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 64 
S.W. 981 (1901) (actual misrepresentation with reference to related an-
tenuptial transfers); Feeser Estate (No. 2), 88 D.&C. 241 (1954); cf. 
Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215,28 At!. lll3 (1894) (widow cannot recover 
against donees since they were not "privies to the fraud," but widow 
can be compensated out of the estate); Norris v. Barbour, infra, note 9. 
Also see Dillard v. Dillard, 269 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1954) (nonevasive). 
(b) Favoring donee: In re Sides' Estate, II9 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 
(1930) (money transferred, donees give back notes to be cancelled at 
death); Mornes Estate, 79 D.&C. 356 (Pa. 1951); In re Rynier's Estate, 48 
Lane. Rev. 475, aff'd, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943); cf. In re Fritz's 
Estate, 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 A.2d 601 (1939), 25 CoRNELL L. Q. ll9 
(1939) (antenuptial transfer; payable in seven years). 
Notes or other obligations entered into with a view to defeating in-
choate dower are in a special category. Perhaps transfers of this sort 
would not be viewed as seriously in a state in which inchoate dower 
can be defeated by other means. The Pennsylvania cases on notes pay-
able at death are discussed, supra, pp. 141-143. 
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to use. For example, consider Norris v. Barbour.9 Here the 
husband delivered to a trustee a bond in the sum of twenty 
thousand dollars, payable one year after his (the husband's) 
death. The proceeds were to be applied according to the pro-
visions of the trust, which had been executed the same day 
as the bond. The husband died eleven years later; and the 
payment of the bond would exhaust available personalty. 
The court was willing to concede the validity of the obliga-
tion as between the parties, the seal affording a conclusive 
presumption of consideration. "But," said the court, "the 
present suit is not one between the parties to the contract." 
Equity, it declared, may enquire into the substance of a trans-
action in order to prevent a fraud: 
"We hold that the right given by our statutes to a 
widow to share in the surplus of her deceased hus-
band's personal estate cannot be defeated by so 
simple a device as this, where he retains up until the 
time of his death full ownership and enjoyment of 
his personal property, and merely executes and 
transfers to a trustee his bare promise under seal, 
unsupported by an actual consideration, to pay to 
the trustee after his (the husband's) death ... a 
sum of money equivalent to the corpus of his per-
sonal estate, or the major portion thereof. In sub-
stance, such a device is but a legacy in disguise .... 
It operates as a fraud upon and is void as to the 
rights of the widow, and in equity will be set aside at 
her instance." 10 
It is unlikely that the Virginia court was purporting to rule 
that all voluntary "transfers" may be defeated by the widow; 
probably the court was more concerned with retention of 
excessive "control" than with lack of consideration.U Earlier 
o 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949). 
1o I d. at 740, 741, 51 S.E.2d at 341. 
11 The court stated that the husband retained full ownership of his 
personalty, id. at 740, 51 S.E.2d at 341. This is inaccurate, since the 
donee of the bond received an inter vivos gift of a chose in action, en-
forceable at death; and under the "reality" rationale this would suffice 
to defeat the widow. Notice that the decision in the Norris case is con-
sistent with the equities. 
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in the opinion there was specific mention of a line of Virginia 
decisions that condone an irrevocable trust, with retention 
of income for life, as an "evasive" device.12 It is hornbook 
law that no consideration is needed to establish a valid trust-
hence emphasis on irrevocability points to a "control" ra-
tionale. Viewed in this light, a sealed note, although valid 
as between the payor and payee, is objectionable because of 
retention of practical economic control. In a trust device the 
money passes to the trustee; but merely to sign a note leaves 
the principal in the undisturbed possession of the donor, sub-
ject to the normal attrition of everyday living, even of in-
solvency. Lacking the earmarking process that is involved in 
a declaration of trust or that accompanies a deed of gift, it is 
probably the extreme example of a valid "evasive" device. 
True, it has "reality"; but what could be thinner? 13 
Under the maintenance and contribution formula the 
widow would prevail against otherwise valid obligations pay-
able at death only when she can prove need. Likewise, under 
either that formula or the usual "control" test, the widow has 
no ground for complaint if the obligation is supported by fair 
consideration .a 
2. PURCHASE BY DECEDENT, TITLE IN NAME OF ANOTHER 
In these transactions, when the decedent supplied all the 
consideration, the "transfer" is in substance a gift by the de-
cedent to the person in whose name the title was placed. The 
amount represented by the purchase price, instead of being 
given directly to the donee, has been converted into a differ-
ent form of wealth, and given to the donee in its new form. 15 
12£.g., Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S.E. 420 (1909). 
13 See discussion of contracts to make a will, Appendix D, infra. 
14 See Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Act, §1(d), 
infra, Chap. 22. 
15 (a) Favoring spouse: Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 
(1887); Resch v. Rowland, 257 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1953); cf. Knights v. 
Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N.E. 377 (1921) (antenuptial); Stroup v. Stroup, 
140 Ind. 179, 39 N.E. 864 (1894); Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109, 
131 At!. 40 (1925) (deed by wife to X, with reconveyance to wife for life, 
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When the property purchased is personalty,16 the transfer 
will no doubt be sustained, as would any other gift, under 
the "reality" rationale. In all probability it will also be sus-
tained under both the "control" and the "intent" 17 ration-
ales, unless the equities run strongly with the surviving 
spouse. 
In most cases involving this device a life estate has been re-
tained by the decedent. This factor is immaterial, since a 
life interest may be reserved with impunity even when the 
property involved is transferred direct to the donee. But the 
transfer is of uncertain validity, particularly under the con-
trol or the intent rationales, when the decedent also retained 
the power to dispose of the property. Even so, the equities 
may dictate its validity. In Whitehill v. Thiess 18 the husband 
deserted his family, leaving the wife with five young children 
to support. The children eventually went to work, turning 
their earnings over to the mother. Seven years before her 
death the mother purchased property "for and during the 
term of her natural life only with full power in the said Mary 
C. Thiess to lease, mortgage, deed or in any otherwise en-
cumber the property absolutely and after her death and with-
wife having power to mortgage, lease, sell, or devise, and in default 
thereof remainder to children); Hays v. Henry, I Md. Ch. 337 (1848) 
(title in name of mistress, reconveyance to husband in trust). 
(b) Favoring donee: Ford v. Ford, 4 Ala. 142 (1842); Wooton v. 
Keaton, 168 Ark. 981, 272 S.W. 869 (1925); Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 
890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918); Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 Atl. 347 
(1932); Trabbic v. Trabbic, 142 Mich. 387, 105 N.W. 876 (1905) (mort-
gage); Crecelius v. Horst, 89 Mo. 356, 14 S.W. 510 (1886); cf. Hoeffner 
v. Hoeffner, 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945); Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 132 
Ill. 342, 24 N.E. 71 (1890); Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa 155, 19 N.W. 876 
(1884); Charest v. St. Onge, 332 Mass. 628, 127 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Sea-
man v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, 78 N.E. 301 (1906) (bona fide purchaser); 
Burtt v. Riley, 260 App. Div. 899, 22 N.Y.S.2d 972 (3rd Dep't 1940), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 976, 24 N.Y.S.2d 
159 (3rd Dep't 1940); York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922); 
Sellers v. Gibney, 51 LANe. L. REv. 383 (Com. Pl. Pa. 1949); Richards v. 
Richards, 30 Tenn. 294 (1850). 
1s Or realty, where inchoate dower does not exist. Cf. Wooton v. 
Keaton, 168 Ark. 981, 272 S.W. 869 (1925). 
17 E.g., Resch v. Rowland, 257 S.W.2d 621 (1953). 
18 161 Md. 657, 158 Atl. 347, 79 A.L.R. 373 (1932). 
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out the exercise of the aforesaid power then ... [to the 
children]." After the wife's death it was held that the wid-
ower had no right in the land. The court conceded that "per-
haps in strict law the money which was turned over by the 
children to the mother became her money." Nevertheless, 
it said, "the arrangement of title would seem to have been a 
reasonable and just one, in view of the source of the purchase 
money, and the common purpose for which the children's 
earnings were turned over to the mother .... The rightful-
ness of the arrangement from the point of view of fairness to 
the children ... seems to us to save it from being a wrong 
upon the husband .... " 19 
We assign a special category to cases where the asset pur-
chased is realty, in jurisdictions still retaining inchoate 
dower. Here the widow has a useful talking point: a con-
tingent property right would have been acquired during the 
marriage, but for the transfer in question. 20 Even here the 
decisions do not uniformly favor the widow. In Ford v. 
FordJ21 for instance, a purchase of realty in the name of a 
bigamous second wife and the children of the affair was sus-
tained as against the legally named spouse. The equities in 
this case were against the claimant spouse. 
The widow has a better case if she can prove that the 
purchase price was obtained from the sale of other realty 
owned by the husband, and that she joined in the sale in order 
19 /d. at 661, 158 Atl. at 348. Whenever an abandoned wife purchases 
property, fairness to the children might dictate the same holding as in 
the Whitehill case even when the children, being infants, made no 
contribution to the purchase price. 
20 See e.g., Rowe v. Ratiff, 268 Ky. 217, 104 S.W.2d 437 (1937); cf. 
Redmond's Adm'x v. Redmond, 112 Ky. 760, 66 S.W. 745 (1902); Bregy, 
INTESTATE, WILLS AND EsTATES AcTs oF 1947, 5860·1 (1949). The suit 
may be brought in the lifetime of the husband. Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa 
155, 19 N.W. 876 (1884). 
21 4 Ala. 142 (1842); cf. Patterson v. Patterson's Ex'r, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
755, 24 S.W. 880 (1894); Spears v. James, 319 Mich. 341, 29 N.W.2d 829 
(1947). In Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 132 Ill. 342, 24 N.E. 71 (1890) the court 
stated that "dower in lands which the wife does not yet own is an 
interest to which the husband has neither a legal, equitable or moral 
right, and the wife is entirely at liberty to so manage her purchases made 
with her own means, if she can, as to prevent his acquiring such right." 
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to bar her dower. 22 And, of course, her chances are excellent 
if the release of dower was obtained by actual misrepresenta-
tions on the part of her husband.23 
3. PowERS OF APPOINTMENT 
The genius of the power of appointment is that it imparts 
flexibility to voluntary property transmission. A property 
owner is said to create a power of appointment when he gives 
another person the power to determine the recipients of the 
property, or the shares that they are to take.24 A typical ex-
ample is a family settlement in which the husband bequeaths 
property to his widow for life and also gives her the power, in 
her will, to determine the remaindermen. The husband here 
is said to be the donor of the power, and the widow is the 
donee. The husband may also create a power in himself- as 
where he transfers property in trust, reserving a life estate and 
the power to appoint the remainder. Powers are classified as 
general or special. A power is general, for our purposes, when 
the donee has the power to appoint to himself or to his estate. 
The power is called special when the donee's appointment is 
limited to a group not unreasonably large, which does not 
include himself or his estate. The manner in which the gen-
eral power may be exercised determines the extent of the 
donee's interest in the property. If the power is to be exer-
cised by will, the donee of course may not appoint during his 
lifetime; but if it may be exercised inter vivos or by will the 
22 E.g., Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 39 N.E. 864 (1894); Resch v. 
Rowland, 257 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1953); but see Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa 155, 
19 N.W. 876 (1884); Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918). 
23 Kober v. Kober, 324 Mo. 379, 23 S.W.2d 149 (1929) (misrepresen-
tations by husband in procuring release of wife's dower, followed by 
purchase of realty in name of children with life estate in husband); also 
see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§5.32-37 (1952). 
24 Cf. 3 RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY, §318 (1940); Simes and Smith, LAw 
OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §871, (2d ed. 1956). This description excludes a 
power of sale, power of attorney, power of revocation, power to cause 
a gift of income to be augmented out of principal, the honorary trust, 
and the discretionary trust. 
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donee may appoint to himself at any time: his interest ap-
proaches virtual ownership. 25 
The flexibility afforded by the power of appointment is de-
sirable. Wealth does the most good when the recipients are 
deserving; the power of appointment serves both the com-
munity and the donor by giving the donor a longer time in 
which to gauge the merit and the need of potential donees. 
Moreover, under the present federal estate tax regulations, 
it is more profitable to give the widow a power of appoint-
ment than to use it against her. When employed in the 
"marital deduction trust" 26 the power of appointment results 
in substantial tax savings, and in this respect it operates as a 
mild deterrent to disinheritance of the widow. But if the 
husband is more concerned with defeating the widow's share 
than with tax savings the power of appointment will suit his 
purpose quite well indeed. 
When the donee of a general testamentary power created 
by another does not appoint to himself or his estate, his 
surviving spouse is not permitted to take her forced share in 
the appointive property. 27 This result flows from automatic 
application of the "relation back" doctrine: the exercise of 
the power is attributable to the instrument that created the 
power - and the appointee takes title from the donor, not 
from the donee.28 It is immaterial whether or not the power 
was exercised. There appear to be no "evasion" cases involv-
ing general powers exercisable inter vivos, where, as we have 
seen, the donee of the power is substantially the owner of the 
25 5 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §23.4 (1952); Scott, "The Effects of 
a Power to Revoke a Trust," 57 HARv. L. REv. 362, 366 (1944). For 
further discussion of the various classifications of powers of appoint-
ment, see Simes and Smith, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§874-79 (2d ed. 
1956). 
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056. 
21 Kate's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 Atl. 97 (1935); cf. Fiske v. Fiske, 173 
Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 919 (1899); Krause v. Jeannette Investment Co., 333 
Mo. 509, 62 S.W.2d 890 (1933); Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26, 293 
N.Y. Supp. 626 (2d Dep't 1937), leave to appeal denied, 274 N.Y. 642 
(1937); Huddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 Atl. 909 (1912). 
28 Simes, "The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. 
L. REV. 480 (1928). 
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appointive property. Probably not many powers are exer-
cisable inter vivos; the donee of such a power is subject to 
pressure from potential appointees. 29 But the Restatement of 
Property takes the stand that even here the surviving spouse 
should lose.30 
Nor is the widow's position materially improved where 
the husband created a power of appointment in himself. In 
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Green/1 for example, a 
second wife failed to reach the appointive property, although 
she had apparently been completely disinherited after nine 
years of marriage. No mention is made of her financial posi-
tion. The husband had created an irrevocable trust three 
years before the second marriage, the income going to his first 
wife for her life, with the husband retaining a general testa-
mentary power of appointment over the remainder. In re-
jecting the widow's claim 32 the court utilized the "relation 
back" doctrine, referring to the decedent as a "mere conduit." 
Moreover, it said that creation of the power by the husband 
in himself "is no different than if a third person had created 
the power and made the testator the donee of it." 33 
29 On the other hand, a power that is exercised inter vivos may 
qualify for the lower gift tax rate. 
3D RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, §332 (2) (1940). 
31 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1936). 
32 The husband had created a second inter vivos trust; semble the 
widow lost as to this trust also. 
33 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1936); cf. Cameron v. Cameron, 
10 Smedes & M. 394 (Miss. 1848); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 
594 (1850); In re Steck's Estate, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957); also 
see In re Burchell's Trust, 278 App. Div. 450, 105 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't 
1951). But cf. Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N.E. 251 (1899). 
In 1931 Marilyn Miller, who had a few years previously been making 
approximately $260,000 per year, transferred in trust some $82,000. Her 
obvious purpose was to guard against her own extravagance. The trus-
tee was to pay her $500 weekly until the principal was reduced to $5000, 
upon which event the trust was to be terminated and the principal 
distributed to the settlor. If the settlor died before that event the trus-
tee was to dispose of any remaining principal as she should by will 
appoint, or, in default of appointment, to the persons who would take 
under New York intestacy distribution. Her will, made four years be-
fore the trust, disposed of her property to named relatives, and, natu-
rally, it mentioned neither the trust nor her husband, whom she had 
married almost a year before executing the trust. The husband re-
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But some support for the widow's claim may be found in 
Pennsylvania. Recent legislation in that state permits the 
widow to reach the appointive property when the power was 
created by the decedent spouse himsel£. 34 Indeed, there was 
some authority in the widow's favor even before the legisla-
tion was enacted. 35 
nounced the will and sought to reach the corpus of the trust. The trial 
court found no fraudulent intent to deprive the husband of his statu-
tory share. Therefore, said the court, in those days before Newman v. 
Dore, the appointed property was not part of the wife's estate. The 
husband was in substance disinherited, since there were insufficient 
assets in the estate to pay creditors. He had been supported by her 
during coverture, and she had given him, inter vivos, "some $65,000." 
(278 N.Y. 134, 142, 15 N.E.2d 553, 554 (1938).) The Court of Appeals 
reversed, but on the ground that the settlor had created a reversion in 
herself (which would pass as part of her estate, permitting the widower 
to share) and not a gift in remainder to her distributees. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 297 N.Y. Supp. 88 (Sup. Ct. 
1937), aff'd without opinion, 253 App. Div. 707, I N.Y.S.2d 640 (lst 
Dep't 1937), motion for leave to appeal granted, 253 App. Div. 880, 
2 N.Y.S.2d 798 (lst Dep't 1938), rev'd, 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553 
(1938). 
The surviving spouse of the donee of a power of appointment does 
not get dower or curtesy in the appointive property unless, of course, 
the donee of a general power appoints the property to his own estate. 
Hakalau v. De La Nux, 35 Hawaii 59 (1942) (curtesy); Hatfield v. 
Sohier, ll4 Mass. 48 (1873) (curtesy); Matter of Davies, 124 Misc. 541, 
209 N.Y. Supp. 296 (Surr. Ct. 1925), aff'd without opinion, 215 App. 
Div. 750, 212 N.Y. Supp. 796, (4th Dep't 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 196, 
151 N.E. 205 (1926) (widow did not appeal from lower court's denial 
of her dower); Barr v. Howell, 147 N.Y. Supp. 483 (1914); cf. Chinnubee 
v. Nicks, 3 Porter 362 (Ala. 1836); Ray v. Pung, 5 Madd. 310, 56 Eng. 
Rep. 914 (1821), id., 5 B. & Ald. 561, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1822). But cf. 
Link v. Edmonson, 19 Mo. 487 (1854); Peay v. Peay, 2 Rich. Eq. 409 
(S.C. 1844). 
3 4 Penn. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.11 (1950) (Estates Act of 1947), dis-
cussed, Chap. 9:4. It has been suggested that under this statute "the 
only case where the reservation of a power to appoint by deed could 
possibly be attacked by the surviving spouse is where such a power is 
unlimited and remains unexercised at the settlor's death." Bregy, IN-
TESTATE, WILLS AND EsTATES AcTs oF 1947, 5863 (1949). But the sur-
viving spouse may not reach the appointive property when the power 
was given by someone other than the testator. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20 
§180.8 (1950). 
35 Cf. Diedel's Trust, 32 D.&C. 685 (1938) (no gift over in default of 
appointment); Potter v. Fidelity Insurance Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 
(No. 2), 199 Pa. 366, 370, 49 Atl. 86, 87 (1901) (opinion below adopted 
on appeal); also see Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57, 78, 
87 (1928). 
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Our study of the community goals implicit in the claim of 
the surviving spouse indicates that the maintenance and 
contribution formula should cover powers of appointment. 
A device that permits delayed beneficence promotes family 
welfare- and consequently the welfare of the state - but not 
when it leaves the deserving widow destitute.36 The recent 
upsurge in estate planning has undoubtedly stimulated the 
use of powers of appointment. As more and more of those 
powers are exercised, the plight of the surviving spouse may 
well stand in sharper focus. The tax-collector 37 and the 
creditor 38 have protection appropriate to their needs; why 
not the widow? 39 To say that she must lose because the ap-
pointed property does not pass through the decedent's estate 
is to beg the question. Her claim for support should be judged 
on its merits, and on its individual merits. 
There is no particular difficulty in applying our statutory 
formula to powers created by the decedent himself. We 
simply expand the definition of "transfer" to include the ex-
as Compare the spouse's right to invade a spendthrift trust for sup-
port. Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 390-l, (2nd ed. 1947); see the 
Socratic machine-gunning by McDougal in "Future Interests Restated: 
Tradition versus Clarification and Reform," 55 HARV. L. REv. 1077, 
1104-15 (1942). 
37 The exercise or non-exercise of a general power created after 
October 21, 1942, is taxed in the donee's estate. For tax purposes a 
general power is defined, with certain exceptions, as "a power which is 
exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors or the 
creditors of his estate." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2041. For a discus-
sion of the tax aspects see the articles set out in the bibliography in 5 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §23.8 (1952). 
3 8 Creditors of the donee may reach the appointive property when a 
statute so permits, when the donee exercises a general power, when the 
transferor retains a life estate and a general power of appointment, 
when the transfer amounts to a fraud on creditors; and a trustee in 
bankruptcy may exercise powers that the donee could have exercised for 
his own benefit. Simes and Smith, LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§944-46, 
1082 (2d ed. 1956), 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §23.14-19 (1952), 3 
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, §§328-31 (1940, Supp. 1948); cf. McDougal, 
"Future Interests Restated: Tradition versus Clarification and Reform," 
55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, ll06-l5 (1942). 
39 Cf. Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 24 A. B. A. J. 807 (1938). 
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ercise, non-exercise (where persons take in default of appoint-
ment), release, or lapse of a power of appointment.40 
Powers created by a person other than the decedent neces-
sitate separate treatment. A person who gives the husband a 
power of appointment is under no obligation to provide for 
the husband's widow. Indeed, if such an obligation were to 
be imposed the donor could evade it by giving the husband 
merely a life estate with fixed remainders in persons other 
than the widow, or simply by giving the power to a person 
other than the husband. Nor do we have a complete analogy 
in the wife's power to invade her husband's spendthrift trust. 
There the husband has enjoyment of income; here he may in 
fact have neither enjoyment of income nor power to appoint 
to his wife. In brief, the widow's maintenance privileges in 
this area depend on the donor of the power. She has a legiti-
mate claim only when the donor made it possible for the de-
cedent donee to make provision for his widow out of the ap-
pointive property. In these circumstances the maintenance 
and contribution formula should affect a general power of 
appointment. 
What if the creator of the power stipulates that it may be 
exercised by the decedent only in conjunction with another 
person? For example, that other person might be the creator 
himself, or some other person having an adverse interest in 
the appointive property. For our purposes, a person would 
have an adverse interest if he could exercise the power in 
favor of himself or his estate, whether or not after the de-
cedent's death he "may be possessed of a power of appoint-
ment (with respect to the property subject to the decedent's 
power) which he may exercise in his own favor. ... " 41 The 
applicant for maintenance should be excluded in these in-
stances because the creator of the power did not give the de-
cedent complete discretion to appoint the property to his 
40 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, §l(d), 
infra, Chap. 22. 
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §204I(b)(C)(ii). 
258 FRAUD ON THE WIDOw's SHARE 
own dependents. The dependent should prevail, however, 
if she happened to be the person with the "adverse interest." 
Under the maintenance and contribution formula, as ex-
pressed in the Suggested Model Decedent's Family Mainte-
nance Statute,42 any property received by the widow from her 
husband, whether by an inter vivos disposition, will, exercise 
of power of appointment, or otherwise, would be considered 
in determining her need. Under the existing forced share 
legislation, howewr, a diversity of results are reached when a 
widow renounces a will in which the husband exercised a 
power of appointment wholly or partially in her favor. It 
all depends on the wording of the particular statute; but in 
most cases the widow will not be permitted to retain the 
benefit conferred by the power of appointment.43 
42 Infra, Chap. 22. 
43 That the surviving spouse cannot retain the appointed benefit: 
Fiske v. Fiske, 173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899); that the benefit can be 
retained: Huddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 Atl. 909 (1912). But a later 
Pennsylvania case held that the benefit could not be retained when 
the decedent disposed of the appointed property and his own property 
as a common "blended" fund. Kates's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 Atl. 97 
(1925); and this rule has been clarified and expanded by statute to in-
clude cases in which the husband had not blended the property. Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §180.8(c) (1950). On these and similar problems see 
Phelps, "The Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of her Husband," 
37 MICH. L. REv. 236, 401, 412-20 (1939); Simes and Smith, LAW oF 
fuTURE INTERESTS, §947 (2d ed. 1956); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
§§5.41, 23.22 (1952); also see 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, §332(2) (1940). 
CHAPTER 17 
Can The Widow Be Treated As A 
Creditor? 
Property conveyed by voluntary transfer in fraud of credi-
tors is vulnerable to the creditor's claim to the same extent 
as if it were still in the hand of the debtor.1 If the transferee 
participated in the fraud the creditor's remedy is available 
even when the transfer was for consideration.2 In addition 
to instances in which she actually is a creditor, the spouse 
may also attain that status in divorce and maintenance mat-
ters.3 Why not, then, treat the surviving spouse as a creditor 
for purposes of attacking inter vivos "evasions"? 
The suggestion is not without merit. We saw earlier 4 
that vital community values are involved in financial protec-
tion to widows. And precedents are not lacking for preferring 
family needs to creditors' claims: homestead and family al-
lowances have priority; inchoate dower is preferred in most 
1 Glenn, 1 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, §§58-62b 
(1940). As to trusts, cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, §156(c) (1935); RESTATE· 
MENT, PROPERTY, §328 (1948 Supp.); Scott, "The Effect of a Power toRe-
voke a Trust," 57 HARV. L. REv. 362, 372, 374 (1944). 
2 Conveyances in fraud of creditors will not be set aside if the grantee 
is a purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. 27 C.J. Fraudulent 
Conveyances, §§474, 526-36 (1922). On the necessity for proof of partic-
ipation by the donee in transfers in fraud of creditors, see Annot. 17 
A.L.R. 728 (1922); also see, supra, Chap. 10, text at note 41. 
3 For example, the divorce statutes in some states permit her to set 
aside any conveyance made by her husband to prevent her from obtain-
ing alimony. Glenn, op. cit. supra, note I, §93C. Aside from such stat· 
utes the wife may act as a creditor in reaching conveyances of her 
husband that are in fraud of her right to accrued alimony. Most cases 
extend her the protection of the fraudulent conveyance statute; there is 
also authority to the effect that she is assisted by the general equity 
powers. ld., §377. The remedy is available even before the divorce 
suit is instituted, and she may enjoin threatened transfers. Similar pro-
tection is afforded a wife who secures a judgment on accrued install-
ments under a maintenance agreement. 
4 Supra, Chap. 2. 
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instances, the statutory share 5 in some instances. But the 
shoe is on the other foot when we consider protection against 
evasion. The three last-named devices are of uncertain value 
in the present state of the evasion case-law. As some courts 
have pointed out, the widow receives less actual protection 
than does the prospective bride (antenuptial transfer doc-
trine), the wife during coverture (common-law duty of sup-
port), and the divorced wife (alimony). Consider, for ex-
ample, the plight of the married woman when her husband 
has deserted her prior to making the objectionable inter vivos 
transfer. Assuming that a divorce is either not feasible or not 
desired, it is of course possible that she can enforce the com-
mon-law duty of support. But there is no guarantee as to sup-
port after the husband's death; and the probabilities are that 
the average widow needs more support than does the average 
wife.6 
On the other hand, the community values involved in the 
widow's claim differ from those involved in payment of 
creditors' claims. Different social goals should be enforced 
by different machinery. It seems clear that no fraudulent con-
veyance should be permitted to thwart collection of a legiti-
mate creditor's claim; but not all inter vivos "evasions" 
should be amenable to the widow's claim. Her power to in-
vade should depend on her need. Unnecessary encroachment 
on security of titles would also ensue if the widow, suing as a 
creditor, would be permitted to upset "collusive" transfers 
for consideration. 
The judicial pronouncements on the point do not favor 
the widow. It is true that the custom of London cases 1 re-
gard the widow as at least a quasi-creditor. It will be re-
membered however that the cases under the custom were 
much more liberal to the wife than are the more modern cases. 
This liberality may have been in compensation for the limited 
5 E.g., Fla. Stat. §731.34 (1957). 
6 See discussion, supra, Chap. 2:3. 
1 See supra, Chap. 5:3. 
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property rights of married women during the long period of 
the custom.8 Statements that the widow is a creditor may 
also be found in the cases involving antenuptial transfers. 
These cases involve the element of actual deception. Possibly 
the courts in the antenuptial transfer cases are more sympa-
thetic to the plaintiff's claim than are the courts in the post-
nuptial evasion cases. It is arguable, of course, that the wife 
should receive the same legal protection regardless of 
whether the transfer induced or followed the wedding. 
Many cases contain statements that the widow is a credi-
tor/ or a quasi-creditor/0 or even that she should be put in a 
more favored position than creditors.U These cases, however, 
by and large are either antenuptial transfer cases,12 alimony 
or maintenance cases, 13 or cases under the custom of Lon-
8 An early fraudulent conveyance decision in England had this to 
say: " ... I must decree for the plaintiff, the creditors against the wife 
and children; for though I have always a great compassion for wife and 
children; yet, on the other side, it is possible, if creditors should not 
have their debts, their wives and children would be reduced to want." 
Taylor v. Jones, 2 Atk. 600, 603, 26 Eng. Rep. 758, 760 (Ch. 1743). 
9 Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929) (misconstruing 
earlier Illinois cases); cf. Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215, 28 Atl. 1113 
(1894); also see the arguments of counsel in Feighley v. Feighley, 7 Md. 
537, 547-60 (1855). 
10 McCammon v. Summons, 2 Disn. 596, 598 (Ohio 1859); Crain v. 
Crain, 17 Tex. 80, 98 (1856) (forced heirs). 
11 E.g., Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 215, 58 N.E.2d 
381, 391 (1944) (discussed, supra, Chap. 7, note 69); Thayer v. Thayer, 
14 Vt. 107, 117-8 (1842) (citing custom of London cases); cf. Grover v. 
Clover, 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (1917); Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 
584, 21 Atl. 135 (1891) (nonevasive); also see cases cited in argument of 
counsel in Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 913, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949). 
Some cases, without explicitly stating that the widow is a creditor, argue 
that she should be entitled to like protection, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 22 
Colo. 480, 489, 46 Pac. 128, 131 (1896) (disapproved in Moedy v. Moedy, 
infra, note 17). 
12 Dorrough v. Grove, 257 Ala. 609, 60 So.2d 342 (Ala. 1952). 
13 Alimony: Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 125, 84 N.E. 192, 
195 (1908); Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 65 A.2d 899 
(1949); Fischer v. Fischer, 24 N.J. Super. 180, 93 A.2d 788 (1952) (wife 
cannot invade policemen's pension fund for alimony since she is a 
general creditor); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 259 App. Div. 845, 19 N.Y.S.2d 
392 (2d Dep't 1940), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 285 N.Y. 517, 
32 N.E.2d 819 (1941), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 655, 33 N.E.2d 866 (1941); cf. 
Deke v. Huenkemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 102 N.E. 1059, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 512 
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don.14 And, of the purely evasion cases, 15 the authority cited 
is almost invariably from the above-mentioned group of 
cases.16 Indeed, there seems to be no recent evasion case hold-
ing squarely that the widow is a creditor.17 Nor is the widow's 
(1913), related hearing, 289 Ill. 148, 124 N.E. 381 (1919); Small v. Small, 
56 Kan. I, 14, 42 Pac. 323, 327 (1895); Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 
514, 62 Atl. 507, 507-08 (1905); Armstrong v. Connelly, 299 Pa. 51, 149 
Atl. 87 (1930) (maintenance). 
14 The fact that the forced share takes priority over creditor's claims 
is of course relevant: see e.g., Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258, 293 (1863-4). 
This case sustained the widow's claim, not on the ground that she was 
a creditor, or superior to a creditor, but because the husband had re-
tained too much "dominion" over the res. The present Florida statutory 
share also takes precedence over creditors' claims: see note 5, supra. 
1 5 The language is often ambiguous; thus lbey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 
436, 43 A.2d 157, 158 (1945), exceptions overruled, 94 N.H. 425, 55 A.2d 
872 (1947): "Just as future creditors are protected by statute from 
conveyances made with actual intent to defraud, similarly it is held by 
judicial reasoning that wives should be protected with respect to their 
distributive shares in the estates of their deceased husbands." Also 
see Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 79, 1 N.W.2d 
458, 460 (1942). 
16 E.g., in Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 394, 31 Atl. 14, 16 (1891) 
the court stated that "she stands in the equity, if not in the attitude, 
of a creditor ... [M]arriage is equivalent to a pecuniary considera-
tion." But none of the cases cited in the Walker case is squarely in 
point: Tyler v. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525, 21 N.E. 616 (1888) (maintenance 
and support); Johnson v. Johnson, 75 Ky. 485 (1877) (cited as 12 Ky. 
485) (divorce suit jurisdictional problems); Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, 40 Miss. 
718 (1866) (post marital transfer, but not authority for the point it is 
cited for); Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. 495, 499 (1871) (stands for 
the opposite of what it is cited for); Killinger v. Reidenhauer, 6 S. & R. 
531, 535 (Pa. 1821) (fraudulent mortgage by husband will not prevail 
against the widow and creditors); Reynolds v. Vance, 48 Tenn. 294 
(1870) (decided under statute concerning transfers in fraud of dower); 
Boils v. Boils, 41 Tenn. 192 (1860) (alimony); Brewer v. Connell, 30 
Tenn. 343 (1851) (decided under statute concerning transfers in fraud 
of dower); Green v. Adams, 59 Vt. 602 (1887) (alimony). 
17 Many cases state explicitly or by inference that the widow is not a 
creditor, as far as the evasion cases are concerned; in other words, she 
cannot have her husband's inter vivos transfers set aside under the 
statutes dealing with transfers in fraud of creditors. Maruska v. Equi-
table Life of U.S., 21 F. Supp. 841 (D. Minn. 1938); Moedy v. Moedy, 
130 Colo. 464, 469-70, 276 P.2d 563, 566 (1954) (expressly disapproving 
Smith v. Smith, supra, note 11); Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824); 
Cook v. Lee, 72 N.H. 569, 58 Atl. 511 (1904); Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 
27, 32, 32 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1941); In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 
576-77, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28, 32 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 697, 
289 N.Y. Supp. 818 (1st Dep't 1936) ("Objectant's contention that a 
widow should stand in as good a position as the creditor is chivalrous, 
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position improved if her husband had agreed by antenuptial 
contract to leave his "estate" to her, unless a definite sum was 
agreed upon.18 
though legally untenable"); Garrison v. Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 
493 (1916); Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 74 Pac. 96 (1903); Richards 
v. Richards, 30 Tenn. 294 (1850); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 
(1850); Lightfoot's Ex'ors v. Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42, 72 (1813) (cus-
tom of London cases distinguished); cf. Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 Ill. 
App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940); Boyle v. Smyth, 248 Ill. App. 57 (1928); 
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin's Adm'r, 16 Mo. 242 (1852); Sanborn v. 
Goodhue, 28 N.H. 48 (1853); In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 157 
(Surr. Ct. 1941); In re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541, 31 N.Y.S.2d 191 
(1941); Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 125, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814, 820 
(1st Dep't 1936) (dissent); Robb v. Washington and Jefferson College, 
103 App. Div. 327, 93 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't 1905), modified and 
aff'd, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359 (1906) (charities); Del Conte v. Luca, 2 
4 D.&C.2d 130 (Pa. 1954); Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419, 123 At!. 626 
(1924); In re Peterson's Estate, 12 Wash. 2d 686, 123 P.2d 733 (1942); 
Mann v. Grinwald, 203 Wis. 27, 31-32, 233 N.W. 582, 584 (1930). 
18 In Mornes v. Lawrence Savings & Trust Co., 8 Lawrence L. J. 163 
(Pa. 1949) a prospective husband agreed by antenuptial contract to 
leave his wife all of his estate in excess of $6000. The court held that 
the wife thereby became a creditor of the estate, but since no fixed 
sum had been agreed upon she was not a creditor for purposes of setting 
aside inter vivos transfers. Also see Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 
N.E. 37, 5 A.L.R. 1426 (1919); Mornes Estate, 79 D.&C. 356 (Pa. 1951); 
and citations in Jacobs and Goebel, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 661 
(1952); cf. Pickell case, Appendix C, note 19, infra. 
CHAPTER 18 
Procedure: Who May Sue? 
Normally, the evasion litigation is initiated by the surviv-
ing spouse. Having renunciation privileges not possessed 
by the other distributees,1 it is up to her- not the personal 
representative - to complain about transfers in derogation 
of those privileges. In fact, she may prejudice her position if 
she permits the personal representative to bring suit on her 
behal£.2 The Halpern case is illustrative. The majority opin-
ion informed the widow (suing as executrix) that the trans-
fers were valid; and Lewis, J. (concurring), sprinkled salt on 
her wounds, as follows: "Whatever personal rights the peti-
tioner, as widow, may have in the estate of her husband, may 
1 Children or collaterals have no standing per se to attack inter vivos 
transfers of the decedent as being in "evasion" of their rights as dis-
tributees. Hirschfield v. Ralston, 66 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (Sup. Ct. 1946); 
cf. Schenectady Trust Co. v. Seward, 21 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (Sup. Ct. 
1940). In some cases children or other distributees have joined the 
surviving spouse in bringing suit: e.g., Wooton v. Keaton, 168 Ark. 
981, 272 S.W. 869 (1925) (children); Rudd. v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 
S.W. 791 (1919) (child; undue influence alleged); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 
317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) (child); Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 
215, 28 Atl. 1113 (1894) (collateral heirs). 
Two early Texas cases state that a child may set aside conveyances in 
fraud of his distributive share, if the parent retained either a life estate 
or the power to revoke: Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 80 (1856), aff'd on 
second appeal, 21 Tex. 790 (1858); Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 66 (1857). 
In Harrell v. Hickman, 147 Tex. 396, 403, 15 S.W.2d 876, 880 (1949), 
the court questioned the statement in the Crain case that reservation 
of a life estate makes a deed testamentary. Cf. Huie, "Community 
Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance," 18 TEXAS L. REv. 121, 134 
(1940). 
2 Cf. Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); 
Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 74 Pac. 96 (1903). Contra: Mann v. 
Grinwald, 203 Wis. 27, 32, 233 N.W. 582, 584 (1930) (under Wisconsin 
statute; dictum only); cf. Grover v. Clover, 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 
(1917) (suit by personal representative to set aside transfer in evasion of 
the widow's allowance, the latter being a claim against the estate); Bar-
roll v. Brice, 115 Md. 498, 80 Atl. 1035 (1911) (surviving spouse dies; no 
inter vivos transfer in dispute). 
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not be enforced in a proceeding, such as the one before us, 
brought by her as executrix." 8 Certainly, the surviving spouse 
should bring suit in her own behalf in a jurisdiction com-
mitted to the "partial defeasance" notion. 4 The amount re-
coverable in such a suit is earmarked for the spouse. 
Nevertheless, although it may not be safe to relegate the 
action entirely to the personal representative, it may be pru-
dent to join him as co-plaintiff. The court conceivably may 
declare that it has always followed or is now adhering to the 
"reality" test - in which event the personal representative 
should be the plaintiff.5 Furthermore, if there is any chance 
of the transfer being declared a sham - or colorable, or ob-
tained by fraud, undue influence and the like- it may be to 
the advantage of the surviving spouse to have the transfer in-
validated on that ground by the personal representative.6 In 
some circumstances she might take all, as the sole distributee. 
When she attacks the instrument as a fraud on her elective 
share, however, the court may restrict her to her elective 
share in the recaptured assets, even when it permits defeas-
ance in toto. 7 
8 303 N.Y. 33, 45, 100 N.E.2d 120, 126 (1951); cf. a well-written note 
in 25 N.Y. U. L. REv. 920, 923 (1950). As to the widow's right to bring 
a stockholder's derivative action with respect to her deceased husband's 
stock, pending probate, see Steuer v. Hector's Tavern, 1 M.2d 614, 148 
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1955). 
4 Sykes, "Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving 
Spouses," lO Mo. L. REv. 1, 9 (1949). 
5 E.g., In re Leiman's Estate, 116 N.Y.S.2d 658, (Surr. Ct. 1952), aff'd 
without opinion, 281 App. Div. 764, 118 N.Y.S.2d 750, (2d Dep't 1952), 
leave to appeal denied, 119 N.Y.S.2d 230, 112 N.E.2d 288 (2d Dep't 
1953); cf. Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 123, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814, 818 
(1st Dep't 1936) (dissenting opinion). Frequently the surviving spouse 
sues individually and as personal representative, e.g., Poole v. Poole, 
96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915). If it is not entirely clear which rationale 
is followed-as in New York at the present time with reference to trans-
fers other than Totten trusts-presumably the widow should join the 
personal representative as co-plaintiff. 
6 The personal representative is the proper party to bring suits to 
set aside transfers of this sort, but a distributee may sue in the event 
that the personal representative unreasonably refuses to sue, or when 
none has yet been appointed. In Merz v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust 
Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939) the personal representative, 
joined as co-defendant, was permitted defeasance in toto, by crossbill. 
7 See discussion, supra, Chap. 9:2. 
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But it should not be assumed that the evasion question 
arises only on the initiative of the widow. In some cases the 
personal representative started the ball rolling, e.g., in seeking 
instructions, 8 or in requesting settlement of his account. 9 
And suit may be brought by the donee; 10 or by a trustee, 
whether in seeking instructions,11 in settlement of accounts,12 
or in attempting to remove a cloud on titleY Usually the 
issue will arise in a court having equitable jurisdiction,14 
but it has also arisen in a court of law.15 Interpleader cases 
may be found; 16 and in several instances the surviving spouse 
sued for damages incurred from a "conspiracy" to defraud her 
of her marital rights.H In several cases the widow brought 
a declaratory judgment action.18 The issue may arise in the 
s E.g., Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904); cf. Malone 
v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N.E.2d 126 (1944). 
a E.g., In re Kalina's Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 
1945), appeal dismissed by default, 270 App. Div. 761, 59 N.Y.S.2d 525 
(2d Dep't 1946). 
1o E.g., In re Rynier's Estate, 48 Lane. Rev. 475, aff'd, 347 Pa. 471, 
32 A.2d 736 (1943) (presentment of claim). 
11 E.g., Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949). 
1 2 E.g., Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 
N.Y.S.2d 648, (3rd Dep't 1939), appeal denied, 256 App. Div. 1026, 11 
N.Y.S.2d 547, aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 (1939). 
1 3 E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 
N.E.2d 337 (1950). In this case the cloud was occasioned by the widow's 
claim that the trust was invalid. 
14 E.g., Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891). 
1 5 E.g., Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905) (adminis-
trator brings trover; widower at that time in Maine had no "forced 
share"). 
16 United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. 
Ark. 1946); Weisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. 
Ct. 1938), affd without opinzon, 256 App. Div. 914, 10 N.Y.S.2d 414 
(1st Dep't 1939). 
11 E.g., Maruska v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 21 
F. Supp. 841 (D. Minn. 1938); cf. Samson, Adm'x v. Samson, 67 Iowa 
253, 25 N.W. 233 (1885). 
1 8 Morrison v. Morrison, 99 Ohio App. 203, 132 N.E.2d 233 (1955); 
Estate of Brown, 384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956). 
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lifetime of the offending spouse/9 or after the death,20 or 
remarriage 21 of the surviving spouse, or while she is a minor 22 
or mentally incompetent. 23 
Parenthetically, a spot check of one hundred and fifty 
evasion cases reveals that in the great majority of the cases the 
widow is surviving spouse. 24 One hundred and twenty-six of 
these cases (eighty-four per cent) involve widows; twenty-four 
cases (sixteen per cent) involve widowers. These figures prove 
little, other than that most "evasions" are perpetrated by 
husbands. And this in turn is to be expected in view of the 
economic superiority of husbands, 25 the fact that women live 
longer than men, and the fact that in some states, e.g., Florida, 
the widower does not have a forced share. 
19 Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1949) (suit by 
wife, individually and as curator for her mentally incompetent hus-
band, to set aside husband's transfers); De Noble v. De Noble, 331 Pa. 
273, 200 Atl. 77 (1938); cf. Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa 155, 19 N.W. 876 
(1884) (dower); Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa 259 (1876) (dower); Delaney 
v. Delaney, 133 N.E.2d 915 (Ohio C.A. 1956); Mann v. Grinwald, 203 
Wis. 27, 31, 233 N.W. 582, 584 (1930). But cf. Ga1ewitz v. Walter Peek 
Paper Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
20 Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949) (widower 
dies after the trial, action revived in name of his administrator and 
heirs). 
21 E.g., Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4); see discussion of this fac-
tor, supra, p. 167. 
22 E.g., Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 Atl. 401 
(1928) (widow aged eighteen). 
23 E.g., Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949); York 
v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922). 
24 As to equities, if any, based on the sex of the claimant, see p. 173, 
supra. 





Solutions Based On Retention Of The 
Typical Statutory Share 
Now that we have concluded our survey of the "evasion" 
case-law we should be able to decide on the advisability of 
remedial legislation. How do we make the decision? Why, 
by going back to first principles. Do the existing legislative 
and judicial controls in this field achieve the desired com-
munity goals? Is the statutory protection against disinherit-
ance of the family geared to need? In testing "evasions" do 
the courts have discretion to weigh and balance the appli-
cant's need against the legitimate expectations of the donee? 
In brief, does the statutory share, as interpreted by the 
courts, enunciate the principles of the maintenance and con-
tribution formula? 
1. SHOULD WE PRESERVE THE STATUS Quo? 
The objective evidence indicates that we need new legis-
lation, to meet modern conditions. The typical statutory 
share is a product of the nineteenth century when - rela-
tively - there was less inter vivos property transmission. 
Nowadays the emphasis is on inter vivos dispositive devices. 
Consequently, effective protection against disinheritance re-
quires some degree of interference with these devices. This 
interference is justifiable only when its purpose is to alleviate 
the need of deserving members of the surviving family. Under 
the statutory share, however, there is no criterion of need; 
and the courts are given no directive on how to test inter 
vivos evasions. It is not surprising that the courts have re-
sponded with unsuitable rationales, some stressing the de-
cedent's "motive," some stressing retention of "control," and 
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some rejecting any possibility of relief to the surviving spouse. 
Under these rationales one claimant may be rebuffed in spite 
of demonstrated need, another claimant may prevail although 
not in need. The first decision results in unwarranted family 
hardship; the second decision results in unwarranted appro-
priation of the donee's property. Both decisions are incon-
sistent with the maintenance and contribution formula. Both 
decisions harm the community. 
And the statutory share is too inflexible in another respect. 
It fails to make allowance for the complicated family relation-
ship resulting from a remarriage. In this situation the statu-
tory share flouts the wishes of the average decedent. Usually 
he would prefer to give the great bulk of his capital to the 
children of his first marriage, with appropriate provision for 
the support of his widow, if such is needed.1 Instead, the 
statutory share awards the widow a specified outright fraction 
of the decedent's capital. Presumably the theory is that this 
fractional share is needed in order to help the widow to 
support the children. In the remarriage cases, however, the 
widow's desires may not coincide with the welfare of the 
decedent's children. She may be at odds with them. In any 
event, she may have children of her own. These children have 
a prior claim on her for support during her lifetime, and 
for her property at her death.2 Thus the existing legislation 
ensures a perpetual evasion problem. The husband will wish 
to "evade," when he has no affection for his second wife. Even 
when he has affection for her his natural inclination may wel1 
be to give the bulk of his property to his children. Indeed, 
the typical "evasion" case involves a stepmother, seeking to 
set aside the decedent's inter vivos transfers to children of a 
prior marriage.3 
Nor have these shortcomings of the statutory share been 
1 See text, supra, Chap. 10, at note 38. 
2 The possibility that a husband may give all his property to his 
second wife indicates the necessity of protecting dependent children 
against disinheritance. 
a See Chap. 10, note 35, supra; Chap. 18, text at note 24, supra. 
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remedied by the courts. To be sure, our analysis of the 
"equities" in the "evasion" cases revealed a close correlation 
between the actual decisions and the decisions that probably 
would have been reached under the maintenance and con-
tribution formula. 4 But this analysis, although suggestive, 
is far from conclusive. Many of the cases examined had to be 
placed in the "not clear" category; in other words, the state 
of the equities could not be deduced owing to inadequate 
judicial recital of the facts. Moreover, even if we assume that 
the courts are consciously or subconsciously following the 
desired formula we cannot ignore the fact that the announced 
rationales suggest otherwise. In short, the courts may be fol-
lowing the equities, but they certainly do not say so. This 
state of affairs should be remedied, if only to give greater 
predictability to property owners and estate planners. The 
maintenance and contribution formula should be given legis-
lative sanction. In other words, protection against disin-
heritance should be related to need, and the courts should be 
given a positive legislative directive to decide "evasion" cases 
by balancing the equities between the applicant for mainte-
nance and the donee. 
We shall now examine proposals that have been made by 
others for legislative reform based on retention of the statu-
tory share. Later, in Chapter Twenty, we shall draw on the 
experience of the civil law. Chapter Twenty-one will be 
devoted to the Decedent's Family Maintenance legislation 
of the British Commonwealth. Finally, in Chapter Twenty-
two, a model statute will be suggested. 
2. TESTS BASED ON "FRAUD" 
Section 33(a) of the Model Probate Code provides that a 
gift "in fraud of the marital rights" of a surviving spouse may 
be treated as a testamentary disposition, and applied to the 
payment of the spouse's share.5 Section 33(b) states that "any 
4 See Chap. 12, supra, passim. 
5 For complete text see Appendix B, infra, p. 333; also see Mo. Ann. 
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gift made by a married person within two years of the time 
of his death is deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights of 
his surviving spouse, unless shown to the contrary." A more 
detailed proposal is found in the 1939 Report of the Commis-
sion on Revision of the Laws of North Carolina Relating to 
Estates.6 Under the North Carolina scheme the widow, but 
not the widower, is permitted to invade such of the decedent 
husband's gratuitous transfers as were either revocable or 
made within a year of death and in contemplation thereof. 
There is a rebuttable presumption that transfers made within 
one year prior to death were made in contemplation of death. 
The proposed North Carolina statute also contains valuable 
procedural suggestions. Moreover, it aids estate planning by 
charging the widow with property received in designated 
inter vivos transfers, as well as property received from the de-
cedent's estate. 7 The complete text of the "evasion" pro-
visions of the Model Probate Code and of the North Carolina 
proposal is set out in Appendix B, 8 with explanatory com-
ments supplied by the respective authors of each plan. 
Note that both proposals place great stress on the proxim-
ity of the transfer to the date of death. In the Model Probate 
Code the burden is on the donee to show absence of fraud 
when the transfer was made within two years of death. Under 
the North Carolina plan there is a rebuttable presumption 
of fraud if "the transfer be in contemplation of the bus-
Stat. §474.150 (Supp. 1955), discussed p. ll4, supra; Tenn. Code Ann. 
§8365 (Williams 1934), discussed p. 110, supra; Vt. Stat. §3039 (1947): 
"A voluntary conveyance by a husband of any of his real estate made 
during coverture and not to take effect until after his decease, and made 
with intent to defeat his widow in her claim to her share of his real 
estate, shall be void and inoperative to bar her claim to her share of 
such real estate. The husband shall be deemed at the time of his death 
to be the owner and seised of such real estate for the purpose of as-
signing and setting out such share to his widow." For the Vermont law 
see p. 108, supra. 
6 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE LAWS OF NoRTH 
CAROLINA RELATING To EsTATEs, 44-48 (1939). 
7 Id., Art. 6, §2; also see §5(c), referring to property that may have 
been received "upon the husband's death." In the Model Probate Code 
(§32) the surviving spouse is charged only with estate assets. 
8 Infra, p. 333. 
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band's death and take place within one year prior thereto." 9 
In an earlier chapter 10 it was suggested that the "proximity 
to death" factor should not receive any particular stress in 
testing evasions of the widow's share. Analysis of the cases 
shows that the litigated transfers are by no means confined 
to "deathbed" transfers, or even to transfers made within two 
years of death. And the "contemplation of death" notion is 
not helpful: it is too ambiguous.U Possibly it may be traced 
to the present Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, concerning transfers "in contemplation of death." If 
so, the confusion in the tax cases is a poor advertisement for 
this test. "The present subjective test of transfers in con-
templation of death works abominably, or to be precise, it 
does not work at all." 12 
The Model Probate Code proposal is also vague as to the 
type of transfers that are affected. Indeed, the "comment" 
to the section in question suggests that the courts would have 
to decide whether or not inter vivos revocable trusts and 
Totten trusts would be affected by the proposed statute.13 
The North Carolina plan, on the other hand, affects trans-
fers made more than one year before death only when they 
are revocable. This restriction, which also appears in the 
Pennsylvania legislation,14 deprives the widow of effective 
protection against disinheritance. 
Finally, neither proposal concerns itself with the claimant's 
"need." 15 For this reason alone, if not for the reasons men-
9 §5(a)(l). 
10 Chap. 10, pp. 148-154, supra. 
11/d. at 151. 
1 2 Lowndes and Rutledge, "An Objective Test of Transfers in Con-
templation of Death," 24 TEXAS L. REv. 134, 158 (1945). 
1s Also see Niles, "Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate 
Law: A Review," 45 MicH. L. REv. 321, 330 (1947); Mechem, "Why 
Not a Modern Wills Act?" 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 514 (1948). 
14 Discussed supra, Chap. 9:4. 
15 Art. 7 of the North Carolina proposal contains useful provisions 
for barring the rights of unworthy spouses, but the criteria are, in the 
main, manslaughter and desertion. The grasping spouse who does not 
need the money is not excluded. Note also that under §5(c) of the 
North Carolina proposal the donee of the inter vivos transfer is liable 
regardless of the value of the estate assets. 
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tioned above, neither proposal seems to offer a permanent 
solution to the evasion problem. 
3. THE FEDERAL EsTATE TAx ANALOGY 
Another possibility is to utilize the "gross estate" concept 
of the federal estate tax regulations.16 To gear the widow's 
elective rights to the gross taxable estate would certainly 
give her more extensive protection than she would receive 
under the Model Probate Code or the North Carolina plan. 
Her claim would "affect" any property in which the husband 
had a beneficial interest at death, or which he had transferred 
in contemplation of death. She could "invade" her husband's 
life insurance, joint ownership interests, revocable trusts, 
powers of appointment, and other border-line devices- at 
least to the extent that these devices would leave the property 
concerned includible in the husband's gross taxable estate. 
And (say some writers), predictability would be enhanced: 
the tax regulations are definitive, and the legal profession is 
familiar with themY 
I have not used the gross estate analogy in the suggested 
model statutory provisions appearing in Chapter Twenty-
two.18 Probably the estate tax regulatory scheme achieves its 
community purpose, but this scheme does not necessarily 
suggest the proper legislative cure for inter vivos evasions of 
the spouse's share. 
What are the community goals implicit in death taxes? 
Well, these taxes are a fairly recent phenomenon in the 
16 Suggesting the "gross estate" analogy: Simes, PuBLIC PoLICY AND 
THE DEAD HAND, 28-31 (1955) (in modified form); Note, 27 N.Y. U. L. 
REv. 306, 312 (1952); also see Atkinson, "Succession," ANNUAL SuRVEY 
OF AMERICAN LAw, 749, 755 (1948); Cahn, "Restraints on Disinherit-
ance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 152 (1936); Niles, "Model Probate Code 
and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review," 45 MICH. L. REv. 321, 
331 (1947). The appropriate provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 are set out in Appendix B, part 3, infra. 
17 E.g., Note, 27 N.Y. U. L. REv. 306, 313 (1952). 
18 Some of the estate tax concepts, however, proved of great value in 
framing the model statute, e.g., see the provisions of §I dealing with 
powers of appointment. 
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United States.19 It seems clear that they are here to stay, but 
there is some doubt as to what they are all about. 20 As far as 
the estate tax is concerned, the most popular theory is that it 
tends to equalize wealth. 21 The importance of preventing 
undue concentration of wealth cannot be minimized. Democ-
racy means equality of opportunity. Without death taxes 
there could be an oligarchy of the purse. Money breeds 
money; 22 it is only wishful thinking to postulate "shirtsleeves 
to shirtsleeves" in any foreseeable number of generations. In 
short, the curbing of unreasonably large fortunes is probably 
a vital urge of the American community.23 But this means 
that the estate tax must be enforced without partiality or 
discrimination, against all estates in the designated brackets; 
and it must affect each of the designated inter vivos transfers 
made by the decedent. If this scheme were to be used to test 
evasions of the statutory share it would be as mechanical in 
operation as the statutory share itself. Having regard neither 
to the claimant's need nor the equities of the donee, it is the 
antithesis of the maintenance and contribution formula. 
It would, of course, be possible to combine the tax regula-
tions with the maintenance and contribution formula. The 
tax regulations could be used to delineate the types of inter 
vivos "transfers" that would be affected by the spouse's claim; 
and assertion of that claim against any particular transfer 
19 By the beginning of the present century only twenty-six states had 
inheritance taxes of varying types. Wisconsin in 1903 led the way in 
taxing direct heirs. The federal estate tax began in 1916. 
20 See, in general, Paul, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY (1947); Seligman, 
EssAYS IN TAXATION, Chap. 5 (lOth ed. 1925); Schulz, "Inheritance Tax-
ation," 8 ENCY. Soc. Sci. 43 (1932); Cahn, "Time, Space and Estate 
Tax," 29 GEo. L. J. 677, 682-88 (1941). 
21 The estate tax has also been justified as a prop of the national fisc. 
But death taxes amount to only a little more than one per cent of the 
total tax yield of the federal government. See table 7, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
jUNE 30, 1952, pp. 550-54. 
22 The statistics that are available indicate that "ownership of wealth 
is much more concentrated than that of income." Blodgett, PRINCIPLES 
oF EcoNOMICS, 426 (1946). 
2a Morris R. Cohen, LAW AND THE SociAL ORDER, 30 (1933); Wedg-
wood, THE EcoNOMICS OF INHERITANCE I, (1929). 
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could then be handled in accordance with the formula. This 
compromise scheme could even be used in conjunction with 
the existing elective share legislation: thus the elective share 
would determine the claimant's share in the decedent's estate; 
the tax regulations would designate the types of inter vivos 
devices that would be vulnerable to the claimant; and the 
maintenance and contribution formula would determine the 
degree of recovery from particular donees, with an "elective 
share" fraction of all the relevant inter vivos devices consti-
tuting the upper limit of recovery. But this would be a forced 
union - a misalliance. Once the principles of the mainte-
nance and contribution formula are accepted they should -
for consistency's sake- be used to determine both the share 
in the estate and the claim against the inter vivos transferee. 
Nor do the estate tax provisions necessarily suggest the best 
delineation of the types of inter vivos devices that should be 
subject to the spouse's share. For example, the surviving 
spouse should have a stronger claim against the husband's 
life insurance than she would have under the present estate 
tax provisions. Moreover, the present regulations concerning 
powers of appointment are not entirely appropriate for de-
termination of spouses' rights. The same comment may be 
made with respect to the tax provisions dealing with transfers 
in contemplation of death. Nor would a modified use of the 
tax provisions be wholly satisfactory. The fundamental ob-
jection would still remain that problems of spouses' rights 
could not be solved without reference to, and familiarity 
with, a rather complicated and relatively impermanent set 
of regulations that express a different community policy. The 
cure must fit the disease. 
CHAPTER 20 
Civil Law Solutions 
The civil law approach is too mechanical for our purposes. 
Nevertheless, the comprehensive rules of the civil law form 
a treasure house of useful ideas. 
It is possible that the main regulatory pattern was set by 
the Romans.1 At any rate, their rules are similar to the 
modern civil-law provisions. This is not surprising. Covering 
a period longer than the life of the Anglo-American legal 
system, Roman law dealt with many of the problems that now 
concern us. These problems were occasioned by familiar 
circumstances: failure to provide for the surviving family; 
democratic notions on freedom of alienation; marital dis-
harmony; and changes in the status of women. 2 The solu-
tions start with the early rule that the next of kin had to be 
mentioned in the will in order to be disinherited; and they 
conclude with the "legitim" of Justinian, by which the fa-
vored members of the family were assured a designated por-
tion of the decedent's property. 
l. QUERELA JNOFFICIOSI TESTAMENT! 
If a testator failed to make a specified provision for his 
children and nearest heirs 3 the disappointed heirs could have 
1 But cf. Lawson, A CoMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE CIVIL LAw, 185 
(1955). 
2 For an analysis of the "family" in Roman history, see Zimmerman, 
OUTLINE OF THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, 18-38 (1947). 
3 The querela could be brought by three groups of relatives: de-
scendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters. The two latter groups 
could attack the will only in the event of no attack by the prior group 
or groups. The last group (brothers and sisters) could bring the 
querela only if turpes personae-persons of infamy, bad character, etc.-
had been preferred to them. Lee, ELEMENTS OF RoMAN LAw, 208 
(1946 ed.). Critical of the view that parents were eligible is Schulz, 
HISTORY oF RoMAN LEGAL SciENCE, 235 (1946); also see Schulz' stric-
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the querela inofficiosi testamenti, or "plaint of an unduteous 
will." This remedy, which became available in the early 
Empire, was based upon the supposed insanity of the tes-
tator in not providing for his heirs. The fiction of insanity 
is said to have been derived from Greek law.4 The fiction was 
later dropped for a rationale emphasizing the rights of the 
disappointed heir.5 We are told that the querela was from the 
beginning "based upon the ancient idea of family ownership 
than upon the more modern conception, that a testator is 
under a duty to provide after his death for those related to 
him by near kinship." 6 The amount 7 that could be ob-
tained was at first discretionary, but eventually was fixed by 
statute at one fourth of what the claimant would have re-
ceived as his intestate share. Justinian later increased this 
amount in the case of children to one third, if there were not 
more than four children, and one half if there were more 
than four children. 
Acceptance of benefits under the will would bar the 
querela. In certain instances the claimant had to make al-
lowance for anything that he had received by inter vivos 
gift from the testator.8 Moreover, the claimant had to show 
tures on the terminology of the querela in his CLASSICAL RoMAN LAW, 
275-79 (1951). 
4 Sohm, INsTITUTES oF RoMAN LAw, 556, note 6 (3rd ed. 1907). Cf. 
Maine, ANCIENT LAW, 209, (1912 ed.). For an account of the influence 
of Greek and Roman institutions on the ancient Egyptian law of in-
heritance, in particular with respect to the rights of forced heirs, see 
Taubenschlag, THE LAW OF GRECO-ROMAN EGYPT IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
PAPYRI, 158-59, (1st ed. 1944). 
s Lee, ELEMENTS oF RoMAN LAw, 454, note 92 (1946 ed.). 
a Leage, RoMAN PRIVATE LAw, 187 (3rd ed. 1924). Muirhead ascribes 
the advent of the querela to a general slackening in religious and 
moral scruples. Muirhead, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
RoME, 244 (3rd ed. 1916); also see Buckland, THE MAIN INSTITUTioNs 
OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, 195-96 (1931); Cooper, THE INSTITUTES OF 
JusTINIAN, 518 (3rd ed. 1852) (comparing the custom of London with 
the querela.) 
1 "In connection with the querela it was known as the portio legibus 
debita or the legitima portio (the statutory portion) and in modern 
usage is termed 'the legitim'." Lee, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 208. But 
cf. Schulz, CLASSICAL RoMAN LAw, 276 (1951). 
s Moyle, IMPERATORIS IusTINIANI lNsTITUTIONES, 283 note 6, (2nd ed. 
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that he had no other means of attacking the will; for example, 
the querela was not available to an emancipated son, since 
he could get another remedy from the praetor.9 It was also 
denied to a claimant who had been disinherited for just cause, 
e.g., because of an attempt on the testator's life. Justinian 
specified fourteen grounds for disinheriting children, with 
fewer grounds for disinheriting parents, brothers, and sis-
ters.10 These grounds related to breach of family duty. 
Originally a successful attack would void the will in toto.n 
Under Justinian, however, the will would be set aside only to 
the extent necessary to provide for the claimant. If anything 
at all had been left him in the will, he was given an action to 
supplement it up to the statutory share.12 Significantly, pro-
tection was afforded against excessive inter vivos giftsY The 
querela inofficiosae donationis and the querela inofficiosae 
dotis were developed to protect the claimant whose share was 
diminished by an immoderate inter vivos gift, or dos, as the 
case may be. The gift or dos would be rescinded and used, 
so far as necessary, to make up the claimant's full statutory 
share.14 
2. THE LEGITIME 
The thoroughgoing protection afforded by the Roman 
legitim is reechoed in the modern legitime. This powerful 
institution has endured despite changing times, changing 
ideas. In Louisiana, for example, it has if anything grown in 
strength, as indicated by its "sanctification" in the Louisiana 
1890), and references therein cited; Radin, HANDBOOK OF RoMAN LAW, 
442, (1927). 
9 Lee, op. cit. supra, note 5, 204-07. 
10 Buckland, A TExT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAw, 331 (1950). 
11 However, if there had been two "instituted heirs" it was possible 
in a given case that only partial intestacy would result. Lee, op. cit. 
supra, note 5, 209. Also see Buckland, A TExT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAw, 
330 (1950). 
12 Sandars, THE INSTITUTES oF JusTINIAN, 543 (1941 ed.). 
13 But cf. Buckland & McNair, RoMAN LAW AND CoMMON LAW, 168 
(Lawson ed., 1952). 
14 Sohm, INSTITUTES OF RoMAN LAw, 558 (3rd ed. 1907). 
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Constitution of 192J.l5 In the Louisiana community the 
values implicit in freedom of property transmission have long 
been mortgaged to the communal concern for the welfare of 
the surviving family. In the case of land, not even the pur-
chaser for value without notice can shake off the family claim. 
In a sense, we have in the legitime a modern manifestation 
of the original group-ownership of wealth, in which no in-
dividual transmission was permitted.16 Under the legitime, 
however, the group is the family. The family property is 
charged with family support. "It is the family's means of life 
from which no member can be shut out except for positive 
misconduct." 17 
The legitime applies only to the gratuitous dispositions of 
the deceased. As to these transactions, 
"the law divides the estate of every person into two 
parts, of which one is called the disposable portion, 
of which he may dispose gratuitously according to 
his pleasure; the other is called the reserve or forced 
portion) of which he is not permitted to dispose 
gratuitously to the prejudice of his legitimate de-
scendants or ascendants, to whom the law reserves it 
and forces the person to leave it, and who are, 
therefore, called forced heirs." 18 
The Louisiana Civil Code states that "Donations inter 
vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed two thirds of the prop-
erty of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, a legitimate 
child; one half, if he leaves two children; and one third, if 
he leaves three or a greater number." 19 Similarly these dona-
15 La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, Section 16. "No law shall be passed 
abolishing forced heirship .... " 
16 Cf. G. D. H. Cole, "Inheritance," 8 ENcY. SociAL SciENCES, 35 
(1932); also see Cairns, "The Explanatory Process in the Field of In-
heritance," 20 IowA L. REv. 266 (1934). 
17 Cole, supra, note 16, 36. On protection of the children of the first 
marriage in early French law, see Brissaud, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRI-
VATE LAW, 156-7 (1912) (3 Continental Legal History Series). 
18 Tessier v. Rousell, 41 La. Ann. Rep. 474, 477, 6 So. 542, 543 (1889). 
A forced heir may waive his right to claim the legitime, Succession of 
Fertel, 208 La. 614, 635, 23 So.2d 234, (1945). 
19 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1493 (West 1952). Art. 1493 also states that 
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tions "cannot exceed two thirds of the property, if the dis-
poser, having no children, leaves a father, mother, or both." 20 
These forced heirs 21 cannot be deprived of their reserved 
portion by the decedent, "except in cases where he has a just 
cause to disinherit them." 22 A decedent cannot make a dona-
tion inter vivos which divests himself of all his property. If 
he does not reserve to himself enough for subsistence, the 
transaction is "null for the whole." 23 Aside from this ex-
ceptional case, however, the rule is that "any disposal of 
property, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, exceeding the 
quantum o£ which a person may legally dispose to the preju-
"Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever 
degree they be, it being understood that they are only counted for the 
child they represent." 
2o La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1194 (West 1952). 
21 As in the typical civil law jurisdiction, the widow in Louisiana is 
not a forced heir, i.e., she is not protected by the legitime. Nevertheless, 
other devices exist for her benefit; and the over-all trend is to better 
her position. She has community property; she has the homestead if 
she is "in necessitous circumstances"; and she has the "marital fourth": 
if the decedent spouse "died rich," the survivor may be awarded a 
fourth of the succession, with provision for temporary allowances. 
Ordinarily in community property states the community property 
stands in the husband's name, and he has power to manage, sell, trans-
fer, and encumber. Has the wife any remedy if the husband gives away 
the community property? It all depends. The cases on this point look 
very much like the cases in the common law states on "evasions" of the 
statutory share. There is considerable stress on "intent to defraud," 
particularly in California, Nevada and Texas. In the main, however, 
the decisive criterion appears to be the comparative size of the transfer. 
The cases are analysed in a carefully-written article: Huie, "Com-
munity Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance," 18 TEXAS L. REv. 
121 (1940); also see deFuniak, I PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY, 
s. 122, (1943); Succession of Geagan, 33 So.2d 118 (La. 1947), discussed 
in Chap. 15, note 30, supra. As to transfers of life insurance in "fraud" 
of the community, see Chap. 15, note 77, supra. 
22 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1495 (West. 1952). On disinherison see 
id. arts. 1617-24; Cahn, "Disinherison as It Developed Historically," 10 
LOYOLA L. J. 41 (1929); Oppenheim, "The Revocation of a Testamen-
tary Disinherison," 16 TuL. L. REv. 97 (1941). 
23 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1497 (West. 1952). This rule has some 
curious inconsistencies, Comment, 6 LA. L. REv. 98 (1944). The article 
apparently can be invoked only by the donor; the forced heirs may 
not act until the donor's death. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1503 states 
that "A donation inter vivos, exceeding the disposable quantum, re-
tains all its effect during the life of the donor." 
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dice of the forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to 
that quantum." 24 The latter doctrine also contrasts favor-
ably with the disposition on the part of some courts in com-
mon-law states to effect a total defeasance of the inter vivos 
disposition in order to give the surviving spouse a fractional 
share. 25 
The strength of the legitime lies in the power of the forced 
heirs to reach inter vivos transfers.26 Articles 1505 states: 
"To determine the reduction to which the dona-
tions, either inter vivos or mortis causa are liable, 
an aggregate is formed of all the property belonging 
to the donor or testator at the time of his decease; 
to that is fictitiously added the property disposed 
of by donation inter vivos, according to its value 
at the time of the donor's decease, in the state in 
which it was at the period of the donation. 
The sums due by the estate are deducted from 
this aggregate amount, and the disposable quantum 
is calculated on the balance, taking into considera-
tion the number of heirs and their qualities of as-
cendant or descendant, so as to regulate their legiti-
mate portion by the rules above established." 27 
Donations mortis causa are, naturally, exhausted first, and 
then donations inter vivos in reverse chronological order, 
the last being appropriated first. 28 Immovable property may 
24 !d. art. 1502; also see id. art. 1503, supra, at note 23. 
2s See discussion, Chap. 9:2. 
2a La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1504 (West. 1952). 
27 La. Rev. Stat. §22:647 (1950) (Acts 1948, No. 195, Section 14.37) pro-
vides that the proceeds of life insurance, endowment and annuity con-
tracts are not subject to the rules of forced heirship; see discussion p. 
240, supra. The language of art. 1505 is broad enough to include dona-
tions made while the donor was a bachelor with no living parents. 
Dicta to the contrary are examined in Fenner, "An Example of Homeric 
Nodding in Relation to the Reduction of Donations Inter Vivos," I 
SouTHERN L. Q. 129, 137-38 (1916). He concludes that the prudent prac-
titioner would decline to prove a title based on such a donation "un-
less it can be shown that the donor has died leaving no forced heirs, 
or in the event that he left forced heirs, that the said donation did not 
exceed the disposable portion of the estate, whether at the time the 
donation was made the donor was married or unmarried." 
28 La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 1507-08 (West. 1952). Legacies are re-
duced pro rata (id. art. l5ll) unless the testator expressly states that a 
legacy is to be preferred (id. art. 1512). 
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be brought into the succession "without any charge of debts 
or mortgages created by the donee." 29 As far as immovable 
property is concerned, the action may be brought against 
transferees from the donee "in the same manner and order 
that it may be brought against the donee himself, but after 
discussion 30 of the property of the donee." 31 Notice that the 
forced heir's rights with reference to third parties apply only 
to immovables. The legitime in this respect is no harsher 
than common-law dower; in fact, it is not as severe: it does 
not catch genuine sales. 
The Louisiana courts have evolved the action en declara-
tion de simulation by which forced heirs are given the power 
to recover property transferred by a simulated sale of the 
decedent.32 This action probably cannot be brought against 
a good-faith purchaser, even to enforce the legitime.33 
3. THE "RESERVED PoRTION": CoNTINENTAL EXAMPLES 
Variations of the "reserved portion" may be found in the 
individual civil-law jurisdictions. By way of example we 
shall glance at the German and Swiss provisions. 
(a) Germany. The German Civil Code has complicated 
rules for augmentation of the compulsory portion (Ergiinzung 
des Pfiichtteils). These rules (as well as the Swiss provisions) 
are set out in Appendix B.34 The mechanics of the German 
scheme are similar in rigidity and complexity to that of the 
legitime. Some points, however, are of special interest. Con-
29 I d. art. 1516. "If the donee has successively sold several objects of 
real estate, liable to the action of revindication, that action must be 
brought against third persons holding the property, according to the 
order of their purchases, beginning with the last, and ascending from 
the last to the first," id. art. 1518; also see id. arts. 1281-82. The vendee 
from a donee can repel the demand by offering to pay the heirs their 
money, Stockwell v. Perrin, 112 La. 643, 36 So. 635, (1904). 
8o I.e., using up, appropriating. 
81 La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 1517-18 (West 1952); Comment, 2 LA. 
L. REV. 387, 389, note 20 (1940). 
82 See cases mentioned in Comment, 2 LA. L. REv. 387, 389, note 18 
(1940). 
s3 I d. at 389-90. 
84 Infra, p. 333, at pp. 347, 351. 
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sumables are valued as of the date of the gift. "Other mat-
ters" are valued as of the time of the accrual of the inherit-
ance, but not to exceed the value as of the date of the gift. 35 
There is a ten year cut-off point on the liability of donees; 36 
and no liability exists if the gift was made "in compliance 
with a moral duty or the rules of social propriety," 37 e.g., a 
gift made to an indigent blood relative, or a "reward for 
voluntary service." 38 The donee may refuse to return the gift 
upon payment of its value.39 Among several donees a prior 
donee is liable only in so far as a subsequent donee is not li-
able.40 And, finally, the claim of the "compulsory benefici-
ary" against the donee is barred in three years.41 
(b) Switzerland. The Swiss Civil Code has a more moder-
ate approach.42 Reduction of gifts to persons other than heirs 
is restricted to the following: ". . . 
3. Gifts which the donor had full liberty to re-
voke and those which he made within the five years 
preceding his death, with the exception of presents 
made on occasions when they are customary; 
4. Alienations made by the deceased with the evi-
dent intention of evading the rules restricting his 
freedom of disposition. 43 
And a measure of flexibility is provided: a child who is an 
invalid or who has not received his education is entitled to 
preferential benefits, payable either in a lump sum or as an 
annuity.44 Moreover, the surviving spouse may not take her 
compulsory share if she has been bequeathed a usufruct in 
the whole of the share of the common descendants. We have 
35 German Civil Code (Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch, cited hereafter as 
G.C.C.) §2325. For a definition of consumables see §92. 
36 G.C.C. §2325. 
37 G.C.C. §2330. 
38 I d., note (f). 
sg G.C.C. §2329. 
40 Ibid. 
41 G.C.C. §2332. 
42 For detailed provisions see Appendix B, infra. 
43 Swiss Civil Code, (cited hereafter as S.C.C.) §527 (1907). 
44 See id. art. 631 par. 2; arts. 14, 273-74. 
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already encountered this notion in New YorkY The Swiss 
also have a practicable approach to the problem of the dece-
dent's life insurance. When the policy is payable to a person 
other than a compulsory heir the redemption value as of the 
date of death is "added to the value of the estate" 46 and is 
subject to reductionY The permissible period for bringing 
the reduction action seems overly long (10 years after death), 
but this is to cover the contingency that the "evasion" may 
not be immediately discernible at the time of death. Once 
discovered, action must be brought within one year.48 
4. SoME IDEAS FROM THE CIVIL LAw 
The basic civil-law approach seems too inflexible. Stress 
on blood relationship- regardless of dependence- is foreign 
to the maintenance and contribution formula. Nevertheless, 
the civil-law experience may help us to solve some of the 
problems involved in legislative implementation of the 
formula. 
Take the question of valuation, for instance. The experi-
ence under the legitime indicates that no rule on this ques-
tion will be completely satisfactory, but that some rule must 
be adopted. Article 1505 of the Louisiana Civil Code states 
that in computing the value of the mass any inter vivos dona-
tion is fictitiously added "according to its value at the time of 
the donor's decease, in the state in which it was at the period 
of the donation." "Value" apparently means the market 
value of articles of like nature, not the inventory value nor 
the value stated on the assessment rolls. Article 1506 says 
that "In the fictitious collation of effects given by act inter 
vivos by the deceased, those which have perished by accident 
45 N.Y. Deced. Est. Law, §IS( d), discussed p. 74, supra. 
46 s.c.c. §476. 
4 7 Id., §529. 
48 I d., §533. For references to the Swedish system (reserved portion, 
subject to the child's right of maintenance) and to maintenance for 
children in Russia, see Yadin, "The Proposed Law of Succession for 
Israel," 2 AMER. J. CoMP. LAw, 152 (1953). 
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in the hands of the donee, are not included; those which have 
perished through his fault only are to be included." Pre-
sumably this means that the loss is borne by the succession if 
the property deteriorates through natural causes. The donee 
is credited with any increase in value attributable to his im-
provements; but increase due to natural causes or a rise in the 
market enures to the succession.49 As has already been men-
tioned, 50 the Germans distinguish between consumables and 
non-consumables. Consumables are valued as of the date 
of the gift (which seems harsh on the donee); and non-con-
sumables are valued as of the time of the accrual of the in-
heritance, but not to exceed the value as of the date of the 
gift. In the model statute suggested in the next chapter 51 I 
borrowed in part from the following Swiss provision: "A 
donee who has acted bona fide is liable to restore only the 
amount by which he is still enriched by the gift at the date 
of the opening of the succession." 52 
Consider also the civil-law rules relating to the order of 
reduction or "abatement," of inter vivos gifts, and to the 
"cut-off" point. As to reduction, under the civil law the inter 
vivos gifts usually are affected in reverse chronological order, 
the last in point of time being exhausted first. 58 This method 
has the great advantage of certainty, thus enhancing predicta-
bility. Moreover, the donee who takes last in point of time-
particularly when the gift was made close to the donor's 
49 See a well-written comment by r E. Pierson, in 12 TuL. L. REV. 
262, 270 (1938). "Suppose, for example," states Pierson, "that in 1920, 
A donated to B an automobile worth $900. In 1935, B sold the car 
to a second-hand dealer for $100. A died in 1937. Applying Article 
1505, the amount which should be computed in the mass of the suc-
cession is the value of the 1920 car in 1937 in the "state" in which it 
was in 1920. In such a case, the natural deteriorations would probably 
be borne by the succession." 
It may be seen that too literal a reading of Article 1505 involves 
complications. The Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance 
Statute §9(b), infra, Chap. 22, attempts to simplify the problem. 
5o See text at note 34, supra. 
51 Infra, p. 301. 
5 2 S.C.C. §528; see Appendix B, infra. 
53 E.g., S.C. C. §532. 
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death- is less likely to have a strong "reliance interest." In 
the suggested model statute, however, I thought it best to give 
the court a discretion in this matter, 54 in keeping with its dis-
cretion in other matters under the statute. The reliance inter-
est of the individual donees would, of course, influence the 
court's decision. The civil law "cut-off" provision furthers 
the reliance interest of all donees. The German Civil Code 
states: "The gift is not taken into consideration if, at the 
time of the accrual of the inheritance, ten years have elapsed 
since delivery of the object given .... " 55 The Swiss scheme 
affects gifts only when they were made within five years of 
death, unless they were revocable or made "with the evident 
intention of evading the rules restricting . . . freedom of 
disposition." 56 The "cut-off" idea appears in the model 
statute.57 
54 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, § 9, infra, 
Chap. 22. 
55 G.C.C. §2325. 
56 S.C.C. §527(3) and (4). 
57 Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Statute, § 8, 
infra, Chap. 22. 
CHAPTER 21 
The British Commonwealth "Decedent's 
Family Maintenance" Legislation 
1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Back in Chapter 5 we concluded that the solution to the 
American "evasion" problem lies in adoption of flexible 
legislative and judicial controls both on the decedent spouse's 
freedom of testation and on his freedom of inter vivos prop-
erty transmission. As far as controls on freedom of testation 
are concerned, the British Commonwealth Decedent's Family 
Maintenance statutes merit careful study. These statutes 
authorize the courts to award maintenance payments out of 
the decedent's estate to deserving members of the surviving 
family; and the case-law indicates that the scheme is a prac-
ticable one. The significance is obvious. If augmented by 
appropriate anti-evasion provisions these Commonwealth 
controls would embody the desired maintenance and contri-
bution formula. In other words, they suggest the answer to 
our "evasion" troubles. 
The year 1938 marked the close of a little over a century of 
unfettered freedom of testation in England. With the enact-
ment in that year of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1 
England 2 joined the ranks of Commonwealth jurisdictions 
that have adopted "maintenance" legislation.3 The distinc-
1 I & 2 Geo. 6, Chap. 45 (1938). Dainow has contributed a valuable 
account of the legislative history of the English act, including the 
arguments pro and con in the parliamentary debates on the successive 
bills, Dainow, "Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England," 
25 CORNELL L. Q. 337 (1940). 
2 The act does not affect Scotland or Northern Ireland. As the Scots 
would say, it applies only to the "Sassenachs." 
a "Family maintenance" legislation originated in New Zealand at 
the turn of the century. The Family Protection Act, 1900, N.Z. Stat. 
64 Viet. No. 20, as amended, N.Z. Stat. 11 Geo. 6, No. 60, §15 (1947). 
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tive feature of this type of legislation is its flexibility. Relief 
is tailored to individual need, in contrast with the fixed 
minimum portions of the legitime and of the typical Ameri-
can forced share. Under the English Act, for example, a court 
may order that periodic payments be made out of the income 
of the net estate if the court believes that the decedent did 
not make "reasonable provision" for the surviving spouse 
or natural and adopted children.4 In awarding maintenance 
payments, the court is to consider the interests of the persons 
who otherwise would be entitled to the property concerned, 
the financial position of the applicant, the conduct of the 
applicant with relation to the testator, the testator's reasons 
for his dispositions, and any other circumstances that the 
court deems relevant. The court may order a lump sum 
award when the estate is under a designated amount. The 
Similar statutes were passed in the Australian states in the following 
years: Victoria 1906, Tasmania 1912, Queensland 1914, New South 
Wales 1916, South Australia 1918, and Western Australia 1920. In 
Canada, British Columbia adopted the New Zealand act in substance 
in 1920, and the three other Western provinces finally passed restricted 
maintenance legislation in the following years: Alberta (1947), Saskat-
chewan (1940), and Manitoba (1946). Ontario entered the fold in 1929. 
The most recent account of maintenance legislation is found in the 
excellent article by Joseph Laufer: "Flexible Restraints on Testamentary 
Freedom-A Report on Decedent's Family Maintenance Legislation," 
69 HARv. L. REv. 277 (1955); also see Albery, THE INHERITANCE (FAMILY 
PROVISION) AcT 1938 (1950) (English); Macdonell & Sheard, PROBATE 
PRACTICE, 92-104 (1953) (Ontario); Mason, Tuthill, & Lennard, THE 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF TESTATORS' FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (1929); Smith, INTESTACY AND FAMILY 
PROVISION (1952) (English); Stephens, THE LAW RELATING TO TESTATORS' 
FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN NEW ZEALAND (1934); Tillard, FAMILY IN-
HERITANCE (2d ed. 1950) (English); Wright, TESTATORS' FAMILY MAIN-
TENANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (1954); Dainow, "Restricted 
Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada," 36 MicH. L. REv. 
1107 (1938); Kennedy, "Testators' Dependants Relief Legislation," 20 
IowA L. REv. 317 (1935); Wiren, "Testator's Family Maintenance in 
New Zealand," 45 L. Q. R. 378 (1929); Comments, 53 HARv. L. REv. 
465 (1940); 27 CAN. B. REV. 228 (1949); 18 id., 261, 449 (1940); 17 id., 
181, 233 (1939). 
4 Relief may be applied for by a wife or husband, a daughter who 
has not been married or who is by virtue of mental or physical disability 
incapable of maintaining herself, an infant son or a son who is by rea-
son of mental or physical disability incapable of maintaining himself. 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, §1(1) (1938). 
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court may also attach conditions to the award; and in any 
event the payments end upon the cessation of the dependence, 
e.g., when the widow remarries. By recent amendment the 
English act was made applicable to intestate estates. 5 Never-
theless, it remains narrower in scope than many of the other 
Commonwealth statutes. Under the parent New Zealand act, 
for example, the class of eligible dependents includes parents 
and illegitimate children; periodic payments may be made 
out of capital; and there are no restrictions on lump sum 
awards. 
Despite their heavy responsibility under this type of legis-
lation the courts have done an efficient and conscientious 
job.6 If anything, they have been conservative in dealing 
with applications. Consider, for example, the fundamental 
inquiry as to whether or not the decedent made a "reason-
able" or an "adequate" provision for his dependents. As an 
English commentator has said, the English statute envisages 
a reasonable provision as "not a single point but an area." 7 
In short, there is a range - the extent of which depends on 
the circumstances -within which provisions of varying 
amounts all could be classed as reasonable. Any provision 
less than the lower limit of that range confers jurisdiction on 
the court. The result is that judicial interference with the 
decedent's plan of distribution is kept to a minimum. Ironi-
cally, sometimes judicial intervention has the incidental 
effect of carrying out the decedent's intention: thus the 
testator may have changed his mind after making the will, or 
the provision made for the applicant may have been frus-
trated by subsequent events or by the operation of some legal 
doctrine. 
s Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, Chap. 64, 
Mitchell, "Intestates' Estates Act 1952," 16 MoDERN L. REv. 206, 211 
(1953). 
6 Laufer, "Flexible Restraints on Testation, " 69 HARV. L. REv. 277. 
293 (1955). 
7 Albery, THE INHERITANCE (FAMILY PRoVISION) AcT, 1938, 8 (1950); 
Macdonell and Sheard, PROBATE PRACTICE, 96 (1953); Unger, "The In-
heritance Act and the Family," 6 MoDERN L. REv. 215, 224 (1943); 
Note, 72 L. Q. R. 18 (1956). 
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In fixing the amount of the award the Commonwealth 
courts consider "that moral duty which a just, but not a lov-
ing, husband or father owes towards his wife or towards his 
children, as the case may be .... " 8 It is conceived to be a 
moral duty of the husband to give the widow more than the 
bare means of subsistence.9 In general, the maintenance 
award approximates her standard of living during her hus-
band's lifetime, as circumscribed by the amount in the hus-
band's estate, her own financial position, and the merits other-
wise of her claim. 
The award is generally made in the form of an annuity. 
This tends to protect the dependent from the perils stemming 
from inexperience in business or investments; at the same 
time, it leaves the rest of the estate free for distribution. A 
lump sum settlement is sometimes expedient, owing to the 
small size of the estate or urgent need on the part of the ap-
plicant. When future needs cannot be presently ascertained 
the courts usually have been willing to issue a "suspensory 
order," which ties up the estate for the time being.10 
The maintenance scheme has not resulted in a flood of liti-
gation. In fact, relatively few cases have resulted,11 in contrast 
with the vast crop of headnotes that have bobbed up under 
the New York forced share legislation of 1930. Undoubtedly 
the discretionary nature of maintenance legislation, which 
discourages unmerited claims, has much to do with this phe-
nomenon. 
The maintenance claim must be meritorious, in addition 
to showing need. Maintenance legislation is not a public 
welfare device, although it may have the incidental effect of 
alleviating the strain on the tax rate. The scheme taps the 
s Allardice v. Allardice, 29 N.Z.L.R. 959, 973 (1910), aff'd, [19II] A.C. 
730 (P.C.). 
9 I d. at 969. In re Borthwick, f1949l 395, the widow had been 
left an annuity of 250 pounds, and the net estate amounted to 130,000 
pounds; held, annuity increased to 1000 pounds. See however, Note 
by V. Evan Gray, 17 CAN. B. REv. 233 (1939). 
10 Laufer, supra, note 6, at 292. 
11 I d. at 314. 
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decedent's own funds, in those cases in which the decedent 
was morally remiss in not providing adequate post-mortem 
support for his family. In other words, the awards are made 
only when the decedent could have and should have made 
them. This ad hoc enquiry into the merits of the case means 
that the amount of the award is not necessarily determined 
by demonstrated need. Thus a New Zealand judge: "I think 
. . . that the plaintiff's conduct as a husband in those respects 
in which it fell short must be taken into account in consider-
ing the quantum of relief to be granted." 12 It is not surpris-
ing that the courts are more disposed to grant relief to widows 
than to widowers; that they are more solicitous of minor 
children than of adult children; and that the length of the 
marriage is a relevant, although not decisive, factor. More-
over, the very flexibility of the maintenance scheme makes it 
ideal for reconciling the conflicting family claims arising from 
remarriages. Indeed, the wide latitude given to the courts 
is reflected in the occasional decision preferring the actual 
"homemaker" to the one who had been a wife in name 
only.13 
2. INTER VIvos "EvASIONs" 
The maintenance claim is just as vulnerable to inter vivos 
transfers as is the widow's share under the typical American 
statute, but so far there seems to be no critical "evasion" prob-
lem in maintenance jurisdictions. Not all Commonwealth 
statutes cover the point, but those that do so provide only for 
maintenance out of the "estate." The handful of decisions 
involving inter vivos transfers take the position that property 
12 Williams v. Cotton, [1953] N.Z.L.R. 151, 153 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
1a E.g., Re Joslin, [1941] Ch. 200, 1 All. E. R. 302. Here the hus-
band's will left all of his small estate (about 370 pounds) to the woman 
with whom he was living and by whom he had had two small children. 
He had deserted his wife after they had lived together "reasonably 
happily" for 19 years. The other woman was not destitute, but the 
widow had a small income. The widow's application was rejected. Cf. 
Andrews v. Andrews, [1940] P. 184 (divorce case), 4 MoDERN L. REV. 307 
(1941). In general, see Unger, "The Inheritance Act and the Family," 
6 MODERN L. REV. 215 (1943). 
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passing by these transfers cannot be considered part of the 
"estate." 14 There is, however, authority to the effect that a 
contract to leave property by will does not supersede mainte-
nance legislation.15 
Why such a paucity of litigation over inter vivos "eva-
sions?" Does it mean that the maintenance system is intrinsi-
cally superior to the system of forced shares in preventing 
evasions - or is there some other explanation? To answer 
these questions we must consider the evasion cases from the 
viewpoint of the equities. 
The maintenance system seems superior in all cases in 
which the equities are clearly against the surviving spouse. 
14 In re Paulin, (1950] Viet. L. R. 462 (payments into bank account 
with testator as trustee); In re Knight, New Zealand [1939] GLR 673, 
675-76 (testator in late seventies buys expensive annuities "in a perverse 
intention to exclude his family from participation ... in his estate"); 
Thompson v. Thompson [1933] N.Z.L.R. Supp. 59 (gift of farm and 
stock three months before death); Re Dalton and Macdonald [1938] 
I W.W.R. 758, 52 B.C.R. 473, 2 D.L.R. 798 (B.C.) (life insurance pay-
able to children held immune to widow's attack); Re Kerslake [1957] 
S.C.R. 516 (life insurance); Dumoulin v. Dumoulin [1939] 
Ont. C.A. (unreported case discussed by V. Evan Gray in 17 CAN. B. 
REv. 233, 237-8 (1939); gift of money made shortly before death, donee 
agreeing to maintain donor during his lifetime and pay his funeral 
expenses, the balance to go to the donee); cf. Nosworthy v. Nosworthy 
[1906] 26 N.Z.L.R. 285 (special power of appointment); Re Dawson 
[1945] 3. D.L.R. 532 (B. C. Sup. Ct.) (checks issued and cashed within a 
week of death held to be in payment of earnings); Re Young [1955] 
O.W.N. 789, 791 (Surr. Ct. Ont.) (federal annuity); Naylor v. Grantley 
[1940] I D.L.R. 716 (Ont.) (assignment of life insurance to nurse; 
opinion indecisive). Also see Albery, THE INHERITANCE (FAMILY PRo-
VISION) AcT, 1938, 17 (1950); Macdonell & Sheard, PRoBATE PRACTICE, 91 
(1953). 
15 Dillon v. Public Trustee of New Zealand [1941] A.C. 294 (contract 
before second marriage to leave farm to children of first marriage, 
who had supplied valuable consideration); cf. Olin v. Perrin, [1946] 2 
D.L.R. 461, O.R. 54 (C.A.) (Ont.). The Dillon case is criticized in 19 
CAN. B. REV. 603 (1941), 20 id. 72 (1942), Theobald, WILLS, 95 (lith ed. 
1954), and is praised in 20 CAN. B. REv. 756 (1941). Also see Notes, 
Kiralfy, "Freedom of Testation under the English Inheritance Act of 
1938," 61 JuRm. L. REv. 186, 189; S. J. Bailey in 6 CoNVEY. (N.S.) 63, 64 
(1941). On contracts to make a will as a device for "evasion" of 
the American statutory share, see Appendix D, infra, p. 366. On the 
effect of an agreement by the dependent not to claim maintenance, see 
Laufer, supra, note 6, 300-02; National Assistance Board v. Parkes 
[1955] 3 W.L.R. 347, 3 All E.R. I, 19 MoDERN L. REv. 90 (1956). 
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Here there can be no evasion problem; she cannot legiti-
mately complain about inter vivos transfers if she is not even 
entitled to maintenance. This in turn enhances the stability 
of property transactions. Thus when a husband makes gen-
erous inter vivos provision for the wife, or when she is in-
dependently wealthy, or when she is clearly remiss in her 
marital obligations, the maintenance legislation prevents her 
from upsetting the husband's estate-planning arrangements. 
Under the American scheme, however, she can blunder in 
like a cow in a china shop. 
When the equities favor the applicant, however, the Com-
monwealth legislation seemingly provides no protection 
against inter vivos transfers- probably even less protection 
than under the American legislation, where there are at least 
some judicial controls on some types of transfer. Why, then, 
so few "evasion" cases under the maintenance statutes? Why 
no village Hampden to cry the doctrine of illusory transfers? 
The answer, if there be one, may lie in a combination of fac-
tors. For one thing, marital disharmony is probably not as 
acute in the Commonwealth, if divorce statistics are a reliable 
guide.16 Possibly marriage settlements are more popular in 
the Commonwealth, although we cannot be sureY We as-
sume that the Commonwealth lawyers are well aware that the 
maintenance statutes are vulnerable to inter vivos transfers; 18 
but perhaps counsel for the applicants consider the validity 
of these transfers to be too well settled to risk litigation. 
Whatever the answer, the authorities have not been un-
16 But cf. Mace, "Family Life in Britain Since the First World War," 
272 ANNALS AMER. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 179, 182 (1950). Some Com-
monwealth jurisdictions have narrow divorce laws. On the other hand, 
this circumstance seemingly would incite inter vivos "evasions." See 
discussion supra, pp. 12-15. 
17 The figures given in Wedgwood, THE EcoNoMics oF INHERITANCE 
(1929) at p. 237 indicate substantial marriage settlements, at least up to 
1926. 
1 8 The Appendix to Albery, THE INHERITANCE (FAMILY PRoviSioN) 
AcT, 1938 (1950) contains a form of trust deed entitled "Settlement 
upon Mistress and Illegitimate Child for Purpose of Evading the Pro-
visions of the Act." 
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aware of the problem.19 Nor can there be any doubt that 
maintenance legislation would need anti-evasion provisions 
if it is to be completely effective in the United States. 
We may profit in this respect by the Israeli example. The 
"ingathering of the dispersed" 20 has inspired a survey of the 
laws of all countries. The object is a fresh start, with the 
emphasis on practicability. In the field of succession law this 
has resulted in the preparation of a draft bill 21 which adopts 
the British Commonwealth family maintenance scheme. One 
of the most interesting points about this bill is the realistic 
acknowledgement that protection is needed against inter 
vivos evasion. Section 74 provides: 
"If the estate is not sufficient to provide mainte-
nance for all entitled to it, the court may consider 
as included in the estate: 
( 1) Anything disposed of by the decedent during 
his lifetime that may be reasonably considered to 
have been so disposed with the intent of defeating 
maintenance rights. 
19 I have a letter from Sir Clifton Webb, Minister of Justice for New 
Zealand, dated 14th April, 1953, stating that the general opinion in 
New Zealand is that deliberate inter vivos evasions of the maintenance 
legislation are infrequent. I have permission to quote the letter, which 
states in part: 
" ... The majority of testators who exclude relatives from a 
share in their estate probably consider that they are justified 
in doing so. The general practice has grown up that where a 
testator by his will excludes a relative who would be entitled 
to claim under the Act a special note of the reasons is taken 
with the instructions for the will. If a claim is made later the 
trustees are then able to give this information to the Court. 
Cases rarely come before the courts simply because the law on 
the subject is quite clear. We have not, however, been indif-
Jerent to the problem. The only reason why nothing has been 
done to amend the legislation is that we have not succeeded 
in devising a practicable method of avoiding dispositions made 
to defeat claims without causing as many anomalies and in-
justices as are cured. The question was last considered a year 
or so ago by our Law Revision Committee which decided that 
no practicable remedy was possible." 
2o Yadin, "The Proposed Law of Succession for Israel," 2 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 143, 147 (1953). 
21 A SuccESSION BILL FOR IsRAEL 93-107 (Harvard Law School Transl. 
1952); id. (Sept. 1953 Revision) 27-33 (Harvard Law School Transl. 
1954). 
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(2) Anything given away by the decedent within 
two years of his death without consideration. 
The court may order the donee to return to the 
estate or to pay maintenance in an amount equal 
to what is left in his hands at the time of the dece-
dent's death and if he did not receive it in good faith 
in an amount equal to what he received." 
The flexibility and simplicity of the Israeli anti-evasion 
provisions is of course in keeping with the spirit of mainte-
nance legislation. An equally flexible but somewhat more 
detailed proposal is made in the Suggested Model Decedent's 
Family Maintenance Act, which appears in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 22 
Suggested Model Decedent's Family 
Maintenance Act 
The provisions of this tentative draft follow the growing 
trend toward shifting the burden of support from the state to 
the individual who is, or should be, responsible for main-
taining his immediate dependents. Indicative of this trend is 
the widely adopted Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, which is aimed at that individual when he is living. 
The suggested family maintenance act extends the responsi-
bility of support in favor of his immediate surviving family. 
The over-all purpose is twofold: to provide reasonable sup-
port for the surviving family and to recognize and delineate 
the decedent's power of inter vivos alienation. 
The draft does not purport to be free from imperfections. 
It has not had the advantage .of extensive scrutiny by special-
ists in the field or by persons who would have the task of 
practical administration. It is offered in the hope that it 
will be useful to those who are concerned with the reform of 
succession law. 
The proposal consists of family maintenance legislation 
buttressed with anti-evasion provisions. The basic aim is to 
associate curbs on disinheritance with financial need. Pro-
tection against testamentary transfers is given only to im-
mediate members of the decedent's surviving "family" who 
have not received a reasonable provision from the decedent 
by way of testamentary or inter vivos transfer, or pursuant to 
the intestacy laws. The emphasis on financial need puts the 
evasion problem in proper focus. The petitioner who is 
denied maintenance is thereby precluded from complaining 
about the testator's inter vivos transfers. In other words, 
maintenance litigation and anti-evasion litigation can occur 
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only when the testator has not made reasonable provision for 
specified dependents. Hence much of the evasion problem 
disappears. 
For the successful petitioner, however, the anti-evasion pro-
tection is comprehensive. The act provides for judicial con-
trol over practically all inter vivos transfers that are made 
within a designated period of time before death. In this re-
spect the act is much broader than current judicial doctrine; 
for example, the "illusory transfer" test catches only revocable 
transfers. In other respects the act is narrower and more 
selective. It affects only those transfers that, when viewed 
alone or in the aggregate, are unreasonably large (section 6); 
it establishes cut-off dates (section 8); and it directs the court 
to keep in mind any injurious effect on the transferee (sec-
tion 9). 
Large discretionary power is placed in the courts. This dis-
cretion must be exercised on three main issues. First, the 
court must decide whether the petitioner is entitled to main-
tenance (section 3). Second, whenever the estate is insufficient 
to provide appropriate maintenance awards, the court may 
order contribution from an inter vivos transferee if the court 
determines that the transfer was unreasonably large. The 
"unreasonableness" of the amount of the transfer is tested by 
reference to circumstances prevailing at the time of the trans-
fer (section 6). Third, if the transfer is held unreasonably 
large, the court must then determine the amount of contri-
bution, if any, to be made by the transferee. In the last men-
tioned inquiry the courts are directed to balance the equities; 
they must consider the injurious effect on the particular 
transferee (section 9). 
The reliance interest of transferees is reflected in cut-off 
provisions (section 8), in waiver provisions (section 17), and 
in the provision for a hearing in the decedent's lifetime to 
determine the reasonableness of the transfer (section 18). 
Administration of the act is allocated to the courts that 
have jurisdiction in matters of an equitable nature. These 
courts will be aided by permanent fact-finding officials. Un-
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deniably, the heavy responsibility placed on the courts may 
pose a problem in judicial administration. The act is based 
on the assumption that American judicial personnel can and 
will assume that responsibility. In view of the British Com-
monwealth experience there is no insuperable reason why 
maintenance legislation could not be used successfully in this 
country. Moreover, our analysis of the case-law on "evasions" 
of the statutory share suggests that the American courts tend 
to balance the equities in these cases. The proposed act 
would give legislative sanction to this tendency. 
The act is intended to be a complete replacement for the 
statutory share and for judicial doctrines relating to "eva-
sion" of the statutory share. The act should also supplant in-
choate dower. A legislature that so wished could use the act 
in conjunction with inchoate dower, but the inflexible nature 
of dower makes the combination an undesirable one. The 
act would supplement and further the purpose of homestead 
legislation. Before enactment it would need to be co-ordi-
nated with statutes permitting summary distribution of the 
assets of small estates. It should supplant existing family al-
lowance statutes. 
SUGGESTED MODEL DECEDENT'S FAMILY 
MAINTENANCE ACT 
SECTION I. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context 
requires otherwise: 
(a) "Child" includes: 
(1) a legitimate son or daughter of the decedent; 
(2) an adopted son or daughter of the decedent; 
(3) an illegitimate son or daughter of the dece-
dent, who immediately prior to the dece-
dent's death was wholly or partially sup-
ported by the decedent or entitled by law 
to receive such support; 
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(4) a stepchild who immediately prior to the de-
cedent's death was wholly or partially sup-
ported by the decedent or entitled by law 
to receive such support; 
(5) a posthumous son or daughter of the dece-
dent, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 
COMMENT 
The act does not apply to grandchildren. This restriction 
represents a compromise between the conflicting policies of 
family support and finality of property transactions. In most 
instances the decedent has no legal or moral responsibility to 
support his grandchildren. If he assumes the responsibility 
of support, the chances of deliberate disinheritance seem 
slight. The exclusion of grandchildren may bring about oc-
casional hardship cases, but to include them would un-
doubtedly entail administrative inconvenience as well as un-
certainty for transferees. This reasoning also applies a fortiori 
to other relatives or non-relatives who may have been sup-
ported by the decedent in his lifetime. However, some states 
impose support duties in favor of needy grandchildren, par-
ents, or grandparents. See the table of basic support duties in 
the introduction to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9A, 1956 Supp. 
p. 103. Further, some states protect the divorcee who, not 
having remarried, was at the time of her husband's death re-
ceiving or entitled to receive support from him. In such 
states the present act could be expanded to give correspond-
ing protection. Section 2 limits the present act to a child 
under 18, unless he is incapable of maintaining himself. 
Illegitimate children are included if supported by the dece-
dent in his lifetime, or if entitled to such support. "Entitled 
by law to receive such support" envisages the legal formalities 
that may be required in the decedent's lifetime, e.g., acknowl-
edgement. It also protects the illegitimate child whose parent 
failed to meet an existing support obligation. 
A stepchild is eligible only if the decedent assumed the 
responsibility. Once the responsibility is assumed the step-
child will be "entitled by law to receive such support"; 
whether or not the support is given. 
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(b) "Court" means the court with original jurisdiction 
over matters of an equitable nature. 
COMMENT 
The act rests on broad and novel judicial controls. This 
makes it desirable to use the "equity" court instead of the 
probate court. In some states probate judges need not be 
lawyers. In many states the probate court lacks the equitable 
powers that are needed to enforce an order under section 6 
requiring contribution from a transferee. Cf. Note, "Equi-
table Jurisdiction of Probate Courts and Finality of Probate 
Decrees," 48 YALE L. J. 1273 (1939). 
(c) "Estate" means the property of the decedent that is 
transmitted at his death by testamentary disposition or under 
the laws dealing with intestacy, less amounts required for pay-
ment of taxes, funeral expenses, administration expenses, and 
secured and unsecured claims. For the purposes of this act 
"estate" includes: 
(1) any property that is transmitted at the dece-
dent's death by the exercise, non-exercise, re-
lease, or lapse of a power of appointment created 
or reserved by the decedent, within ten years of 
his death, exercisable by any person or persons 
including the decedent; 
(2) any property of the decedent that is subject at 
the decedent's death to an unexercised power 
of appointment created or reserved by the dece-
dent within ten years of his death, exercisable 
by any person or persons including the dece-
dent; 
(3) any property that is transmitted by the decedent 
at the time of his death by the exercise, non-ex-
ercise, release, or lapse of a power of appoint-
ment created by a person other than the dece-
dent, and exercisable by the decedent in favor 
of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the 
creditors of his estate. "Estate" does not include 
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any property as described in this clause if the 
power of appointment was exercisable by the de-
cedent only in conjunction with a person or 
persons having a substantial interest in the 
property, subject to the power, which is ad-
verse to exercise of the power in favor of the 
decedent. 
COMMENT 
Elective rights under the American statutory share usually 
are subordinated to the claims of creditors (Chapter 2, supra, 
text at note 5). Apparently there is a corresponding limita-
tion on maintenance privileges under the British Common-
wealth family maintenance statutes. Cf. WRIGHT, TESTATOR's 
FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN AusTRALIA AND NEw ZEALAND, 4 
1954). 
For the purposes of this act "estate" is deemed to include 
property transmitted at the decedent's death by virtue of a 
power of appointment created or reserved by the decedent. 
It includes any property which at the decedent's death is sub-
ject to an unexercised power of this type. It also includes prop-
erty which the decedent transmits at his death by virtue of a 
general power of appointment created by another person. In-
clusion of these general powers in the definition of "estate" 
prevents the "relation back" doctrine (Chapter 16, supra, text 
at note 27) from excluding the maintenance claim of the sur-
viving family. The language pertaining to general powers is 
taken from the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §2041. 
Section 1 (c) (1) and (2). These two clauses affect powers of 
appointment reserved by the decedent in connection with a 
transfer. They also affect powers of appointment created by 
the decedent with no accompanying transfer. The ten-year 
restriction is inserted in order to co-ordinate subsection (c) 
with section 8. Section 8 establishes a ten-year cut-off date 
with respect to the liability of transferees to contribute to 
maintenance awards. 
The act does not cover special powers of appointment 
created by a person other than the decedent. The disposition 
of such property is within the owner's discretion. But if the 
owner places his property at the disposal of the decedent, 
under a general power, the decedent will not be permitted to 
evade his family responsibilities. 
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(d) "Transfer" means any postnuptial inter vivos trans-
mission of property by the decedent for substantially less than 
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's 
worth. "Transfer" includes any such transmission of property 
at any time after the birth of an illegitimate child whether or 
not the decedent later marries the child's other parent. For 
the purposes of this act a transmission of property in a gen-
uine business transaction will be considered as made for an 
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 
"Transfer" includes, but is not restricted to, a transmission 
of the decedent's property effected by such methods as gift, 
gift causa mortis, revocable or irrevocable trust, creation of 
any joint interest, contract to make a will, and any contract, 
such as life insurance, under which the decedent purchased 
benefits payable at his death. Concerning powers of appoint-
ment, "transfer" means a transmission of the decedent's prop-
erty effected by the exercise, non-exercise, release, or lapse 
of the powers of appointment described in the definition of 
"estate" in clauses (1) and (3) of section 1 (c). 
CoMMENT 
The first sentence restricts the act to postnuptial transfers. 
For a discussion of antenuptial transfers see Appendix C. 
Since the act is limited to postnuptial transfers, the second 
sentence is needed in order to protect the illegitimate child 
whose parents never intermarried. Such a child would be ex-
cluded from the contribution provisions if he could complain 
only about "postnuptial" transfers. Concerning other peti-
tioners, "postnuptial" must be related to the marriage with 
which the petitioner is associated. For the widow it refers to 
her marriage with the decedent. For a child it refers to the 
marriage of his parents, even though the decedent may later 
have remarried. 
The first sentence also confines the act to those transfers 
which are either totally or partially gratuitous. Payment of 
substantially less than an adequate and full consideration will 
not suffice to take a transfer out of the act. It is, however, a 
factor that the court must consider under section 7 (4) in de-
ciding the amount of contribution, if any, that is payable by 
the transferee. The word "substantially" is intended to ob-
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viate any question of the act applying to ordinary business 
transfers. This notion is also expressed in the second sen-
tence, which excludes a "genuine business transaction." The 
act is not intended to infringe upon commercial transactions. 
In other words, the act is designed to catch avowed or dis-
guised gifts but not bad business bargains. 
The first sentence of the second paragraph is designed to 
catch all gratuitous postnuptial dispositive devices except 
those that are specifically excluded. For example, the act ap-
plies to deeds of realty, gifts of personalty (see supra} p. 193), 
gifts causa mortis (pp. 197-198), revocable trusts (p. 201), ir-
revocable trusts (p. 205), bank account trusts, joint bank ac-
counts, joint tenancies (p. 213), United States savings bonds 
(p. 230), partnership interests (p. 235), contracts to make a 
will (p. 372), life insurance (p. 241), annuities providing death 
benefits, employee death benefits, pecuniary obligations of 
the decedent payable at his death, and purchases by the dece-
dent with title taken in the name of another. Some of these 
devices, of course, represent the result of a transfer as well as 
a method of transfer; for example, trusts. The existing case 
law pertaining to each of the above mentioned devices is dis-
cussed in Chapters 12-16 supra. The page references in paren-
theses indicate a discussion of the application of the act to 
the device in question. 
Contracts to make a will are anomalous. These contracts 
normally are antenuptial and they often involve adequate 
consideration in money or money's worth. The proposed act 
would affect only postnuptial contracts. Under the existing 
case law, however, the courts tend to give adequate protection 
to the surviving spouse against the contract to make a will; 
see Appendix D, p. 373 infra. If the proposed legislative 
scheme is adopted it is probable that this tendency will be 
more pronounced, as far as antenuptial contracts are con-
cerned. It may also be hoped that this judicial protection will 
be extended to children. 
The last sentence concerns powers of appointment. "Trans-
fer" is deemed to encompass the transmission of property in 
the decedent's lifetime by virtue of the powers of appoint-
ment previously described in the definition of "estate." Such 
"transfers" are affected by the act only if they occur subse-
quent to the applicable cut-off dates. These cut-off dates, 
which apply to all transfers otherwise subject to the act, are 
set out in section 8. 
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(e) "Transferee" means the recipient of the beneficial in-
terest in the property concerned. "Transferee" includes a 
person who succeeds to such an interest upon the transferee's 
death, and any immediate or remote taker from the original 
transferee who provides substantially less than an adequate 
and full consideration in money or money's worth. "Trans-
feree" does not include a person who acquires property or its 
proceeds by judicial sale or by condemnation proceedings 
from the decedent, from the original transferee, or from any 
subsequent taker. 
COMMENT 
The first sentence states in part that a "transferee" is the 
person beneficially entitled to the property in question. This 
is intended to preclude the possibility of a mere title-holder, 
e.g., a fiduciary, being liable for contribution. 
The second sentence includes in the definition of "trans-
feree" any immediate or remote taker from the original trans-
feree who does not provide sufficient consideration. The 
purpose is to prevent evasion of the act by avowed or dis-
guised gifts on the part of a transferee. For restrictions on the 
amount contributable by any transferee, see section 9. 
SECTION 2. Eligible petitioners. A petition for maintenance 
may be filed by or on behalf of the following persons and no 
others: 
(I) the surviving spouse; 
(2) a child who at the time of the decedent's death 
was under eighteeen; or 
(3) a child who at the time of the decedent's death 
was eighteen or over but physically or mentally 
incapable of maintaining himself. 
COMMENT 
This section limits the class of persons eligible to petition 
for maintenance to the decedent's spouse and children. The 
reasons for this limitation are set out in the comment to Sec-
tion I (a), which defines "child." Under section 11 (a) (3) 
periodic payments to an unmarried daughter under eighteen 
will cease upon her marriage. The procedure in filing peti-
tions is set out in section 10. 
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SECTION 3. Power of court to award maintenance. The court 
may award maintenance from the estate in any amount it 
deems just if it determines that under the circumstances pre-
vailing at the date of decedent's death the petitioner has not 
received a reasonable provision from the decedent by way of 
testamentary or inter vivos disposition or under the laws 
dealing with intestacy. 
This section empowers the court to award maintenance to 
any petitioner who has "not received a reasonable provision" 
from the decedent. This phrase is vague by design; however, 
it gains some content from the provisions of section 4 which 
set out the factors to be considered by the court. The rea-
sonableness of the provision made by the decedent is deter-
mined as of the time of death. This will prejudice the peti-
tioner who experiences sudden and unanticipated need 
between the time of decedent's death and the time of the 
hearing. But these rare instances should not be within the 
decedent's responsibility. Moreover, the court is empowered 
under section l3(b) to award temporary maintenance. 
Unlike the English family maintenance legislation, there 
is no limitation on the proportion of the estate that may be 
appropriated for maintenance awards. The provision made 
by the decedent may be inadequate even though it amounts 
to a sizeable fraction or all of the estate, since the estate may 
have been depleted by inter vivos transfers to persons other 
than the petitioner. The provision made by the decedent for 
the petitioner may have been made at any time, even ante-
nuptially, since it includes, but is not restricted to, postnuptial 
"transfers." The act also applies when the decedent dies in-
testate. Sometimes the intestacy statutes may work an in-
justice. Florida, for example, gives the widow merely a child's 
share; Fla. Stat. §731.23 (1957). Ordinarily the widow would 
need more than a child's share. 
SECTION 4. Criteria of a reasonable provision. In determin-
ing whether the petitioner has received a reasonable provision 
from the decedent the court shall consider: 
(1) the petitioner's present and future financial 
need; 
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(2) any federal or state benefits receivable by the 
petitioner that are not predicated on his finan-
cial need; 
(3) the value of the estate; 
(4) the amount transferred by the decedent to per-
sons other than the petitioner; 
(5) the petitioner's conduct toward the decedent; 
and 




This section provides criteria to guide the court in deter-
mining whether the decedent made reasonable provision for 
the petitioner. The main criterion is the petitioner's finan-
cial need, set out in clause (1). Clause (I) must be read in 
conjunction with section 11, which states that maintenance 
payments are to be terminated in certain instances, e.g., upon 
a child attaining the age of eighteen. 
Under clause (2) the court must take into account any pub-
lic benefits receivable by the petitioner that are not predi-
cated on his financial need. Since the decedent, as a taxpayer, 
has already contributed to these benefits he is not acting 
unreasonably if he denies equivalent aid to the petitioner. 
The British Commonwealth courts apparently assume that 
"if the individual may have support from the state for the 
asking he may not claim it from the estate." Laufer, "Flex-
ible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on De-
cedent's Family Maintenance Legislation," 69 HARV. L. REv. 
277, 303-04 (1955). This approach seems particularly appro-
priate under the present act in view of the potential liability 
of transferees. 
Under clause (4) the court must consider transfers made to 
other persons, since the size of these transfers bears on the 
reasonableness of the provision made for the petitioner. 
Consideration of the petitioner's conduct is essential if the 
court, in the classic formula of the Privy Council, is to "place 
itself in the position of the testator and consider what he 
ought to have done in all the circumstances of the case, treat-
ing the testator for that purpose as a wise and just, rather 
than a fond and foolish, husband and father." Bosch v. Per-
310 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
petual Trustee Co., [1938] A.C. 463, 478-79. Thus, under 
clause (5) the court must consider the moral claim of the peti-
tioner. Normally this will be the moral claim of the surviving 
spouse, since the decedent should, within reason, be expected 
to make adequate provision for his children regardless of 
their conduct. The claim may be a strong one, e.g., material 
contribution to the decedent's financial resources. On the 
other hand, it may be such as to justify rejection of the peti-
tion, e.g., desertion on the part of a spouse. 
SECTION 5. Apportionment of burden of maintenance award. 
(a) The burden of any maintenance award shall be borne 
by the persons beneficially entitled to the estate in proportion 
to the value of their respective interests in the estate. The 
court may order otherwise if it determines that pro rata 
apportionment would work exceptional hardship on any such 
person. 
(b) For the purposes of this section the interests of persons 
successively entitled to any property in the estate shall not be 
separately valued. The portion of the burden of the main-
tenance award allocated to the property under this section 
shall be charged against the corpus. 
COMMENT 
Subsection (a). Provision is made for pro rata abatement of 
all estate assets in apportioning the burden of maintenance 
payments. The court is empowered to deviate, since pro rata 
abatement may in some cases be inequitable. There is no 
requirement that the court must follow the decedent's direc-
tions on apportionment. His directions might unduly prej-
udice a person eligible to apply for maintenance. 
The entire section may be found, with slightly different 
phraseology, in several British Commonwealth family main-
tenance statutes, e.g., New South Wales Stat., 3 Geo. 6 No. 
30, §6 (2) (1938). 
SECTION 6. Power of court to order contribution. 
(a) If the estate is insufficient to provide for appropriate 
maintenance awards the court may order a transferee subject 
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to its jurisdiction to contribute to the awards. No transferee 
shall be liable for contribution unless the court determines 
that the transfer was unreasonably large under the circum-
stances prevailing at the time of the transfer. 
(b) This act does not apply to antenuptial transfers or 
judicial remedies with respect thereto. 
CoMMENT 
Subsection (a). The court is empowered to order trans-
ferees subject to its jurisdiction to contribute to the support 
of the surviving family. 
The conflict of laws poses problems. The act has not been 
limited to resident petitioners. Neither has it been restricted 
to local decedents. Hence, a petitioner residing in state X 
can reach the decedent's immovables located in state X even 
though the decedent died domiciled in state Y. But the peti-
tioner will be at a disadvantage with respect to the decedent's 
property located in state Y, particularly immovables; cf. 
Scoles, "Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in Ad-
ministration of Decedents' Estates," 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 151 
172-80 (1955) (family allowance); Ehrenzweig, "Interstate 
Recognition of Support Duties." 42 CALIF. L. REv. 382 
(1954). Also, it may not be possible to obtain contribution 
from non-resident transferees. Whenever the court has ef-
fective jurisdiction for its contribution order, however, sub-
sequent interstate enforcement may be feasible under the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
The second sentence of subsection (a) limits the liability 
of transferees to transfers that are adjudged "unreasonably 
large." The court must place itself in the position of the dece-
dent, keeping in mind the decedent's moral obligation to 
make a reasonable provision for his surviving family. Since 
a compromise must be made between family support and 
finality of property transactions, the inquiry relates to cir-
cumstances at the time of the transfer. This enhances pre-
dictability for both the transferee and the decedent. The 
transferee is not liable for contribution if the transfer was 
reasonable at the time it was made) even though the dece-
dent's wealth should subsequently have diminished. The 
estate planner can eliminate much of the transferee's uncer-
tainty by giving the potential petitioners enough to preclude 
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a successful petition, and in addition, by obtaining a waiver 
from the spouse. 
Lapse of time since the date of the transfer is irrelevant; 
in determining whether the transfer was unreasonably large 
the court is only concerned with the circumstances at the 
time of the transfer. Lapse of time may be decisive under 
section 8, however, which bars the court from exacting con-
tribution when the transfer was made prior to specified cut-
off dates. Moreover, it is an important factor under section 
9, where the court must look into the reliance interest of the 
transferee before determining the amount of contribution 
payable. 
Subsection (b). This subsection states that the act does not 
affect antenuptial transfers. These transfers are discussed in 
Appendix C. 
SECTION 7. Criteria of an unreasonably large transfer. In de-
termining whether a transfer was unreasonably large the 
court shall consider: 
( 1) The ratio of the wealth transferred to the 
wealth retained. 
(2) The aggregate of the wealth transferred under 
prior and simultaneous transfers to any trans-
feree. For this purpose the court shall consider 
all transfers drawn to its attention, whether 
made prior or subsequent to the appropriate 
cut-off dates referred to in section 8. 
(3) Any moral or legal obligation of the decedent to 
make the transfer. 
(4) The amount, in money or money's worth, of 
any consideration paid by the transferee to the 
decedent. 
(5) Any other circumstance that the court deems 
relevant. 
COMMENT 
This section provides criteria to guide the court in deter-
mining whether the transfer was unreasonably large. 
Under clause (1) the relative size of the transfer is per-
suasive, although not decisive. 
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Under clause (2) the court must consider the amount of 
wealth already transferred, even under transfers made prior 
to the cut-off dates prescribed in section 8. These cut-off 
dates are related to the date of the decedent's death which 
would, of course, be unknown to the decedent. For example, 
suppose in 1955 the decedent made a large transfer of prop-
erty in which he retained no beneficial interest. If he dies in 
1960 section 8 (a) of the act will exempt the transferee from 
any liability to make contribution. Nevertheless, in deciding 
on the reasonableness of another transfer made in 1959 the 
court will consider the amount of wealth previously trans-
ferred in 1955. 
Clause (2) is also designed to prevent evasion of the act by 
a large number of moderate gifts, not one of which is by it-
self unreasonably large, but which in the aggregate may be 
decidedly unreasonable. In such case the court might deter-
mine that each transfer subsequent to the appropriate cut-off 
date was unreasonably large, and consequently that each 
transferee might be called upon for contribution. Clause (2) 
thus puts the transferee on notice that his liability to con-
tribute may be affected, within reason, by prior or simulta-
neous gifts to other transferees. This hinders predictability, 
but not seriously. Most group transfers or series of transfers 
are to children of a prior marriage, at the expense of the sec-
ond or third wife. Normally, each child should be able to 
obtain sufficient information from the decedent to gauge the 
validity of the transfer. A flexible test is particularly desir-
able in these situations, since the transactions will be in the 
nature of a family settlement on children who may themselves 
be eligible for maintenance. The inconvenience to other 
recipients, including charities, is not critical enough to over-
ride the maintenance claim of the surviving family. 
Clause (3) recognizes the decedent's moral obligation to the 
transferee as a factor affecting the reasonableness of the trans-
fer. For example, the gift may have been in return for un-
solicited but valuable services performed for the decedent by 
the transferee. 
SECTION 8. Termination of transferee's liability for contribu-
tion; cut-off dates. 
(a) A transferee of property in which the decedent 
retained no substantial beneficial interest is 
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under no liability to contribute if the decedent 
made the transfer more than three years before 
his death. 
(b) A transferee of property in which the decedent 
retained a substantial beneficial interest is 
under no liability to contribute if the decedent 
made the transfer more than ten years before 
his death. Such a transferee is under no liability 
to contribute if the interest of the decedent was 
terminated more than three years before his 
death. 
(c) For the purposes of this section the decedent's 
interest is substantial if he retained, for ex-
ample, a life estate, a power to alter or amend 
dispositive provisions, a power to revoke, or a 
power of appointment. The decedent's interest 
is not substantial if, for example, he had merely 
a remote reversionary interest arising by opera-
tion of law. 
COMMENT 
These cut-off provisions recognize the reliance interest that 
stems from the mere passage of time. See supra, p. 153 for a 
discussion of the practicability of the three and ten year 
periods. 
Subsection (c). This subsection gives the court some guid-
ance on the meaning of "substantial beneficial interest." 
SECTION 9. Extent of transferee's liability for contribution. 
(a) No transferee shall be liable to contribute more 
than an amount equal to the extent to which 
the transfer was unreasonably large. If the dece-
dent made several transfers that were unreason-
ably large, no transferee shall be liable to con-
tribute more than his pro rata share, based on 
the extent to which the tranfer was unreasonably 
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large. In determining the amount of contribu-
tion payable by any transferee the court shall 
consider the injurious effect on the transferee, 
in view of any circumstances occurring between 
the date of the transfer and the date on which 
the transferee receives notice of the petition. 
(b) If the transferee has retained the property he 
shall not be liable to contribute more than the 
value of his beneficial interest therein. If the 
transferee has disposed of or exchanged the 
property, in whole or in part, he shall not be 
liable to contribute more than the combined 
value of any remaining original property and 
any remaining proceeds or substituted property. 
For the purposes of this section, "value" is the 
fair market value as of the date the transferee 
becomes beneficially entitled to the property, or 




This section provides rules to help the court determine the 
source and amount of contribution that transferees are liable 
to make to, or on behalf of, successful petitioners. 
Subsection (a). The first sentence provides a general for-
mula for determining the extent of contribution. Suppose 
that the decedent transferred $6000 to A. Under section 6 
the court may determine, in view of the circumstances pre-
vailing at the time of the transfer, that the transfer was un-
reasonably large to the extent of $4000. Likewise, it may 
determine that a gift of $2000 to B was unreasonably large 
to the extent of the entire $2000. Assuming no decrease in 
the value of the property concerned, the most that A is 
liable to contribute is $4000, and B's top limit is $2000. The 
problem of change in value is dealt with in subsection (b). 
The second sentence concerns apportionment of the bur-
den of contribution. Suppose that $3000 is needed for con-
tribution to petitioners. Under the second sentence the top 
limit for each transferee is his pro rata share, i.e.) A's limit 
is $2000, and B's limit is $1000. 
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Under the third sentence the court may determine that the 
transferee should contribute a lesser amount than the top 
limit indicated in the first two sentences. The third sentence 
is a broad directive to the court to consider the reliance 
interest of the transferee. This reliance interest will concern 
events subsequent to the date of the transfer. For example, 
a transferee should be credited with the payment of taxes or 
maintenance charges, at least to the extent that he has not 
been reimbursed by income from the property. The reliance 
interest may also stem from the mere passage of time. For 
example, a transferee who has been receiving income from, 
or otherwise relying on, a gift of principal made several years 
before the decedent's death will normally be more injuriously 
affected by a contribution order than would the recipient of 
life insurance or a gift causa mortis. The third sentence is 
also flexible enough to permit the court to take care of hard-
ship cases. 
Subsection (b). This subsection deals with specific prob-
lems that arise when the court must determine the amount 
of contribution payable by a transferee. 
Under the second sentence the transferee who makes a gift 
of his entire beneficial interest in the subject-matter of the 
transfer is no longer under any liability for contribution. 
The donee of such a gift would be liable, however, since he 
comes within the definition of "transferee" in section 1 (e). 
When the transfer is for value the original transferee remains 
liable, to the extent of value received. The other party to 
the transaction would not be liable; having paid value, he is 
not a "transferee." 
The last sentence states that value is determined as of the 
date of the transfer or the date of the petition, whichever 
amount is lower. This compromise formula favors the trans-
feree. He is protected when the asset concerned has declined 
in value after the date of the transfer. Under this rule a large 
gift of perishables may entail no liability for contribution. 
This differs from the civil law rule, which pegs the value as 
of the time of the gift (see supra, p. 287-288). But gifts of 
perishables are not likely to be employed as an evasive device. 
The transferee is also protected in the event of an increase in 
value. This may work occasional hardship on the peti-
tioners. On the other hand, it avoids the troublesome ques-
tion of the extent to which the increase in value is attribut-
able to the efforts of the transferee. 
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SECTION 10. Procedure. 
(a) The petition shall be verified and shall state: 
(1) the financial circumstances of the petitioner 
as of the date of the petition; 
(2) the provision that the petitioner received 
from the decedent, whether by way of testa-
mentary or inter vivos disposition...or under 
the laws dealing with intestacy; and 
(3) the names and addresses of all other eligible 
petitioners and of any transferees who may 
be liable to contribute, so far as known to 
the petitioner. 
(b) Copies of the petition shall be filed in the court 
and in the probate court. A copy shall be served 
on the personal representative and on all eli-
gible petitioners and transferees named in the 
petition. Within a period of -- days from 
such service the personal representative shall file 
in the court a verified statement disclosing, so 
far as known to him: 
(1) relevant details on all transfers, whether 
made before or after the appropriate cut-off 
dates referred to in section 8; 
(2) any other information that may help the 
court to adjudicate the petition. 
(c) If the court determines that the petitioner has 
stated a prima facie case it shall set a date for 
a preliminary hearing. The court shall give 
directions for appropriate service to be made on 
all persons concerned. The preliminary hearing 
shall be before a permanent master, who shall 
be a member of the bar of at least five years 
standing. The permanent master shall submit 
a written report to the court stating the findings 
of fact and any conclusions of law. The report 
shall recommend the amount of maintenance 
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and contribution payments, if any, and the 
source, manner, and terms of payment. The 
court shall set a date for a hearing on the report 
and on objections thereto. Copies of the report 
shall be served on all interested parties. The 
court after the hearing may incorporate the 
report in either a maintenance award or a con-
tribution order, or both, or it may modify the 
report or reject it in whole or in part, or it may 
receive further evidence, or it may recommit 
the report with instructions. 
CoMMENT 
This section provides skeletal rules of procedure. Each 
jurisdiction can augment the section with its own rules. 
The court should use permanent officials. For example, an 
experienced lawyer should be appointed permanent master; 
an Official Guardian, or some equivalent official, should 
represent all minor children (Cahn, "Restraints on Disin-
heritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 147 (1936); cf. Ontario 
Dependent's Relief Act, R.S.O. 1950 c. 101, §I (a)). This 
latter official could also act as a "petitioner's representative" 
when the adult petitioner lacks the means to hire a lawyer. 
These officials should be compensated by salary rather than 
by fees. 
SECTION II. Periodic payments. 
(a) The maintenance award and the contribution 
order shall provide for periodic payments, un-
less the court determines that payment should 
be made in a lump sum. The award and the 
order shall specify that the payments be termi-
nated not later than: 
(I) in the case of a widow, her remarriage; 
(2) in the case of a widower, his remarriage or 
upon his becoming capable of maintaining 
himself, whichever occurs earlier; 
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(3) in the case of a female child, her attainment 
of the age of eighteen or her marnage, 
whichever occurs earlier; 
( 4) in the case of a male child, his attainment of 
the age of eighteen; 
(5) in the case of a child of either sex who is in-
capable of maintaining himself, his attain-
ment of the age of eighteen or upon his 
becoming capable of maintaining himself, 
whichever occurs later; and 
(6) in any case, the death of the petitioner. 
(b) Periodic payments under a maintenance award 
and under a contribution order shall not, prior 
to actual payment: 
(1) be assigned or incumbered by the peti-
tioner; 
(2) be subject to attachment or garnishment. 
COMMENT 
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Subsection (a). The first sentence provides for periodic 
payments unless the court decides that the circumstances war-
rant a lump-sum payment, e.g., when the estate assets are 
modest. 
The second sentence provides for termination of periodic 
payments in designated circumstances. Under clause (2) the 
payments to the widower are to cease when he becomes capa-
ble of maintaining himself. This restriction does not apply 
to widows. Since the restriction may in some cases be un-
necessarily harsh it seems best to leave the point to the court's 
discretion. Problems of this sort normally will arise under 
section 16 when an interested person requests a reduction or 
termination of payments. 
SECTION 12. Conditions of award or order. The mainte-
nance award or contribution order may be made subject to 
any conditions that the court considers appropriate. Satis-
faction of the award or order may be secured by deposit or 
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investment of funds, transfer or incumbrance of property, 
purchase of an annuity, or in any other manner the court 
considers appropriate. 
CoMMENT 
This section outlines methods of enforcing maintenance 
awards and contribution orders. Normally an application 
for maintenance will cause no undue delay in the administra-
tion of the estate. In England the usual practice is to secure 
the payments by purchase of an annuity. Likewise, a trust 
can be used, to be administered by the Official Guardian or 
some other public official. Surplus estate assets may then be 
distributed to the persons otherwise entitled. 
SECTION 13. Preservation of assets; temporary maintenance. 
(a) The court may appoint a receiver for any property 
affected by the act. The court may enjoin any person from 
transferring or incumbering any property affected by the act. 
(b) Whenever a petition has been filed, there shall be no 
distribution of the estate until the petition has been adjudi-
cated. However, in hardship cases the court may award tem-
porary maintenance to any petitioner in any amount it 
deems just. 
COMMENT 
Subsection (a). The purpose is to preserve available assets. 
The first two sentences are adapted from section 5(e) of the 
1939 Report of the Commission on Revision of the Laws of 
North Carolina Relating to Estates; see Appendix C, infra. 
In the second sentence "any person" would include an heir as 
well as a transferee. 
Subsection (b). This subsection assumes that maintenance 
legislation would supplant existing family allowance legisla-
tion. 
SEcTION 14. Suspensory orders. 
(a) At the hearing on the report the court may make an 
order, suspending the distribution of the estate in whole or 
MODEL ACT 321 
in part, to permit a rehearing on the petition at any subse-
quent date. Whenever the court makes such a suspensory 
order it shall determine which transferees, if any, shall re-
main potentially liable for contribution. 
(b) For the purposes of this section 
(I) no transferee shall remain potentially liable 
for contribution unless the court so orders 
at the time it makes the suspensory order; 
(2) no contribution order shall be made later 
than three years after the decedent's death. 
CoMMENT 
Subsection (a). The first sentence empowers the court to 
make a suspensory order. For a similar provision see section 
3(2) of the Canadian Uniform Act, 1945 Proceedings of the 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation 
in Canada, 112. Such an order may be made when the dece-
dent did not make a reasonable provision for the petitioner 
and the petitioner's financial needs are uncertain; for ex-
ample, she may be a widow who for the time being is able 
and willing to live in the home of her daughter. See Parish 
v. Valentine, [1916] N. Z. L. R. 455 (Sup. Ct.). In such case 
the court may freeze all or any part of the estate assets pend-
ing a petition for maintenance at some future date. For the 
Commonwealth practice on this controversial matter see 
Laufer, "Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A 
Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation," 69 
HARV. L. REv. 277, 292 (1955). Since a suspensory order may 
be incompatible with the reliance interest of a transferee 
the second sentence requires the court to decide, in the case 
of each transferee, whether the transfer he received was un-
reasonably large and whether he is to remain liable for con-
tribution. If he remains so liable the extent of his contribu-
tion will, of course, be governed, inter alia, by such equities 
as he may have at the time of the rehearing. 
Subsection (b). This subsection is intended to protect the 
transferee against unreasonable delay in deciding the extent 
of his contribution, if any. 
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SECTION 15. Limitations on filing petition. 
(a) The petition must be filed within one year after the de-
cedent's death or prior to the expiration of a period of thirty 
days after the running of the non-claim statute, whichever 
occurs later. Whenever a petition is filed all eligible peti-
tioners desiring relief under the act must file a petition 
within twenty days after receiving notice of the original 
petition. 
(b) The court may entertain a petition filed subsequent 
to the appropriate date specified in subsection (a); but such 
a petition shall not affect any portion of the estate that has 
been distributed, and the petitioner shall not be entitled to 
contribution from any transferee. 
CoMMENT 
Subsection (a). The first sentence sets a limitation on the 
filing of petitions. Until the non-claim statute has run the 
court will not know what assets are available, since main-
tenance petitioners are subordinate to creditors. But peti-
tions for temporary maintenance could be made before that 
time, especially if the maintenance statute is coordinated with 
legislation permitting summary distribution of small estates 
to the surviving family, free of creditor's claims. Cf. Basye, 
"Dispensing with Administration," 44 MICH. L. REv. 329, 
337-46 (1945). 
Subsection (b). This subsection applies to any petition 
filed subsequent to the appropriate period prescribed in sub-
section (a). Late petitions of this sort must be distinguished 
from petitions in good standing, the adjudication of which 
may be delayed by a suspensory order under section 14. 
SECTION 16. Variation or termination of payments. 
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of 
this section the court shall not order an increase in any lump-
sum payment or periodic payments. The court on its own 
initiative or upon the written request of a petitioner, a trans-
feree, or the personal representative, may at any time reduce 
or terminate any periodic payments or change the manner 
of making or of securing periodic payments. 
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(b) The court may increase, reduce, terminate or order 
the complete or partial return of any lump-sum payment or 
periodic payments on the ground of misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of material facts by any person. 
(c) As far as is practicable any surplus funds made avail-
able by the reduction or termination of periodic payments 
or by the complete or partial rescission of a lump-sum pay-
ment shall be returned pro rata to the sources from which 
they were taken. However, the court may use such surplus 
funds to meet any need of other petitioners that was estab-
lished in the original hearing. 
CoMMENT 
Subsection (a). The first sentence prohibits increases ex-
cept under subsection (b) (misrepresentation of facts) or 
under subsection (c) (surplus funds). The purpose is to 
expedite distribution of estate assets and to further the re-
liance interest of transferees. In this respect the first sen-
tence differs from comparable provisions of the British Com-
monwealth family maintenance statutes, which are broad 
enough to authorize increases. 
The second sentence authorizes the reduction or termina-
tion of periodic payments. This provision does not apply to 
lump-sum payments, which may neither be increased nor de-
creased, except under subsections (b) and (c). This sentence 
also authorizes a change in the manner of payments, e.g., 
from periodic payments to a single lump·sum payment. 
These requests for variation of payments are distinct from 
appeals. Any award or order will be appealable under the 
existing appellate machinery in each jurisdiction. 
Subsection (b). This subsection authorizes variation of any 
award or order on the ground of misrepresentation or non-
disclosure. For example, the payments might be increased 
because of misrepresentations by a transferee, or reduced be-
cause of misrepresentations by the petitioner. 
Subsection (c). This subsection provides for the disposition 
of funds that become available because of a reduction in pay-
ments. Unless used to meet the needs of other petitioners, 
these funds are to be returned as far as practicable to the 
estate or transferee in the ratio in which the funds were 
originally appropriated. 
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SECTION 17. Waivers. 
(a) No petitioner shall be denied maintenance on the 
ground that he signed a waiver thereof, whether signed be-
fore or after the date of the decedent's last marriage or after 
the decedent's death. However, a surviving spouse is not 
entitled to maintenance if before the effective date of this 
act such spouse signed an instrument that: 
(I) was a valid waiver of all rights in the estate of 
the decedent spouse, including the right of elec-
tion against any last will; and 
(2) was made for a reasonable consideration, under 
the circumstances prevailing at the time of 
signing. 
(b) No transferee is liable for contribution to the main-
tenance of a surviving spouse by reason of any transfer with 
respect to which the surviving spouse at any time signs a 
written waiver of contribution. No transferee is liable for 
contribution to the maintenance of a child by reason of any 
transfer with respect to which the child's judicial guardian 
at any time signs a written waiver of contribution. No con-
sideration is required for a waiver of contribution. 
(c) No waiver of contribution is valid unless the signature 
is either acknowledged or proved in the manner required for 
the recording of a conveyance of real property. 
CoMMENT 
Subsection (a). The first sentence prevents a petitioner 
from "contracting out" of his maintenance privileges. This 
carries out the basic policy of maintenance legislation. The 
decedent must not be permitted to foist on the state the 
burden of supporting his dependents. To effectuate this 
policy the petitioners must be shielded from their own im-
providence. 
The second sentence is designed to validate a waiver, 
signed by a surviving spouse before the effective date of the 
act, of all rights in the estate of the decedent spouse. Such 
a waiver must be supported by reasonable consideration. 
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This latter requirement is consistent with existing law on 
antenuptial and postnuptial settlements; see Atkinson, 
WILLS, 110-12 (2d. ed. 1953). 
Subsection (b). This subsection provides for waivers of 
contribution by a surviving spouse and by a child. No pro-
vision is made for such waivers signed prior to the effective 
date of the act since the act applies only to transfers made 
after that date. The waiver will protect a transferee who 
anticipates that his transfer may be determined to be "un-
reasonably large," under section 6. No consideration is 
needed. To be sure, the surviving spouse or the guardian of 
a child may in some cases be improvident in signing such a 
waiver. On the other hand, the transferee is also entitled to 
protection. Security of title requires that the transferee be 
permitted to rely on the validity of the waiver of contribution 
regardless of the amount, if any, of consideration. The de-
pendent's protection lies in his privilege of demanding con-
sideration before he signs. Most "evasion" disputes concern 
large transfers to children of a prior marriage. If a waiver is 
sought in these circumstances, the self-interest of both sides 
will probably dictate a waiver of contribution in return for 
reasonable consideration. The petitioner also has the privi-
lege of attacking the waiver as having been obtained by 
reason of the fraud or undue influence of the transferee, the 
decedent, or any other person. 
Subsection (c). This subsection prescribes the formalities 
for the execution of waivers. The language is taken in part 
from the N.Y. Deced. Es. Law §18(9). 
SECTION 18. Hearing during decedent's lifetime. 
(a) The decedent or any transferee may apply to the court 
during the decedent's lifetime for a determination that the 
transfer is not unreasonably large, under the circumstances 
prevailing at the time of the transfer. Notice of a preliminary 
hearing before the permanent master shall be served on all 
potential petitioners. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed 
for living and unborn children. With necessary changes the 
procedure shall be as specified in section 10. 
(b) The determination of the court shall be conclusive in 
the event of a subsequent petition for maintenance. 
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CoMMENT 
This section permits a transferee to ascertain during the 
decedent's lifetime whether or not the transfer is so "unrea-
sonably large" as to make him vulnerable to a contribution 
order. This section should tend to minimize any infringe-
ment on the transferee's freedom of alienation. 
SECTION 19. Exoneration, death taxes. Petitioners who re-
ceive maintenance awards shall be exonerated from payment 
of: 
(1) estate taxes, to the extent that other persons are 
liable to pay any part of the federal estate tax 
attributable to the taxable gross estate; 
(2) inheritance taxes, to the extent that other assets 
are available in the estate. 
COMMENT 
The purpose of this section is to protect the successful 
petitioner from liability for death taxes, as far as is practi-
cable. In clause (1) "other persons" covers persons beneficially 
entitled to those estate assets that were not appropriated for 
maintenance awards. It also covers transferees whose prop-
erty is includible in the "gross estate" for estate tax purposes, 
at least to the extent that the Internal Revenue Code does 
not restrict such liability. The burden of death taxes on these 
persons is not specified by this act. It will be determined by 
testamentary directive, existing apportionment statute, or 
judicial doctrine, as the case may be. 
If exoneration is not practicable the maintenance award is, 
of course, subject to death taxes; see section l(c). 
In deciding the amount of contribution to be required of 
a transferee the court may consider taxes paid or payable by 
the transferee by reason of the transfer; see comment to sec-
tion 9(a). 
SECTION 20. Costs and attorney fees. The court may make 
any order it deems just with respect to costs and attorney 
fees for any proceeding under this act. 
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CoMMENT 
This gives the court discretion to award costs and attorney 
fees. For the practice in New Zealand and Australia see 
WRIGHT, TESTATOR's FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN AusTRALIA 
AND NEW ZEALAND, 128-35 (1954). 
SECTION 21. Application. The provisions of this act apply 
only to: 
(1) the estates of decedents who die after the date 
that it takes effect; and 
(2) transfers made after the date that it takes effect. 
CoMMENT 
The purpose of this section is to preclude questions as to 
constitutionality. 
SECTION 22. Severability. If any provision of this act or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held in-
valid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or ap-
plications of the act that can be given effect without the in-
valid provision or application, and to this end the provisions 
of this act are severable. 
SECTION 23. Time of Taking Effect. This act shall take effect 
on ................................................ . 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PART 1. THE MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946). 
"§33. Gifts in fraud of marital rights. 
"(a) Election to treat as devise. Any gift made by a person, 
whether dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the marital rights 
of his surviving spouse to share in his estate, shall, at the election 
of the surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition 
and may be recovered from the donee and persons taking from 
him without adequate consideration and applied to the payment 
of the spouse's share, as in case of his election to take against the 
will. 
"(b) When gift deemed fraudulent. Any gift made by a mar-
ried person within two years of the time of his death is deemed to 
be in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse, unless 
shown to the contrary. 
"Comment. This section makes no attempt to define 
the expression "in fraud of marital rights." It is believed 
that only by judicial decision can that be done. Among 
the situations which courts would have to classify in this 
connection is that where a married person sets up an 
inter vivos trust reserving to himself a life estate and a 
power to revoke the trust. It has sometimes been held 
that such a transfer could be set aside at the instance 
of the surviving spouse, particularly where it deprived 
the settlor of most of his estate. It is sometimes said that 
the transfer is set aside because it is illusory. See 44 
Mich. L. Rev. 151 (1945). But it is believed to be more 
satisfactory to say that it is fraudulent as to the share 
of the surviving spouse. A similar problem arises where 
a married person sets up a so-called savings bank trust. 
It is believed that no statute could adequately indicate 
all cases which might properly be regarded as actually 
or constructively fraudulent as to the share of the surviv-
ing spouse. 
"Subsection (b) lays down an aid in determining 
whether a gift is fraudulent where the proof is slight. 
Under this section it is possible to show that a gift made 
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within two years of the death of a married person is 
not fraudulent, but the burden of proof is upon the per-
son asserting the absence of fraud." 
PART 2. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REVISION 
OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA RELAT-
ING TO ESTATES (1939). 
"SECTION 5. Wife's Power to Set Aside Transfers in Fraud of 
Her Rights. -
"(a) From the effective date of this act, any gratuitous transfer 
of property, whether real or personal, by a husband shall be 
deemed in fraud of his wife, unless she join therein or assent 
thereto in writing, if: 
"(1) the husband retain a power to revoke the transfer, whether 
exercisable by him alone or in conjunction with any other person, 
or (2) the transfer be in contemplation of the husband's death 
and take place within one year prior thereto. 
"(b) A gratuitous transfer by the husband in which the wife 
did not join or to which she did not assent in writing shall, if 
made within one year prior to his death, be presumed to be in 
contemplation of death, but such presumption may be rebutted. 
"Comment. Paragraph (a): The value to the widow 
of the power to dissent is jeopardized if her husband 
retains power to strip himself of his property for the 
purpose of defeating her claim. Under existing law, a 
husband may place all or the greater part of his property 
in a revocable trust, and it will not be included in de-
termining the widow's share on dissent despite the fact 
that at all times the husband will have retained sub-
stantial control over the property and though his estate 
is obliged to pay estate taxes upon it. Moreover, a hus-
band is now free to give away all his personal property 
on his deathbed, and his widow will have no claim to 
any share in it. The above section is designed to protect 
the widow against such abuses of her husband's power 
by enabling her to reach a gratuitous transfer, made 
without her joinder or written assent, if the transfer 
were revocable or were in contemplation of the hus-
band's death and within one year thereof, the two types 
of situations in which the normal instinct to retain title 
to one's property does not operate to protect the widow. 
This does not give the widow as much protection against 
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gratuitous transfer as is accorded her husband's creditors, 
but it is submitted that she is certainly entitled to no 
less. 
"Paragraph (b): In view of the difficulties of proving 
that a transfer is in contemplation of death, the widow 
is assisted by the creation of a rebuttable presumption 
to that effect if the transfer is made within a year of the 
husband's death. Under the preceding paragraph, a 
widow cannot reach transfers made more than a year 
prior to the husband's death, even though they were 
made in contemplation of death, unless the husband has 
retained a power of revocation. 
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"(c) A widow may institute an action against any transferee of 
property transferred by the husband in fraud of his wife to have 
the property so transferred adjudged assets of the husband's 
estate, for the purpose, if she has dissented from the husband's 
will, of increasing her share upon dissent or, if the husband died 
intestate, of increasing her intestate share. If, in such action, it 
be adjudged that the property was transferred in fraud of the 
wife, the court shall order that so much of the property as may 
be necessary adequately to secure the widow's claim, be, in the 
case of real property, impressed with a lien in her favor to be 
satisfied out of such property when her claim shall have been 
ascertained upon the settlement of the estate, or, in the case of 
personal property, be delivered to the personal representative to 
hold for a like purpose, or, in the case of either real or personal 
property, that the defendant give bond in an amount sufficient 
to secure payment of the widow's claim. The value of the prop-
erty at the time of the husband's death shall be ascertained upon 
a proceeding for the settlement of the husband's estate to which 
the transferee shall be a party, and the amount so ascertained 
shall be added to the husband's estate for the purpose of comput-
ing the widow's claim, which, if the husband died intestate, shall 
be computed in the same manner provided in Sections I and 2 of 
this Article for the determination of the widow's claim upon 
dissent. The transferred property shall be applied to the satis-
faction of the widow's claim in the proportion that it bears to 
the total net value of the husband's estate, including therein the 
value of all property adjudged to have been transferred in fraud 
of the wife, but excluding therefrom the value of such property 
as may have been received by the widow upon the husband's 
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death. If, for any reason, the widow cannot obtain satisfaction 
for that portion of her claim attributable to such transfer, no 
recourse therefor may be had by her against other property in 
the husband's estate or which had been the subject of another 
transfer by him. 
"Comment. This paragraph provides an action, in the 
nature of an action for a declaratory judgment, to be 
brought by the widow against the husband's transferee 
to determine whether the property transferred falls 
within the terms of paragraph (a) of this section and, if 
so, to declare the transferred property assets of the hus-
band's estate for the purpose of increasing her share 
either on dissent or in case of the husband's intestacy 
(a point which will be discussed below). It will not be 
possible in this action to determine the extent of the 
transferee's liability. A transferee should not be held 
liable to the widow if she has received upon the death 
of her husband sufficient property so that, even though 
the transferred property is added to his estate, she will 
still have received her intestate share therein. Again, if 
the widow has received some property upon her hus-
band's death, even though it may not be sufficient to 
satisfy her intestate share, it is still fair that the trans-
feree should be credited with a proportionate share of 
that which the widow has received. These are matters 
which involve the beneficiaries of an estate passing by 
will or intestacy as well as the widow and the transferee, 
and the appropriate time for their determination is the 
settlement of the estate. Accordingly, it is provided 
above that, upon rendition of a judgment for the widow 
in the action brought by her, the court shall give sup-
plemental relief in the form of orders assuring the pres-
ervation of the transferred property, or the giving of 
security in lieu thereof, to protect the widow's interest 
until the extent of her claim can be determined upon the 
settlement. 
"The determination of the widow's claim involves the 
same computations provided for the case of a dissent 
where no transfer is involved, except that the husband's 
estate is increased by the value of the property trans-
ferred, thus automatically increasing the widow's share. 
In order to apportion the credit for the property for 
which the widow must account fairly as between the 
beneficiaries of the estate and the transferee, it is pro-
vided that the property received by the latter shall be 
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liable only in the proportion it bears to the net estate, 
including the transferred property and excluding the 
property received by the widow. Thus, suppose a hus-
band dies testate, leaving an estate of $100,000 but mak-
ing no provision in his will for his wife. Before his death 
he had made a transfer in fraud of her of $60,000. She 
obtains $40,000 proceeds of life insurance payable to 
her. For the purpose of determining her claim on dis-
sent, the estate is valued at the sum of these items, or 
$200,000. Her share, assuming there be no children, 
would be one-half that sum, or $100,000, of which she 
has received $40,000, leaving her claim on dissent for 
$60,000. For this claim $160,000 is available, $100,000 
in the estate and $60,000 in transferred property. The 
estate is liable, therefore, for l()ia of that claim or 
$37,500, and the transferred property for %a, or $22,500. 
"Since there is a risk that transferred property may 
have been dissipated or sharply diminished in value be-
tween the time of the transfer and the wife's action, and 
since the transferee, who is subjected to personal liability 
by the succeeding paragraph under certain circum-
stances, may not be able to respond in damages, it would 
subject the estate to a considerable risk of loss if it were 
liable to satisfy any share of the transferee's liability. 
Provision has, accordingly, been made against this con-
tingency. 
"As above noted, this action is available to the widow 
even though the husband dies intestate. There is just as 
great a risk in that case that a widow may be left penni-
less by a hostile husband who strips himself of his prop-
erty by antemortem transfers. Her right to share in his 
intestate estate is valueless if that estate contains little or 
no property. The provisions governing the widow's 
share on dissent are equally adaptable to meet this situa-
tion, so the grant of power to the widow to reach trans-
ferred property in this situation presents no procedural 
difficulty. 
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"(d) If it be adjudged in any action brought under this section 
that the transfer was made in fraud of the wife but the transferee 
shall himself have transferred the property or, the property being 
personalty, it shall have been received and retained by the trans-
feree in, or removed by him to, another jurisdiction and he shall 
refuse or fail to deliver over such property to the personal repre-
sentative or give adequate bond therefor, as the court may have 
ordered, the court shall forthwith adjudge him personally liable 
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for such portion of the widow's claim as may be found in the 
proceeding for the settlement of the estate to be attributable to 
the property transferred to him. The widow may join in any 
such action, or institute a separate action against any subsequent 
transferee unless he or a previous transferee shall have been a 
bona fide purchaser for value of the property. To the extent of 
the property received by him, any such subsequent transferee 
shall be subject to the same liability as the original transferee. If 
the husband, the original transferee, or any subsequent trans-
feree had transfered the property to two or more transferees in 
such manner as to render the transfers substantially one transac-
tion, the widow, or a defendant transferee, may join the transfer-
ees participating in such transaction as parties defendant in the 
action, but the liability of each shall be limited to the extent of 
the property received by him. 
"Comment. Although it is anticipated that the 
widow's claim, established as provided in the preceding 
paragraph, would normally be satisfied out of the prop-
erty transferred to the defendant, precaution must be 
taken to protect her against subsequent transfers by the 
husband's transferee and the risk, in the case of personal 
property, that the property will be outside the state. 
Accordingly provision is made herein for the imposition 
of a personal liability against the defendant in such 
event by a judgment in the nature of a declaratory judg-
ment fixing the fact of his liability but leaving the 
amount thereof to be determined subsequently in the 
settlement of the estate. Provision is also made to reach 
property in the hands of a subsequent transferee and 
to impose personal liability upon him where such might 
be done against the original transferee. However, a 
transfer for consideration cuts off the right of the widow 
to proceed against the transferee paying consideration 
or any subsequent transferee from him. If the transfer is 
a genuine sale or incumbrance for consideration, the 
transferee is protected even though he may have had 
notice of the character of the original transaction, since 
no requirement that a subsequent transferee must take 
without notice is imposed. 
"The power to reach subsequent transferees will not 
materially affect the stability of titles. In the first place, 
the number of transactions which could possibly be af-
fected is closely restricted by the terms of paragraph (a) 
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of this section. Secondly, any genuine purchaser is pro-
tected by the fact that he has given consideration. Fi-
nally, the succeeding paragraph provides a limitation on 
the time in which the widow may bring an action which 
will remove any remaining uncertainty within a period 
not longer than that usually absorbed in the administra-
tion of an estate. Certainly the power granted under this 
section introduces an element of uncertainty in titles 
which is insignificant in comparison to that arising from 
the power of the husband's creditors to reach property 
conveyed in fraud of their claims. 
"Provision is also made in this section to enable the 
widow to join a subsequent transferee in an action 
against the original transferee and, where transfers had 
been made to two or more transferees in a single trans-
action to join all such transferees. Such joinder does not, 
however, operate to increase the liability of any party 
so joined. 
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"(e) No action shall be instituted by the widow under this sec-
tion after the final settlement of the estate or after two years 
from the date of the husband's death, and any such action shall 
abate upon her death. A defendant may be restrained by in-
junction from transferring the property during the course of the 
action, and, where justice shall require, the personal representa-
tive or some other person may be appointed receiver of the prop-
erty. 
"Comment. This paragraph establishes special limita-
tions on the bringing of the action and authorizes the 
court to protect the widow's interest in the property by 
injunction or, when necessary, by the appointment of a 
receiver. 
"Section 6. Waiver by Wife in Lifetime of Husband.- During 
the lifetime of the husband and whether before or after marriage, 
a woman may waive the right to dissent from her husband's will 
or to bring an action under Section 5 of this Article to reach 
property which has been transferred by him. Any such waiver, 
whether made before or after marriage, shall be by an instrument 
in writing, duly approved as is required for conveyances of land, 
and upon her separate examination in the manner provided by 
law for contracts between husband and wife affecting any part 
of the real estate of the wife. 
"Comment. This section authorizes a means whereby 
a husband may safeguard his testamentary and ante-
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mortem transfers from the exercise of the widow's power 
to dissent from his will or to reach property transferred 
by him which would otherwise be subject to Section 5 
hereof. Such waivers would normally, although not 
necessarily, be made by wives in connection with settle-
ments of property upon them. Certain formalities are 
prescribed in this section for the protection of the widow. 
Elsewhere provision is made to debar the widow from 
exercising the power to dissent or to reach transferred 
property where she has feloniously and intentionally 
killed her husband or where she has been guilty of mari-
tal misconduct." 
PART 3. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954- (ES-
TATE TAX PROVISIONS). 
"Sec. 2035. TRANSACTIONS IN CoNTEMPLATION oF DEATH. 
(a) General Rule.- The value of the gross estate shall include 
the value of all property ... to the extent of any interest therein 
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except 
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration 
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contempla-
tion of his death. 
(b) Application of General Rule.- If the decedent within a 
period of 3 years ending with the date of his death (except in case 
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property, re-
linquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of 
appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release 
shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made 
in contemplation of death within the meaning of this section and 
sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers and powers 
of apointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, 
or release made before such 3-year period shall be treated as hav-
ing been made in contemplation of death. 
"Sec. 2036. TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED LIFE EsTATE. 
(a) General Rule.- The value of the gross estate shall include 
the value of all property ... to the extent of any interest therein 
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in 
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
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money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he 
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable with-
out reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact 
end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the 
income from the property, or 
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any 
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or 
enjoy the property or the income therefrom. 
"Sec. 2037. TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT DEATH. 
(a) General Rule.- The value of the gross estate shall include 
the value of all property ... to the extent of any interest therein 
of which the decedent has ... made a transfer (except in case 
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, if-
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, 
through ownership of such interest, be obtained only by 
surviving the decedent, and 
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest 
in the property . . . , and the value of such reversionary 
interest immediately before the death of the decedent ex-
ceeds 5 per cent of the value of such property. 
(b) Special Rules.- For purposes of this section, the term 
"reversionary interest" includes a possibility that property trans-
ferred by the decedent-
(1) may return to him or his estate, or 
(2) may be subject to a power of disposition by him, 
but such term does not include a possibility that the income 
alone from such property may return to him or become subject 
to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary 
interest immediately before the death of the decedent shall be 
determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) 
by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of 
mortality and actuarial principles, under regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of a 
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possibility that property may be subject to a power of disposition 
by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a 
possibility that such property may return to the decedent or his 
estate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an interest so transferred 
shall not be included in the decedent's gross estate under this 
section if possession or enjoyment of the property could have been 
obtained by any beneficiary during the decedent's life through 
the exercise of a general power of appointment (as defined in 
section 2041) which in fact was exercisable immediately before the 
decedent's death. 
"Sec. 2038. REVOCABLE TRANSFERS. 
(a) In General.- The value of the gross estate shall include 
the value of all property .... To the extent of any interest 
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer 
(except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, 
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death 
to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capac-
ity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in con-
junction with any other person (without regard to when or from 
what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, 
revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in 
contemplation of decedent's death. 
(b) Date of Existence of Power.- For purposes of this section, 
the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate shall be con-
sidered to exist on the date of the decedent's death even though 
the exercise of the power is subject to a precedent giving of notice 
or even though the alteration, amendment, revocation, or termi-
nation takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period after 
the exercise of the power, whether or not on or before the date of 
the decedent's death notice has been given or the power has been 
exercised. In such cases proper adjustment shall be made repre-
senting the interests which would have been excluded from the 
power if the decedent had lived, and for such purpose, if the 
notice has not been given or the power has not been exercised 
on or before the date of his death, such notice shall be considered 
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to have been given, or the power exercised, on the date of his 
death. 
"Sec. 2039. ANNUITIES. 
(a) General.- The gross estate shall include the value of an 
annuity or other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason 
of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or agree-
ment entered into after March 3, 1931 (other than as insurance 
under policies on the life of the decedent), if, under such contract 
or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the 
decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such an-
nuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another 
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference 
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before 
his death. 
(b) Amount Includible.- Subsection (a) shall apply to only 
such part of the value of the annuity or other payment receivable 
under such contract or agreement as is proportionate to that part 
of the purchase price therefor contributed by the decedent. " 
"Sec. 2040. JOINT INTERESTS. 
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty ... to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants 
by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the en-
tirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person 
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and pay-
able to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may be 
shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never 
to have been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent 
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or 
money's worth: Provided, That where such property or any part 
thereof, or part of the consideration with which such property 
was acquired, is shown to have been at any time acquired by such 
other person from the decedent for less than an adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be 
excepted only such part of the value of such property as is pro-
portionate to the consideration furnished by such other person: 
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Provided further, That where any property has been acquired by 
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, as a tenancy by the entirety 
by the decedent and spouse, then to the extent of one-half of the 
value thereof, or where so acquired by the decedent and any other 
person as joint tenants and their interests are not otherwise speci-
fied or fixed by law, then to the extent of the value of a fractional 
part to be determined by dividing the value of the property by 
the number of joint tenants. 
"Sec. 204 I. PowERS oF APPOINTMENT. 
(a) In General. -The value of the gross estate shall include 
the value of all property (except real property situated outside of 
the United States)-
(2) Powers created after October 21, 1942.- To the extent of 
any property with respect to which the decedent has at the time 
of his death a general power of appointment created after October 
21, 1942, or with respect to which the decedent has at any time 
exercised or released such a power of appointment by a disposi-
tion which is of such nature that if it were a transfer of property 
owned by the decedent, such property would be includible in the 
decedent's gross estate under sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive. A 
disclaimer or renunciation of such a power of appointment shall 
not be deemed a release of such power. For purposes of this para-
graph (2), the power of appointment shall be considered to exist 
on the date of the decedent's death even though the exercise of 
the power is subject to a precedent giving of notice or even 
though the exercise of the power takes effect only on the expira-
tion of a stated period after its exercise, whether or not on or be-
fore the date of the decedent's death notice has been given or the 
power has been exercised. 
(3) Creation of another power in certain cases.- To the ex-
tent of any property with respect to which the decedent-
(A) by will, or 
(B) by a disposition which is of such nature that if it 
were a transfer of property owned by the decedent such 
property would be includible in the decedent's gross es-
tate under section 2035, 2036, or 2037, 
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exercises a power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, 
by creating another power of appointment which under the ap-
plicable local law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the 
vesting of any estate or interest in such property, or suspend the 
absolute ownership or power of alienation of such property, for a 
period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of 
the first power. 
(b) Definitions.- For purposes of subsection (a)-
(I) General power of appointment.- The term "general power 
of appointment" means a power which is exercisable in favor of 
the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate; 
except that-
(A) A power to consume, invade, or appropriate prop-
erty for the benefit of the decedent which is limited by 
an ascertainable standard relating to the health, educa-
tion, support, or maintenance of the decedent shall not 
be deemed a general power of appointment. 
(C) In the case of a power of appointment created 
after October 21, 1942, which is exercisable by the de-
cedent only in conjunction with another person-
(i) If the power is not exercisable by the decedent ex-
cept in conjunction with the creator of the power- such 
power shall not be deemed a general power of appoint-
ment. 
(ii) If the power is not exercisable by the decedent ex-
cept in conjunction with a person having a substantial 
interest in the property, subject to the power, which is 
adverse to exercise of the power in favor of the decedent 
- such power shall not be deemed a general power of 
appointment. For the purposes of this clause a person 
who, after the death of the decedent, may be possessed of 
a power of appointment (with respect to the property 
subject to the decedent's power) which he may exercise 
in his own favor shall be deemed as having an interest in 
the property and such interest shall be deemed adverse 
to such exercise of the decedent's power. 
(iii) If (after the application of clauses (i) and (ii)) the 
power is a general power of appointment and is exercis-
able in favor of such other person - such power shall be 
deemed a general power of appointment only in respect 
of a fractional part of the property subject to such power, 
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such part to be determined by dividing the value of such 
property by the number of such persons (including the 
decedent) in favor of whom such power is exercisable. 
For purposes of clauses (ii) and (iii), a power shall be deemed 
to be exercisable in favor of a person if it is exercisable in favor 
of such person, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his 
estate. 
(2) Lapse of power. -The lapse of a power of appointment 
. . . during the life of the individual possessing the power shall 
be considered a release of such power. The preceding sentence 
shall apply with respect to the lapse of powers during any calendar 
year only to the extent that the property, which could have been 
appointed by exercise of such lapsed powers, exceeded in value, at 
the time of such lapse, the greater of the following amounts: 
(A) $5,000, or 
(B) 5 per cent of the aggregate value, at the time of 
such lapse, of the assets out of which, or the proceeds of 
which, the exercise of the lapsed powers could have been 
satisfied. 
"Sec. 2042. PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE. 
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property-
(!) Receivable by the executor.- To the extent of the amount 
receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life 
of the decedent. 
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.- To the extent of the 
amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under 
policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the 
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, 
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'incident of 
ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by 
the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by opera-
tion of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest ex-
ceeded 5 per cent of the value of the policy immediately before the 
death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "re-
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versionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the 
proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, 
or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value 
of a reversionary interest at any time shall be determined (with-
out regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods 
of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial 
principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or 
his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility that the 
policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposi-
tion by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were 
a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the 
decedent or his estate. 
"Sec. 2043. TRANSFERS FOR INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION. 
(a) In General.- If any one of the transfers, trusts, interests, 
rights, or powers enumerated and described in sections 2035 to 
2038, inclusive, and section 2041 is made, created, exercised, or 
relinquished for a consideration in money or money's worth, but 
is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth, there shall be included in the gross 
estate only the excess of the fair market value at the time of death 
of the property otherwise to be included on account of such 
transaction, over the value of the consideration received therefor 
by the decedent." 
PART 4. THE COMPULSORY PORTION: GERMANY. 
(taken from Wang, THE GERMAN CIVIL ConE, (1907)) 
"2303. If a descendant of a testator is excluded from succession 
by disposition mortis causa, he may demand his compulsory por-
tion from the heir. The compulsory portion is equal to one-half 
of the statutory portion. 
"The same right belongs to the parents and spouse of the testa-
tor, if they have been excluded from succession by a disposition 
mortis causa. 
"Note to S. 2306. A compulsory beneficiary has a right to his 
compulsory portion free from all charges. Where his share in the 
inheritance which is subject to a limitation or charge is greater 
than his compulsory portion, he may either claim his compulsory 
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portion free from all charges, or accept his share in the inherit-
ance subject to the limitation or charge. 
"2315. A compulsory beneficiary shall deduct from his com-
pulsory portion any benefit which has been conferred on him by 
the testator by a juristic act inter vivos, with the direction that 
such benefit shall be deducted from his compulsory portion. The 
value of such benefit is added to the estate in calculating the value 
of the compulsory portion. The value of such benefit is deter-
mined as at the time at which the benefit was conferred. . .. 
"Note to s. 2315. Such direction may be either express or im-
plied. As the testator was under obligation to furnish an 'ad-
vancement' to his child, he could not have directed the advance-
ment to be deducted from the child's compulsory portion. 1624. 
"2325. When a testator has made a gift to a third party (a), a 
compulsory beneficiary may claim, by way of augmentation of his 
compulsory portion, (b), the amount whereby the compulsory 
portion would be increased if the object given were added to the 
estate. 
"A consumable thing is estimated at the value which it had at 
the date of the gift. An object other than a consumable thing 
is established at the value which it had at the time of the accrual 
of the inheritance; if its value at that time is greater than its value 
at the date of the gift, only the latter is taken into consideration. 
"The gift is not taken into consideration if, at the time of the 
accrual of the inheritance, ten years have elapsed since delivery of 
the object given; if the gift was made by the testator to his sur-
viving spouse, the period does not begin to run until the dissolu-
tion of the marriage. 
"Notes: (a) That is, to a person who is not a compulsory bene-
ficiary. For a gift made to a 'compulsory beneficiary," see 2327. 
(b) Erganzung des Pflichteils. 
"2326. The compulsory beneficiary may claim an augmenta-
tion of his compulsory portion even if one-half of his statutory 
portion has been given to him. If more than one-half of his 
statutory portion has been given to him, such claim is barred to 
the extent of the excess in value which he has received. 
"2327. Where the compulsory beneficiary has himself received 
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a gift from the testator, the value of the gift shall be added to the 
estate in the same manner as if it were made to a third party (c), 
and shall at the same time be deducted from the compulsory bene-
ficiary's augmentation of his compulsory portion. The value of a 
gift to be deducted in the manner provided for by 2315, shall be 
deducted from the total value of the compulsory portion and of 
any augmentation of such portion. 
"Where the compulsory beneficiary is a descendant of the testa-
tor, the provision of 2051, par. I, applies mutatis mutandis (d). 
"Notes to 2327: (c) 'Third Party' here means 'a person who 
is not a compulsory beneficiary.' 
(d) The period of ten years specified in 2325, par. 3, does not 
apply to this case. 
"2328. If an heir is himself a compulsory beneficiary, he may 
refuse augmentation of another compulsory beneficiary's portion 
to the extent that he is not deprived of his own compulsory 
portion, including what would accrue to him by way of augmenta-
tion of his own compulsory portion. 
"2329. In so far as an heir is not liable for augmentation of a 
compulsory portion, the compulsory beneficiary may, under the 
provisions relating to the return of unjustified benefits (e), require 
any donee of the testator to return the gift for the purpose of 
making up the deficiency. If the compulsory beneficiary is sole 
heir, he has the same right. 
The donee may refuse to return the gift by payment of its value. 
Among several donees a prior donee is liable only in so far as a 
subsequent donee is not liable. 
(e) See 818-822. 
"2330. The provisions of 2325 to 2329 do not apply to gifts 
which are made in compliance with a moral duty or the rules of 
social propriety (f) 
(f) See notes (m) and (n) to 534 
(m) E.g., a gift made to a poor relative by blood 
(n) E.g., a reward for voluntary service 
"2331. A gift made out of any common property under the re-
gime of general community of goods, community of income and 
profits, or community of moveables, is deemed to have been made 
by both spouses in equal shares. If, however, the gift was made to 
a person who is a descendant of one only of the spouses, or of 
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whom one only of the spouses is a descendant, or if one of the 
spouses has to make compensation to the common property for 
the value of the gift, it is deemed to have been made by such 
spouse alone. 
These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to a gift made out of 
any common property under the regime of continued community 
of goods (g) 
(g) Cf. 1483. 
"2332. The claim to compulsory portion is barred by prescrip-
tion in three years from the time at which the compulsory bene-
ficiary has knowledge of the accrual of the inheritance and of 
any disposition whereby his compulsory portion is injured; in 
the absence of such knowledge, in thirty years from the accrual 
of the inheritance. 
Any claim which a compulsory beneficiary has against a donee 
under 2329 is barred by prescription in three years from the 
accrual of the inheritance. 
The prescription is not suspended by the fact that such claims 
may not be enforced until after a disclaimer of the inheritance or 
legacy (h). 
(h) See 2306 et seq. 
"2333. A testator may deprive a descendant of his compulsory 
portion. 
(1) If the descendant makes an attempt against the life of the 
testator or his spouse, or of any of his descendants; 
(2) If the descendant has been guilty of wilful corporal ill-
treatment of the testator or his spouse; in the case of ill-treatment 
of his spouse, however, only where the descendant is also de-
scended from such spouse. 
(3) If the descendant has been guilty of any crime, or any 
serious wilful offence against the testator or his spouse; 
(4) If the descendant maliciously commits a breach of his 
statutory duty to furnish maintenance to the testator; 
(5) If the descendant leads a dishonourable or immoral life 
contrary to the testator's wishes." 
And see Schuster, "The Principles of German Civil Law" 626 
et seq., (1907). 
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PART 5. THE COMPULSORY PORTION: SWITZERLAND 
(taken from Switzerland, THE Swiss CIVIL ConE, English version 
with vocabulary and notes by Ivy Williams (1925)) 
"471. The compulsory portion is as follows: 
I. for a descendant three-quarters of his statutory share 
of inheritance; 
2. for the father or mother one-half 
3. for a brother or sister one-quarter 
4. for the surviving spouse the whole of his statutory 
share where there are statutory co-heirs with him, and 
one-half of it where he is sole heir. 
"473. A testator can by testamentary disposition leave to his 
surviving spouse the usufruct in the whole of the share of the in-
heritance devolving on their common descendants. 
Such usufruct is taken to be in satisfaction of the right of in-
heritance conferred by law on the surviving spouse where de-
scendants take as co-heirs with them. 
The surviving spouse loses half his usufruct if he re-marries. 
"474. The devisable portion of the estate is determined by its 
value at the death of the testator. 
In this computation the debts of the deceased, his funeral ex-
penses, the cost of sealing the inheritance and of making an 
inventory, and that of maintaining for one month the members 
of the deceased's household must first be deducted from the gross 
value of the estate. 
"475. Gifts made by the deceased inter vivos are included in 
the value of the estate in so far as they are subject to reduction.1 
"476. Where the life of the deceased is insured and he has un-
dertaken by an agreement inter vivos or by will or pact to assign 
the policy to a third person, or has gratuitously transferred it in 
his lifetime, the redemption value of the policy at the date of the 
death of the insured is added to the value of the estate. 
"527. The following gifts are subject to the same reduction as 
testamentary dispositions: 
I. Gifts inter vivos made by the deceased as satisfac-
tion of the donee's right of inheritance or by way of 
dower or for the donee's outfit or as a division of the 
1 See ss. 527 et seq. 
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donor's estate, where they are not liable to be brought 
into hotchpot; 2 
2. Alienations in consideration of a renunciation or 
sale of rights of inheritance; 3 
3. Gifts which the donor had full liberty to revoke and 
those which he made within the five years preceding his 
death, with the exception of presents made on occasions 
where they are customary; 
4. Alienations made by the deceased with the evident 
intention of evading the rules restricting his freedom of 
disposition. 
"528. A donee who has acted bona fide is liable to restore only 
the amount by which he is still enriched by the gift at the date of 
the opening of the succession. 
Where the benefit received by virtue of a testamentary pact has 
to be reduced, the beneficiary is entitled to claim the return of a 
proportionate part of what he gave in consideration of the benefit. 
"529. Where the life of the deceased is insured and he has un-
dertaken by an agreement inter vivos or by will or pact to assign 
the policy to a third person or has gratuitously transferred it in 
his lifetime, the redemption value of the policy is subject to 
reduction. 
"530. Where a testator has burdened the inheritance with usu-
fructs and rent-charges to such an extent, that according to the 
presumed duration of these rights, their capitalized value would 
exceed the devisable portion of the estate, the heirs can either 
demand that they shall be reduced to their proper limit, or re-
deem them by surrendering the devisable portion of the estate to 
those entitled. 
"531. The appointment of a reversionary heir is not binding 
on an heir who is entitled to a compulsory portion, in so far as it 
constitutes a burden on that portion. 
"532. Reductions are made in the first place in testamentary 
dispositions and tflen in gifts inter vivos, beginning with the latest 
in point of time and continuing in that order until the com-
pulsory portions are fully restored. 
2 They must be brought into hotchpot, unless the testator directs 
otherwise (see s. 626). 
Bf.e., as under s. 495. 
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"533. The action for reduction must be brought within one 
year from the time when the heirs had cognizance of the infringe-
ment of their rights, and in any case not later than ten years from 
the opening of the will in respect of testamentary dispositions, 
and from the death of the donor in respect of other gifts. 
Where a disposition has been declared void and an earlier one 
has in consequence revived, the period runs from the date of the 
declaration of nullity. 
The claim for a reduction can always be pleaded as a defence 
to an action." 
APPENDIX c 
Antenuptial Transfers 
The basic policy underlying the "maintenance and contribu-
tion" formula is also suggestive of the proper approach to the 
problem of antenuptial transfers. 
We concluded earlier 1 that antenuptial transfers should be 
given separate treatment. Nevertheless, the antenuptial transfer 
cases have striking points of similarity with the cases dealing with 
postnuptial transfers. Some of the antenuptial transfer cases even 
utilize the illusory transfer doctrine.2 Moreover, we find in the 
antenuptial transfer cases a familiar irresolution on matters of 
basic policy. There is indecision on matters of proof and on the 
scope of the action. Two problems will be examined. First, on 
matters of proof: should the courts follow the rule of (a) "actual 
fraud," (b) "presumed fraud," or (c) some other rule? Second, 
as to the scope of the action, does the wife's remedy affect trans-
fers of personalty, or of realty where inchoate dower has been 
abolished? 
We may obtain a better appreciation of these problems if we 
examine the origin and social utility of the wife's remedy. 
Historically, the wife's action to set aside antenuptial transfers 
in "fraud" of her marital rights stems from an English doctrine 
that developed solely for the protection of the husband. As far 
back as the seventeenth century, Chancery would set aside secret 
conveyances by the fiancee whenever she had induced the proposal 
of marriage by her pecuniary, if not physical, assets. 3 The justifica-
tion was entirely mercenary: in those days the husband was 
legally responsible for the wife's debts, had practical ownership 
1 See text, pp. I8I-I82, supra. 
2 See note 24, infra. 
a Strathmore v. Bowes, I Ves. Jr. 22. 30 Eng. Rep. 2ll (I789). The 
Strathmore case has a Gilbertian setting, described in Shannan, "The 
Countess of Shannon v. Bowes," I CAN. B. REv. 425 (I923), and also in 
the excellent article by Bregy and Wilkinson, "Antenuptial Transfers 
as Frauds on Marital Rights in Pennsylvania," 90 U. PA. L. REv. 62, 
64-66 (I94l). . 
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of her personalty, and had an estate during coverture in her 
freeholds, which entitled him to the rents and profits.4 Eventually 
the reliance factor was dropped; he could have the transfer set 
aside even though he had married without knowing that the 
woman owned the property concerned. 5 The wife, however, was 
refused any remedy with respect to secret antenuptial conveyances 
made by her potential husband to evade her dower from attach-
ing. It was felt that she did not need this protection, apparently 
in view of the then prevailing custom of making antenuptial 
jointures and settlements in lieu of dower. That custom not ob-
taining in this country, the American courts utilized the English 
rule (which protected the husband) to permit the American wife 6 
to set aside her husband's secret antenuptial conveyances of 
realty.7 
(a) MATTERS OF PROOF 
The American cases,8 following the English lead, eventually 
discarded the requirement of reliance. One early American case 
4 Day, "Rights Accruing to a Husband upon Marriage with Respect to 
the Property of his Wife," 51 MicH. L. REv. 863, 864 (1953). 
5 Taylor v. Pugh, I Hare 608, 66 Eng. Rep. 1173 (1842). 
6 The action is also available to the husband: see, e.g., Gedart v. 
Ejdrygiewicz, 305 Mass. 224, 25 N.E.2d 371 (1940), 14 U. CIN. L. REv. 
451 (1940) (woman assures man her realty "all pay up," then mortgages 
it to her daughter three days before the marriage). 
7 The cases are reviewed in Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 
99, 115 (1867); also see Bregy and Wilkinson, supra note 3; 26 AM. JuR., 
Husband and Wife §185-95 (1940); Note, 40 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1941). 
8 The basic inquiry is whether the transfer was in contemplation of 
marriage: Bozarth v. Bozarth, 399 Ill. 259, 77 N.E.2d 658 (1948): Chase 
v. Phillips, 208 Mass. 245, 95 N.E. 266 (1911), writ of error dismissed, 
223 U.S. 715 (1912) (transfer made while woman still married to her 
first husband; valid); Griffin v. Griffin, 225 Mich. 253, 196 N.W. 384 
(1923); Noe v. Noe, 359 Mo. 867, 224 S.W.2d 77 (1949) (three years 
before marriage). But the transfer may be invalidated even though 
the potential husband had no particular woman in mind: Higgins v. 
Higgins, 219 Ill. 146, 76 N.E. 86 (1905). In the Higgins case a widower 
deeded his farm to his six children, reserving a life estate. He then 
went East to visit relatives and married the plaintiff there two days 
after being introduced; also see Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286 Ill. 478, 122 N.E. 
121 (1919) (conveyance of realty twenty-two months before marriage). 
The statutes of limitation applicable to the widow's request for dower 
or statutory share begin to run at the husband's death: Breshears v. 
Breshears, 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (1950). If the transfer was 
for consideration the attacking spouse will be required to show that 
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even stated that the wife need not have known that the potential 
husband owned the property concerned.9 Most of the cases adopt 
the doctrine of "presumed fraud": a secret transfer in contem-
plation of marriage will be presumed to be fraudulent, regardless 
of whether the wife relied on the husband's apparent ownership.1o 
The presumption may be overcome,11 however, by evidence of a 
worthy purpose, e.g., to make reasonable provision for children 
of a prior marriage.12 
the grantee was in collusion: Dorrough v. Grove, 60 So. 2d 342 (Ala. 
1952). 
The transfer is set aside only to the extent of the wife's claim: Bre-
shears v. Breshears, 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1950) (transfer 
5 days before marriage, with the marriage license in his hands); Hanson 
v. McCarthy, 152 Wis. 131, 139 N.W. 720 (1913); but cf. Collins v. 
Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 Atl. 597 (1904); Clavin v. Clavin, 41 N.Y.S.2d 
377 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd without opinion, 267 App. Div. 760, 45 N.Y.S. 
2d 937 (1st Dep't 1943); Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 
541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (Ist Dep't 1935); Lestrange v. Lestrange, 242 
App. Div. 74, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1934). 
The suit being in equity, relief is not automatic. The wife may be 
estopped if she discovered the transfer before the glide to the altar; 
Clark v. Clark 183 Ill. 448, 56 N.E. 82, 75 Am. St. Rep. ll5 (1900). 
But not, says a California case of fifty years ago, if she has been seduced 
and "got with child"; Murray v. Murray, ll5 Cal. 266, 273, 47 Pac. 37, 
39 (1896) ("to her the alternative was marriage, or the continued state 
of concubinage, and the bastardy of her offspring"). In Cook v. Lee, 
72 N.H. 569, 58 Atl. 5ll (1904) the plaintiff who was with child by her 
fiance, married him knowing of the transfer; held, plaintiff widow could 
be reinstated as judgment creditor, a status she had attained in con-
nection with her breach of promise suit before marriage; also see 
Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197, 148 S.E. 171 (1929) (seduction, but relief 
not predicated thereon). 
o Chandler v. Hollingsworth, supra note 7. Most of the later cases 
appear to require knowledge. 
10 E.g., Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, 51 L.R.A. 858 
(1900). 
11 Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 30 Am. Rep. 441 (1879); Goff v. 
Goff's Exrs, 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917); Hamilton v. Smith, 57 
Iowa 15, 10 N.W. 276 (1881); cf. Beechley v. Beechley, 134 Iowa 75, 108 
N.W. 762 (1906). 
12 E.g., Beechley v. Beechley, 134 Iowa 75, 108 N.W. 762, 120 Am. 
St. Rep. 412, 13 Ann. Cas. 101, 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 955 (1906); Sederlund v. 
Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922); cf. Hampton v. Hampton 
Holding Co., I 7 N.J. 431, Ill A.2d 761 (1955). Contra: Ward v. Ward, 
63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, 51 L.R.A. 858 (1900); also see cases cited 
in 2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY, §506 notes 91, 92 (1939). 
In Wilson v. Findley, 223 Iowa 1281, 275 N.W. 47 (1937), the mar-
riage took place ten days before the husband's death; held, valid, 
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In recent years there has been some disposition to restrict the 
action by doing away with the presumption of fraud. Under the 
new approach the plaintiff spouse is required to prove actual re-
liance on the other spouse's apparent ownership of the property 
in question. For example, in Kirk v. Kirk 18 it was stated: "Either 
spouse may challenge, as fraudulent, a conveyance of real estate 
or a gift of personal property made during a treaty of marriage, 
but mere proof of the conveyance or gift, without the knowledge 
of the other party, does not constitute a prima facie case of 
fraudulent transfer. In addition, it is necessary for the party 
alleging it to prove the fraud, or 'actual fraud,' to use an expres-
sion common in the decisions. Mere conjecture or suspicion does 
not take the place of evidence." What the court meant by "evi-
dence" may be gleaned from the next paragraph of the decision: 
"Or did he make the conveyance, not to satisfy a bona fide obliga-
tion, but with the intention of depriving her of rights which, 
expressly or by implication, he induced her to believe she would 
receive by marrying him?" 14 In other words, the "actual fraud" 
requirement appears to impose a stiff burden of proof on the 
claimant. Certainly she must prove active or implied representa-
tions of property ownership on his part; presumably she must 
prove that she was induced to marry him in reliance on those 
representations. 
The "actual fraud" doctrine has received support in other 
cases,15 and has been endorsed in a carefully written article.16 It 
is not yet clear that it is the prevailing trend. Probably all Ameri-
13 340 Pa. 203, 207-08, 16 A.2d 47, 50 (1940). Accord: Overbeck v. 
McHale, 354 Pa. 177 (1946) (transfer for consideration). 
14 !d. at 208, 16 A.2d at 50. 
15 "The old doctrine was utterly unreasonable. Suppose the intended 
husband was worth millions in city property and owned hundreds of 
lots, and should convey on the eve of his marriage one or a few of 
such lots and not disclose it. Would the deed be ipso facto void? Yes, 
by the doctrine of some cases. We conclude, therefore, that the facts 
and circumstances of this case may be considered in determining 
whether the giving of that deed was fraudulent." Dudley v. Dudley, 
76 Wis. 567, 579, 45 N.W. 602, 606 (1890). Accord: Connelly v. Ford, 
202 Mich. 558, 561, 168 N.W. 411, 412 (1918); Noah v. Noah, 246 Mich. 
324, 224 N.W. 611 (1929); Tracy v. Thatcher, 135 Kan. 615, 11 P.2d 
691 (1932); cf. Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 30 Am. Rep. 441 (1879). 
16 Bregy and Wilkinson, "Antenuptial Transfers as Frauds on Mari-
tal Rights in Pennsylvania," 90 U. PA. L. REv. 62 (1941). 
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can courts would permit recovery upon proof of "actual fraud"; 
but there is still substantial authority for the "presumed fraud" 
rule, in which the burden is on the transferee to show that the 
transfer was for a reasonable purpose or in pursuance of a moral 
obligation. The "actual fraud" rule favors the transferee; the 
"presumed fraud" rule favors the wife. 
Neither rule is entirely satisfactory. The "actual fraud" rule 
may not interfere "with the power of a chancellor to draw rea-
sonable inferences from all the evidence in the case," 17 but it 
presupposes too high a degree of financial shrewdness in the av-
erage bride, whether it be a first or a second marriage. She should 
be able to feel assured that support will be forthcoming; she 
should not be forced to bargain for it. In marriage the woman 
takes on the responsibilities of homemaking. In return she looks 
to her husband for support and for security in her old age. It is 
true that many women out of necessity continue to work during 
the early years of marriage; 18 but it is also true that her home-
making responsibilities would be more easily discharged if she did 
not have to work. Consequently the husband is obliged to pro-
vide for his wife during coverture and to give her at least a desig-
nated fraction of whatever "estate" he leaves at death. Thus in 
these antenuptial transfer cases the emphasis should be on the 
husband's duty of support, not on the presence or absence of the 
husband's scienter. Whatever the husband's motive for the trans-
fer and whatever the wife's motive for the marriage, the wife has 
a justifiable complaint about unreasonably large antenuptial 
transfers. 
But note that the wife's quarrel should lie only with unreason-
ably large antenuptial transfers. This is important. We must 
bear in mind that antenuptial transfers are more apt to precede 
a second marriage, when the parties frequently marry for com-
panionship and convenience. The husband, being older, has had 
a chance to acquire an estate; and it is only natural that he should 
wish to make some provision for the children of his first marriage. 
Probably the normal estate planning here would involve some 
inter vivos provision for the children of the first marriage, plus a 
11 I d. at 76. 
1s See Chap. 2, note 27, supra. 
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life estate for the widow, with remainder on her death to his 
children. The second wife should expect no more. 
Tested by these considerations, neither the "actual fraud" rule 
nor the "presumed fraud" rule appears to carry out the desired 
community policy. The wife should not have to prove actual 
reliance: marriage settlements 19 and antenuptial contracts are 
not so common that either the first or the second wife should feel 
impelled to call for an audit before she says "I do." On the other 
hand, the "presumed fraud" rule is too generous to the wife. We 
should not encourage "nuisance" litigation over settlements on 
children of a prior marriage. These settlements are quite normal; 
thus the burden should be on the wife to prove that the secret 
transfer was unreasonably large, not on the children to overcome 
a presumption that it was fraudulent. In brief, our basic policy 
on postnuptial transfers is the key to proper judicial controls on 
the potential husband's antenuptial transfers. "In discharging his 
duty to his children, he must not be recreant to his equally bind-
ing duty to his future bride." 2° For example, let us assume that 
children of a former marriage received $10,000 by a secret ante-
nuptial transfer. Let us also assume that the claimant is by now 
the transferor's widow, 21 and that the jurisdiction concerned has 
adopted the Suggested Model Decedent's Family Maintenance 
Act. This statute affects postnuptial transfers only, but the under-
lying policy applies also to antenuptial transfers. In such a juris-
diction the widow logically should not prevail against her de-
ceased husband's antenuptial transfers unless she first can show 
that she is entitled to maintenance and that the estate is in-
adequate to provide for her needs. Her next step in "family main-
tenance" jurisdictions (and her first step in "statutory share" 
jurisdictions) should be to prove that the transfer was in an un-
reasonably large amount under the circumstances prevailing at 
the time of the transfer. If she can do this the court should then 
be permitted to require the donees to contribute any amount that 
it deems fair, up to the full amount that was transferred. Norm-
19 The wife is in a stronger position if the transfer was in evasion of 
an antenuptial contract; see, e.g., Newton v. Pickell, 201 Ore. 225, 269 
P.2d 508 (1954); but cf. Chap. 17, note 18, supra. 
20 Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 491, 75 N.W. 797, 802, 41 
L.R.A. 258 (1898). 
21 See note 28, infra. 
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ally this will approximate the excess over what the court considers 
would have been a reasonable transfer. If any amount up to 
$6,000 would have been reasonable, then the donees could be 
ordered to return $4,000. But the court should have discretion to 
name any amount it thinks fair, in order to balance the equities 
between the parties. 22 
(b) ScoPE oF THE AcTioN 
But what if personalty was transferred- or realty, in a juris-
diction in which inchoate dower is abolished- and the suit is 
brought in the husband's lifetime? In these circumstances the 
cases suggest that the wife could set the transfer aside if "actual 
fraud" is proved.23 When there is no "actual fraud," i.e., repre-
sentations inducing reliance, the converse appears to be true: the 
courts will not presume fraud with reference to transfers of this 
sort, apparently on the theory that the decree would be unen-
forceable. In Petty v. Petty 24 the wife sued in the husband's life-
time to set aside a transfer of land and slaves made after the 
engagement. She prevailed as to the land. With respect to the 
slaves, however, the court said that she "has no such right or 
interest in them during the coverture, as to authorize her to ask 
an annulment of the deed to them. And should such decree be 
rendered, ... the title would re-vest in the husband, and he 
would have the right to sell or give the estate to whom he pleased 
the next moment." 25 And a leading article has stated: "Certainly 
2 2 The fact that the fiance was financially independent would sug-
gest that the transfer was a reasonable one. The wife's need at the time 
of the litigation would be a factor to be considered in deciding on the 
amount of contribution, whether the jurisdiction concerned operates 
under the statutory share or under family maintenance legislation. 
2a E.g., Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 203, 16 A.2d 47 (1940). 
24 4 B. Mon. 215 (Ky. 1843). 
25 The court did concede that she might have an action on the death 
of her husband. And perhaps she may win, with or without reference 
to the fact that personalty is involved, on the ground that the ante-
nuptial transfer is "illusory," i.e., that excessive control was retained 
(see cases, infra). If the transfer was a reasonable one, however, what 
difference does it make that it is "illusory?" In fact, retention of a life 
estate inures to the wife's favor, since it provides more funds from 
which she could be supported during coverture. Colorable or sham or 
testamentary transactions are, of course, void in any event: Alexander 
v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173 (1954) 
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fraud should not be presumed from a gift the day before the 
wedding when it could not have been attacked if made the day 
after." 26 
(testamentary trust). Cases using the "postnuptial" terminology include: 
In re Freistadt's Will, 104 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd without 
opinion, 278 App. Div. 962, rev'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1951) (an-
tenuptial Totten trusts tested as to whether "illusory"); Clavin v. Clavin 
41 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd without opinion, 267 App. Div. 
760, 45 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1943); Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okla. 
29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941) (transfer 22 days before second marriage held 
ineffective, using "control" rationale). The United States savings bonds 
in the famous Deyo v. Adams litigation were purchased four years 
before marriage. The litigation was argued throughout on the basis of 
the rules applicable to postnuptial transfers. In re Deyo's Estate, 180 
Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943), refusing to follow Deyo v. 
Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942), discussed p. 224, 
supra. Cf. Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, (1904) (leasehold estate and 
furniture; postnuptial cases cited); Marano v. LoCarro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 
(Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opinion, 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 
829 (1st Dep't 1946) (transfer either 4 days before or 10 days after 
marriage). Contra,· Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 Ill. 253, 262, 59 N.E.2d 
684, 688 (1945). 
20 Bregy and Wilkinson, "Antenuptial Transfers as Frauds on Marital 
Rights in Pennsylvania," 90 U. PA. L. REv. 62, 73 (1941), citing Fritz 
Estate, 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 A.2d 601 (1939). In the Fritz case a sealed 
note executed three days before marriage was upheld against the widow 
on the reasoning of the Pennsylvania postnuptial cases. Bregy and 
Wilkinson, at p. 70, cite 13 R.C.L. §104 for the point under discussion, 
as also does a well-written note in 20 CoRNELL L. Q. 381, 383, note 9 
(1935); but the text in 13 R.C.L. cites chiefly dicta: Butler v. Butler 21 
Kan. 521, 382, 30 Am. Rep. 441, 445 (1879) (suit in lifetime involving 
realty, dictum as to personalty); Kelly v. McGrath, 70 Ala. 75, 45 Am. 
Rep. 75 (1881) (mortgage executed the day before marriage; wife, suing 
in lifetime of husband prevails as to her dower and homestead rights); 
Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 485-86, 75 N.W. 797, 800 (deed of 
realty held fraud on wife's homestead rights; dictum that were it not 
for the homestead rights plaintiff widow would have no ground for 
complaint). Also see Bynum v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 77 F. 
Supp. 56 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (group insurance benefits to common law wife, 
later formal marriage; valid under South Carolina "mistress" statute); 
Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (bakery 
business and land transferred by man before his second marriage; wife, 
suing in huband's lifetime, wins as to realty but loses as to personalty); 
Note, 14 U. CIN. L. REv., 451, 452 (1940). 
On the other hand, authority does exist for permitting the wife or 
the widow to set aside antenuptial transfers of personalty. See, e.g., 
Beere v. Beere, 79 Iowa 555, 44 N.W. 809 (1890) (bill of sale of person-
alty three days before "shotgun" marriage, husband abandoning wife 
the next day); Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 At!. 597 (1904) (hus-
band transfers all his property twenty days before marriage; wife sues 
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The nature of the wife's "interest" in the husband's personalty 
should not be a decisive factor in these antenuptial transfer cases. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that a woman may 
not complain of transfers made the day after marriage, it does not 
follow that she has no ground for complaint if one of her reasons 
for marriage is a belief that her husband has a reasonable amount 
of property. To be sure, the golddigger cannot complain if the 
mine has been salted: but in these antenuptial transfer cases 
there is actual value, deliberately spirited away. Moreover, here 
we have the additional element of active or implied misrepre-
sentation, in circumstances calling for full disclosure. And is the 
wife any less injured because the property transferred happened 
to be bonds instead of Blackacre? Possibly most cases involving 
unreasonably large transfers also entail "actual fraud," but the 
wife may find this latter factor difficult to prove. If she can show 
that it was an unreasonably large transfer, made secretly, why 
should she be prejudiced because she did not demand that her 
fiance pass his accounts? True, she married him "for better or 
for worse"; but that refers to future shocks and reverses. To say 
that she must lose because the decree would be unenforceable 
carries more conviction than to say that she loses because she has 
no "interest" in his personalty during coverture. But courts and 
commentators agree, cryptically, that the wife would win if there 
was "actual fraud." How would the decree be any more enforce-
able 27 in that situation? The problem seems to have been ig-
nored, probably because in most cases the husband is dead at the 
at his death, prevails; semble, actual fraud); Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. 67 
(1862) (husband prevails in wife's lifetime); Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 
4ll, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1930) (antenuptial gift of personalty set aside on 
husband's death, to extent of statutory share); LeStrange v. LeStrange, 
242 App. Div. 74, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1934) (trust of realty 
and transfer of bank deposit to sons of former marriage the day after 
marriage license issued; wife sues in husband's lifetime; held, void, 
stressing element of misrepresentation); cf. Rubin v. Myrub Realty, 
244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (lst Dep't 1935), stating that the 
wife's position in these cases is strengthened by the "increased rights" 
given her under §18 of the New York Dec. Es. Law; Matter of Schurer, 
157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 
248 App. Div. 679, 289 N.Y. Supp. 818 (lst Dep't 1936) (distinguishes 
the Rubin and LeStrange cases because of "definite misrepresentation 
therein"). 
27 Enforceability was not discussed in the LeStrange case, note 26, 
supra. 
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time of the suit.2s Even if he is alive,29 however, the matter of 
enforceability should not overtax the ingenuity of equity. If 
realty was transferred, and inchoate dower is not available, the 
decree could establish an equitable lien 30 on the property that 
was returned to the husband, enforceable for her support during 
his lifetime or upon his death.81 With reference to personalty, 
2s Of fifty cases involving antenuptial transfers, selected at random, 
the recalcitrant spouse was alive at the time of the suit in only eleven 
cases: Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937); 
Kelly v. McGrath, 70 Ala. 75, 45 Am. Rep. 75 (1881); Deke v. Huen-
kemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 102 N.E. 1059, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 512 (1913), later 
appeal, 289 Ill. 148, 124 N.E. 381 (1919); Beere v. Beere, 79 Iowa 555, 
44 N.W. 809 (1890); Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa 15, 10 N.W. 276 
(1881); Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 30 Am. Rep. 441 (1879); Petty v. 
Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215 (Ky. 1843); Griffin v. Griffin, 225 Mich. 253, 196 
N.W. 384 (1923) (divorce suit); LeStrange v. LeStrange, 242 App. Div. 
74, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1934); Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197, 
148 S.E. 171 (1929) (action to obtain alimony without divorce); Duncan's 
Appeal, 43 Pa. 67 (1862). Most of the cases examined involved second 
marriages, with the transfer being made to children of the first marriage. 
In many of the cases the wife was considerably younger than the hus-
band, and (naturally, under the prevailing tests) willing to admit that 
it was a marriage of convenience. In LeStrange v. LeStrange, 242 App. 
Div. 74, 75, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21, 22 (2d Dep't 1934), at the time of the 
marriage the husband was sixty-eight, the wife's age not stated. Each 
had been married before. Said the court: "Evidently the agreement 
to marry was a practical one, and the parties wished to have a separate 
home and live their lives free from the conflicts arising through living 
in the home of younger people." In Re Ramsey's Estate, 98 N.Y.S.2d 
918 (Surr. Ct. 1950), the husband, aged sixty-seven, conveyed away his 
farm three days before his marriage to plaintiff, aged twenty-six, and 
reserved a life estate; held, valid. 
29 The wife's position on discovery of the transfer is awkward. She 
has an action for fraud and deceit against her husband, but in the 
circumstances it is not an appropriate remedy: her concern is more 
with the property transferred. She cannot get a divorce or an annul-
ment because of the husband's misrepresentation of his financial posi-
tion; but see Shoufeld v. Shoufeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933) 
(false statement by the woman that she had $6000; annulment granted, 
three judges dissenting). The Shoufeld case was called "border-line" in 
Berardino v. Berardino, 156 Misc. 203, 206, 280 N.Y.S. 15, 16 (1935). 
And if she waits until her husband dies the donee may have squandered 
the property or transferred it to a purchaser for value without notice. 
30 But cf. Deke v. Huenkemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 137, 102 N.E. 1059, 48 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 512 (1913); later appeal 289 Ill. 148, 124 N.E. 381 (1919). 
31 The decree could be recorded, to prevent sales to bona fide pur-
chasers. It could be enforceable to the same extent and amount as is 
afforded her by the local forced share statute. Presumably the land could 
be sold during the husband's lifetime, subject to the wife's interest. 
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the decree could direct that a specified amount 82 be used to pur-
chase property to be held in tenancy by the entireties; or that 
the same amount be put into an irrevocable trust, with the in-
come to the husband for life,83 remainder to the wife, and, in the 
event that the wife predeceases the husband, with power of ap-
pointment in the husband. As further alternatives, the husband 
could be directed to make suitable improvements in or on the 
homestead; in aggravated circumstances the husband could be 
forced to purchase life insurance payable to the wife, with proviso 
for cashing in or changing beneficiaries if the wife predeceases 
him; or, if the wife needs the money immediately for support, an 
order could be made requiring that it be paid directly to her. 
Use of the "reasonableness" test would no doubt tend to re-
strict the frequency and extent of the widow's recovery, since she 
is usually a second or third wife. Nevertheless, the suggested test 
would ensure that she would win or lose on the equities of the 
case.84 Recovery would not hinge on the state of mind of either 
An alternative to the lien would be an injunction against further un-
reasonably large transfers. 
3 2 Also equivalent to the widow's forced share in the husband's per-
sonalty. 
88 The reasoning here is that the wife may request return of the 
property to her husband, but normally she should not be entitled to 
secure it for herself. 
3 4 That the comparative amount of the property transferred is rele-
vant: Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763, 240 S.W. 1061 (1922); Butler 
v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 30 Am. Rep. 441 (1879). 
A singular case is Gellatly v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 357 (1947). 
When a plaintiff widow became acquainted with the 77 year old 
Gellatly he was worth several millions, an eccentric who "wore white 
velvet trousers and a red velvet coat." He had already decided to 
devote his fortune to augmenting his valuable art collection, and to 
present the collection to an institution that could preserve and display 
it in his name. The plaintiff believed Gellatly to be wealthy. The 
court stated that "she frankly admits that she thought the marriage 
would give some assurance of being able to care for the needs of her 
[invalid] daughter"; that "he permitted her to believe that he was a 
man of means"; and that he led her to believe he intended to make 
provision for her maintenance "at his death." The formal transfer to 
the Smithsonian authorities took place June 13, 1929, with a supple-
mentary transfer in August 1930. On 2 September 1930 he wrote 
plaintiff an offer of marriage, having been acquainted with her for five 
years. At the time of his death in 1931 the art collection was worth 
some four millions, his estate "practically nothing except some small 
articles, including an umbrella and a suit case." Mrs. Gellatly had to 
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the man or the woman at the time of the transfer, on whether 
the husband is alive or dead at the time of the litigation, on the 
fortuitous nature of the wife's "interest" 35 during coverture, or 
on the type of property that is involved. 
borrow money to pay for the funeral. The Smithsonian Institute re-
fused any relief, whereupon various bills were introduced in Congress 
over a period of years to give her relief. One such bill was referred to 
the Court of Claims in 1944. The court held that the widow, as ad-
ministratrix, had no grounds in law or equity to set aside the transfer. 
No reason was given, other than the fact that the Smithsonian Institute 
had "lived up to their agreement" with the decedent; nor was there 
any discussion of the antenuptial transfer case-law. 
s5 The "interest" of course represents the judgment of the state legis-
lature. Nevertheless, the forced share purports to be the equivalent of 
common law inchoate dower, as far as protection against disinheritance 
is concerned. Imposition of a restraint on the property after it is 
returned to the husband is justifiable because of the husband's repre-
hensible antenuptial transfer. 
APPENDIX D 
Contracts To Make A WilP 
(a) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The contract to make a will is another device that merits sepa-
rate treatment. Litigation over spouses' rights in these contracts 
almost invariably concerns antenuptial contracts, usually made 
long before the marriage to the surviving spouse; and, of course, 
no contract may be enforced unless consideration is present. Here 
also, however, the case-law is confused; here also we deal almost 
invariably with second and third marriages; and here also the 
solution to the problem of spouses' rights is suggested by the 
policy underlying the maintenance and contribution formula. 
A contract to make a will concerns a promise by A to B that A 
will leave a legacy or devise either to B or to a designated third 
party. The most obvious but the most important thing that can 
be said about this arrangement is that it is a contract, not a will. 
The substantive and formal validity of the arrangement depends 
on the law of contracts; B's remedies are contract remedies. If A 
dies without having made the promised devise, B may obtain 
contract damages or quasi-contractual recovery from A's estate or 
he may obtain the property concerned by a suit in the nature of 
specific performance. If A makes the promised will it is usually 
and properly held that A still has the power to revoke the will. 
The contract to make a will may be a reciprocal arrangement. 
1 I am indebted to six excellent articles by Professor Berte! M. Sparks. 
The articles appear in the following order: "Historical Development 
of the Law of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath," 42 KY. L. J. 573 (1954); 
"Problems in the Formation of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath," 40 
CoRNELL L.Q. 60 (1954); "Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Be-
queath Prior to the Death of the Promisor: I & n," 53 MicH. L. REv. 1, 
215 (1954); "Enforcement of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath After 
the Death of the Promisor," 39 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1954); "Contract to 
Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Service," 20 Mo. L. REv. I 
(1955). The articles are commented on by Rheinstein in "Critique: 
Contracts to Make a Will," 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1224 (1955); and they 
have recently appeared in book form: Sparks, CoNTRACTS To MAKE 
WILLS (1956). 
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Two testators, normally spouses, may make a common ("mutual") 
disposition of their respective property. The usual plan, whether 
the spouses sign separate wills or one "joint" will, is to give the 
surviving spouse a life estate, with remainder to the children. 
These arrangements do not imply per se that the survivor has 
made a contract not to revoke. When the contract can be proved, 
however, the more enlightened, more practicable view is that the 
arrangement is just another species of contract to make a will. 
Under this view the survivor can revoke, but the beneficiaries of 
the contract still have their contract remedies against his estate. 
The contract to make a will is quite popular with laymen. The 
promisor retains full use of the property concerned during his 
lifetime. In return for his promise he may obtain material sup-
port, companionship, personal services. The device is useful in 
marriage settlements, particularly between older people; it also 
is used in adoption proceedings, separation agreements, and di-
vorce settlements. Partners employ it to dispose of partnership 
assets; and corporations find it valuable in schemes for deferred 
compensation of high-salaried personnel. 
(b) RIGHTS OF THE SuRVIVING SPousE 
The great majority of the cases involving spouses' rights con-
cern contracts entered into before the marriage with the surviving 
spouse - generally before the promisor even met the surviving 
spouse.2 The cases involving these "antenuptial" 3 contracts usu-
ally concern a promisor who was fairly well along in years at the 
time the contract was made; and almost without exception the 
marriage concerned was a second or third marriage. Cases involv-
2 Presumably a contract made in contemplation of the marriage could 
be set aside under the rules relating to antenuptial transfers. See 
Appendix C, supra. 
8 We must distinguish between (a) contracts between a spouse and 
a third party, and (b) antenuptial and postnuptial contracts between 
the spouses themselves. Contracts in class (b) which regulate or waive 
succession rights between the spouses are usually upheld, as between 
the parties thereto, if the terms are fair and made after full disclosure; 
Atkinson, WILLS, §31 (2d ed. 1953). Local statutes entail exceptions to 
this rule; e.g., Tucker v. Zachary, Okla., 269 P.2d 773 (1954) (postnuptial 
agreement). We are concerned with contracts in class (b) only when 
they restrict the succession rights of a later-acquired spouse of one of 
the parties. 
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ing first marriages appear to be restricted to "postnuptial" con-
tracts.' 
The promisee has prevailed in almost two-thirds of the cases. 
The more recent cases, however, reveal a trend in favor of the 
surviving spouse.5 The decisions contain a variety of rationales-
some of a flexible nature, others quite arbitrary. Since the issue 
usually arises in a suit for specific performance by the contract 
beneficiary,6 a common rationale when the widow prevails 1 is 
that an equity court in its discretion may refuse specific per-
formance when that remedy would be unfair to innocent 8 third 
persons.9 A similar flexible approach is to consider the "equi-
ties" 10 of the parties to the litigation: in some instances the courts 
refer to the duration 11 of the marriage between the decedent and 
the surviving spouse, and the merits otherwise of the contract 
4 Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P .. 2d 853 (1934); Crofut v. Layton, 
68 Conn. 91, 35 Atl. 783 (1896); Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 
N.E. 539 (1920); Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), 
writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924). 
5 E.g., Tod v. Fuller, 78 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1955); Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 
299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); In re Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 
924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954). Contra: Komarek Estate v. 
Komarek, 177 Kan. 659, 282 P.2d 446 (1955); In re Davis' Estate, 171 
Kan. 605, 237 P.2d 396 (1951). 
s But it also may arise in accounting proceedings, In re Erstein's 
Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954); in partition 
suits, Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910); in suit to quiet 
title, Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, ll3 P.2d 495 (1941); 
and in proceedings to construe the will in the lifetime of the testator, 
Underwood v. Myer, 107 W.Va. 57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929). 
1 The successful spouse prevails only to the extent of her dower or 
elective share; Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 
129 S.W.2d 905 (1939). 
8 On the significance of the plaintiff spouse's knowledge of the con-
tract, at the time of the marriage, see p. 375, infra. 
9 Owens v. McNally, ll3 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); In re Arland's 
Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924); cf. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 
299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944). 
10 Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); Ruch v. 
Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909); Ver Standig v. St. Louis 
Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939); Ralyea v. Ven-
ners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y. Supp. 8 (Sup.Ct. 1935); In re Arland's 
Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 P. 157 (1924); cf. Poor v. Logan, 252 S.W.2d 
I (Ky. 1952). 
11 Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909); In re Arland's 
Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924); cf. Fleming v. Fleming, 194 
Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 
(1924). 
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beneficiary's case. But references to the financial condition of the 
surviving spouse are relatively infrequent.U And not all courts 
use the term "equity" as descriptive of some appealing feature of 
the particular litigant's case. Sometimes it appears from the con-
text that the court is thinking of the moral claim of widows in 
general, or of contract beneficiaries in general. 
Other rationales are less pliant, less sensitive to the individual 
circumstances of the case. For example, some courts have con-
cluded that when the contract was made the parties thereto must 
necessarily have contemplated that enforcement would be subject 
to the elective rights of the later-acquired spouse.18 And the 
promisee will lose, of course, if he is characterized as a legatee: 
qua legatee he is subordinate to the widow.14 Other courts, less 
concerned with the doctrinal niceties, merely take it for granted 
that the contract is subject to the widow's claim,15 or that the 
estate that was to be willed away was the net estate after deducting 
the widow's claim.16 
The favorite rationale when the decision is for the promisee is 
that at the time of the marriage the property concerned belonged 
to the promiseeY The "stream can not rise higher than its 
source"; 18 neither, say these decisions, can the widow have any 
rights in property that before the marriage the husband-to-be had 
contracted to give to a third party. This notion seems particularly 
12 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), writ of 
error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924); Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 34, 172 N.E. 
32 (1930); Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909). 
1s E.g., Owens v. McNally, ll3 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); cf. Wides 
v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944). 
HE.g., In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 
1940). 
1s Mayfield v. Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918); Ver Standig v. 
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939); In re 
Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954); cf. 
Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P.2d 853 (1934); Near v. Shaw, 76 Misc. 
303, 137 N.Y. Supp. 77 (Co. Ct. 1912) (contract not proven). 
10 Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944). 
A statute declaring that marriage revokes a man's will does not aid 
the widow since the promisee's rights stem from the contract, not the 
will; Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal. App. 175, 182 Pac. 450 (1919), later 
appeal, 62 Cal. App. 721, 217 P. 1082 (1923); Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 
Minn. 170, 253 N.W. 378 (1934). 
17 E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919); Dillon v. 
Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912). 
18 Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 62, 125 N.W. 998, 1003 (1910). 
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appealing when the contract related to real estate, in a jurisdic-
tion in which inchoate dower is available.19 Dower has also been 
refused on the reasoning that the decedent held the land as a 
"trustee" 20 for the promisee, or that the contract to devise is 
analogous to a contract to sell.21 
It is not unnatural that the cases on our present problem reflect 
a variety of inflexible cliches, e.g., that the contract removes the 
affected property from the decedent's estate, or that the bene-
ficiary is in the nature of a legatee. Nor is it unnatural that even 
those courts that are disposed to consider the "equities" are 
vague as to the criteria that determine the significance of any 
given "equity." These phenomena are to be expected when the 
community decision on widow's support, as announced in the 
statutory share, bears no relation to need and ignores the problem 
of inter vivos transactions. The statutes being arbitrary, a like 
attitude on the part of the courts is not entirely reprehensible. 
(c) PoLICY CoNsiDERATIONs 
The apparent diversity in judicial thinking has its parallel in 
the views of commentators. Professor Sparks tends to be critical 
of the cases enforcing spouses' rights, particularly when the con-
tract concerns less than the entire estate 22 or when it was made 
19 Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910); Harris v. Harris, 
130 W.Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947). 
20Harris v. Harris, 130 W.Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947); also see 
Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App.2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941). 
21Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900); Harris v. 
Harris, 130 W.Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947). 
The analogy is debatable since the widow would seem to have a 
stronger case when the contract was to make a devise. In the contract 
to sell, the consideration is money. Whether it is paid before or after 
the promisor's death it may, and probably will, augment the estate 
available for the widow's share. In the contract to devise, however, the 
consideration frequently is not monetary, and usually is given during 
the promisor's lifetime. 
Also used is the theory that the contract is in the nature of an inter 
vivos transfer which if made in "good faith" removes the property from 
the estate available to the widow: e.g., Brindisi v. Stallone, 259 App. 
Div. 1080, 21 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1940); cf. Crofut v. Layton, 68 
Conn. 91, 35 Atl. 783 (1896). But see In re Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 
924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954). 
22 Sparks, CoNTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS, 173 (1956). Most of the cases 
involving spouses' rights concern all of the estate. But an amount 
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after the marriage to the surviving spouse.23 Professor Rheinstein 
takes the opposite view. "But it would be strange," he says, "if 
the public interest in protecting a surviving spouse against disin-
heritance would have to yield to the private interest of a third 
party with whom the spouse who later happens to be the pre-
deceasing one has, before or after marriage, concluded a contract 
to make a will ... it must also be irrelevant whether or not the 
existence of the contract to make a will was known to the sur-
viving spouse at the time of the marriage." 24 
Both views have merit, since the beneficiary and the surviving 
spouse are each entitled to protection. The difficulty with each 
view is that it leads to stress on the rights of one party at the ex-
pense of the other, without regard to the individual equities. 
Complete protection for one party may in many cases entail un-
necessary hardship to the other party. The beneficiary, on the 
one hand, undoubtedly relies on the contract being fulfilled. The 
consideration that has been "paid" may in some instances be 
purely conceptual, but in other instances it may be quite sub-
stantial. The deserving widow, on the other hand, must be pro-
tected since she relies, or is entitled to rely, on the financial sup-
port that society has provided by way of dower and the statutory 
share. Both parties being worthy of protection, it follows that 
the one suffers if there is overemphasis on the privileges or expec-
tations of the other. Consequently I believe that the preferred 
position lies somewhere between the two views. Probably both 
writers would agree that implicit (although perhaps not explicit) 
in either view is the proviso that neither party should prevail in 
all circumstances. There being a conflict of interests, of policy 
considerations, the courts should have an approach that reconciles 
the two points of view. I believe that our conclusions as to the 
community values that are implemented in dower and the statu-
tory share have application to antenuptial and postnuptial con-
comprising less than the entire estate may be unreasonably large, as far 
as the spouse's claim is concerned. And when the contract affects 
designated property, that property may in actuality be the entire estate, 
as in Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal. App. 175, 182 Pac. 450 (1919), later 
appeal, 62 Cal. App. 721, 217 Pac. 1082 (1923). 
23 Sparks, op. cit. supra note 22 at 177. 
24 Rheinstein, "Critique: Contracts to Make a Will," 30 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 1224, 1236 (1955). 
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tracts to make a will, as well as to voluntary antenuptial and post-
nuptial transfers. The Suggested Model Decedent's Family Main-
tenance Statute affects only voluntary postnuptial transfers,25 but 
the basic approach relates also to contracts to make a will. As far 
as spouses' rights are concerned, the fact that the contract to make 
a will normally is made before marriage should be no more de-
cisive than in the case of voluntary antenuptial transfers. To be 
sure, the contract beneficiary is not a mere voluntary transferee: 
he has paid consideration. But the nature and amount of the con-
sideration should be a circumstance to be considered, not a factor 
that per se should foreclose the widow. "[I]t would be a rare case 
where some consideration could not be worked into the arrange-
ment." 26 
I suggest the following approach. Jurisdictions that adopt the 
family maintenance type of legislation should not permit the 
claimant to attack the contract to make a will unless she can show 
that she is entitled to maintenance and is not otherwise ade-
quately provided for. The next step in these jurisdicions - and 
the first and only step in jurisdictions operating under the statu-
tory share- should be to balance the equities between the surviv-
ing spouse and the contract beneficiary. By "equities" I mean cir-
cumstances or factors that militate in favor of one party or the 
other under the maintenance and contribution formula. 27 The 
two most important equities, of course, would be the spouse's 
need 28 and the nature and amount of consideration "paid" by the 
promisee.29 Also relevant would be such factors as the widow's 
treatment of the decedent, her knowledge or otherwise of the con-
tract at the time of the marriage, and hardship to the beneficiary. 
25 The reasons for excluding the contract to make a will are set out 
at p. 366, supra; see also Suggested Model Decedent's Family Main-
tenance Act, §1(d) (comment), text, p. 306, supra. 
26 In re Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 932, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316, 324 
(Surr. Ct. 1954). 
27 See text, pp. 44-46, supra. 
28 In jurisdictions using the statutory share the upper limit of re-
covery would be governed by the fractional amount of the estate per-
mitted under the statutory share. 
29 Inquiry into the adequacy of consideration is not unheard of in 
other areas of the law; cf. Llewellyn, "The Modern Approach to Coun-
selling and Advocacy," 46 COLUM. L. REv. 167 (1946). 
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It should be immaterial, of course, that the promisor made the 
promised will or died intestate.80 
The courts should find no insuperable difficulties in balancing 
the equities. Some cases, of course, will be easier to decide than 
others. Thus a needy and deserving widow should prevail when 
the beneficiary's claim depends more on "inheritance" than on 
substantial consideration. 51 Not so, however, if the beneficiary had 
given all of the property concerned to the decedent in return for 
the promise to make a will. In other cases, with the equities more 
in balance, a partial award to the widow may be indicated. In 
brief, the path of the courts should be cleared of preconceived 
dogmas. Relief for the surviving spouse should be discretionary, 
and avowedly so.s2 
Analysis of the existing case-law indicates that the suggested ap-
proach is a practicable one. Indeed, it would seem that the courts 
consciously or subconsciously pay much more attention to the 
equities of the case than would be suspected from the announced 
rationale. To test this theory I tried to discover the break of the 
equities in the individual cases dealing with spouses' rights in 
contracts to make a will. In other words, from the given facts I 
tried to decide what result would have been reached in each case 
under the approach suggested above. Cases in which the actual 
decision is clearly consistent or inconsistent with the equities 
under this approach are classified as "consistent" or "inconsist-
ent," respectively. When an element of doubt appears the case is 
classified either as "probably consistent" or "probably inconsist-
ent." "Not clear" means that I could not decide one way or the 
other. In most instances cases falling under this last classification 
had insufficient facts; in a few cases the known equities appeared 
to be in equilibrium. The breakdown of cases, grouped with ref-
erence to the party that actually prevailed, is as follows: 33 
30 In re Erstein's Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 
1954), disapproving Brindisi v. Stallone, 259 App. Div. 1080, 21 N.Y.S. 
2d 29 (2d Dep't 1940); also see Dillon v. Public Trustee of New Zea-
land, L. R. [1941] A.C. 294. 
31 See In re Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924). 
32 See Dillon v. Public Trustee of New Zealand, L.R. [1941] A.C. 294 
(family maintenance legislation). 
33 CASES FAVORING THE SURVIVING SPOUSE. Consistent. In re 
Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924). Probably consistent, 
Tod v. Fuller, 78 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1955); Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 
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A. CASES FAVORING SPOUSE 
Consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Probably consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Not Clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Total cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
184 N.W. 206 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924); Wides 
v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944) (widow willed home 
for life and about one-sixth of $60,000 estate; her financial position not 
clear); In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 
1940). Not clear. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); 
Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N.E. 539 (1920); In re Erstein's 
Estate, 205 Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954); cf. Mayfield v. 
Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918); Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 
P.2d 853 (1934); Poor v. Logan, 252 S.W.2d I (Ky. 1952) (suit in dece-
dent spouse's lifetime); Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y. Supp. 332 (1892) (contract 
not proved). 
CASES FAVORING THE CONTRACT BENEFICIARY. Consistent. 
Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal. App. 175, 182 Pac. 450 (1919), later appeal, 
62 Cal. App. 721, 217 Pac. 1082 (1923); Komarek Estate v. Komarek, 177 
Kan. 659, 282 P.2d 446 (1955) (both spouses elderly at time of marriage, 
widow received substantial property); In re Davis' Estate, 171 Kan. 
605, 237 P.2d 396 (1951) (promisee had given decedent considerable 
financial help); Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912); Ruch 
v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909); Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 
42, 143 So. 694 (1932) (promisee paid valuable consideration, marriage 
of only 3 weeks duration); Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y. 
Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (claim by widow's estate); Larrabee v. Porter, 
166 S.W. 395 (Tex. 1914). Probably consistent. Crofut v. Layton, 68 
Conn. 91, 35 Atl. 783 (1896); Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 
344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939); Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 
515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900) (equities for promisee, widow's need not clear). 
Probably inconsistent. Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 
(1910) (seven years marriage). Not clear. Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 
Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941); Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 34, 172 
N.E. 32 (1930); Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919) 
(promisees merely heirs, but marriage of short duration); Price v. 
Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935); Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 Minn. 
170, 253 N.W. 378 (1934) (no discussion of spouse's claim); In re Lewis' 
Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1953) (annuity payable under separation agree-
ment held superior to spouse's claim on ground that husband's estate 
had been charged with liability therefor); Brindisi v. Stallone, 259 
App. Div. 1080, 21 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1940); Harris v. Harris, 130 
W. Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947) (short duration). Cf. Underwood v. 
Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929) (suit in decedent spouse's 
lifetime). 
Dicta bearing on our problem are found in the following cases: 
Favoring the surviving spouse: Alban v. Schnieders, Adm'r, 67 Ohio 
App. 397, 403, 34 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1940) (contract not proven); Fields 
v. Fields, 137 Wash. 592, 243 Pac. 369 (1926) (contract not proven); 
APPENDIX D 
B. CASES FAVORING BENEFICIARY 
Consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Probably consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Probably inconsistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Not clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Total cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Summary 
Total cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Consistent, or Probably consistent.. . . . . . . . 16 
Probably inconsistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Not clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
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Admittedly this classification of cases is far from conclusive. 
The dearth of reported facts is reflected in the number of cases 
grouped under "not clear." And when sufficient facts are given, 
the classification represents at best one person's reaction to those 
facts. Nevertheless, the findings do suggest that courts are already 
groping toward the desired approach, and that it is a workable 
one. It reconciles the conflicting policy interests; it also provides 
a working reconciliation of the reported cases. Far from being in 
hopeless confusion, the cases tend to fall in line when tested in 
this manner. Of the thirty-three cases, only one decision appears 
to be clearly inconsistent with the equities. 
(d) EFFECT OF THE WIFE's KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTRACT AT THE 
TIME OF MARRIAGE 
Should it matter that at the time of the marriage the wife was 
aware of her husband's contract to will his property to a third 
person? The cases leave the impression that this is a serious ques-
tion indeed. Some courts and some commentators 34 say that the 
wife's actual knowledge of the contract is a decisive bar to her re-
covery.35 It has even been suggested that constructive notice 
cf. Thomas v. Byrd, II2 Miss. 692, 73 So. 725 (1916) (contract deemed 
testamentary). 
Favoring the beneficiary: McGowan v. Barber, 127 F.2d 458, 463 (2d 
Cir. 1942) (contract not proven). 
34 E.g., Sparks, CoNTRAcTs TO MAKE WILLS, 174 (1956). 
B5 Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, ll3 P.2d 495 (1941); 
Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 143 So. 694 (1932); Burdine v. Burdine's 
Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900). 
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would suffice, at least when the contract affects realty.36 We can-
not always tell from these cases whether the knowledge factor is 
conclusive or whether it is tossed in for makeweight effect.37 When 
the spouse prevails, her lack of knowledge is sometimes considered 
decisive,38 and is often mentioned as a point in her favor. 39 
A commendable attitude toward the knowledge factor is ex-
hibited in the recent Kentucky case of Wides v. Wides, Ex'r.40 
Here a husband, in anticipation of being divorced, contracted to 
make a will leaving his property to his wife and four children. 
The contract was incorporated in the divorce judgment. Three 
years later he remarried, the second wife being in ignorance of 
the contract. Before he died he made a will leaving his second 
wife their home for life and approximately one sixth of his 
$60,000 estate. The widow elected to take her statutory share. 
The court took the view that enforcement of the promisee's rights 
was a matter for equitable discretion. Stressing the wife's lack of 
knowledge of the contract, the court stated: 
The husband had sought to be fair to all. He devised 
only a reasonable part of his estate to his second wife and 
the balance to his divorced wife and children equally as 
provided in his separation agreement or contract. Our 
conclusion is that to adjudge recovery of the entire estate 
or its equivalent in money to them to the exclusion of 
the second wife's statutory rights would be inequitable 
and contrary to the spirit and intent of the statutes re-
flecting the public policy of the State.41 
36 Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 34, 172 N.E. 32 (1930) (but court suggests 
that any fair contract would defeat the spouse); Larrabee v. Porter, 166 
S.W. 395 (Tex. 1914) (but court states that equities not particularly in 
widow's favor); cf. Harris v. Harris, 130 W.Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947) 
(possession of a building). 
37 E.g., Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909) (stress on 
equities). 
ss Tod v. Fuller, 78 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1955). Contra: Rundell v. Mc-
Donald, 41 Cal. App. 175, 182 Pac. 450 (1919), later appeal, 62 Cal. App. 
721, 726-7, 217 Pac. 1082, 1085 (1923). 
89 Owens v. McNally, ll3 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); Ver Standig 
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939); In 
re Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924); cf. Mayfield v. 
Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918); Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 
Pac. 878 (1912). 
4o 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1945). 
4t Id. at II4, 184 S.W.2d at 584. 
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When the case was later reinstated on the trial docket evidence 
as to the wife's knowledge of the contract was rejected. This rul-
ing was affirmed on appeal, on the ground that "the widow's 
innocence was a matter of considerable equity, yet it was and is 
not controlling in and of itself. The paramount factor is the 
policy of the law to protect a widow .... " 42 Although the rul-
ing on the evidence seems inconsistent with the ratio decidendi, 
the court's philosophy is good. These cases usually involve second 
marriages,43 but even in second marriages may we not assume that 
the prospective wife regards her husband as much an object of 
affection as a walking annuity? If this be so, should she be 
penalized, in a case in which she was aware of her fiance's contract 
to make a will, merely because her emotions supplanted her 
business acumen? Under the approach suggested above, her 
knowledge of the contract becomes merely a circumstance to be 
considered, relevant but not decisive.44 
(e) INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS IN "EVASION" OF THE BENEFICIARY'S 
RIGHTS 
We tread familiar ground when we examine the decisions deal-
ing with the decedent's inter vivos transfers in evasion of the bene-
ficiary's contract rights. These cases provide a striking analogy to 
the postnuptial transfer cases, even when no spouse's claim is 
involved. The case-law on this point has been ably covered by 
Professor Sparks.45 The problem arises chiefly in connection with 
contracts to devise or bequeath all or a fractional part of the 
promisor's property. One would assume that such a promisor im-
pliedly undertakes not to make inter vivos transfers in an amount 
that would defeat the legitimate expectations of the beneficiary.46 
42 Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 300 Ky. 344, 346, 188 S.W.2d 471, 472 (1945). 
43 See p. 367, supra. The marriage being a second marriage, it would 
seem that the widow could not characterize the usual "knowledge" bar 
as being a restraint on marriage; cf. 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY 
§27.13 (1952). 
44 Knowledge may be quite important when, as in Larrabee v. Porter, 
166 S.W. 395, 404 (Tex. 1914), the marriage is "void of sentiment." 
45 Sparks, CoNTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS, 52-69 (1956). 
46 The power of the promisor to make inter vivos transfers is of 
course undisputed. Recent cases on the problem include Bell v. Pier-
schbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W.2d 784 (1954) (bona fide purchaser 
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In this situation, as well as in connection with postnuptial trans-
fers in "evasion" of the widow's share, we encounter a judicial 
disposition to talk in terms of the promisor's "intent," 47 or his 
"good faith." 48 Here also we find the old familiar misuse of the 
"testamentary" label, applied in one case even to an irrevocable 
trust.49 And the case-law parallels the postnuptial "evasion" case-
law in another important respect: the courts appear to ask if the 
gift was unreasonably large under the circumstances.5° Factors 
that are considered include the size and purpose of the gift, the 
relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent, the moral claim 
of the beneficiary, 51 and the amount of consideration involved. 52 
will be protected); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 134 N.Y.S.2d 753, 284 App. Div. 
972 (2d Dep't 1954); Richardson v. Lingo, 274 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1955). 
As to United States savings bonds purchased in "fraud" of contract 
expressed in joint and mutual will, see Chase v. Leiter, 96 Cal. App. 
439, 215 P.2d 756 (1950); also see Anderson v. Benson, II7 F. Supp. 
765 (D. Neb. 1953), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 215 F.2d 752 (8th 
Cir. 1954) (resulting trust in widow's favor); In re Nelson's Will, 200 
Misc. 3, 106 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1951) (Totten trust). 
47 E.g., Whiton v. Whiton, 179 Ill. 32, 53 N.E. 722 (1899); cf. Ander-
son v. Benson, II7 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb., 1953), appeal dismissed on 
stipulation, 215 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1954). 
48 E.g., RastetJer v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915). 
49 Farmer's Nat. Bank of Danville v. Young, 297 Ky. 95, 179 S.W.2d 
229 (1944) ("had the effect of a will"). 
50 E.g., Bergmann v. Foreman State Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Ill. 
App. 408, 414 (1934); Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818 
(1908). 
s1 Sparks, CoNTRACTs To MAKE WILLS, 61 (1956). 
5 2 I d. at 65. 
TABLE A 
CASES THAT SHOW THE PROXIMITY OF THE DATE OF 
TRANSFER TO THE DATE OF DEATH 
NoTE: The cases in each group are divided into two sub-
groups: those cases that favor the surviving spouse and those 
that favor the donee. 
Probably within few days, although not clear. SPousE: Rudd v. 
Rudd, Ky. (1919); Manikee v. Beard, Ky. (1887); Baker v. Smith, 
N.H. (1891). DoNEE: Cameron v. Cameron, Miss. (1848); Brodt v. 
Rannells, Ohio (1890); Hall v. Hall, Va. (1909). 
Within one week. SPousE: Smith v. Lamb, Ark. (1908); 
Hatcher v. Buford, Ark. (1895); Mushaw v. Mushaw, Md. (1944); 
Newman v. Dore, N.Y. (1937); Me Cammon v. Summons, Ohio 
(1859); Hill's Estate, Pa. (1931); Brewer v. Connell, Tenn. (1851); 
Thayer v. Thayer, Vt. (1842); DoNEE: Ellis v. Jones, Colo. (1923); 
Patterson v. Me Clenathan, Ill. (1921); Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa 
(1912); 
One week to one month. SPousE: Merz v. Tower Grove Bank 
& Trust Co., Mo. (1939); Newton v. Newton, Mo. (1901); Stone v. 
Stone, Mo. (1853); DoNEE: Richard v. James, Colo. (1956); Small 
v. Small, Kan. (1895); Sanborn v. Goodhue, N.H. (1853); In re 
Kilgallen's Estate, N.Y. (1953); Schmidt v. Rebhann, N.Y. (1952), 
Moyer v. Dunseith, N.Y. (1943); Garrison v. Spencer, Okla. 
(1916); Patch v. Squires, Vt. (1933). 
One to three months. SPOUSE: Davis v. Davis, Mo. (1838); 
Burns v. Turnbull, N.Y. (1944); Bodner v. Feit, N.Y. (1936); 
Nichols v. Nichols, Vt. (1889); DoNEE: Harmon v. Harmon, Ark. 
(1917); Harris v. Spencer, Conn. (1898); Holmes v. Mims, Ill. 
(1953); Samson v. Samson, Iowa (1885); Wright v. Holmes, Me. 
(1905); Roche v. Brickley, Mass. (1926); Jones v. Somerville, Miss. 
(1900); Matter of Ward, N.Y. (1951); In re Lorch's Estate, N.Y. 
(1941); In re Schurer's Estate, N.Y. (1936); Lightfoot v. Colgin, 
Va. (1813). 
Three to six months. SPoUSE: Wanstrath v. Kappell, Mo. 
(1949); Rice v. Waddill, Mo. (1902); Gillette v. Madden, N.Y. 
(1952); DoNEE: Williams v. Collier, Fla. (1935); Haskell v. Art In-
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stitute of Chicago, Ill. (1940); Blankenship v. Hall, Ill. (1908); 
Bestry v. Dorn, Md. (1941); Ascher v. Cohen, Mass. (1956); Van 
Devere v. Moore; Minn. (1954); Potter v. Winter, Mo. (1955); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, N.Y. (1943); Guitner v. McEowen, Ohio 
(1954); Dunnett v. Shields, Vt. (1924); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 
Wise. (1922). 
Six to twelve months. SPousE: Hamilton v. First State Bank 
of Willow Hill, Ill. (1929); Straat v. O'Neil, Mo. (1884); Marano 
v. LoCarro, N.Y. (1946); Feeser Estate (No.2), Pa. (1954); London 
v. London, Tenn. (1839). DoNEE: Phillips v. Phillips, Colo. (1903); 
Harber v. Harber, Ga. (1921); Pruett v. Cowsart, Ga. (1911); Poole 
v. Poole, Kan. (1915); Malone v. Walsh, Mass. (1944); Redman v. 
Churchill, Mass. (1918); Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 
Mich. (1942); Re Wrone's Estate, N.Y. (1941); Farrell v. Puthoff, 
Okla. (1903); Estate of Kerr, Pa. (1951); Young's Estate, Pa. (1902); 
Gentry v. Bailey, Va. (1850). 
One to two years. SPousE: Grover v. Clover, Colo. (1917); 
Smith v. Hines, Fla. (1863); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., Ill. 
(1944); Stroup v. Stroup, Ind. (1894); Brown v. Crafts, Me. (1903); 
Jaworski v. Wisniewski, Md. (1925); Sanborn v. Lang, Md. (1874); 
Dyer v. Smith, Mo. (1895); Tucker v. Tucker, Mo. (1862); Ibey v. 
Ibey, N.H. (1947); MacGregor v. Fox, N.Y. (1953); Longacre v. 
Hornblower & Weeks, Pa. (1952); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. 
Braum, Pa. (1928); (also valid in part) DoNEE: Williams v. 
Williams, Kan. (1889); Cook v. Cook, Ark. (1851); Stewart v. 
Stewart, Conn. (1824); Whittington v. Whittington, Md. (1954); 
In re Halpern's Estate, N.Y. (1951); In re Kalina's Will, N.Y. 
(1946); MacLean v. J. S. MacLean Co., Ohio (1955); Sellers v. 
Gibney, Pa. (1949); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 
Pa. (1932); Orth v. Doench, Pa. (1932); Potter Title and Trust 
Co., v. Braum, Pa. (1928) (also invalid in part); Mcintosh v. Ladd, 
Tenn. (1840). 
Two to three years. SPoUsE: Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930); 
Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, Miss. (1866); Hastings v. Hudson, Mo. (1949); 
Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bank, Va. (1956); DoNEE: 
Speaker v. Keating, N.Y. (1941); Ford v. Ford, Ala. (1842); 
Moedy v. Moedy, Colo. (1954); Williams v. Evans, Ill. (1895); 
Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., Md. (1915); Leonard v. Leonard, 
Mass. (1902); In re Zern's Estate, N.Y. (1954); In re Phipp's Will, 
N.Y. (1953); Marine Midland Trust Co. of Binghampton v. Stan-
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ford, N.Y. (1939); Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, N.Y. (1939); 
Matter of Glen, N.Y. (1936); York v. Trigg, Okla. (1922); McKean 
Estate, Pa. (1951); Ballantyne Estate, Pa. (1951); Windolph v. 
Girard Trust Co., Pa. (1914). 
Three to four years. SPousE: Cochran's Adm'x. v. Cochran, 
Ky. (1938); Hays v. Henry, Md. (1848); Brownell v. Briggs, Mass. 
(1899); Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, N.Y. (1949); Krause v. 
Krause, N.Y. (1941) (also valid in part); Harris v. Harris, Ohio, 
(1947); In re Pengelly's Estate, Pa. (1953); DoNEE: United Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, Ark. (1946); West v. Miller, Ill. 
(1935); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, Mass. (1950); Wahl 
v. Wahl, Mo. (1947); Crecelius v. Horst, Mo. (1886); Estate of 
Sides, Neb. (1930); In re Galewitz' Estate, N.Y. (1954); In re 
Iafolla's Estate, Pa. (1955); Mornes Estate, Pa. (1951); Lines v. 
Lines, Pa. (1891); Richards v. Richards, Tenn. (1850). 
Four to five years. SPousE: Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1896); 
Rabbitt v. Gaither, Md. (1887); Getz v. Getz, N.Y. (1950); Veder-
man Estate, Pa. (1851); Rowland v. Rowland, Tenn. (1885); 
DoNEE: Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944); Bullen v. Safe Deposit 
& Trust Co., Md. (1939); Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, Md. 
(1927); Kerwin v. Donaghy, Mass. (1945); Inda v. Inda, N.Y. 
(1942); Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Pa. (1920); Hum-
mel's Estate, Pa. (1894). 
Five to ten years. SPoUsE: Wilson v. Wilson, Ky. (1901); 
Leonard v. Leonard, Mass. (1902); Resch v. Rowland, Mo. (1953); 
Walker v. Walker, N.H. (1891) (also valid in part); Goewey v. 
Hogan, N.Y. (1951); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, N.Y. (1941); 
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Ohio, (1944); Reynolds v. Vance, 
Tenn. (1870); DoNEE: Thuet v. Thuet, Colo. (1953); Flowers v. 
Flowers, Ga. (1892); Osborn v. Osborn, Kan. (1918); Kelley v. 
Snow, Mass. (1904); In re Leiman's Estate, N.Y. (1952); Morrison 
v. Morrison, Ohio (1955); In re Huntzinger's Estate, Pa. (1952); 
In re Rynier's Estate, Pa. (1943); Dickerson's Appeal, Pa. (1887). 
Over ten years. SPousE: Thomas v. Louis, N.Y. (1954) 
(twelve); Darrow v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co., Ohio (1954) 
(fifteen); Brown's Estate, Pa. (1956) (thirteen); Estate of Black, 
Pa. (1950) (various times up to seventeen years); DoNEE: Wooton 
v. Keaton, Ark. (1925) (between eleven and twelve); Burnet v. 
First Nat'l Bank, Ill. (1957) (twenty-eight; twelve); Poole v. 
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Poole, Md. (1916) (fourteen); Charest v. St. Onge, Mass. (1955) 
(sixteen); In re Naydan's Estate, N.Y. (1951) (fifteen years before 
the marriage); In re Krasney's Estate, Pa. (1957) (twelve); Norris v. 
Barbour, Va. (1949) (eleven). Cf. Walker v. Walker, N.H. (1891) 
(eleven, as to realty; invalid as to personalty). 
TABLE B 
CASES THAT SHOW RELATIONSHIP OF THE DONEE 
TO THE DECEDENT 
NoTE: The cases in each group are divided into two sub-groups: 
those cases that favor the surviving spouse and those that favor 
the donee. 
DECEDENT's CHILDREN BY A PRIOR MARRIAGE 
(a) SPousE: Smith v. Lamb, Ark. (1908); Grover v. Clover, Colo. 
(1917); Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1898); Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 
Ky. (1938); Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930); Rudd v. Rudd, Ky. 
(1919); Wilson v. Wilson, Ky. (1901); Gibson v. Gibson, Ky. 
(1890); Murray v. Murray, Ky. (1890); Manikee v. Beard, Ky. 
(1887); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., Ill. (1944); Hamilton v. First 
State Bank, Ill. (1929); Buzick v. Buzick, Iowa (1876); Brown v. 
Crafts, Me. (1903); Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, Miss. (1866); Resch v. Row-
land, Mo. (1953); Rice v. Waddill, Mo. (1902); Dyer v. Smith, Mo. 
(1895); Stone v. Stone, Mo. (1853); Walker v. Walker, N.H. (1891); 
(also valid in part); Getz v. Getz, N.Y. (1950); Matter of Mooney, 
N.Y. (1950); Burns v. Turnbull, N.Y. (1945); Krause v. Krause, 
N.Y. (1941) (also valid in part); Krasney's Estate, Pa. (1957); 
Feeser Estate (No.2) Pa. (1954); Reynolds v. Vance, Tenn. (1870); 
Mcintosh v. Ladd, Tenn. (1840); Nichols v. Nichols, Vt. (1889); 
Thayer v. Thayer, Vt. (1842); Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. 
Bank, Va. (1956). 
(b) DoNEE: United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, Ark. (1946); 
Cook v. Cook, Ark. (1851); Moedy v. Moedy, Colo. (1954); Ellis v. 
Jones, Colo. (1923); Williams v. Collier, Fla. (1935); Harber v. 
Harber, Ga. (1921); Pruett v. Cowsart, Ga. (1911); Osborn v. 
Osborn, Kan. (1918); Poole v. Poole, Kan. (1915); Small v. Small, 
Kan. (1895); Beck v. Beck, Iowa (1884); Whittington v. Whitting-
ton, Md. (1954); Bestry v. Dorn, Md. (1941); Ascher v. Cohen, 
Mass. (1956); Kerwin v. Donaghy, Mass. (1945); Rose v. Union 
Guardian Trust Co., Mich. (1942); Jones v. Somerville, Miss. 
(1900); Potter v. Winter, Mo. (1955); Crecelius v. Horst, Mo. 
(1886); Estate of Sides, Neb. (1930); In re Zern's Estate, N.Y. 
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(1954); In re Freistadt's Will, N.Y. (1951); Morrison v. Morrison, 
Ohio (1955); MacLean v. J. S. MacLean Co., Ohio (1955); Brodt 
v. Rannells, Ohio (1890); In re Huntzinger's Estate, Pa. (1952); 
In re Iafolla's Estate, Pa. (1955); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. 
Braum, Pa. (1928) (also invalid in part); Dickerson's Appeal, Pa. 
(1887); Mcintosh v. Ladd, Tenn. (1840); Gentry v. Bailey, Va. 
(1850); Lightfoot's Ex'ors v. Colgin, Va. (1813); Sederlund v. 
Sederlund, Wise. (1922). 
DECEDENT's CHILDREN, NoT CLEAR WHETHER His LAsT MARRIAGE 
OR A PRIOR MARRIAGE 
(a) SPoUSE: Stroup v. Stroup, Ind. (1894); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 
Mo. (1949); Tucker v. Tucker, Mo. (1862); Ibey v. lbey, N.H. 
(1947); Baker v. Smith, N.H. (1891); Steixner v. Bowery Savings 
Bank, N.Y. (1949); In re Graham's Estate, Pa. (1954) (also valid 
in part); Estate of Black, Pa. (1950); Hill's Estate, Pa. (1931); 
London v. London, Tenn. (1839); Hughes v. Shaw, Tenn. (1827). 
(b) DoNEE: Speaker v. Keating, N.Y. (1941); Harmon v. Har-
mon, Ark. (1917); Stewart v. Stewart, Conn. (1824); Flowers v. 
Flowers, Ga. (1892); Redman v. Churchill, Mass (1918); Stewart v. 
Barksdale, Miss. (1953); Cameron v. Cameron, Miss. (1848); San-
born v. Goodhue, N.H. (1853); In re Halpern's Estate, N.Y. 
(1951); Matter of Ward, N.Y. (1951); Matter of Schacter, N.Y. 
(1944); lnda v. Inda, N.Y. (1942); In re Lorch's Estate, N.Y. 
(1941); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, N.Y. (1939); Bal-
lantyne Estate, Pa. (1951); DeNoble v. DeNoble, Pa. (1938); Benk-
art v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Pa. (1920); Young's Estate, Pa. 
(1902); Lines v. Lines, Pa. (1891); Richards v. Richards, Tenn. 
(1850). 
DECEDENT's CHILDREN, OF THE LAST MARRIAGE 
(a) SPOUSE: Davis v. Davis, Mo. (1838); Bolles v. Toledo Trust 
Co., Ohio (1944). 
(b) DoNEE: Thuet v. Thuet, Colo. (1953); Wilson v. Lowrie, 
Colo. (1925); Phillips v. Phillips, Colo. (1903); Samson v. Samson, 
Iowa (1885); Allender v. Allender, Md. (1952); In re Galewitz' 
Estate, N.Y. (1954); York v. Trigg, Okla. (1922); Garrison v. 
Spencer, Okla. (1916); Stefano v. First Nat'l Bank, Pa. (1947). 
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CLOSE RELATIVES (PARENT, BROTHER, NEPHEW, ETc.) 
(a) SPousE: Hatcher v. Buford, Ark. (1895); Smith v. Hines, 
Fla. (1863); Fleming v. Fleming, Iowa (1921); Brownell v. Briggs, 
Mass. (1899); MacGregor v. Fox, N.Y. (1953); Hastings v. Hudson, 
Mo. (1949); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., Mo. (1939); 
Newton v. Newton, Mo. (1901); Thomas v. Louis, N.Y. (1954); 
Goewey v. Hogan, N.Y. (1951); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 
N.Y. (1941); Del Conte v. Luca, Pa. (1954); In re Lonsdale's Es-
tate, Pa. (1857); Rowland v. Rowland, Tenn. (1855); Norris v. 
Barbour, Va. (1949). 
(b) DoNEE: West v. Miller, Ill. (1935); Robertson v. Robert-
son, Ala. (1905); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, Fla. (1949); 
Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944); Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, Ill. 
(1957); Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa (1912); National Shawmut Bank 
v. Cumming, Mass. (1950); Malone v. Walsh, Mass. (1944); 
Kelley v. Snow, Mass. (1904); Leonard v. Leonard, Mass. (1902); 
Van Devere v. Moore, Minn. (1954); In re Kilgallen's Estate, N.Y. 
(1953); In re Leiman's Estate, N.Y. (1953); In re Aybar's Estate, 
N.Y. (1952); In re Naydan's Estate, N.Y. (1951); Deyo v. Adams, 
N.Y. (1944); Matter of Karlinski, N.Y. (1943); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
N.Y. (1943); Moyer v. Dunseith, N.Y. (1943); Murray v. Brooklyn 
Savings Bank, N.Y. (1939); Matter of Glen, N.Y. (1936); Guitner v. 
McEowen, Ohio (1954); Estate of Kerr, Pa. (1951); In re Rynier's 
Estate, Pa. (1943); Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., Pa. (1914); 
Hummel's Estate, Pa. (1894); Orth v. Doench, Pa. (1932); Patch v. 
Squires, Vt. (1933) (semble); Dunnett v. Shields, Vt. (1924); In re 
Steck's Estate, Wis. (1957). 
DISTANT RELATIVEs (UNCLES, CousiNS, IN-LAws ETc.) 
(a) SPousE: Marano v. LoCarro, N.Y. (1946); Newman v. Dore, 
N.Y. (1937). 
(b) DoNEE: Mornes Estate, Pa. (1951); Sellers v. Gibney, Pa. 
(1949); Hall v. Hall, Va. (1909) (semble); 
NoN-RELATIVEs (INCLUDING FoRMER WIFE) 
(a) SPoUsE: In re Pengelly's Estate, Pa. (1953); Vederman Es-
tate, Pa. (1951); Brewer v. Connell, Tenn. (1851). 
(b) DoNEE: Williams v. Williams, Kan. (1889); Ford v. Ford, 
Ala. (1842); Wooton v. Keaton, Ark. (1925); Holmes v. Mims, Ill. 
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(1953); Haskell v. Art Institute, Ill. (1940); Blankenship v. Hall, 
Ill. (1908); In re Leiman's Estate, N.Y. (1952) (to woman with 
whom living as husband and wife; also to sister); In re Phipps 
Will, N.Y. (1953); In re Aybar's Estate, N.Y. (1952); (stranger; also 
to brother); Schmidt v. Rebhann, N.Y. (1952); Re Wrone's Estate, 
N.Y. (1941); Farrell v. Puthoff, Okla. (1903); In re Auch's Estate, 
Pa. (1955); McKean Estate, Pa. (1951) (former wife). 
NoN-RELATIVEs (SEMBLE) 
(a) SPoUsE: Harris v. Harris, Ohio (1947). 
(b) DoNEE: Patterson v. McClenathan, Ill. (1921); Wright v. 
Holmes, Me. (1905); Charest v. St. Onge, Mass. (1955); Roche v. 
Brickley, Mass. (1926); Thomas v. Brevoort Sav. Bank of Brook-
lyn, N.Y. (1949); Hirschfield v. Ralston, N.Y. (1946); 
CHARITY 
(a) SPousE: Straat v. O'Neil, Mo. (1884); Darrow v. Fifth Third 
Union Trust Co., Ohio (1954); Vederman Estate, Pa. (1951). 
(b) DoNEE: Richard v. James, Colo. (1956); Williams v. Evans, 
Ill. (1895); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932). 
TABLE C 
THE EQUITIES 
NoTE: There are two groups of cases: one in which the actual 
result favors the surviving spouse, and one in which the actual 
result favors the donee. The cases in each group are classified 
according to the apparent state of the equities. "Unreasonable" 
means that the transfer was unreasonably large, and thus the 
equities favored the spouse. "Reasonable" means that the equities 
favored the donee. See Chapter 11, passim. 
A. CAsEs FAVORING SuRVIVING SPousE 
1. Unreasonable 
Grover v. Clover, Colo. (1917) (widow not even left enough 
money to pay funeral expenses); Smith v. Smith, Colo. (1896) 
(court emphasizes heartless attitude in leaving widow penniless); 
Blodgett v. Blodgett, Ill. (1932) (fraudulent judicial sale); Coch-
ran's Adm'x v. Cochran, Ky. (1938) (in three years of marriage 
husband strips himself of practically all his estate of $100,000); 
Payne v. Tatem, Ky. (1930) ($4,000 transferred, net estate at death 
about $900); Wilson v. Wilson, Ky. (1901) (substantial antenuptial 
transfer, secret postnuptial transfer); Murray v. Murray, Ky. (1890) 
(husband gave away either before or after marriage all of his 
$70,000 estate except for $12,500); Mushaw v. Mushaw, Md. (1944) 
(husband transfers "substantially all" of estate); Jaworski v. Wis-
niewski, Md. (1925) (wife transfers most of property); Sanborn v. 
Lang, Md. (1874) (husband conveyed "nearly the whole of his 
property" to nephew); Hart v. Parrish, Mo. (1951) (fraudulent 
sheriff's sale; $37.50 for land worth $3,500); Headington v. Wood-
ward, Mo. (1919) (two secret deeds of land by wife four years be-
fore death, at expense of an aged "useful" husband); Burns v. 
Turnbull, N.Y. (1945) (wife transfers practically all assets eleven 
weeks before her death by suicide); Schnakenberg v. Schnaken-
berg, N.Y. (1941) (entire estate transferred); Newman v. Dore, 
N.Y. (1937) (total estate transferred three days before death); 
Reiss v. Reiss, N.Y. (1937) (husband changes name of beneficiary 
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of his life insurance from wife to another, in violation of an agree-
ment not to do so in consequence of settlement of litigation be-
tween husband and wife); McGee v. McGee, N.C. (1843) (stresses 
necessity of "an effectual provision" for the wife); Hayes v. Lind-
quist, Ohio (1926) ("colorable"; no intent to pass title); Brewer v. 
Connell, Tenn. (1851) (transfer in evasion of alimony to fraudu-
lent magistrate); Crain v. Crain, Tex. (1856); (children as forced 
heirs). 
2. Probably unreasonable 
Hatcher v. Buford, Ark. (1895) (gift causa mortis; proportion 
not clear); Smith v. Hines, Fla. (1863-4) (transfer of approxi-
mately six-tenths of gross estate; "intent"); Smith v. Northern 
Trust Co., Ill. (1944) (substantially all, about fourteen months 
before death, with no provision for widow; but vague implications 
that the equities were not all with the widow); Crawfordsville 
Trust Co. v. Ramsey, Ind. (1913), (gift causa mortis; some pro-
vision for claimant widow); Buzick v. Buzick, Iowa (1876) (suit 
in lifetime: "grossest fraud"); Fleming v. Fleming, Iowa (1922) 
("yet we are asked to say that this wife, who has done faithful 
service and practiced self-denial for 36 years . . . must be left 
penniless"); Benge v. Barnett, Ky. (1949) (forty-five per cent of 
personalty within two years of death); Rudd v. Rudd, Ky. (1919) 
(husband transfers substantially all his property just before death; 
widow owned a small farm); Rabbitt v. Gaither, Md. (1887) 
(purchase of farm by husband, in name of grand niece of first 
wife, coupled with antenuptial transfers; practically all of hus-
band's property came from his first wife; proportion transferred 
not clear); Hays v. Henry, Md. (1848) (conveyance to mistress, hav-
ing "utterly discarded his wife"; proportion not clear); Jiggitts 
v. Jiggitts, Miss. (1866) (nearly all of property); Merz v. Tower 
Grove Bank & Trust Co., Mo. (1939) (transfer, 13 days before 
death, of about $300,000; widow gets $200 a month for life and 
one-half of residue of will, amounting to about $18,000); Kerwin 
v. Kerwin, Mo. (1918) (entire personalty); Rice v. Waddill, Mo. 
(1902) (antenuptial transfer of land; gifts of practically the whole 
of husband's considerable personalty within six months before 
death; ailing decedent aged 70 had married wife, aged about 36, 
about nine months before death, husband had never shown gener-
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osity to his donee relatives before); Newton v. Newton, Mo. (1901) 
(proportion not clear, but probably most of property); Dyer v. 
Smith, Mo. (1895) (all of estate given over a year before death to 
children of former marriage, at expense of widow who had chil-
dren of her own); Tucker v. Tucker, Mo. (1862) (transfer of nine 
slaves fourteen to eighteen months before death, one slave given 
to wife; total estate not stated); Davis v. Davis, Mo. (1838) (wife 
given support in will, but renounces; transfer of slaves did not 
escape "argus eyes of the Chancellor"); Laton v. Balcom, N.H. 
(1886) (clandestine purchase by mortgagee at tax sale: stern dis-
cussion of mutual obligations of husband and wife); Frank v. 
Frank's Inc., N.J. (1951) (dower in corporate property; marital 
disharmony); Thomas v. Louis, N.Y. (1954), (insufficient facts); 
Gillette v. Madden, N.Y. (1952) (reference to New York rule on 
"depletion" of an estate); MacGregor v. Fox, N.Y. (1952) (practi-
cally all); Goewey v. Hogan, N.Y. (1951) (proportion not clear; 
secrecy of the marriage considered irrelevant); Mottershead v. 
Lamson, N.Y. (1950) ("principal part"); Debold v. Kinscher, 
N.Y. (1945) ($3,500 out of $4,200); In re Sanchez' Estate, N.Y. 
(1945) (substantially all; separation agreement not a defence); 
Krause v. Krause, N.Y. (1941) (no provision for wife); Bod-
ner v. Feit, N.Y. (1936) (sixty per cent, three months before 
death); Harris v. Harris, Ohio (1947) (testamentary trust with 
income not to exceed $5,000 annually to the widow, but the trust 
obviously could produce only a mere fraction of this; widow per-
mitted to invade inter vivos trust worth almost one-half amount 
of decedent estate); Feeser Estate (No. 2), Pa. (1954) (practically 
all of personalty, judgment note payable out of realty); Vederman 
Estate, Pa. (1951) (transfer of practically all, to non-relatives; 
widow "does not own nearly enough to support herself and her 
daughter in comfort"); In re Lonsdale's Estate, Pa. (1857) (trans-
fer out of "unnatural antipathy" to wife, and "suffering from 
mania a potu"; but wife given small annuity); Reynolds v. Vance, 
Tenn. (1870) (consideration of $300 for all of decedent's realty 
worth $3,000, not recorded until after death; he had considerable 
personalty); Hughes Lessee v. Shaw, Tenn. (1827) ("The effect of 
the proof increases in proportion to the amount of the estate con-
veyed, compared with the amount retained"); Nichols v. Nichols, 
Vt. (1889) (roughly $10,200 out of $11,700, month and a half 
390 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
before death, to children of former marriage); Norris v. Barbour, 
Va. (1949) (bond for $20,000 which would exhaust his personalty; 
house apparently went to wife by joint tenancy; no mention of 
other real property); 
3. Reasonable 
Brown v. Crafts, Me. (1903) (about one-third of husband's per-
sonalty to daughter by former marriage; wife a golddigger); City 
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, N.Y. (1938) (decedent retained 
other substantial property, and gave considerable sums to claim-
ant husband before her death). 
4. Probably reasonable 
Manikee's Adm'x v. Beard, Ky. (1887) (entire personalty in con-
templation of death; claimant widow had sufficient dower out of 
decedent's considerable real estate to support herself); Wanstrath 
v. Kappel, Mo. (1949) (amount transferred approximately $402,· 
000, estate under administration about $10,000; widow had been 
given one-half the income after husband's death, until remar-
riage; widow 30 years younger than husband); Stone v. Stone, 
Mo. (1853) (widow had previously expressed herself satisfied with 
provision for her; court deemed the principle of protecting wife's 
rights too important to suffer it to be overthrown "even in case 
which has no merit to commend it"); President and Directors of 
Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, N.Y. (1940) (held illusory on theoreti-
cal possibility that widow might be prejudiced; modified by 
upper court on other grounds); Darrow v. Fifth Third Union 
Trust Co., Ohio (1954) (second wife invades trust which gave 
her life estate); McCammon v. Summons, Ohio (1859) ("we 
may well commiserate his [decedent spouse's] condition, and 
understand why it was he desired his property to be thus dis-
tributed. But we have a legal duty to perform, and must discharge 
it impartially"); In re Pengelly's Estate, Pa. (1953) (inter vivos 
trust of $25,000 to housekeeper, decedent's estate $12,000 plus 
real estate of indeterminate value; parties had separated 35 years 
before trust established, and housekeeper had been living with 
decedent since the separation); Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l 
Bank, Va. (1956) (second wife gets one-fifth of $200,000 estate). 
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5. Not clear 
Smith v. Lamb, Ark. (1908) (husband transfers all of personalty 
to son by former marriage four days before death; donee paid 
debts for decedent and gave widow materials to build a home); 
Blevins v. Pittman, Ga. (1940) (parties separated at time of trans-
fer); Hamilton v. First State Bank, Ill. (1929) (within year of death 
husband procures two certificates of deposit totalling $1500 pay-
able to himself or his child of prior marriage or the survivor; net 
estate: a homestead, worth $600); Stroup v. Stroup, Ind. (1894) 
(insufficient facts); Gibson v. Gibson, Ky. (1890) (insufficient facts); 
Brownell v. Briggs, Mass. (1899) (comprehensive scheme to de-
fraud wife, but personalty reacquired before death); Resch v. 
Rowland, Mo. (1953) (proportion not stated); Hastings v. Hud-
son, Mo. (1949) (decedent wife transfers practically all her prop-
erty, but court mentions "chimney-comer equities": decedent 
had owned most of her property at time of marriage or acquired 
it thereafter by inheritance; marriage late in life; bad blood be-
tween decedent and husband's daughter; donee had provided 
money for wife when she was ill; claimant husband incapacitated, 
with small pension); Straat v. O'Neil, Mo. (1884) (satisfaction of 
$52,000 in specific legacies to charities a year before death; total 
estate at death $200,000; wife and four children survive); lbey v. 
lbey, N.H. (1947) ($2,250; gross estate $9000); Baker v. Smith, 
N.H. (1891) (insufficient facts); Pichurko v. Richardson, N.Y. 
(1951) (proportion not clear); Galewitz v. Walter Peek Paper 
Corp., N.Y. (1955) (insufficient facts); Getz v. Getz, N.Y. (1950) 
(proportion not clear); In re Mooney's Will, N.Y. (1950) (insuffi-
cient facts); Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, N.Y. (1949) (pro-
portion not clear); Marano v. LoCarro, N.Y. (1946) (substantial 
transfer, marriage seven months before death); Application of 
Barasch, N.Y. (1944) (insufficient facts); Hellstern v. Gillett, N.Y. 
(1937) (insufficient facts); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Ohio (1944) 
(decedent husband attempted to make apparently reasonable 
inter vivos provision for wife, subsequently ruled invalid; claim-
ant widow had some property of her own and given $500 month 
for life); Krasney Estate, Pa. (1957) (insufficient facts); Estate of 
Brown, Pa. (1956) (proportion not clear); Del Conte v. Luca, Pa. 
(1954) (insufficient facts); In re Graham's Estate, Pa. (1954) (wid-
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ower wins as to Totten trusts, loses as to U.S. Savings Bonds); 
Elias v. Elias, Pa. (1953) (insufficient facts); Longacre v. Hom-
blower and Weeks, Pa. (1952); Black Estate, Pa. (1950) (propor-
tion not clear); Hill's Estate, Pa. (1931) (insufficient facts); Row-
land v. Rowland, Tenn. (1855) (proportion not clear; suit by 
children as "heirs"); London v. London, Tenn. (1839) (transfer of 
sole realty, for some consideration; claimant widow had been ac-
cused of adultery); Thayer v. Thayer, Vt. (1842) (husband trans-
fers most of property; but discord between spouses, and widow 
had a "small amount of property"). 
B. CASES FAVORING DoNEE 
1. Reasonable 
Cook v. Cook, Ark. (1851) ("The amount given . was quite 
reasonable"); Richard v. James, Colo. (1956) (marriage four 
months before husband dies of cancer); Williams v. Collier, Fla. 
(1935) (stress on reasonableness of provisions for widow, moral 
claim of donees); Pruett v. Cowsart, Ga. (1911) (conveyance to 
children of former marriage in recognition of fact that the land 
was purchased with first wife's money and that title was taken in 
decedent's name perhaps by oversight); Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 
Ill. (1957) (no intent to defraud; estoppel); Holmes v. Mims, Ill. 
(1953) Goint bank account of joint earnings of husband and biga-
mous second wife sustained against attack by first wife who had 
divorce set aside three years after husband's death); Hoeffner v. 
Hoeffner, Ill. (1945) (reasonable provisions for widow); Patterson 
v. McClenathan, Ill. (1921) wife's transfer sustained against 
widower who was an invalid, but who", .. was not dependent on 
his wife's property for support."); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. 
Benton, Ill. (1912) ("ample property" left for widow); Williams v. 
Evans, Ill. (1895) (claimant widower, who had neither lived with 
nor supported aged decedent for twenty years held entitled to 
dower in land, but loses as to personalty); DeLeuil's Ex'rs v. De-
Leuil, Ky. (1934) (donee incapacitated, other provisions made for 
claimant); Weber v. Salisbury, Ky. (1912) (stress on reasonableness 
of provisions for claimant); Bestry v. Dorn, Md. (1941) (equities 
favor donee); Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Md. (1939) rea-
sonable provisions for widow); Whitehill v. Thiess, Md. (1932) 
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(husband deserts wife and six children; wife buys property 
chiefly out of earnings of children, taking life estate only, with 
power of absolute disposition in wife; stress on reasonableness, 
possibility that the husband might have ample means of his own); 
Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, Md. (1927) (reasonable pro-
visions for widow); Poole" v. Poole, Md. (1916) (deed fourteen 
years before death, recorded immediately); Brown v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., Md. (1915) (reasonable provisions for widower); Rose 
v. Union Guardian Trust Co., Mich. (1942) (reasonable provisions 
for widow); Smith v. Corey, Minn. (1914) (reasonable provisions 
for widow, who was decedent's third wife); Potter v. Winter, Mo. 
(1955) (widow amply provided for); Wahl v. Wahl, Mo. (1947) 
(transfer held not fraudulent as it was "reasonable"); Meli-
nik v. Meier, Mo. (1939) (some evidence that joint bank account 
composed of transferee's money); Pollman v. Schaper, Mo. (1914) 
(claimant widow died before litigation; probably she had 
acquiesced in the transfers); Lusse v. Lusse, Mo. (1909) (appar-
ently a "genuine transaction", for consideration); Walker v. 
Walker, N.H. (1891) (reasonable as to one transfer, valid; un-
reasonable as to another, invalid); In re Freistadt's Will, N.Y. 
(1951) (promise to first wife, provision for surviving widow; 
originally held illusory, reversed because of Halpern case, to take 
further evidence); In re Naydan's Estate, N.Y. (1951) (widow 
amply provided for); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 
N.Y. (1939) (reasonable settlement to wife); York v. Trigg, Okla. 
(1922) (reasonable provisions for widow); Ballantyne Estate, Pa. 
(1951) (reasonable provisions for widow); Dunnett v. Shields, 
Vt. (1924) (reasonable provisions for widow); Lightfoot's Ex'rs v. 
Colgin, Va. (1813) (reasonable provisions for widow, moral claim 
of donees). 
2. Probably Reasonable 
Speaker v. Keating, N.Y. (1941) (wife, separated from husband 
for thirty years, on advice of counsel transfers apparently most if 
not all of her wealth by assigning mortgages into joint ownership 
with daughter, wife retaining interest by arrangement with 
daughter); West v. Miller, Ill. (1935) (reasonable provisions for 
widow made by decedent, and, later, by donee); Williams v. 
Williams, Kan. (1889) (prolific Welsh husband deserts wife, emi-
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grates to Kansas where lives illegally for twelve years with second 
"wife," begetting two children and with her help amassing estate 
of $8000; held for second woman, ignoring antenuptial contract 
with Welsh wife, stressing moral obligation to Kansas brood, 
source of his estate); Ford v. Ford, Ala. (1842) (irrevocable deed of 
trust of all husband's property two years before death to second 
wife and children by second wife sustained against claim of 
first wife abandoned many years before, who subsequently has had 
two illegitimate children; first marriage apparently valid but 
balanced by high moral claim of second "wife.") Wootton v. 
Keaton, Ark. (1925) (husband, separated from wife for 36 years, 
but supporting the children, transfers $29,000 to mistress eleven 
or twelve years before death; total wealth not stated; other woman 
no fool); Harmon v. Harmon, Ark. (1917) (husband makes gift 
of interest in his business, one and a half months before death, 
to his sons. The property had come to the husband on the death 
of another son a few days previously); Moedy v. Moedy, Colo. 
(1954) (transfer of land to joint tenancy with son of former mar-
riage, two and one-half years before death); Thuet v. Thuet, Colo. 
(1953) (wife conveys family home to daughter by secret deed not 
to be recorded or delivered till death; the land had been given 
to wife by her family, she and the daughter had helped maintain 
the home, and at wife's death husband still being cared for in 
the family home); Burton v. Burton, Colo. (1937) (gifts to children 
of former marriage by aged husband at expense of" ... a wife in 
name only, of some twenty months, whom he did not greatly 
trust ... "); Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, Fla. (1949) (husband 
mentally incompetent, wife his curator; husband still possessed of 
sufficient property to give wife reasonable amount at his death); 
Cheatham v. Sheppard, Ga. (1944) (husband cleans out his estate 
by inter vivos gifts but gave wife respectable amount also); Boyle 
v. John M. Smyth Co., Ill (1928) (family arrangement); Wheelock 
v. Wheelock, Ind. (1933) (trust created by husband after post-
nuptial agreement with wife, there being no promise in the agree-
ment to retain all his personalty); Vosburg v. Mallory, Iowa (1912) 
(wife, with elephantiasis, delivers note worth $432 to her brother 
five days before death. Her total property (including note) was 
about $1,500, plus one-half interest in property worth $1,800); 
Beck v. Beck, Iowa (1884) (suit in lifetime); Cooke v. Fidelity 
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Trust and Safety Vault Co., Ky. (1898) (advancements, labelled 
"not an excessive provision"); Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. (1905) 
(husband married decedent wife a year before her death from 
tuberculosis she being worth $10,000; she gave practically all of 
it away before death); Whittington v. Whittington, Md. (1954) 
(widow received roughly $12,000 out of $40,000); Allender v. Al-
lender, Md. (1952) ("reasonableness" of the transfer impliedly 
considered relevant); Ascher v. Cohen, Mass. (1956) (wife transfers 
interest in close corporation built up by herself and first 
husband); National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Cumming, 
Mass. (1950) (substantial transfer by husband who became mar-
ried for first time, late in life, to a widow with three children; 
some provision for the widow); Roche v. Brickley, Mass. (1926) 
(wife transfers about one-third her estate in trust; some provision 
for husband); Leonard v. Leonard, Mass. (1902) (deed for support 
held valid; spouses living together but " ... after 1886 her hus-
band furnished her with no supply of food"; presumably she had 
some personal income as he did not die until1894; gift of savings 
account held "illusory" on grounds of motive and insufficient evi-
dence); Goodrich v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Battle Creek, 
Mich. (1935) (widow dead before litigation); Trabbic v. Trabbic, 
Mich. (1905) (discharge of mortgage, proceeds of new mortgage 
divided among sons; some provision for wife); Brandon v. Daw-
son, Mo. (1892) (gift causa mortis; new trial ordered on ground 
widow's testimony improperly excluded); Crecelius v. Horst, Mo. 
(1886) (husband purchases farm in name of child by former mar-
riage, with retention of life estate; spouses had then not been 
living together for nine years); Estate of Sides, Neb. (1930) (size 
of decedent's estate $40,215.12, inter vivos transfers $41,444; court 
considered all the circumstances); Sanborn v. Goodhue, N.H. 
(1853) (husband three weeks before death of tuberculosis trans-
fers notes approximating one-quarter of his estate in trust for his 
two minor children; other provisions made for widow); In re 
Aybar's Estate, N.Y. (1952) (claimant widower, a disabled war 
veteran who had been declared incompetent, possessed of ade-
quate means); Schmidt v. Rebhann, N.Y. (1951), (transfer of 
apartment building by wife few weeks before death; stress on 
equities of the donee, who had taken care of and lived with the 
wife, the husband having separated from the wife nine years be-
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fore death); In re Prokaskey's Will, N.Y. (1951) (Totten trusts by 
the wife, post Halpern; "In determining the effect of such pur-
ported transfers consideration must be given to the surrounding 
circumstances"; parties had separated before the transfer; hus-
band's financial position, or proportion of total estate transferred 
not stated); Hart v. Hart, N.Y. (1949) (other provisions for claim-
ant); Spafford v. Pfeffer, N.Y. (1947) (husband transfers firm to 
daughter shortly before death; good review of available evidence; 
donee expended own money on the property); Matter of Schacter, 
N.Y. (1944) ("The decedent retained in his control other assets 
of substantially similar value"; no "intent"); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
N.Y. (1943) (reasonable provision for widow); Moyer v. Dunseith, 
N.Y. (1943) (schoolteacher, contributing to pension fund since 
1917, marries in 1935, and in 1940, 16 days before death, changes 
beneficiary rights ($13,000) from her mother to her sister); Re 
Wrone's Estate, N.Y. (1941) (donee had given financial assistance 
to decedent; spouses separated at time of transfer and until 
death); Morrison v. Morrison, Ohio (1955) (transfer of inter-
est in close corporation before marriage); MacLean v. J. S. 
MacLean Co., Ohio (1955) (stress on fact evidence discloses 
no "failure ... to provide present support"; decedent left 
estate of $44,000); Farrell v. Puthoff, Okla. (1903) (man trans-
fers his separate property to his bigamous second "wife," 
with whom he had lived for five years); Mornes Estate, Pa. 
(1951) (other provisions for claimant); In re Rynier's Estate, 
Pa. (1943) (other provisions for claimant); Potter Title and Trust 
Co. v. Braum, Pa. (1928) (aged man married for 3 months to 16 
year old girl executes mortgages worth $19,400, without receiving 
consideration, and assigns mortgages worth $65,000, to son by 
former marriage, his total wealth not stated; widow wins as to 
mortgages, loses on assignments); Young's Estate, Pa. (1902) (pro-
portion not clear; settlement of wife's belated attempt to elect 
against will); Hummel's Estate, Pa. (1894) (transfer with "intent" 
sustained as donees had not participated in the fraud; but court 
awards widow compensation out of the decedent's estate on 
ground that she had a "higher equity" than the heirs); Dickerson's 
Appeal, Pa. (1887) (proportion not clear; estate planning, observ-
ing meticulous formalities); Mcintosh v. Ladd, Tenn. (1840) (stress 
on reasonableness of transfer); Patch v. Squires, Vt. (1933) (wife 
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transfers about thirteen-sixteenths of her property twenty-six days 
before death, but evidence that (a) husband had not lived with or 
supported wife for over twenty-six years, (b) the property came to 
the wife by gift from her mother, and (c) donees were her kin who 
had cared for her in her illness); Hall v. Hall, Va. (1909) (widow 
receives generous devise and some personalty); Gentry v. Bailey, 
Va. (1850) (slaves; small proportion transferred); Estate of Steck, 
Wis. (1957) (life estate for widow); Sederlund v. Sederlund, Wis. 
(1922) (widow received only one tenth of husband's estate; but 
parties had been married but a short time, and the property 
transferred represented the earnings of the husband and his 
former wife and nine children). 
3. Unreasonable 
Small v. Small, Kan. (1895) (man with five children marries 
second wife twenty nine years before death; "most amicable" re-
lations between the spouses, and in effect she brought up the 
children; secret transfers culminating nineteen days before death 
strip his estate so that all widow got out of valuable realty and 
$100,000 in personalty was $1,400 a year for life or until re-
marriage); Kerwin v. Donaghy, Mass. (1945) (husband, worth 
about half a million, transfers "substantially all" his property); 
Redman v. Churchill, Mass. (1918) (widow in practical effect was 
disinherited when husband transferred $50,000 to himself as exec-
utor of his mother's will); In re Leiman's Estate, N.Y. (1953) (Tot-
ten trusts to sisters and mistress upheld, per Halpern case, even 
though estate depleted); Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, N.Y. 
(1939) (wife gets only about one-fifth gross estate); Cf. Dick v. 
Bauman, Ohio (1943) (transfer of realty and personalty leaves 
aged widow penniless; not clear that she sought to set aside trans-
fer of personalty; she lost her inchoate dower right since she died 
before suit). 
4. Probably Unreasonable 
Stewart v. Stewart, Conn. (1824) (all husband's realty; amount 
of his remaining personalty not mentioned); Haskell v. Art Insti-
tute, Ill. (1940) (gift of forty valuable paintings; bequests of al-
most half a million in will, with half of remaining net estate to 
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wife, in lieu of all other claims against estate); Blankenship v. 
Hall, Ill. (1908) (practically all of husband's real estate: but 
widow, insane, could not be deprived of inchoate dower and 
homestead); Osborn v. Osborn, Kan. (1918) (wife joins in sale of 
land with understanding she would have benefit of proceeds; 
court brushes aside any question of donee's financial position, or 
possibility that wife may have contributed to payment of mort-
gage on the realty); Malone v. Walsh, Mass. (1944) (decedent wife 
grasping, vindictive, pretended she had no money; but husband 
somewhat shiftless and had not supported her; wife transferred 
her $15,000 into joint savings account with her brother living in 
Ireland whom she had not seen for 30 years but with whom she 
had corresponded); Jones v. Somerville, Miss. (1900) (secret trans-
fer few months before death; widow gets only about one-ninth 
of husband's total property); Cameron v. Cameron, Miss. (1848) 
(most of husband's personalty; amount of remaining realty not 
stated); In re Halpern's Estate, N.Y. (1951) ($14,000 out of some 
$17,300; parties separated at or about time of transfers); In re 
Kalina's Will, N.Y. (1946) (widow given bare minimum in a small 
estate); Inda v. Inda, N.Y. (1942) (proportion not clear; widow 
and ten children survive); In re Schurer's Estate, N.Y. (1936) 
(substantial amount transferred); Holmes v. Holmes, N.Y. (1832) 
(husband buys son's land at a price "far beyond its value," thereby 
exhausting his "considerable" personal estate: widow loses, but 
of course can have dower in the realty); Brodt v. Rannells, Ohio 
(1890) (all personalty shortly before death); Garrison v. Spencer, 
Okla. (1916) (widow, who had been "supported" by husband dur-
ing coverture, stripped of everything but homestead); Estate of 
Kerr, Pa. (1951) (substantial transfers; court refers to "a natural 
sympathy for the widow under the circumstances of the case"); 
Stefano v. First Nat'l Bank, Pa. (1947) ("apparently did treat 
his wife unfairly from a financial standpoint"); Beirne v. 
Continental-Equitable Trust Co., Pa. (1932) (proportion not 
stated; widow left $40 monthly in will, which was same amount 
he had been paying her during separation before death); In re 
Davies Estate, Pa. (1931) ("intent"; total estate not stated); 
Windolph v. Girard, Pa. (1914) (wife transfers $108,550 plus in-
terest in an estate; "intent"); Lines v. Lines, Pa. (1891) (substan-
tially all of estate transferred, widow receiving annuity amounting 
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to about one-fifteenth of the income); Richards v. Richards, Tenn. 
(1850) (note for $300; no money in estate to pay widow her year's 
support). 
5. Not Clear 
United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, Ark. (1946) (pro-
portion not stated); Robertson v. Robertson, Ala. (1905) (propor-
tion not clear); Norris v. Bradshaw, Colo. (1935) (marriage late in 
life; husband gives all his small estate to husband of child by 
former wife); Wilson v. Lowrie, Colo. (1925) (insufficient facts); 
Ellis v. Jones, Colo. (1923) (proportion not stated, but probably 
reasonable: deed given to reward child of former marriage for 
care of the decedent spouse); Phillips v. Phillips, Colo. (1903) 
(stresses natural duty of father to care for children); Harris v. 
Spencer, Conn. (1898) ("large part or all" of wife's property month 
and a half before death; parties had been married only about six 
months); Harber v. Harber, Ga. (1921) (transfer of all real estate, 
wife gets annuity, proportion not stated); Flowers v. Flowers, Ga. 
(1892) (erroneous charge to jury; new trial ordered); Stice v. 
Nevin, III. (1951) (headnotes only; wife's right of attack dies with 
her); Padfield v. Padfield, Ill. (1875) (advancement, with pro-
vision for support of decedent); Pond v. Sweetser, Ind. (1882) 
(proportion not stated); Samson, Adm'x v. Samson, Iowa (1885) 
(transfer by husband to children of "greater part" of his estate 
shortly before death); Poole v. Poole, Kan. (1915) (widow con-
siderably younger than husband and had previously received a 
settlement: transfer of remaining estate with intent to defraud); 
Lindsey's Ex'r v. Lindsey, Ky. (1950) (widow fails to sustain bur-
den of proof that certificates of deposit purchased with husband's 
money); Charest v. St. Onge, Mass. (1955) (insufficient facts); 
Seaman v. Harmon, Mass. (1906) (purchase of realty in name 
of donee, during separation; insufficient facts); Kelley v. Snow, 
Mass. (1904) (proportion not stated); Stone v. Hackett, Mass. 
(1858) (insufficient facts); Van Devere v. Moore, Minn. (1954) 
(insufficient facts); Stewart v. Barksdale, Miss. (1953) (insuffi-
cient facts); In re Zern's Estate, N.Y. (1954) (insufficient facts); 
Matter of Galewitz, N.Y. (1954) (some provision for widow; pro-
portion not stated); In re Kilgallen's Estate, N.Y. (1953) (wife in 
last illness transfers her earnings from over 35 years employment; 
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"intent"); In re Phipps' Will, N.Y. (1953) (some provision for 
widow; chief beneficiary was decedent's secretary); Estate of Mor-
statt, N.Y. (1952) (insufficient facts); Radecki v. Radecki, N.Y. 
(1952) (insufficient facts); Matter of Ward, N.Y. (1951) (wife trans-
fers $18,000 in Totten trusts; no facts on proportion, or on wid-
ower's financial condition); In re Sturmer's Estate, N.Y. (1950) 
(insufficient facts; separation agreement held not a waiver of elec-
tion rights); Superat v. Dylawski, N.Y. (1950) (insufficient facts); 
Thomas v. Brevoort Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, N.Y. (1949) (insuffi-
cient facts); Hirschfield v. Ralston, N.Y. (1946) (proportion not 
clear); Deyo v. Adams, N.Y. (1944) (marriage of short duration; 
proportion not stated); Matter of Karlinski, N.Y. (1943) (insuffi-
cient facts); In re Lorch's Estate, N.Y. (1941) ($3700 out of ap-
proximately $12,000; parties separated apparently without wid-
ow's fault); Burtt v. Riley, N.Y. (1940) (insufficient facts); Matter 
of Smith, N.Y. (1939) (insufficient facts); Matter of Glen, N.Y. 
(1936) (insufficient facts); In re Yarme's Estate, N.Y. (1934) (in-
sufficient facts); Guitner v. McEowen, Ohio (1954) (insufficient 
facts); Neville v. Sawicki, Ohio (1946) (decedent considered donee 
daughter had legal claim to property transferred); In re Iafolla's 
Estate, Pa. (1955) (widow had waived her rights, and died before 
suit; substantial transfer); In re Huntzinger's Estate, Pa. (1952) 
(insufficient facts); McKean Estate, Pa. (1951) (proportion not 
clear); Sellers v. Gibney, Pa. (1949) (insufficient facts); Cancilla v. 
Bondy, Pa. (1945) (a "patently crude attempt" to destroy her 
dower: but he had made other provision for her); DeNoble v. 
DeNoble, Pa. (1938) (equities with donee; widow's financial posi-
tion not clear); Orth v. Doench, Pa. (1932) (insufficient facts); 
Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Pa. (1920) (proportion not 
clear); In re Sutch's Estate, Pa. (1902) (notes comprising more 
than one-half father's estate given to children by former marriage 
who had helped him build up truck farm); Pringle v. Pringle, Pa. 
(1868) (insufficient facts); Mann v. Grinwald, Wis. (1930) (suit by 
bigamous wife suing as administratrix). 
TABLED 
EVASION CASES DEALING WITH INTER VIVOS GIFTS 
AuToMOBILE: Favoring donee: In re Kilgallen's Estate, 123 
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 
1050, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd 265 App. Div. 27, 37 
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dept. 1942) afj'd without opin. 290 N.Y. 779, 
50 N.E.2d 106 (1943). 
BANK AccoUNT. Favoring spouse: Estate of Rosenfeld, N.Y. 
Sur., N.Y. L. J. (9 Feb. 1939), 1 P.H. Unreported Trust Cases, 
para. 25, 275. And cf. Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 
45, 44 L.R.A. 208 (1899) (retention of pass-book and right of 
withdrawal; no surviving spouse). Favoring donee: Wright v. 
Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905). 
BoND OF DECEDENT, PAYABLE AT OR AFTER DEATH: Favoring 
spouse: Cf. Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949) 
(payable after death). 
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT: Favoring spouse: Hamilton v. First 
State Bank of Willow Hill, 254 Ill App. 55, 59 (1929); Payne v. 
Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930). Favoring donee: Lindsey's 
Executor v. Lindsey, 313 Ky. 171,230 S.W.2d 441 (1950). 
CoNTENTS OF JOINTLY OwNED SAFETY DEPOSIT Box. Favoring 
spouse: Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926). 
FuRNITURE, HousEHOLD CHATTELS: Favoring spouse: Newton 
v. Newton, 162 Mo. 173, 61 S.W. 881 (1901). Favoring donee: 
Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905). 
HoRsEs, CATTLE: Favoring spouse: Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 
112 S.W. 884 (1908). Favoring donee: McClure v. Owens, 32 Ark. 
443 (1877); Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915); Gar-
rison v. Spencer, 58 Okla. 442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916). 
INTEREST IN A BusiNESS. Favoring spouse: Cochran's Adm'x v. 
Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Galewitz v. Walter 
Peek Paper Corp. 145 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1955), Aff'd without 
opinion, 161 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1st Dep't 1957); Marano v. Lo Carro, 
62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), afj'd without opinion, 270 App. 
Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946); Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 
Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926). And cf. Mendez v. Quinones, 
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78 F. Supp. 744 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1948) modified sub. nom. 
Mendez v. Mendez, 176 F2d 849 (1st Cir. 1949). Favoring donee: 
Harmon v. Harmon, 131 Ark. 501, 199 S.W. 553 (1917); Allender 
v. Allender, 87 A.2d 608 (Md. 1952); Charest v. St. Onge, 332 Mass. 
628, 127 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Hirschfield v. Ralston, 66 N.Y.S.2d 59 
(Sup. Ct. 1946); Re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541, 31 N.Y.S.2d 191 
(1941); MacLean v. J. S. MacLean Co., Ohio Prob., 123 N.E.2d 
761 (1955). Cf. Holzbeierlein v. Holzbeierlein, 67 App. D.C., 91 
F2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (antenuptial transfer). 
JEWELRY. Favoring Donee: In re Kilgallen's Estate, 123 
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Surr. Ct. 1953). 
JuDGMENT OR JuDGMENT NoTE. Favoring spouse: Murray v. 
Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244, 8 L.R.A. 95 (1890). Favoring 
donee: In re Rynier's Estate, 48 Lane. Rev. 475, aff'd, 347 Pa. 
471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943); In re Davies' Estate, 102 Pa. Super. 326, 
156 Atl. 555 (1931). And cf. In re Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 50 
Atl. 943 (1902) (consideration). 
LEASEHOLD. Favoring donee: Bestry v. Dorn, 180 Md. 42, 22 
A.2d 552 (1941); Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99 Atl. 551 (1916). 
MoNEY. Favoring spouse: Manikee's Adm'r v. Beard, 85 Ky. 
20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462, 63 
N.E. 1068 (1902); Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 
945 (1949); Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902). 
Favoring donee: Wooton v. Keaton, 168 Ark. 981, 272 S.W. 869 
(1925); Whidden v. Johnson. 54 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1951); Wright v. 
Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905). Leonard v. Leonard, 
181 Mass. 458,63 N.E. 1068 (1902); Smith v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 
145 N.W. 1067 (1914); In re Kilgallen's Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 827 
(Surr. Ct. 1953); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S.2d 
839 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st 
Dept. 1942), aff'd without opin. 290 N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 
(1943); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 259 App. Div. 845, 19 N.Y.S.2d 392 
(2d Dept. 1940), motion to dismiss app. denied, 285 N.Y. 517, 32 
N.E. 819 (1941), afj'd, 285 N.Y. 655, 33 N.E.2d 866 (1941). Hayes 
v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926). 
MoRTGAGES. Favoring spouse: Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 
S.W. 244, 8 L.R.A. 95 (1890); Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 
213 (1903); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 
Atl. 401 (1928); Lonsdale's Estate, 29 Pa. 407 (1857). And cf. In re 
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Kellas Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 
924, 1006,46 N.Y.S.2d 884 (3rd Dep't 1943), aff'd on other grounds 
293 N.Y. 908, 60 N.E.2d 34 (1944); Armstrong v. Connelly, 299 Pa. 
51, 149 Atl. 87 (1930) (evasion of support and maintenance; fore-
closure after husband's death); Cancilla v. Bondy, 353 Pa. 249, 44 
A.2d 586 (1945). Favoring donee: Speaker v. Keating, 36 F. Supp. 
556 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Samson v. Samson, 67 Iowa 253, 25 N.W. 
233 (1885); Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915); 
Small v. Small, 56 Kan. 1, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); Redman v. Church-
ill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (1918); Trabbic v. Trabbic, 142 
Mich. 387, 12 Detroit Leg. N. 782, 105 N.W. 876 (1905); Estate of 
Kerr, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 239, 38 Del. Co. Rep. 205 (Pa. 1951); Potter 
Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 Atl. 401 (1928); 
Young's Estate, 202 Pa. 431, 51 Atl. 1036 (1902). 
NoTES oF DECEDENT PAYABLE AT DEATH: Favoring spouse: 
Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L.Rep. 1229,64 S.W. 981 (1901). And cf. 
Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215, 28 Atl. 1113 (1894); Favoring 
donee: In re Rynier's Estate, 48 Lane. Rev. 475, a[J'd, Pa. 471, 
32 A.2d 736 (1943). 
NoTES OF A THIRD PARTY, TRANSFERRED To DoNEE: Favoring 
spouse: Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W.2d 376 
(1938); Manikee's Adm'x v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); 
Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895); Favoring donee: Samson 
v. Samson, 67 Iowa 253, 25 N.W. 233 (1885); Small v. Small, 56 
Kan. 1, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); Smith v. Corey, 125 Minn. 190, 145 
N.W. 1067 (1914); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 
750 (1922). And cf. Sanborn v. Goodhue, 28 N.H. 48 (1853) (as-
signment of notes, in trust). 
NoTES OF DoNEE, RELEASED oR CANCELLED AT DEATH: Favoring 
spouse: Cf. Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895). Favoring 
donee: Estate of Sides, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930). And 
cf. Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915); Mulloy v. 
Young, 29 Tenn. 198 (1859) (release of note; alimony). 
PAINTINGS. Favoring donee: Haskell v. Art Institute of Chi-
cago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736 (1940). And cf. Gellatly v. 
United States, 71 F. Supp. 357 (1947) (supra, p. 364). 
SECURITIES. Favoring spouse: Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 
273 Ky. I, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. I, 13 
S.W. 244, 8 L.R.A. 95 (1890); Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 
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224 S.W.2d 945 (1949); Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 
N.E. 269 (1926); Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks, 83 D.&C. 259 
(Pa. I952). And cf. Brown v. Crafts, 98 Maine 40, 56 Atl. 213 
(I903); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 3I Atl. 14 (I89I); Marano 
v. Lo Carro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Supp. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opin., 
270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (lst Dep't 1946); In Re Kellas' 
Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd 267 App. Div. 924, 
1006, 46 N.Y.S.2d 884 (3rd Dep't 1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 908, 60 
N.E.2d 34 (1944). Favoring donee: TRANSFER SusTAINED: Harris 
v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 41 Atl. 773 (1898); Samson v. Samson, 
67 Iowa 253, 25 N.W. 233 (1885); Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, I50 
Pac. 592 (1915); Small v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 42 Pac. 323 (I895); 
Redman v. Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (I918); Wahl v. 
Wahl, 200 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1947), appeal transferred 357 
Mo. 89, 206 S.W.2d 334 (1947); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 
31 Atl. 14 (I891); In re Kilgallen's Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Surr. 
Ct. 1953); In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. 28 (Surr. 
Ct. I935), aff'd without opin., 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. 818 (1st 
Dept. I936). And cf. Robertson v. Robertson 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 
I04 (1905) (irrevocable trust); Allender v. Allender 87 Atl. 2d 
608 (Md. 1952); Re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541,31 N.Y.S.2d 191 
(1941); MacLean Co. Ohio Prob., 123 N.E.2d 761 (1955); Estate of 
Kerr, I Fiduc. Rep. 239, 38 Del. Co. Rep. 205 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 
1951); Dickerson's Appeal, ll5 Pa. I98, 8 Atl. 64 (I887). 
SLAVES. Favoring spouse: Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (I863-4); 
Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350 (I860), 32 Mo. 464 (I862); Davis v. 
Davis, 5 Mo. Ill (I838); Brewer v. Connell, 11 Humph. 500, 30 
Tenn. 343 (I851). And cf. Stone v. Stone, IS Mo. 389 (I853). 
Favoring donee: Cf. Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140 (1852) 
(trust). 
MISCELLANEOUS 
(a) ADVANCEMENTs: Favoring spouse: Murray v. Murray, 90 
Ky. I, I3 S.W. 244, 8 L.R.A. 95 (I890). And cf. Dyer v. Smith, 62 
Mo. App. 606 (1895); Favoring donee: Mcintosh v. Ladd, 20 
Tenn. 445, I Humph. 459 (I840) (realty). And cf. Cooke v. Fidel-
ity Trust and Safety-Vault Co., 104 Ky. 473, 20 Ky. L.Rep. 667, 47 
S.W. 325 (1898) (realty); Schaper's Ex'r v. Schaper, I58 Mo. App. 
605, I38 s.w. 896 (1911). 
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(b) BILLS oF SALE. Favoring spouse: Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 
258 (1863-4). And cf. Mottershead v. Lamson, 101 N.Y.S.2d 174 
(Sup. Ct. 1950). 
(c) CoNFESSION OF JuDGMENT. Favoring spouse: Blodgett v. 
Blodgett, 266 Ill. App. 517 ( 1932), transferred 343 Ill. 569, 17 5 
N.E. 777 (1931). And cf. Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433, 
55 Atl. 1067 (1903). 
(d) "SATISFACI'ION" OF SPECIFIC LEGACIES. Favoring spouse: Cf. 
Straat v. O'Neil, 84 Mo. 68 (1884). 
TABLE E 
TABLE OF CASES 
The cases are arranged by states in order to give the practising 
lawyer a quick entry into the "evasion" case-law of the individual 
American jurisdictions. The cases in each jurisdiction are grouped 
as follows: 
First, "evasion" cases. These involve postnuptial transfers in 
alleged "evasion" of the elective share. In these cases the court 
either reaches a decision on the merits or takes a stand on the 
"evasion" question (see page 147 supra). These cases were 
analysed from the viewpoint of the equities in chapters Ten and 
Eleven. Subject to human error, this group contains all "evasion" 
cases reported up to the end of May 1958. Cases which favor the 
surviving spouse are italicized. A few cases involve a transfer that 
the court has ruled invalid as well as a transfer that the court has 
ruled valid. Such a case is arbitrarily classified as favoring the 
spouse if the opinion is concerned chiefly with the transfer which 
was ruled invalid; otherwise it is classified as favoring the donee. 
Second, supplemental "evasion" cases. These cases involve 
gratuitous postnuptial transfers, but they lack the requirements 
for inclusion in the first-mentioned group: no decision is reached 
on the merits, and the court has nothing significant to say on the 
"evasion" problem. 
Third, related cases. These are divided into three subgroups: 
cases dealing with antenuptial transfers, cases dealing with con-
tracts to make a will, and miscellaneous cases. The first two sub-
groups include all cases cited in Appendix C and Appendix D 
respectively. The miscellaneous cases deal with collateral matters, 
e.g., transfers in fraud of alimony privileges. Some of these miscel-
laneous cases are apropos only by way of analogy, but most of 
them contain dicta bearing directly on the "evasion" problem. 
The "related cases" include a number of decisions not referred 
to elsewhere in the book. They are marked with an asterisk. 
Some of these decisions were reported after the manuscript was 
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completed. The rest of them deal with peripheral points not 
considered important enough for exhaustive citation in the text. 
Since the table presents all relevant cases on a state by state basis, 
these decisions are included for purposes of completeness. 
UNITED STATES 





Gellatly v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 357 (1947) ....... 364, 403. 
ALABAMA 
EVASION CASES 
Ford v. Ford, 4 Ala. 142 (1842) 
................. 55, 71, 165, 169, 203, 250, 251, 380, 385, 394. 
Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 104 (1905) 
.................... 90, 100, 190, 198, 203, 228, 385, 399, 404. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Anderson v. Lewter, 232 Ala. 375, 168 So. 839 (1936). . . . . . . 168. 
Dorrough v. Grove, 257 Ala. 609, 60 So.2d 342 (Ala. 1952) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160, 261, 365. 
Kelly v. McGrath, 70 Ala. 75, 45 Am. Rep. 75 (1881) .... 361, 363. 
McBee v. McBee, 91 So.2d 675 (Ala. 1956). * 
Contract to make a will 
Mayfield v. Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918) ... 369, 374, 376. 
Miscellaneous 
Chambless v. Black, 250 Ala. 604, 35 So.2d 348 (1948) .... 23, 168. 
Chinnubee v. Nicks, 3 Porter 362 (Ala. 1836) .............. 255. 




Gristy v. Hudgens, 23 Ariz. 339, 203 Pac. 569 
(1922) (community property) ......................... 244. 
ARKANSAS 
EVASION CASES 
Cook v. Cook, 12 Ark. 381 (1851). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380, 383, 392. 
Harmon v. Harmon, 131 Ark. 501, 199 S.W. 553 (1917) 
............................... 167, 196, 379, 384, 394, 402. 
Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641 (1895) 
................................... 131, 195, 379, 385, 388. 
Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, II2 S.W. 884 (1908) 
.......................... 132, 191, 195, 379, 383, 391, 401. 
United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 
460 (W. D. Ark. 1946) ... 71, 89, 90, 104, 202, 266, 381, 383, 399. 
Wooton v. Keaton, 168 Ark. 981 272 S.W. 869 (1925) 
........................... 164, 250, 264, 381, 385, 394, 402. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
McClure v. Owens, 32 Ark. 443 (1877) (personalty) ........ 401. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Barnett v. Barnett, 209 Ark. 973, 193 S.W.2d 319 (1946). 
Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939). 
Miscellaneous 
Featherston v. Hartford Insurance Co., 146 F. Supp. 535, 539 
(W. D. Ark. 1956) (personalty). 
McKinney v. Caldwell, 250 S.W.2d II7 (Ark. 1952) 
(chattel mortgage). 









SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 217, 73 Am. Dec. 533 (1859) 





Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37 (1896) ........ 356. 
Contract to make a will 
Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368, 369, 374, 376. 
Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal. App. 175, 182 P. 450 (1919), 
later appeal, 62 Cal. App. 721, 217 P. 1082 (1923) 
....................................... 369, 371, 374, 376. 
Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App.2d 46, 
113 P.2d 495 (1941) ...................... 368, 370, 374, 375. 
Miscellaneous 
In re Allshouse's Estate, 81 P.2d 169 (Cal. App. 1938), 
rev'd, 13 Cal.2d 691, 91 P.2d 887 (1939) (Missouri law). 
Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 
• 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) .................................. 34. 
Brucks v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
36 Cal.2d 845,228 P.2d 545 (1951) ..................... 206. 
Chase v. Leiter, 96 Cal. App.2d 439, 215 P.2d 756 (1950) 
............................................... 228, 378. 
Estate of Dean, 68 Cal. App.2d 86, 155 P.2d 901 (1945) ..... 215. 
Katz v. Driscoll, 86 Cal. App.2d 313, 194 P.2d 822 (1948) .... 229. 
Gaskins v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 
30 Cal. App.2d 409, 86 P.2d 681 (1939). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239. 
Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 P. 524 (1923) 
(community property). 
Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031, 88 A.L.R. 
856 (1933) (Indiana law). 
Paley v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Association, 324 P.2d 35 (Calif. 1958). 
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Patterson v. Chapman, 179 Cal. 203, 176 P. 37,2 A.L.R. 
1467 (1918) ........................................ 246. 
Penn Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fields, 81 F. Supp. 54 
(S.D.Cal. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1949) ........ 242. 
Wissner v. Wissner, 89 Cal. App.2d 759, 201 P.2d 837 (1949), 
rev'd, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (community property) ......... 239. 
COLORADO 
EVASION CASES 
Burton v. Burton, 100 Colo. 567, 69 P.2d 307 (1937) 
.................................... 71, 137, 158, 204, 394. 
Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 216 Pac. 257 (1923) 
........................... 136, 137, 165, 184, 379, 383, 399. 
Grover v. Clover, 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (1917) 
....................... 136, 161,200,261,264,380, 383,387. 
Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 P.2d 563 (1954) 
................... 101, 137, 170, 184, 261, 262, 380, 383, 394. 
Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 45 P.2d 638 (1935) ... 137, 399. 
Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363 (1903) 
................................ 71, 136, 185, 380, 384,399. 
Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956) 
................................... 137,203, 379, 386, 392. 
Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128, 34 L.R.A. 49 (1896) 
aff'd, 24 Colo. 527, 52 P. 790 (1898) 
.... 90,131,135,136,162,164,168, 185,261,262,381,38~387. 
Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953) 
.................. 101, 133, 137, 165, 167, 183, 381, 384, 394. 
Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925) 
............................... 136, 195, 199, 202, 384, 399. 
SuPPLEMENTAL EvASION CASES 
Hammond v. Hammond, 91 Colo. 327 (1932). . . . . . . . . . . . . 136. 
Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932) ..... 137, 184. 
RELATED CASES 
Contract to make a will 
Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275,30 P.2d 853 (1934) .... 368, 369, 374. 
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Miscellaneous 
Bostron v. Bostron, 128 Colo. 535, 265 P.2d 230 (1953) ..... . 
Bushner v. Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 
307 P.2d 204 (1957) (deed). 
Denver National Bank v. Von Brecht, 322 P.2d 667 
(Colo. 1958) (inter vivos trust). 
Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 247 Pac. 174 (1926) ........ . 
Wright v. Nelson, 242 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1952) (divorce). 
CONNECTICUT 
EVASION CASES 




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189, 379, 399, 404. 
Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317 (1824) 
................. 71, 99, 102, 120, 184, 203, 262, 380, 384, 397. 
RELATED CASES 
Contract to make a will 




Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867). . . . . . . 355, 356. 
Miscellaneous 
Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819 (Del. 1957), aff'd 78 S. Ct. 
1228 (1958) (trust; conflicts). 
Tracy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 101 A.2d 321 
(Del. 1953) (life insurance). 
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Culhane, 129 A.2d 770 
(Del. Ch. 1957) (election). 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
SUPPLEMENTAL EvASION CASES 
Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121 (D.C.D. Col. 1939) ........ 195. 
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RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial 
Ho1zbeierlein v. Ho1zbeierlein, 91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937) 
............................... 134, 155, 238, 361, 363, 402. 
Leonardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (1958). "" 
Miscellaneous 
Hopp v. Calloway, 280 Fed. 977 (D.C. Cir. 1922) 
(inchoate dower). 
Murray v. Gadsen, 197 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952) 
(joint bank account). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220. 
Sch1aefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 130 A.L.R. 1014 
(D.C. Cir. 1940) ..................................... 239. 
FLORIDA 
EVASION CASES 
Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, 44 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1949) 
............... 90, 103, 154, 158, 165, 203, 232, 266, 385, 394. 
Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863-4) 
.................... 87, 90, 103, 133, 154, 164, 165, 167, 191, 
192, 232, 262, 267, 380, 385, 388, 404, 405. 
Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815, 162 
So. 868 (1935) ... _ 90, 103, 154, 157, 158, 203, 232, 379, 383, 392. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Whidden v. Johnson, 54 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1951) .......... 189,402. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957). 
Hirsch v. Bartels, 49 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1950) ............ . 232, 234. 
Mcintyre v. Mcintyre, 92 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1957). 
Contract to make a will 
Tod v. Fuller, 78 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1955) ........... 368, 373, 376. 
Miscellaneous 
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 4 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1941) .. 201, 239. 
Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1956), rev'd, 78 S. Ct. 
1228 (1958) (trust, conflicts). 
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In re Hester's Estate, 28 So.2d 164 (1947) ................. 143. 
Johnson v. Remy, 220 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1955) ............. 239. 
Lowry v. Florida National Bank of Jacksonville, 
42 So.2d 368 (1949). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222. 
In re Payne's Estate, 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955) (partnership). * 
Reddick v. Meffert, 32 Fla. 409 (1893) (inchoate dower). * 
Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956) ............. 207. 
Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944) .......... 34. 
GEORGIA 
EVASION CASES 
Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 _(1940) .... 133, 391. 
Cheatham v. Sheppard, 198 Ga. 254, 31 S.E.2d 
457 (1944) .............. 134, 155, 159, 170, 184, 381, 385, 394. 
Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632, 15 S.E. 834 (1892) 
........................ 87, 134, 166, 171, 184,381, 384,399. 
Harber v. Harber, 152 Ga. 98, 108 S.E. 520 (1921) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 133, 166, 172, 185, 380, 383, 399. 
Pruett v. Cowsart, 136 Ga. 756, 72 S.E. 30 (1911) 
............................... 120, 166, 184, 380, 383, 392. 
RELATED CASES 
Miscellaneous 
Norwood v. Norwood, 207, Ga. 148, 60 S.E.2d 449 (1950) .... 118. 
Smith v. Peacock, 114 Ga. 691,40 S.E. 757 (1901) ........... 247. 








Trader v. Trader, 48 Idaho 722, 285 Pac. 678 
(1930) (alimony). • 
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ILLINOIS 
EVASION CASES 
Blankenship v. Hall, 233 III. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 134, 162, 164, 184, 261, 380, 386, 398. 
Blodgett v. Blodgett, 266 Ill. App. 517 (1932), transferred, 
343 Ill. 569, 175 N.E. 777 (1931) ............... 134, 387, 405. 
Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57 (1928) 
............................. 103, 154, 201, 255, 263, 394. 
Burnet v. First National Bank, 12 Ill. App.2d 514, 
140 N.E.2d 362 (1957) .................... 200,381,385,392. 
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912) 
........................... 100, 101, 154, 196, 198,203, 392. 
Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929) 
........................... 188,217,261, 380, 383, 391,401. 
Haskell v. Art Institute, 304 III. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 
736 (1940) ... 71, 100, 105, 120, 134, 164, 189, 192, 195, 263, 380, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385, 397, 403. 
Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945) 
.......................... 157, 167, 184, 212, 250, 361, 392. 
Holmes v. Mims, I Ill.2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953) 
......... ······· ........... 165,167,170,216,379,385,392. 
Padfield v. Padfield, 78 Ill. 16 (1875) ............. 101, 133, 399. 
Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 Ill. 475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921) 
................................... 168, 203, 379, 386, 392. 
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 
(1944) ........... 88, 90, 131, 133, 162, 170, 200, 380, 383, 388. 
Stice v. Nevin, 344 Ill. App. 642, 101 N.E.2d 873 (1951) 
........................................... 103, 200, 399. 
West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1935); cert. denied, 
296 u.s. 633 (1935) ........... 71, 149, 196,203,381,385,393. 
Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164, 203, 380, 386, 392. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Carey v. Funk, 327 Ill. App. 274, 64 N.E.2d 180 (1945) 
(mortgage notes). 
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RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Bozarth v. Bozarth, 399 Ill. 259, 77 N.E.2d 658 (1948) ....... 355. 
Clark v. Clark, 183 Ill. 448, 56 N.E. 82, 75 Am. St. Rep. 
115 (1900) ......................................... 356. 
Daniher v. Daniher, 201 Ill. 489, 66 N.E. 239 (1903)...... . 165. 
Deke v. Huenkemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 102 N.E. 1059, 48 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 512 (1913), later appeal, 289 Ill. 148, 124 N.E. 
381 (1919) .................................. 261, 262, 363. 
Ellet v. Farmer, 384 Ill. 343, 51 N.E.2d 570 (1943). * 
Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935), cert. denied, 
296 u.s. 630 (1935) .............................. 100, 101. 
Higgins v. Higgins, 219 Ill. 146, 76 N .E. 86 (1905). . . . . . . . . 355. 
Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945) 
(also an evasion case) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361. 
Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286 Ill. 478, 122 N.E. 121 (1919) ........... 355. 
Jones v. Jones, 213 Ill. 228, 72 N.E. 695 (1904) ............ 165. 
Knights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N.E. 377 (1921) ....... 249. 
Contract to make a will 
Bergmann v. Foreman State Trust & Sav. Bank, 273 Ill. 
App. 408 (1934) ..................................... 378. 
Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N.E. 539 (1920) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235, 239, 368, 374. 
Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 34, 172 N.E. 32 (1930) ..... 369, 374, 376. 
Whiton v. Whiton, 179 Ill. 32, 53 N.E. 722 (1899) .......... 378. 
Miscellaneous 
Farkas v. Williams, 3 Ill. App.2d 248, 121 N.E.2d 344 (1954), 
rev'd, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) ............... 202. 
Franceschi v. Franceschi, 326 Ill. App. 494, 62 N.E.2d 
I (1945) (divorce). * 
Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899). . . . . . . . . . . 72, 89. 
Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 132 Ill. 342, 24 N.E. 71 (1890) .... 250, 251. 
Laterza v. Murray, 2 Il1.2d 219, 117 N.E.2d 779 (1954) 
(separate maintenance). * 
Merchants Nat. Bank v. Weinold, 12 Ill. App.2d 209, 138 
N.E.2d 840 (1956) (trust). * 
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Milewski v. Milewski, 351 Ill. App. 158, 114 N.E.2d 419 (1953) 
............................................... 216, 239. 
Petta v. Host, I Ill.2d 293, 115 N.E.2d 881 (1953) 
(late election). 
Tyler v. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525, 21 N.E. 616 (1888) ............ . 
In re Waggoner's Estate, 5 Ill. App.2d 130, 125 N.E.2d 
154 (1955) ........................................ . 
INDIANA 
EvASION CAsEs 




100 N.E. 1049 (1913) .................... 133, 195, 197, 388. 
Pond v. Sweetser, 85 Ind. 144 (1882) ............. 201, 203, 399. 
Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, N.E. 864, 27 L.R.A. 
523 (1894) ......................... 249, 252, 380, 384, 391. 
Wheelock v. Wheelock, 97 Ind. App. 501, 187 
N.E. 205 (1933) ................................. 201, 394. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Kratli v. Booth, 99 Ind. App. 178, 191 N.E. 180 (1934) ..... 202. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Smiley v. Smiley, 114 Ind. 258, 16 N.E. 585 (1888). 
Miscellaneous 
See Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031, 88 A.L.R. 
856 (1933) (conflicts; Indiana law). 
IOWA 
EvASION CAsEs 
Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa 155, 19 N.W. 876 (1884) 
• 
.......... ····· ................ 162,250,252,266,383,394. 
Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa 259, 24 A.R. 740 (1876) .. 267, 383, 388. 
Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), 
writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924) ... 71, 131, 155, 163, 
170, 232, 233, 235, 239, 368, 369, 373, 385, 388. 
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Samson v. Samson, 67 Iowa 253,25 N.W. 233 (1885) 
...................... 165, 189, 266, 379, 384, 399, 403, 404. 
Vosburg v. Mallory, 155 Iowa 165, 135 N.W. 577 (1912) 
...................... 167, 170, 173, 195, 196, 379, 385, 394. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Lunning v. Lunning, 168 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1918) (personalty). 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Beech1ey v. Beechley, 134 Iowa 75, 108 N.W. 762 (1906) ..... 356. 
Beere v. Beere, 79 Iowa 555, 44 N.W. 809 (1890) ....... 361, 363. 
Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa 15, 10 N.W. 276 (1881) .... 356, 363. 
Haulman v. Haulman, 164 Iowa 471, 145 N.W. 930 (1914) ... 203. 
Wilson v. Findley, 223 Iowa 1281, 275 N.W. 47 (1937) ...... 356. 
Contract to make a will 
Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368, 369, 370, 374. 
Bell v. Pierschbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W.2d 784 (1954) .. 377. 
Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), 
writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29 (1924). 
In re Lenders' Estate, 247 Iowa 1205, 78 N.W.2d 536 (1956). 
Miscellaneous 
Guardianship of Bagnall, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N.W.2d 
597 (1947) ......................................... 239. 
Caruth v. Caruth, 128 Iowa 121, 103 N.W. 103 (1905) 
~ku~. • 
Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 39 Iowa 56 (1874). . . . . . . . . 124. 
Estate of Lundwall, 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951) .... 229. 
MacGregor v. Gardner, 14 Iowa 326 (1862) ............... 204. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 222 Iowa 145, 268 
N.W. 540 (1936) .................................... 247. 
KANSAS 
EVASION CASES 
Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918) 
. . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . 134, 162, 163, 184, 250, 252, 381, 383, 398. 
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Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915) 
........... 134, 162, 172, 189,265, 380, 383, 399,401,403,404. 
Small v. Small, 56 Kan. I, 42 Pac. 323 (1895) 
... 101, 120, 134, 162, 170, 189, 203, 262, 379, 383, 397, 403, 404. 
Williams v. Williams, 40 Fed. 521 (C.C.D. Kan. 1889) 
....................... 93, 134, 163, 165, 168, 380, 385, 393. 
SuPPLEMENTAL EvASION CAsEs 
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 79 Kan. 82, 99 Pac. 238 (1908) 
(collusive judicial sale). 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 30 Am. Rep. 441 (1879) 
................................... 356, 357, 361, 363, 364. 
Tracyv. Thatcher, 135 Kan. 615,11 P.2d 691 (1932) ........ 357. 
Contract to make a will 
Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912) ... 369, 374, 376. 
Komarek Estate v. Komarek, 177 Kan. 659, 282 P.2d 
446 (1955) ...................................... 368, 374. 
Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919) ...... 369, 374. 
In re Davis' Estate, 171 Kan. 605,237 P.2d 396 (1951) ... 368, 374. 
Miscellaneous 
Hagerman v. Hagerman, 160 Kan. 742, 165 P.2d 431 (1946) 
(family settlement). 
Hoard v. Jones, 119 Kan. 138, 237 P. 888 (1925) (deed). 
KENTUCKY 
EVASION CASES 
Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782 (1949) 
• 
• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113, 118, 154, 388. 
Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938) 
...................... 70, 82, 91, 114, 134, 152, 166, 172, 191, 
200, 264, 381, 383, 387, 401, 403. 
Cooke v. Fidelity Trust and Safety-Vault Co., 104 Ky. 473, 
20 Ky. L. Rep. 667, 47 S.W. 325 (1898) .......... 155, 395, 404. 
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DeLeuil's Executors v. DeLeuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S.W.2d 
474 (1934) ............................... 72, 155, 201, 392. 
Gibson v. Gibson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 636 (1890) ...... 113, 383, 391. 
Lindsey's Ex'r v. Lindsey, 313 Ky. 171, 230 S.W.2d 441 (1950) 
........................................... 190, 399, 401. 
Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887) 
...... 100, 112, 168, 169, 170, 191, 195, 379, 383, 390, 402, 403. 
Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. I, 13 S.W. 244, 8 L.R.A. 95 (1890) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112, 134, 163, 166, 191, 383, 387, 402, 403, 404. 
Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930) 
. .. . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 113, 152, 163, 166, 380, 383, 387, 401. 
Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 S.W. 791 (1919) 
........................... 82, 172, 192, 264, 379, 383, 388. 
Weber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 147 S.W. 34 (1912) 
....................................... 112, 154, 195, 392. 
Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 64 S.W. 981 (1901) 
. . . . . . . . . . 113, 152, 154, 164, 166, 191, 247, 381, 383, 387, 403. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Gaines v. Gaines' Executors, 9 B. Mon. 295, 48 Am. Dec. 
425 (Ky. 1848) (divorce). 
Patterson v. Patterson's Ex'r, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 755, 





Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763, 240 S.W. 1061 (1922) ... 364. 
Fennessey v. Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519, 2 S.W. 158 (1886) ...... 113. 
Goff v. Goff's Exr's, 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917) ... 113, 356. 
Leach v. Duvall, 71 Ky. 201 (1871). * 
Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940) 
........................................ 100, 114, 133, 362. 
Petty v. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215 (Ky. 1843) .............. 360, 363. 
Smith v. Erwin, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 82 S.W. 411 (1904). * 
Contract to make a will 
Farmer's National Bank v. Young, 297 Ky. 95, 
179 S.W.2d 229 (1944) ................................ 378. 
Poor v. Logan, 252 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1952) .............. 368, 374. 
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Price v. Aylor, 285 Ky. I, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935) ............ 374. 
Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944) 
................................... 368, 369, 374, 376, 377. 
Miscellaneous 
Bowles v. Rutroff, 216 Ky. 557, 288 S.W. 312 (1926) ........ 71. 
Cochran's Adm'x v. Yeiser, 294 Ky. 585, 
172 S.W.2d 226 (1943) ................................. 70. 
Ginn's Adm'x v. Ginn's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 217, 
32 S.W.2d 971 (1930) ................................. 203. 
Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2 (1950) 
(tentative trust). • 
Johnson v. Johnson, 75 Ky. 485 (1877) ................... 262. 
Redmond's Adm'x v. Redmond, 112 Ky. 760, 
66 s.w. 745 (1902) ................................... 251. 
Rowe v. Ratiff, 268 Ky. 217, 104 S.W.2d 437 (1937) ......... 251. 
Simpson v. Simpson's Ex'rs, 94 Ky. 586, 23 S.W. 361 (1893) 
(antenuptial agreement). 
Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky. 376, 113 S.W. 498 (1909) 
• 
(gift by bachelor).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196. 
Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 245 S.W.2d 914, 




Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So.2d 234 (1945) ....... 282. 
Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 
33 So.2d 118 (1947) .............................. 229, 283. 
Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108 So.483 (1926) ......... 134. 
Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So.2d 18 (1951) ....... 229. 
Stockwell v. Perrin, 112 La. 643, 36 So. 635 (1904) ......... 285. 
Tessier v. Rousell, 41 La. Ann. Rep. 474, 6 So. 542 (1889) ... 282. 
MAINE 
EVASION CASES 
Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213 (1903) 
................... 71, 134, 163, 172, 380, 383, 390, 402, 404. 
TABLE E 421 
Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (1905) 
100, 134, 160, 172, 173, 189,262,266, 379, 386, 395,401,402. 
SuPPLEMENTAL EvAsioN CAsEs 
Lambert v. Lambert, 117 Me. 471, 104Atl. 820 (1918) .. 195,196. 
RELATED CASES 
Miscellaneous 
Cooper, Petitioner, 194 Me. 260 (1841) .................... 33. 
Dunn v. Kelley, 69 Me. 145 (1879) ........................ 33. 
Gilman v. Gilman, 53 Me. 184 (1865) .................. 32, 33. 
Helt v. Ward, 128 Me. 191, 146 Atl. 439 (1929) ............ 33. 
Hussey v. Titcomb, 127 Me. 423, 144 Atl. 218 (1929) ........ 33. 
Kersey v. Bailey, 52 Me. 198 (1863) ....................... 33. 
Perkins et al., Appellants, 141 Me. 137, 39 A.2d 855 (1944) ... 33. 
Walker v. Walker, 83 Me. 17, 21 Atl. 176 (1890) ............ 33. 
MARYLAND 
EvASION CAsEs 
Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (Md. 1952) 
................ 88, 133, 155, 191, 192, 193, 384, 395,402,404. 
Bestry v. Darn, 180 Md. 42, 22 A.2d 552 (1941) 
....................... 106,133,167,170,380,383,392,402. 
Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915) 
....................................... 105, 201, 380, 393. 
Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 
9 A.2d 581 (1939) ......... 93, 155, 165, 168, 237, 238, 381, 392. 
Hays v. Henry, 1 Md. Ch. 337 (1848) 
........... 99, 100, 105, 131, 164, 165, 167, 200, 250, 381, 388. 
Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109, 131 Atl. 40 (1925) 
....................... 105, 160, 170, 171, 183,249, 380,387. 
Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154, 164, 208, 379, 387. 
Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99 Atl. 551 (1916) 
........................... 149, 155, 165, 189, 381, 393, 402. 
Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887) 
.................... 96, 100, 101, 131, 160, 170,249, 381, 388. 
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Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107 (1874) 
........................... 131, 162, 170, 183, 186, 380, 387. 
Sturgis v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 152 Md. 654, 
137 Atl. 378 (1927) .......... 152, 168, 171, 215, 216, 381, 393. 
Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 Atl. 347, 
79 A.L.R. 373 (1932) ......... 155, 165, 167, 168, 184,250,392. 
Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106, 126, 154, 160, 208, 216, 380, 383, 395. 
SuPPLEMENTAL EvAsiON CAsEs 
Kernan v. Carter, 132 Md. 577, 104Atl. 530 (1918) ......... 156. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 Atl. 597 (1904) ....... 356, 361. 
Miscellaneous 
Barroll v. Brice, 115 Md. 498, 80 Atl. 1035 (1911) .......... 264. 
Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140 (1852) ........ 99, 105,404. 
Duttera v. Babylon, 83 Md. 536, 35 Atl. 64 (1896) 
(deed to spouse). 
Feighley v. Feighley, 7 Md. 537, 61 Am. Dec. 375 (1855) 
........................................... 160, 184, 261. 
Levin v. Levin, 166 Md. 451, 171 Atl. 77 (1934) (alimony). * 
Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 65 A.2d 
899 (1949) (alimony) ................................. 261. 
Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45 (1899) ..... 220,401. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
EVASION CASES 
Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E.2d 198 (1956) 
.................................. 104, 201, 380, 383, 395. 
Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N.E. 251 (1899) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104, 132, 164, 183, 186, 254, 381, 385, 391. 
Charest v. St. Onge, 332 Mass. 628, 127 N.E.2d 175 (1955) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250, 382, 386, 399, 402. 
Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904) 
....................... 104, 134, 158, 201, 266, 381, 385, 399. 
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Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) 
............. 71, 92, 104, 120, 134, 162, 201, 264, 381, 383, 397. 
Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902) 
.......... 76, 104, 170, 184, 189, 190, 380, 381, 385, 395, 402. 
Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N.E.2d 126 (1944) 
........... ······ .. 71, 10~ 16~ 17~ 21~26~ 38~ 38~ 398. 
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 
91 N.E.2d 337 (1950) ..... 89, 158, 165, 201, 266, 381, 385, 395. 
Redman v. Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N.E. 953 (1918) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104, 121, 189, 380, 384, 397, 403, 404. 
Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 N.E. 866 (1926) 
...................... 104, 134, 155, 164, 201, 379, 386, 395. 
Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, 78 N.E. 301 (1906) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201, 250, 399. 
Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858). . . . . . . . . . . 201, 399. 
SUPPLEMENTAL EVASION CASES 
Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray 418 (Mass. 1859) ............... 195. 
Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen (Mass.) 43 (1866) .............. 195. 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 325 Mass. 257, 90 N.E.2d 338 (1950) .. 229. 
RELATED CASES 
Antenuptial Transfer 
Chase v. Phillips, 208 Mass. 245, 94 N.E. 266 (1911), 
writ of error dismissed, 223 U.S. 715 (1912) ............. 335. 
Gedart v. Ejdrygiewicz, 305 Mass. 224, 
25 N.E.2d 371 (1940) ................................. 355. 
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 
181 N.E. 181 (1932). 
Contract to make a will 
Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37, 
5 A.L.R. 1426 (1919) ................................. 263 
Sherman v. Sherman, 143 N.E.2d 689 (Mass. 1957) 
(inter vivos gift). 
Miscellaneous 
Bohaker v. Koudelka, 333 Mass. 139, 128 N.E.2d 769 (1955) 
(purchase in name of another). 
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Day Trust Co. v. Malden Sav. Bank, 328 Mass. 576, 
105 N.E.2d 363 (1952) ........ 0. o o .. o. o o o .. 0. o .. o. o o .. 206. 
Doane v. Doane, 238 Mass. 106, 130 N.E. 484 
(1921) (support). • 
Fiske v. Fiske, 173 Mass. 413,53 N.E. 919 (1899)0. 0. o o 0 253,258. 
Hatfield v. Sohier, 114 Mass. 48 (1873) .. o o .. o . o o o o o .. o o . o . 255. 
Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N.E. 578 (1891) o. o 0. o o. 246. 
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Annuity. See also Insurance. 
cases, 242-244. 
family maintenance acts, 293, 295. 
family protection statutes, 236. 
knowledge of claimant, 243. 
model act, 320. 
promissory note, 106. 
separation agreement, 374. 
Swiss Civil Code, 286. 
Antenuptial Transfer. See also "Kerr" 
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historical development, 354-355. 
illusory nature, 88, 93, 360-362. 
insurance, 361. 
irrevocable trust, 203. 
Kentucky cases, ll3. 
knowledge, 112, 3'56, 364-365. 
misrepresentation, 247, 357, 362. 
mortgage, 355, 361. 
moral claim of transferee, 165. 
note, 361. 
participation by transferee, 159-160. 
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Antenuptial Transfer (continued) 
postnuptial transfers, compared, 7, 
147, 181-182. 
proof, 355-360. 
presumption of fraud, 356-360. 
provision for spouse, 155. 
purchase by decedent, title in name 
of another, 249. 
scope of action, 360-365. 
suit in lifetime, 360-365. 
transfer before meeting spouse, 355. 
trust, 71. 
widow as creditor, 261-263. 
Apartment Building, 88, 90, 167, 212. 
Appeals. See Model Act. 
Apportionment. 
civil law, 288-289. 
model act. See Model Act. 
Arizona. See Table E. 
Arkansas. See Table E. 
Art Collection. See Paintings. 
Assets, Summary Distribution of. See 
Model Act. 
Assignment, 239. See also Custom of 
London; Insurance; Model 
Act. 
Attachment, 230. See Model Act. 
Attorney Fees. See Model Act. 
Australia, 3'27. See also Table E. 
Automobiles, 288, 401. 
"Bairn's Part." See Custom of London. 
Bailment, 221. 
Bank Account. See also Bank Account 
Trust; Certificate of Deposit; 
Joint Bank Account. 
commercial, 216-217, 219. 
gift, 401. 
property of transferee, 167. 
Bank Account Trust. See also Defea-
sance, Extent of; Halpern, 
Matter of. 
analogy to U.S. savings bond, 225. 
animus donandi, 210. 
cases, 121-128, 205-211. 
colorable transfer, 210. 
defeasance, extent, I 22. 
delivery, 122. 
described, 205-207. 
illusory nature, 93. 
irrevocability, 122. 
passbook, 122. 
reality test, 122-128, 178. 
secrecy, 210. 
Bankruptcy. See Creditor's Rights. 
Beneficial Interest. See Cut-off; Reten-
tion of An Interest; Taxes. 
Bigamy. See Equities; Mistress; Statu-
tory Share. 
Bill of Sale, 90, 99, 133, 195, 405. See 
also Antenuptial Transfers; 
Gifts. 
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 79-87, 103. 
See also Table E. 
Bona Fide Gift, II I. See also Gift; 
"Kerr" Passages; Tennessee. 
Bona Fide Purchaser, 63-64. 
Bonds. See also U. S. Savings Bond. 
"Kerr" passages, 100. 
payable after death, 228, 248, 401. 
payable at death, 71, 401. 
secured by mortgage, 142, 228. 
state, 228. 
British Columbia, 291. See also 
Table E. 
British Commonwealth. See Mainte-
nance Legislation. 
Burden of Proof. See Antenuptial 
Transfer; Maintenance and 
Contribution; Proof. 
Business, Transfer of, 167, 401-402. See 
also Antenuptial Transfer; 
Close Corporation; Deeds, 
Gift; Securities. 
Buy and Sell Agreement. See Partner-
ship. 
California. See also Table E. 
community property, evasions, 283. 
life insurance, 240. 
statute, U. S. savings bond, 225. 
Canada. See also Table E. 
maintenance legislation, 291. 
Uniform Family Maintenance Act, 
321. 
Cattle, 401. 
Certificate of Deposit, 188, 401. See 
also Bank Account. 
Charity, Inter Vivos Gift to. See Ta-
ble B. 
Charity, Testamentary Gift to. See 




Check. See Gift. 
Child. See also Custom of London; 
Equities; Homestead; Lapse; 
Marital Disharmony; Model 
Act; Procedure; Revocation by 
Operation of Law. 
as forced heir, 165, 283. 
as plaintiff, 157. 
capacity to sue, 264. 
illegitimate, 292. 
maintenance legislation, 294. 
need, 272. 
of prior marriage, Table B. 
statutory protection against disin-
heritance, 35-36. 
stepchildren, 16, 272, 302. 
Chose in Action, 16. See also Obliga-
tions Payable at Death. 
Church 
courts, 52. 
relation to freedom of testation, 53. 
testamentary jurisdiction, 50. 
Civil Law 
in general, Chapter 20. 
Louisiana, 281-285. 
Germany, 285-286. 
Roman law, 279-281. 
Switzerland, 286-287. 
Close Corporation. See also Colorable 
Transfer; Partnership. 
colorable transfer, 135. 
control test, 93, 192-193. 
defeasance, extent of, 130. 
estate planning, 130. 
revocable trust, 83-84. 
Cloud on Title, 266. 
Collaterals. See Inheritance; Procedure. 
Collusion. See Colorable Transfer; 
Equities. 
Colorable Transfer. See also Antenup-
tial Transfer; Colorado; Con-
trol Test; Halpern, Matter of; 
Intent Test; "Kerr" Passages; 
Reality Test. 
cases, 132-135. 
control test, 83. 
examples 
close corporation, 135. 
deed, reconveyance on condition, 
133. 
gift causa mortis, 133. 
personalty, 135. 
power of attorney, 134. 
realty, 134-135. 
revocable trust, 133, 204. 
safe-deposit box, 13'5. 
illusory nature, 88, 132-133. 
"mere depository," 100, 133. 
power to revoke, effect of, 132-133. 
shams, 75, 102, 104, 120, 127, 131-
134, 136, 140, 142, 190, 210, 
265. 
Colorado. See also Table E. 
cases, 135-137. 
equities, 137. 
participation by donee, 160. 
trust "causa mortis," 199. 
widow as creditor, 261. 
Commercial Bank Account. See Bank 
Account. 
Commissions. See Trustee. 
Community Property. See also Civil 
Law; Custom of London. 
annuities, 242. 
described, 21, 147. 
evasions, 244, 283. 
life insurance, 229, 240. 
savings bonds, 229. 
Community Values. See also Equities; 
Maintenance and Contribu-
tion; Reliance Interest; Statu-
tory Share. 
creditors, protection of, 38, 259-261. 
custom of London, 54. 
death taxes, 38, 276-278. 
delivery, concept of, 188-189. 
family support 
charities, testamentary gifts to, 29, 
33:.._34. 
children, statutory protection, 35. 
evasion cases, 179-180. 
family allowances, 29, 31-33. 
homestead, 29-31. 
inchoate dower, 30, 63-64. 
judicial doctrines, 29. 
legitime, 282. 
pensions, 29. 
public welfare, 29. 
relation to Statute of Wills, 73'. 
revocation by operation of law, 34. 
freedom of alienation, 17, 30, 37-
38, 42-43, 61. 
freedom of testation, 25, 39. 
in general, Chapters 2-5. 
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Community Values, family support 
(continued) 
security of title, ix, 41-43, 45, 161, 
260, 296, 325. 
testation, freedom of, 38--41. 
Compensation, Deferred. See Deferred 
Compensation Plan. 
Complete Transfer, 67, 120, 128-129. 
See also Absolute Transfer; 
Reality Test. 
Condition Subsequent, 189, 194. 
Confession of Judgment, 405. See also 
Colorable Transfer; Judgment. 
Confidential Relationship, 229. See also 
Undue Influence. 
Conflict of Laws, 201, 311. See also 
Domicile; Jurisdiction; Model 
Act. Cases may be found 
under "Related Cases: Miscel-
laneous" in Table E. 
Connecticut, 178. See also Table E. 
Consent of Surviving Spouse. See also 
Waiver. 
bar of dower, 251-252. 
custom of London, 50. 
Consideration. See also Bona Fide 
Purchaser; Custom of Lon-
don; Deeds; Model Act. 
contract to make a will, 182, 371-372, 
378. 
excessive, 99, 190. 
false recital, Ill. 
in general, 37. 




sale at low price, 88. 
security of title, 160-161. 
separate maintenance, 99. 
Conspiracy, 243, 266. See also Equities. 
Constructive Trust. See also Equitable 
Lien. 
joint bank account, 217. 
U.S. savings bond, 110, 227-228. 
Consumables, 285-286, 288. See also 
Model Act. 
Consume, Power to, 138. 
Contemplation of Death. See also 
Equities. 
ambiguity, 151-153. 




Constitutionality. See Model Act. 
Contract. See also Antenuptial Trans-
fer; Contract to Make a Will; 
Joint Bank Account; Obliga-
tions Payable at Death. 
contract of sale, 370. 
death benefits, Chapter 15. 
partnership, 163, 233-235. 
"Contracting Out." See Marriage Set-
tlement; Model Act; Waiver. 




bona fide purchaser, 377-378. 
consideration, 3'71-372, 378. 
contemplation of marriage, 367. 
definition, 7, 366-367. 
defeasance, extent of, 368. 
equities, 368-369, 373-375. 
estate planning, 367. 
evasions 
beneficiary's rights, 377-378. 
spouse's rights, x, 147, 228, 367-
370, 377-378. 
"illusory" transfer, 126. 
inchoate dower, 370. 
joint bank account, 216. 
knowledge, 368, 3'71-372, 375-377. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
partnership, 234. 





U.S. savings bond, 378. 
Control Test. See Halpern, Matter of; 
Illusory Transfer; Settlor. For 
application to particular meth-
ods of transfer see appropri-
ate title. 
affected by equities, 5. 
criticized, 87-97. 
described, 68. 
factual control, 85, 89-90, 185. 
illusory transfer, 75-76, 87-97. 
in general, Chapter 7. 
Halpern, Matter of, 124-125. 
INDEX 459 
Control Test (continued) 
intent, influence of, 94-95. 
land, 96. 
Ohio case law, 76-87. 
predictability, 89-90. 
proximity to death, 95. 
Corporation, 16. See also Business, 
Transfer of; Close Corpora· 
tion; Securities. 
Corporation, Close. See Close Corpo-
ration. 
Costs, 169. See also Model Act, 
Co-trustee. See Settlor. 
Courts. See Judiciary; Model Act. 
Creditor's Rights. See also Bank Ac-
count Trust; Community Val-
ues; Custom of London; Equi-
ties; Intent Test. 
early common law, 59. 
defeasance, extent of, 129, 132. 
family allowance, 259. 
fraudulent conveyance, 259. 
function in administration of es-
tates, 73. 
homestead, 30-31, 259. 
inchoate dower, 259-260. 
life insurance, 236, 241. 
participation by transferee, 159. 
power of appointment, 256. 
U.S. savings bond, 229. 
widow as creditor, Chapter 17. 
Curative Acts, 16. 
Curtesy, 21, 59, 74. 
Curator. See Procedure. 
Custom 
Anglo-Saxon, 51. 
custom of Chester, 52. 
custom of London, Chapter 5. 
custom of York, 52. 
Norman, 50. 
Custom of London. See also Table E. 
absolute transfer, 54, 57. 
advancement, 57. 
American cases, influence on, 70, 99-
101, ll4. 
antenuptial settlement, 51. 
assignment, 55. 
"bairn's part," 50. 
bar of, 51, 57. 
cases 
compared with statutory share 
cases, 54-58. 
precedent, value as, 56. 
children, 50, 57. 
community of goods, 51. 
consideration, effect of, 50. 
creditors' claims, 51, 57. 
creditor, widow as, 57. 
deeds, 54-55. 
"dead's part," 50. 
described, 49-50, 59. 
draftsmanship, 56. 
fraud on, 54-57, 99. 
gift causa mortis, 55, 198. 
grandchildren, 51, 57. 
history, 49-54. 
illusory transfer, 55. 
in general, Chapter 5. 
interest, retention of, 55, 70. 
intestacy rules, relation to, 40, 53. 
judgment, confession of, 56. 
leasehold, 54. 
life estate, retention of, 55. 
marriage settlement, 56. 
obsolescence, reasons for, 52-54. 
possession, retention of, 54. 
proportion transferred, 55-56. 
proximity to death, 55-56. 
purchase by decedent, title in name 
of another, 55. 
realty, purchase of, 51. 
rents, 54. 
Roman law, compared, 51, 280. 
satisfaction, 57. 
statutory share, compared, 35, 49. 
testamentary transfer, 56-57. 
trust, 55. 
value, purchase for, 51. 
volume of transfers, 58. 
widow as creditor, 260-263. 
"wife's part," 50. 
Wills Act, 57. 
writ de rationabili parte bonorum, 
50. 
Custom of York. See Custom. 
Cut-off Provision. See also Statute of 
Limitations. 
apprehension of death, 152-154. 
civil law, 286, 288-289. 
inter vivos gift, 46. 
model act, Chapter 22. 
revocable trust, 46. 
Daggett, 240. 
"Dead's Part." See Custom of London. 
460 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
Death Taxes. See Community Values; 
Taxes. 
Decedent's Estate. See also Contract to 
Make A Will. 
defined, 21, 120-12 I. 
delay in administration, 31. 
geography, influence of, 53. 
modem composition, 3, 17. 
summary distribution, 301. 
Decedent's Family Maintenance Legis· 
lation. See Family Mainte· 
nance Legislation. 
Deceit Action, 363. See also Misrepre· 
sentation. 
Declaration of Trust. See Self-Declara· 
tion of Trust. 
Declaratory Judgment, 228, 266. 
Deeds. See also Colorable Transfer; 
Control Test; Custom of Lon· 
don; Defeasance, Extent of. 
antenuptial, 184-185. 
cases, 182-186. 
colorable, 135-137, 182. 
control test, 91, 93. 
effective at death, 135. 
equities, 183, 185. 
flexibility, 16. 
illusory, 127. 
in general, Chapter 12:1. 
intent test, 99, 111-112. 
interest, retention of, 111-112, 184-
185. 
power of attorney, 183. 
revocation clause, 137, 183-184. 
secrecy, 182, 185-186. 
testamentary nature, 71, 72, 183, 264. 
Defeasance, Extent of. 
antenuptial transfer, 130, 356. 
cases, 131-132. 
contract to make a will, 368. 
in general, 128-132. 
"invalid as to the widow," 131-132. 
legitime, 284. 
Missouri statute, 114. 
procedure, 265. 
revocable trust, 81-82, 86. 
Tennessee statute, lll-112. 
Deferred Compensation Plan, 367. 
Delaware. See Table E. 
Delivery. See also Community Values; 
Gift; Joint Bank Account; 
Joint Safe Deposit Box. 
Deposit Certificates. See Certificate of 
Deposit. 
Depreciation, 288. See also Value. 
Derivative Action. See Securities. 
Desertion. See Equities; Statutory 
Share. 
"Device or Contrivance." See "Kerr" 
Passages. 
"Died Rich," 283. 
Disability. See Equities; Maintenance 
Legislation; Mental Incompe-
tence; Procedure. 
Disinheritance. See also Community 
Values; Statutory Share. 






protection against, related to need, 
299. 
spouse's protection against, 24-34. 
Distributee. See Procedure. 
District of Columbia. See Table E. 
Divorce. See Equities; Marital Dishar-
mony; Model Act. 
"Dominion." See also "Kerr" Passages; 
Possession, Retention of. 
control test, 68, 84-85, 262. 
illusory transfer, 82, 87-88. 
in general, 87-88. 
joint interest in stock, 193. 
Donations. See Legitime. 
Donee. See Transferee. 
Domicile, 242. See also Conflict of 
Laws. 
Draftsmanship. See also Custom of 
London; Estate Planning. 
deed, 189. 
irrevocable trust, 204. 
judicial tests, vulnerable to, 6. 
New Zealand, 297. 
partnership, 234. 
revocable self-declaration of trust, 
202. 
revocable trust, 70, 89-90. 
Ecclesiastical Courts. See Church. 
Elective Share. See Statutory Share. 
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Employee Death Benefits, 244-245, 261. 
See also Obligations Payable at 
Death. 
Engagement Ring, 186. See also Gift; 
Jewelry. 
England 
Administration of Estates Act, 41. 
custom of London, Chapter 5. 
divorce rate, 11. 
history of intestacy law, 39. 
maintenance legislation 
cases, Table E. 
in general, 290-297. 
marriage settlements, 296. 
Entireties, Tenancy By, 364. See also 
Joint Tenancy. 
Equitable Conversion, 231. 
Equitable Lien, 363. 
Equities. See also Contemplation of 
Death; Control Test; Intent 
Test; Maintenance and Con-
tribution; Model Act; Reality 
Test. 
"clean hands," 170. 
contemplation of death. See "prox-
imity to death." 
defined, 175-176. 
individual equities 
abandonment of claimant by de-
cedent, 163-164. 
bigamy, 165, 170, 251. 
cases, Tables A, B, and C. 
claimant's financial position, 168-
169. 
claimant's treatment of decedent, 
169-170. 
decedent's promise to first wife, 
ll3, 168. 
decedent's wife's own savings, 167-
168. 
desertion, 163-164. 
disparity in age, 171-172. 
duration of marriage, 147, 172-
173, 193, 205, 368. 
intoxication, 164, 203. 
moral claim of donees, 165-166. 
moral claim of widows, 161-162. 
participation by donee, 107, Ill, 
135-136, 140-141, 143, 159-161. 
promise to first wife, 168. 
proportion included in the trans-
fer, 147-148. 
provision by decedent for the sur-
viving spouse, 112, 154-156. 
proximity to death, 55, 107, 112, 
145, 148-154, 274-276, 298. 
cases, Table A. 
statistics, 148. 
relationship of the donee, 156-
159. 
cases, Table B. 
statistics, 157. 
remarriage of claimant, 167. 
reprehensible conduct by decedent, 
164. 
sex of claimant, 173. 
source of decedent's property, 166-
167. 
standard of living, 111, 153-154, 
293. 
uy.pleasantness between the 
spouses, 170-171. 
whether claimant helped accumu-
late decedent's estate, 113, 
162-163. 
whether decedent was testate or 
intestate, 173-174. 
statistics, 174. 
widow's own property, 167. 
in general, Chapters 10-11. 
judicial confusion, xi, 5, 19, 273'. 
maintenance legislation, 293. 
maintenance and contribution, 45. 
predictability, 146. 
proof, 146. 
role in judicial process 
in general, Chapter 11, Table D. 
statistics, 177. 
Estate. See Decedent's Estate; Mainte-
nance Legislation. 
Executors and Administrators. See Pro-
cedure. 
Exoneration. See Model Act. 
Estate Planning. See also Draftsman-
ship. 
affected by widow's claim, 42. 
antenuptial transfers, 358. 
contract to make a will, 367. 
defeasance, effect of, 130. 
irrevocable trust, 202-204. 
joint safe-deposit box, 220. 
joint tenancy in realty, 213. 
judicial doctrines, 273. 
large estates, 156. 
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Estate Planning (continued) 
life insurance, 241. 
maintenance legislation, 296. 
North Carolina proposal, 274. 
Pennsylvania statute, 144. 
powers of appointment, 256. 
predictability, ix. 
proximity to death, 151. 
revocable self-declaration of trust, 
202. 
testacy or intestacy, 174. 
U.S. savings bond, 230. 
Estate Tax. See Model Act; Taxes. 
Ergiinzung des Pfiichtteils, 285. See also 
German Civil Code; Legisla-
tive Solutions. 
Estoppel, ll2. 




distinguished from alimony and 
separate maintenance cases, 
162. 
"evasion" case, defined, 7, 147. 
involving inter vivos gifts, Table D. 
listed by equities, Table C. 
listed by proximity to death, Table 
A. 
listed by relationship of donee to 
decedent, Table B. 
listed by states, Table E. 
summarized, 271-273. 
family maintenance acts, 294-298. 
gravity of, 3-19. 
involving testacy, statistics, 174. 
litigation 
actual evasions, relation to, 8. 
aggravating factors, 10--19. 
chronology, 7-9. 
equities, influence of, 8-9. 
relation to divorce rate, 14-15. 
remarriage, effect on, 12-15. 
volume of, 6-9. 
winning party, 7-9. 
women's wealth, 26. 
statutes 
civil law, Appendix B. 
Israel, 297. 
Missouri, ll4-ll6. 
Model Probate Code, Appendix B. 
North Carolina proposal, Appen-
dix B. 
Pennsylvania, 138-140, 143-144. 
Tennessee, IIO--ll2. 
U.S. savings bond, 225. 
under maintenance legislation, Chap-
ter 21, Table E. 
Eve of Marriage Transfer. See Ante-
nuptial Transfer. 
Evidence. See Antenuptial Transfer; 
Control Test; Equity; Intent 
Test; Parol Evidence Rule; 
Proof. 
"Expressio Unius," 86. 
Family. See Community Values; Mari-
tal Disharmony. 
Family Allowances. See also Commu-




typical provisions, 31-33. 
will, effect on, 31. 
Family Maintenance Legislation. See 
Maintenance Legislation. 
Farm, Transfer of. 
antenuptial, 363. 
control test, 93. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
Fiduciary Powers. See also Control. 
defined, 89. 
Florida. See also Table E. 
claimant preferred to creditors, 262. 
"dominion," 262. 
family allowance statute, 32. 
intestacy statute, 308. 
irrevocable trust, 204. 
joint safe-deposit box, 222. 
judicial sale, 143. 
life insurance statute, 232. 
"orphan" statute, 35. 
partnership, 232-23'3. 
reasonableness, 232. 
remarriage of claimant, 167. 
statutory share, 21-22, 130, 174. 
trust, 232. 
France 
life insurance, effect on Ic~gitime, 240. 
original protection for children, 282. 
testation, frequency of, 40. 
Fraud. See also Community Values; 
Equities; Fraudulent Convey-
ance; Legislative Solutions. 
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Fraud (continued) 




actual, 356-360, 362. 
presumed, 356-360. 
anticipation of a reconciliation, 102. 
badge of fraud, 100, 186. 
community property, 244. 
constructive, 103, 106, 125. 
express, 133. 
good faith, 106, 108. 
gross, ll4. 
implied, 109. 
in the inducement, 129. 
"Kerr" passages, 98-101. 
knowledge by transferee, 109. 
legal, 121. 
male fide transfer, 108. 
meanings, 101-103. 
non-disclosure, 202. 
"on the marital right," 102, 103, 114-
ll6, 228, 234, 248, 274. 
positive, 102. 
presumption, 109, IIO-lll, ll3-ll6, 
125, 191. 
rebuttal of, 113-114. 
prima facie case, ll3-114, 191. 
reasonableness, 102-103. 
reconciliation between spouses, 237. 
risk in defining, 5, 97. 
shams, 102. 
Fraudulent Conveyance, 261-263. See 
also Creditor's Rights. 
Freedom of Alienation. See Community 
Values. 
Freedom of Testation. See Community 
Values; Intestacy. 
Furniture, 361, 401. 
Future Interests, 247, 310, 314. 
Garnishment. See Model Act. 
Georgia. See also Table E. 
dower, abolition of, 64. 
statutory share, 21. 
German Civil Code. See also Civil Law; 
Legislative Solutions. 
cut-off provision, 289. 
Ergiinzung des Pfiichtteils, 285-286. 
excerpts, 347-350. 
Gift. See also Fraud; Proof. 
burden of proof, 190. 
cases 
analysed, 186-193. 
listed by subject-matter, Table D. 
check, 247. 
delivery, 80, 188. 
in general, Chapter 12:2. 
Kentucky rule, 113. 
loan, distinguished from, 107. 
of note, 246-247. 
post-obit, 40, 49. 
proximity to death, 192. 
requirements for validity, 187. 
retention of life estate, 190. 
retention of possession, 190, 192. 
secrecy, 190. 
"unreasonableness," 191. 
Gift Causa Mortis. See also Colorable 
Transfer. 
creditors, 194. 
defeasance, extent of, 131. 
donationis mortis causa, 40. 
donee's own property, 167. 
described, 194. 
gift, relation to, 189, 196-197. 
in general, 194-199. 
intent test, II2. 
irrevocable trust, 198-199, 203. 
passage of title, 197. 
reliance interest, 43, 181. 
revocability, 194, 198. 
title, when passes, 194-195. 
U.S. savings bond, 226. 
Good Faith Divestment, 4, 75, 98, 107-
108, ll5, 123. See also Con-
tract to Make A Will; Control 
Test; Fraud; Intent Test; Re-
ality Test. 
Good Faith Purchaser. See Considera-
tion; Fraudulent Conveyance; 
Inchoate Dower; Legitime. 
Grandchildren. See Custom of London; 
Model Act; Table B. 
Grandparents. See Model Act; Table B. 
Guardian, Official. See Model Act. 
Gulliver and Tilson, 73. 
Halpern, Matter of. See also Table E. 
distinguished, 185. 
effect of, 6, 76, 126-127, 173, 178, 207. 
equities, 108, 209-211. 
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Halpern, Matter of (continued) 
in general, 121-128. 
procedure, 264. 
Hawaii. See Table E. 
Homestead. See also Community 




improvements on, as remedy, 364. 
Louisiana, 283. 
policy, 30, 64. 




during coverture, 59. 
in wife's personalty, 60. 
power to defraud, 3-6. 
protection against fraud, 4. 
reliance interest, 41. 
rights in wife's property, 355. 
Idaho. See Table E. 
Illegitimate Child. See also Model Act. 
maintenance legislation, 296. 
model act, 301-302. 
Illinois. See also Table E. 
"inequitable" decisions, I 78. 
widow as creditor, 261. 
Illusory Transfer. See also Control 
Test; Halpern, Matter of. For 
application to particular meth-
ods of transfer see appropriate 
title. 
antenuptial, 360-362. 
cases, listed, 88-89. 
control, formal retention, 82. 
equities, relation to, 82-83, 87, 93-95. 
Halpern, Matter of, 76, 124-125. 
in general, 74-97. 
judicial confusion, 4. 
meaning, change in, 82. 
narrowness of test, 96-97. 
Ohio cases, 76-87. 
predictability, 83, 88-90. 
revocation clause, 82-83. 
revocable trust, 68, 74-97. 
testacy, relation to, 173-174. 
testamentary transfer, 88. 
Inchoate Dower. See also Statutory 
Share. 
assignment of, 131-132. 




evasions, 63, llO, 126, 140, 147, 152, 
166, 247, 251, 262. 
maintenance legislation, relation to, 
64, 301. 
history, 59-62. 
in general, Chapter 6. 
jointures, 61, 355. 
judicial sale, 64, 143. 
marketable title, 63. 
model act, 301. 
partnership, 231. 
personalty, 4, 60. 
policy, 60, 160. 
settlements, in lieu of, 355. 
United States, 62-64. 
utility, 63~4. 
Income. See also Reliance Interest; Re-
tention of an Interest. 
beneficiaries, 139, 314. 
retention of, 75. 
Incorporation by Reference, 79. 
Indiana. See also Table E. 






Roman law, 280. 
Russia, 39. 
suggestions for reform, Chapters 4, 
19-22. 
testation, distinguished from, 38. 
theories of, 38. 
Inheritance Tax. See Model Act; Taxes. 
Injunction, 230, 320, 364. 
Insolvency, 141. See also Creditors' 
Rights; Obligations Payable at 
Death. 
Instructions, Seeking, 266. See also Pro-
cedure. 
Insurance. See also Annuities; Contract; 







antenuptial, 361, 364. 
as evasive device, 236--237, 240. 
assignment, as collateral, 239. 
cases, 238-240. 
community property, 240. 
control test, 94. 
decedents' estates, 17. 
estate tax approach, 276. 
family business, 71, 232. 
gift causa mortis, 194. 
in general, 235-242. 
insurable interest, 236. 
loan, 239. 
Louisiana statute, 284. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
model act, 305-306. 
partnership, 231-235. 
Pennsylvania statute, 144. 
reliance interest, 43. 
statutory share, relation to, 239. 
Swiss approach, 287. 
testamentary nature, 72. 
trust, 71, 74, 79, 94, 200-201, 239. 
U.S. savings bond, analogy, 225. 
war risk, 239. 
Intent Test. See also Equities; Fraud. 
For application to particular 
methods of transfer see appro-
priate title. 
actual intent, 118. 
collusion, 105. 
colorable transfer, 105 
Colorado, 135-137. 




evidentiary factors, 107-108. 
fraud 
meanings, 101-103. 
requirement of, 105. 
illusory transfer test, relation to, 81-
82. 
in general, Chapter 8. 
judicial confusion, 5. 
Kentucky, 112-114. 
"Kerr" passages, 98-101. 
Israel, 298. 
Missouri, 114-116. 
motive, 75, 118. 
New Hampshire, 109-110. 
New York, 125. 
participation by donee, 159-160. 
Pennsylvania, 141. 
proof, 171. 
reasonableness, I 09. 




Interest, Retention of. See Retention 
of Interest. 
Interpleader, 266. 
Inter Vivos Transfers. See also Eva-
sions. 
death duties, effect on, 16-17. 
diversity, 16--19. 
increase in, 17. 
estate planning, effect on, 17. 
flexibility, 16--19. 
popularity, 15-17. 
Intestacy. See also Custom of London; 
Inheritance. 
history, 39. 
liberty of testation, relation to, 39-41. 
model act, 299, 308. 
statistics, 174. 
Intoxication. See Equities. 
"Invalid as to the Widow." See De-
feasance, Extent of. 
Investments, Power to Make, 89. See 
also Control Test. 
Iowa. See also Table E. 
equities, 162-163. 
judicial sales, 64. 
partnership, 23'3-234. 
Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust. See also 
Reliance Interest; Revocable 
Inter Vivos Trust. 
cases, 203. 
draftsmanship, 6, 90-92, 96, 203-205. 
fraudulent, 90. 
gift causa mortis, 198-199. 
in general, 202-205. 
model act, 305-306. 
remedy for antenuptial transfer, 364. 
testamentary nature, 71. 
Virginia cases, 249. 
undue influence, 204. 
Irrevocable Self-Declaration of Trust, 
86. 
Israel. See also Legislative Solutions. 
evasions, 297. 
maintenance legislation, 297. 
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Jewelry, 402. 
Joinder of Parties. See Procedure. 
Joint Bank Account 
cases, 216-217. 
certificate of deposit, 188. 
consideration supplied by transferee, 
167. 
control test, 94. 
doctrinal basis, 215. 
fictitious donee, 217-219. 
illusory transfer test, 88. 
in general, 214-220. 
pass book, 94. 
popular misunderstanding of, 216. 
reality, 219-220. 
testamentary nature, 71-72, 219. 
withdrawals, 215, 219. 
Joint Ownership. See also Joint Bank 
Account; Joint Tenancy in 
Realty; Joint Safe Deposit Box; 
Survivorship Devices. 
increasing popularity, 16. 
Joint Safe-Deposit Box. 
in general, 220-222. 
joint tenancy, 221-222. 
title to contents, 221-222, 401. 
Joint Tenancy. See also Joint Bank 
Account; Joint Safe-Deposit 
Box. 
apartment house, 90. 
family home, 16. 
illusory transfer, 88, 90-91, 133. 
realty, in general, 212-214. 
partnership, 233-235. 
Pennsylvania statute, 144. 
Jointures. See Inchoate Dower. 
Joint Will. See Wills. 
Judgment. See also Colorable Transfer; 
Custom of London; Fraudu· 
lent Conveyance. 
collusive, 140-141. 
confession of, 134, 405. 
gift of, 402. 
notes, 71, 402. 
Judicial Sale. See Colorable Transfer; 
Inchoate Dower. 
Judicial Separation, ll2. 
Judiciary. See also Model Act. 
confusion, 3-6, 271-273. 
model act, function under, 300-303. 
need for legislative directive, Chap-
ter 4. 
Jurisdiction, 266. See also Conflict of 
Laws; Model Act. 
Jury Charge, 399. 
Kansas. See also Table E. 
equities, 162. 
"inequitable" decisions, 178. 
judicial sale, 64. 
provision for surviving spouse, 156. 
shams, 134. 
Kentucky. See also Table E. 
equities, influence of, 179, ll2-ll4. 
gift cases, 191. 
"inequitable" decision, 178. 
in general, ll2-ll4. 
partial defeasance, 132. 
participation by donee, 159. 
presumption of fraud, 108, ll2-ll4. 
relationship of donee, 157. 
"Kerr" Passages. See also Fraud; In-
tent Test. 
colorable test, related to, 134-135. 
defeasance, extent of, 129. 
dominion, related to, 87. 
equities, related to, 137. 
in general, 98-101. 
intent test, related to, 209-210. 
Knowledge, by Claimant. See Annuity; 
Antenuptial Transfer; Con-






typical provisions, 34. 
gift causa mortis, 194. 
Lease 
consideration supplied by donee, 167. 
gift of leasehold, 54, 361, 402. 
joint safe-deposit box, 221. 
paintings, 192. 
Legislative Solutions 
civil law, 279-289. 
federal estate tax 
discussed, 276-278. 
excerpts, 340-347. 
German Civil Code 
discussed, 285-286, 288-289. 
excerpts, 347-350. 
in general, Chapters 19-22. 
legitime, 281-285. 
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Legislative Solutions (continued) 
literature, 121. 
maintenance legislation, Chapter 21. 
model probate code. 
discussed, 273-276. 
excerpts, 333-334. 
North Carolina Commission, report 
discussed, 274-276. 
excerpts, 33'4-340. 
querela inofficiosi testamenti, 279-
281. 
statutory share, retention of, 271-278. 
suggested model act, Chapter 22. 
Swiss Civil Code 
discussed, 286--289. 
excerpts, 351-353. 
tests based on "fraud, " 273-276. 
Legitim, 50. 
Legitima Portio. See Roman Law. 
Legitime. See also Civil Law; Roman 
Law. 
as legislative solution, 281-285. 
family maintenance, contrasted with, 
291. 
good faith purchaser, 285. 
life insurance, 240. 
simulated sale, 286. 
statutory share, contrasted with, 35. 
Life Estate, Retention of. See also 
Control Test; Deeds; Purchase 
by Decedent, Title in name of 
another; Retention of an In-
terest. 
with power to encumber, 250. 
Life Insurance. See Insurance. 
Litigation. See also Costs; Evasions; 
Procedure. 
increase in, 6--9. 
statistics, 7. 
result of, statistics, 7. 
tactics, 169. 
under maintenance legislation, 293. 
under model act, 299-300. 
Loan. See Insurance; Mortgage. 
Loss, Risk of, 288. 
Louisiana. See also Table E. 
legitime, 281-285. 
life insurance, 240, 284. 
Lump Sum Award, 286, 291-293. See 
also Model Act. 
Maine. See also Table E. 
family allowance statute, 32-33. 
"inequitable" decision, 178. 
Maintenance and Contribution. See 
also Community Values; Main-
tenance Legislation, Model 
Act; Statutory Share. 
American case-law, related to, 68, 
176, Chapter II. 
antenuptial transfer, 359-360. 
contract to make a will, 372. 
contribution 
antenuptial transfer, 359-360. 
gift causa mortis, 197. 
joint tenancy in realty, 213-214. 
life insurance, 241. 
policy, 45. 
U.S. savings bond, 23'0. 
cut-off, 154. 
estate tax regulations, 277-278. 
gifts causa mortis, 198. 
in general, x, 44-46. 
inchoate dower, 63. 
intent test, 118-119. 
life insurance, 239. 
obligations payable at death, 249_ 
partnership, 235. 
Pennsylvania statute, 144_ 
power of appointment, 256--258. 
proximity to death, 150. 
statutory share, tested by, 271-273. 
Maintenance Legislation 
adopted by England, 61. 
amount of award, 293. 
annuity, 293. 
Canadian Uniform Act, 321. 
children, 294. 
contrasted with 
family allowances, 32-33. 
model act, 323. 
statutory share, 35, 167, 169. 
disability, 291. 
evasions, 294-298. 
in general, Chapter 21. 
litigation, volume of, 293. 




U.S., ix, xi, Chapter 22. 
suspensory orders, 293, 321. 
Management of Property. See also Con-
trol Test. 
continuation of, 192. 
factual control, 89-90. 
Manitoba, 291. See also Table E. 
Marital Deduction. See Taxes. 
468 FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 
Marital Disharmony. See also Commu-
nity Values; Divorce; Mainte· 
nance and Contribution; Mar-
riage Settlement; Statutory 
Share. 
British Commonwealth, evasions, 296. 
divorce 
causes, 10. 
children, statistics, I 4. 
contract to make a will, 367. 
evasion problem, affected by, 12-
15, 296. 
longevity, effect of, II. 
misrepresentation, ground for, 3'63. 
relationship to divorce laws, 14. 
remarriages, relation to, 12-15. 
spouse as creditor, 259. 
war, effect on, II. 
influence on "evasions," 10, 158. 
remarriage 
antenuptial contract, 14, 367. 
antenuptial transfer, 181, 358. 
chances of, I 3. 
chances of success in, 13. 
children, problem of, 13-15. 
contract to make a will, 14, 181, 
367-368, 377. 
frequency 
by age, 12-13. 
by divorced persons, 12-13. 
by sex, 13. 
by states, 12, Appendix A. 
effect of longevity, 13. 
over the years, 12. 
in general, ix, 12-15, 157-158, 272. 
widows, chances for, 14. 
shifting concept of family, 165, 294. 
succession laws, harshness on wives, 
15. 
suicide 
statistics by sex, 10. 
"Marital Fourth," 283. 
Marketability, Restrictions on. See 
Community Values; Reliance 
Interest. 
Marketable Title, 16. 
"Market Pattern," 58. 
Marriage Settlement, 359. 
antenuptial, 263, 325, 359. 
British Commonwealth, 296. 
contract to make a will, 367. 
custom of London, 54. 
evasions, 359. 
remarriage, on, 14. 
Maryland. See also Table E. 
Allender v. Allender, 193. 
"inequitable" decision, I 78. 
intent test, 106. 
life insurance, 237-238. 
participation by transferee, 160. 
provision for surviving spouse, 155. 
"reasonableness" test, 126, 193. 
Massachusetts. See also Table E. 
"inequitable" decisions, 178. 
intent test, I 04. 
provision for surviving spouse, 156. 
reality test, 120-121. 
statutory share, 21, 120. 
strict statutory construction, 162. 
Master, Permanent. See Model Act. 
Mental Incompetence 
claimant, 164, 2ll, 239, 267, 291. 
family protection, 29. 
inchoate dower, 62. 
transferor, 266. 
Michigan. See also Table E. 
statute 
joint safe-deposit box, 222. 
U.S. savings bond, 225. 
Minnesota. See also Table E. 
annuity, 243-244. 
fraud, 243. 
judicial sale, 64. 
Misrepresentation. See also Fraud. 
antenuptial transfer, 247, 357, 362. 
community property, 240. 
deceit action, 363. 
fraud, relation to, 101-102. 
inchoate dower, 252. 
promissory note, 247. 
widow as creditor, 261. 
Mississippi. See also Table E. 
dower, abolition of, 64. 
"inequitable" decisions, 178. 
"separate estate" statute, 22. 
statutory share, 22. 
Missouri. See also Table E. 
children as plaintiffs, 157. 
death 
apprehension of, 72, 152, 187-188. 
proximity to, 151. 
deed, 185-186. 
equities, 179. 
evasion statute, Il4-116. 
gift causa mortis, 195. 
gift, 187-188, 191. 
"inequitable" decision, 178. 
in general, 114-Il6. 
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Missouri (continued) 
intent test, 96, 108, 114-116, 179. 
Merz v. Tower Grove Bank rb' Trust 
Co., ix, 115, Table E. 
partial defeasance, 132. 
participation by donee, 159. 
Mistress. See also Family Disharmony; 
Equities; Statutory Share. 
as losing party, 165. 
as winning party, 164. 
maintenance legislation 
eligible under, 294. 
settlement on, 296. 
purchase in name of, 250. 




annuities, 306, 320. 









attorney fees, 326-327. 
award 
burden of, 310. 
conditions of, 319-320. 
satisfaction of, 319-320. 
termination of, 308-309, 318-319. 
benefits, public, 309. 




antenuptial contracts, protection 
for, 306. 
defined, 301. 
illegitimate, 301-302, 305. 
posthumous, 302. 
stepchild, 302. 
condemnation proceedings, 307. 
conflict of laws, 311. 
consideration, 305-307, 312, 3'24. 
constitutionality, 327. 
contract, 305. 
"contracting out," 324. 
contracts to make a will, 182, 305-
306, 372-375. 
contribution order 
authority for, 310-313. 
conditions, 318-320. 
described, 300. 
limitations on, 303, 307, 314-316, 
324-326. 




judicial administration, 300-301. 
jurisdiction, 311. 
powers, 308. 
creditors, 303-304, 322. 
cut-off, 154, 193', 205, 289, 300, 304, 
306, 313-314, 317. 




distribution of assets, 320. 
equities, 301. 
estate, defined, 303. 
estate planning, 311. 
evasions, 300-301. 
exoneration, 326. 
future interests, 310. 
family allowance legislation, 301, 311, 
320. 
fees, 318. 
funeral expenses, 303. 
garnishment, 319. 
gift, 193, 305-306. 




hearing in decedent's lifetime, 3'25-
326. 
homestead, 301. 
inchoate dower, 301. 
injunction, 320. 
Internal Revenue Code, compared, 
304. 
Israeli statute, compared, 298. 
joint bank account, 306. 
joint tenancy, 213-214, 306. 
judicial doctrines, 301. 
judicial sale, 307. 
jurisdiction, 301-302, 311. 
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Model Act (continued) 
life estate, 314. 
life insurance, 241-242, 305-306, 316. 
limitations, 322. 
lump sum, 318, 322-323. 
marriage settlement, 325. 
misrepresentation, 323. 
moral obligation, 312. 
non-claim statute, 322. 
non-resident, 3Il. 
obligations payable on death, 249, 
306. 
officials, 300-301, 318. 
partnership, 235, 306. 
periodic payments, 318-319, 322. 
perishables, 316. 
personal representative, 317. 
permanent master, 317, 325. 
petitioners, 307, 322. 
policy, 299-301, Chapter 4. 
"postnuptial," 305. 
power of appointment, 256-258, 303, 
305, 314. 
power to amend, 314. 
power to revoke, 314. 
preliminary hearing, 317, 325. 
preservation of assets, 320. 
probate court, 303, 317. 
procedure, 317-318, 325. 
reasonable provision, 308-309, 312. 
receiver, 320. 
recipient from transferee, 307. 
rehearing, 321. 
relatives, 302. 
reliance interest, 300, 316. 
report, of permanent master, 318. 
reversionary interest, 314. 
revocable trust, 201, 305-306. 
scope, 299-301. 
secured claim, 303. 
service, 317. 
simultaneous transfers, 312-313. 
small estates, summary distribution 
of, 301, 322. 
spouse, 307. 
suit in lifetime, 300. 
surplus assets, 320, 323. 
suspensory order, 320-322. 
taxes, 303, 304, 316, 326. 
temporary maintenance, 320, 322. 
title in third party, 306. 
transfer, defined, 304--306. 
transferee, defined, 41, 306-307. 
trusts, 96, 205, 305-306. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, 299, 311. 
unsecured claim, 303. 
U.S. savings bond, 230, 306. 
value, 288, 315-316. 
waiver, 300, 312, 324--325. 
Model Probate Code. See also Legis-
lative Solutions. 
discussed, 273-276. 
excerpts, Appendix B. 
Missouri statute, contrasted with, 114. 
proximity to death, 150. 
Model Written Obligations Act. 246. 
Money 
cases, 402. 
Moral Claim or Duty. See Equities; 
German Civil Code; Mainte-
nance Legislation; Model Act; 
Reliance Interest. 
Mortgage 
antenuptial, 355, 361. 
cases, 402-403. 
flexibility, 16. 
fraudulent, 142, 262. 
Louisiana, 285. 
payable at death, 190. 
purchase-money, 212. 
sale of property, by decedent, 142. 
Motive. See also Fraud; Intent Test. 
described, 5, 103. 
Nebraska. See also Table E. 
intent test, I 06. 
judicial sale, 64. 
Negotiable Instruments Law, 246. 
Nevada, 283. See also Table E. 
Newman v Dore. See also Table E. 
draftsmanship, 204. 
illusory transfer test, 124--125, 146, 
209-210. 
in general, 74--76. 
intent, meaning of, 103, 105, 108, 115. 
policy of, 82, 97, 128. 
testacy, requirement of, 173. 
New Hampshire. See also Table E. 
in general, I 08-II 0. 
widow as creditor, 262. 
New Jersey. See Table E. 
New Mexico. See Table E. 
New South Wales, 291, 310. 
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New. York. See also Halpern, Matter 
of; Newman v Dore; Table E. 
bank account trust, 6, 205-21 I. 
contract, 234. 
employee death benefits, 244-245. 
"inequitable" decisions, I 78. 
in tent test, 95-96. 
Law Revision Commission, 128, 225, 
245. 
life insurance, 237-238. 
partnership, 234-235. 
statutes 
charitable gifts, 203. 
intestacy, 173·. 
joint bank account, 217. 
pension plan, 244. 
personal property, 230. 
statutory share, 8, 22, 24, 74-76, 88, 
125, 173, 293. 
U.S. savings bond, 225-226. 
U.S. savings bond, 224-227, 235. 
New Zealand. See also Table E. 
evasion experience, 297. 
maintenance legislation, 290-295, 321, 
327. 
Non-Relatives. See Table B. 
Non-Residents. See Conflict of Laws; 
Model Act. 
North Carolina. See also Table E. 
commission report, 150, 274-276, 334-
340. 
statutory share, 21. 
North Dakota, 22-23. See also Table E. 
Northern Ireland, 290. 
Note. See also Mortgage; Obligations 
Payable at Death. 
antenuptial, 361. 
cancellable at death, 106-108, 192, 
247, 403. 
of third party, 403. 
payable at death, 246-247, 403. 
testamentary nature, 71, 106-108. 
Obligations Payable at Death. See also 
Mortgage; Note. 
in general, 246-249. 
Pennsylvania, 141-143. 
Ohio. See also Table E. 
case law, 76-87. 
creditors' statute, 77-78, 81. 
draftsmanship, 204. 
"inequitable" decisions, I 78. 
in general, 76-87. 
joint bank account, 218. 
reality test, 218-219. 
Oklahoma, I 78. See also Table E. 
Ontario, 64, 291. See also Table E. 
Option, 71. 
Oregon. See Table E. 
Paintings, 71, 130, 3'64-365, 403. 
Parol Evidence Rule, 222. 
Participation by Transferee. See Equi-
ties. 
Parties, Proper. See Chapter 18. 
Partition. See Procedure. 
Partnership 
"buy and sell" agreement, 231. 
contract to make a will, 367. 
in general, 231-235. 
joint tenancy, 234-235. 
Passbook. See Bank Account Trust; 
Joint Bank Account. 
Pennsylvania. See also Table E. 
bank account trust, 139-140. 
evasion statute, 126, 138--140, 143-
144, 178, 214,275. 
good faith divestment, 140. 
"inequitable" decisions, 178. 
in general, 138--144. 
intent, 140-141. 
joint tenancy, I 44. 
life insurance, I 44. 
obligations payable at death, 141-
143. 
participation by transferee, I 40, I 41. 
power of appointment, 138-139, 255, 
258. 
revocable inter vivos trust, 144. 
revocable self-declaration of trust, 
202. 
written obligations, 246. 
U.S. savings bond, 144. 
Pension Plan. See Employee Death 
Benefits. 
Periodic Payments. See Annuities; 
Maintenance Legislation; 
Model Act. 
Perishables. See Consumables; Model 
Act. 
Personal Representative. See Procedure. 
Plaintiff. See Proof; Procedure; Sta-
tistics. 
Pledge, 239. 
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Policy. See Community Values. 
Population 
increase in, 7. 
mobility of, 28. 
Possession, Retention of, 111, 116, 133. 
See also Control Test; Custom 
of London; Dominion; "Kerr" 
Passages. 
"Pour Over" Provision, 79. 
Power of Appointment 
antenuptial transfer, remedy, 3.64. 
created by another, 253, 257. 
created by decedent, 254. 
defined, 252. 
exercisable in conjunction with an-
other, 257. 
in general, 252-258. 
irrevocable trust, with, 203. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
model act, treatment in, 256-258, 276. 
Pennsylvania, 138-139, 255. 
"relation back," 253-254. 
spouse of donee, 255. 




shams, 131, 134. 
testamentary transfer, 71. 
Power of Sale, 91. 
Power to Amend. See Model Act. 
Power to Dispose, 134. See also Color-
able Transfer. 
Power to Revoke. See Revoke, Power 
to. 
Predictability, 6, 117, 273, 288. See also 
Reliance Interest. 
Preservation of Assets. Se~ Model Act. 
"Present Interest" Test, 102, 225, 227. 
See also Reality Test. 
Presumption. See Fraud; Proof. 
Preventive Measures. See Estate Plan-
ning. 
Probate 
disadvantages, 69, 213. 
publicity, 216. 
utility, 73. 
Procedure. Chapter 18. See also De-
feasance, Extent of; Model Act; 
Proof. 
accounting proceedings, 226, 368. 
children, 264. 
collaterals, 264. 
declaratory judgment, 228, 266. 
defeasance, extent of, 265. 
derivative action, 265. 
distributee, 265. 
executor, 265. 
Halpern, Matter of, 264. 
in general, Chapter 18. 
injunction, 230, 320, 364. 
interpleader, 266. 
joinder, 265. 
lifetime, suit in, 266. 





quieting title, 368. 
revival, 267. 
suit, when brought, 266-267. 
trover, 266. 
who may sue 
curator, 266. 
spouse, mentally incompetent, 267. 
spouse, remarried, 267. 
spouse, infant, 267. 
who must sue, 123:...124. 
widow, as executrix, 265. 
will construction, 368. 
Profit-Sharing Agreement. See Em-
ployee Death Benefits. 
Promise to First Wife. See Equities. 
Proof 
antenuptial transfer, 355-360. 
burden of, 45, 190, 203, 209, 228. 
difficulty of, 204. 
presumptions, 126, 217, 274. 
Property Settlement. See Marriage Set-
tlement. 
Provision for Spouse. See Equities. 
Proximity to Death. See Equities. 
Puerto Rico. See Table E. 
Purchase by Decedent. Title in Name 
of Another, 55, 63, 160, 249-
252. 
Purchaser for Value, 42, 363. See also 
Model Act. 
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Purchase Money Resulting Trust, 167. 
See also Purchase by Decedent, 
Title in Name of Another. 
Quasi-Contract, 366. 
Queensland, 291. 
Querela lnofficiosi Testamenti. See 
Legislative Solutions; Roman 
Law. 
Quiet Title, Suit to. See Procedure. 
Reality Test. See also Halpern, Matter 
of. For application to particu-
lar methods of transfer see 
appropriate title. 
absolute transfer, 120. 
complete transfer, 120. 
consideration, effect of, 141. 
equities, 120. 
future interest, 120. 
in general, Chapter 9. 
litigation, effect on, 7. 
knowledge, of spouse, 120-121. 
present interest, 120-121. 
retention of possession, 90. 
vested interest, 120. 
"Reasonableness" Test, IIO, 126, 155, 
193, 228, 237, 364-365. See 
also Intent Test; Unreasonable 
Transfer. 
Receiver. See Model Act. 
Recordation, Ill, 116, 324, 363'. 
Reconciliation of Spouses, 171. See also 
Equities; Misrepresentation. 
"Relation Back," 253-254, 304. 
Relationship of Transferee. See Equi-
ties; Statistics; Table B. 
Reliance Interest 
gift, 181, 288-289. 
gift causa mortis, 181. 
inchoate dower, 63-64. 
irrevocable trust, 181. 
joint tenancy, 213. 
lapse of time, 42-43. 
life insurance, 241-242. 
maintenance and contribution, x, 45, 
68. 
model act, 300 
Pennsylvania statute, 144. 
proximity to death, 153-154. 
U.S. savings bond, 181. 
Remarriage. See Equities; Marital Dis-
harmony. 
Remedies. See Procedure. 
Rental Cards. See Joint Safe-Deposit 
Box. 
Rent, 59, 185. See also Lease. 
Reservation of an Interest. See Reten-
tion of an Interest. 
"Reserved Portion," 285-289. See also 
France; Germany; Legislative 
Solutions; Legitime; Switzer-
land. 
Restatement, Property, § 332, 254. 
Restatement, Trusts, §57, 70, 90; §58, 
139, 207; § 185, 89. 
Resulting Trust, 228-229. 
Retention of an Interest, 55, 68, 105, 
13'7. See also Control Test; 
"Kerr" Passages. 
Retirement Plan. See Employee Death 
Benefits. 
Reversionary Interest. See Model Act. 
Revindication, 285. 
Revival. See Procedure. 
Revocable Self-Declaration of Trust. 
in general, 202-203, 237. 
testamentary nature, 72. 
Revocable Inter Vivos Trust. See also 
Control Test; Halpern, Mat-
ter of; Illusory Transfer Test; 
Model Act; Newman v Dare; 
Testamentary Transfer. 
cases listed, 200-201. 
charitable, 72. 
control, degree of, 78, 90, 93-94. 
creditors' rights, 77-78, 92. 
estate tax, 276. 
fraud, 141. 
in general, 74-87. 
intent test, 115. 
New York law, 6, 74-76. 
Ohio law, 76-87. 
Pennsylvania law, 141-142. 
revoke, power to, 70. 
settlor, for exclusive use of, 77. 
termination, 92. 
testamentary nature, 68-73, 85, 91. 
utility, 17, 69. 
veto power, 78. 
Revocation by Operation of Law, 34. 
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Revoke, Power to. See Colorable Trans-
fer; Control Test; Revocable 
Inter Vivos Trust. 
draftsmanship, 204. 
effect of, 76, 90-92, 203'. 
revocation fee, 92-93. 
with trustee's consent, 78. 
Rheinstein, 53, 64, 371. 
Rhode Island. See Table E. 
Rings. See Engagement Ring; Jewelry. 
Roman Law 
custom of London, relationship, 51. 
querela inofficiosi testamenti, 279-
281. 
wills, 40. 
Russia, 39, 287. 
Safe-Deposit Box. See Joint Safe-De-
posit Box. 





custom of London, 57. 
Savings Bank Trust. See Bank Account 
Trust. 
Savings and Loan Association, 216. 
Savings Bonds. See U.S. Savings Bonds. 
Scotland. 
Sassenachs, defined, 290. 
"wha's like us?" 54. 
Secrecy. See also Equities. 
Colorado cases, 137. 
colorable transfer, 132-133. 
deed, 185-186. 
Kentucky, ll2-II3. 
Securities. See also Close Corporation. 
cases, 403. 
derivative action, 265. 
gift causa mortis, 198. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
option, 71. 
Security of Title. See Community 
Values; Reliance Interest. 
Self-Declaration of Trust. See Irrevoca-
ble Self-Declaration of Trust; 
Revocable Self-Declaration of 
Trust. 
Separation Agreement, 88, 367, 374. 
"Separate Estate." See Alabama; Mis-
sissippi. 
Separate Maintenance 
cases, distinguished from evasion 
cases, 147, 162. 
joint bank account, 216. 
secrecy, 185. 
spouse as creditor, 259. 
veteran's benefits, 239. 
widow as creditor, 261-263. 
Separation of Spouses. See Equities. 
Settlement. See Marriage Settlement. 
Settlor. See also Control Test; Rev-
ocable Inter Vivos Trust. 
as co-trustee, 91, 95-96. 
Shams. See Colorable Transfer. 
Slaves, 404. 
Small Estates, Summary Distribution 
of. See Model Act. 
Source of Decedent's Property. See 
Equities. 
South Australia, 291. 
South Carolina. See also Table E. 
"mistress" statute, 23, 361. 
South Dakota. 22-23, 64. See also 
Table E. 
Sparks, 370, 377. 
Specific Performance, 366, 368-370. 
Spendthrift Trust, 257. 
Standard of Living. See Equities. 
Statistics. See also Marital Disharmony. 
antenuptial transfer, 363. 
children 
as plaintiffs, 157. 
involved in divorces, 13-14. 
contract to make will, 373-375. 
litigation 
unreasonable transfers, 9. 
volume, 7. 
longevity, 13. 
proximity to death, 148-149, Table 
A. 
reasonableness of transfer, 177, Ta-
ble C. 
relationship of donee, 157, Table B. 
remarriages, 12, 13, Appendix A. 
suicides, 10. 
surviving spouse, sex of, 267. 
testacy or intestacy, 17 4. 
widows, 27-28. 
women's wealth, 25-27. 
Statute of Limitations. See also Equi-
ties-proximity to death. 
civil law, 286-287. 
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Statute of Limitations (continued) 
common law, 63, 71, 355. 
model act, 322. 
Statute of Wills, 40-41, 72-73. See also 
Bank Account Trust; Testa-
mentary Transfer. 
Statutory Share. See also Equities; Leg-
islative Solutions. 
alimony, compared, 260. 
amount, vii. 
annuity, 24. 
antenuptial transfer doctrines, com-
pared, 260-263. 
apparent aims, 24-25. 
arbitrary nature 
exception, 22, 23. 
merits of claim, 17-18. 
misconduct, 18. 
widow's need, 17-18. 
bar of 
judicial separation, 112. 
trust, 74. 
children, 22, 157. 
evasions 
perpetual problem, 272. 
vulnerability to, xi, 3:....t, 74-76. 
when laudable, 18. 
history, 21, 74-76. 
inflexibility, vii, ix, xi, 271-272. 
in trust, 23. 
judicial confusion, 3-6. 
life estate, 24. 







policy, 3, 5-6, 186-189, 271-273. 
relation to testacy, 173-174. 
remarriage, 167. 
typical provisions, 3, 21-24. 
Stepchild. See Child. 
Stepmother, 18, 158, 272, 302. See also 
Child; Model Act; Remarriage. 
Stephenson, Gilbert, 16. 
Stock-Purchase Agreement. See Em-
ployee Death Benefits. 
Stock, Voting of, 193. 
Succession Law. See Inheritance. 
Suicide, 10, 237. 
Suit in Lifetime. 
alimony, 187, 243. 
antenuptial transfer, 360-365. 
dower, 143, 251. 
model act, 300, 3'25-326. 
transferor mentally incompetent, 266. 
Summary Distribution of Assets. See 
Model Act. 
Support. See Alimony; Community 
Values; Separate Maintenance; 
Statutory Share; Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act. 
Survivorship Devices 
increasing popularity, 16. 
in general, Chapter 14. 
Suspensory Orders. See Maintenance 
Legislation; Model Act. 
Sweden, 14, 287. 
Switzerland, 286-289, 351-353. See also 




Taxes. See also Community Values; 
Homestead; Model Act. 
cases, l 06, 195. 
estate 
as legislative solution, 276-278. 
contemplation of death, 152, 198, 
275. 
estate planning, 216. 
life insurance, 241. 
marital deduction, 253. 
model act, 326. 
power of appointment, 256. 
gift, 254. 
inheritance, 97, 277, 326. 
Tax Sale, 389. See also Colorable Trans-
fer; Fraudulent Conveyance. 
Teachers' Retirement Fund. See Em-
ployee Death Benefits. 
Tennessee. See also Table E. 
dower, lack of, 64. 
"inequitable" decision, 108. 
in general, 108, ll0-ll2. 
Tentative Trust. See Bank Account 
Trust. 
Testacy Statistics. See Statistics. 
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Testation, Freedom of, 40. See also 
Community Values; France; 
Inheritance; Intestacy. 
Testamentary Transfer. See also Con-
trol Test; Custom of London; 
Illusory Transfer Test; Intent 
Test; "Kerr" Passages; Ohio; 
Pennsylvania; Statute of Wills. 
For application to particular 
methods of transfer see appro-
priate title. 
contract to make a will, 375, 378. 
in general, 6, 69-73, 81-82, ll4-115, 
120, 127-128. 





life insurance, 240. 
Title-Holder, 307. 
Title Insurance, 63. 
Title, Passage of, 197-198. See also 
Testamentary Transfer. 
Totten Trust. See Bank Account Trust. 
"Trading Account," 90. See also Con-
trol Test; Illusory Transfer. 
Transfer. See Inter Vivos Transfer. 
Transferee. See also Equities; Main-
tenance and Contribution; 
Model Act; Reliance Interest. 
improvements by, 213. 
inconvenience to, 41-43, 300. 
recipients from, 41, 285, 306-307. 
relationship to decedent, Table B. 
sales, by, 42, 213. 
wealth of, 163. 
Transfer to Self as Executor, 121. 
Trover, 266. 
Trusts. See Bank Account Trust; Con-
structive Trust; Irrevocable In-
ter Vivos Trust; Irrevocable 
Self-Declaration of Trust; Re-
sulting Trust; Revocable Inter 
Vivos Trust; Revocable Self-
Declaration of Trust; Testa-
mentary Trust; Trustee. 
Trustee. See also Control Test; Illu-
sory Transfer; Procedure; Rev-
ocable Inter Vivos Trust. 
accounting, 92. 
commissions, 91-92. 
evasions by, 203-204. 
powers of, 83, 96, 144. 
Undue Influence. See also Confidential 
Relationship. 
as protective device, 29. 
irrevocable trust, 204. 
model act, 325. 
procedure, 264-265. 
Unger, 41, 53. 
Uniform Commercial Code, 246. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, 299. 
Unreasonable Transfer. See also Equi-
ties; Maintenance Legislation; 
Model Act; "Reasonableness" 
Test. 
antenuptial, 358-360. 
contract to make a will, 378. 
described, 176-177. 
maintenance and contribution, 45. 
statistics, 9, 177. 
U.S. Savings Bond 
antenuptial, 361. 
cases, 226. 
contract to make a will, 378. 
constructive trust, IIO, 227-229. 
illusory nature, 88, 94. 
in general, 223-230. 
Pennsylvania, 144. 
testamentary nature, 71. 
utility, as evasive device, 4, 17, 230. 
Unworthy Spouse. See Equities; Main-
tenance Legislation; Mainte-
nance and Contribution; Statu-
tory Share. 
Utah. See Table E. 
Valuation, of Transfer. 
civil law, 287-288. 
model act, 315-316. 
Value. See Consideration; Purchaser 
for Value. 
Values. See Community Values. 
Vermont. See also Table E. 
inchoate dower abolished, 64. 
in general, 108-109. 
statutory share, 22. 
Vested Interest. See Present Interest 
Test; Reality Test. 
Veteran's Benefits, 239. 
Victoria, 291, 295. 
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Virginia. See also Table E. 
"inequitable" decision, 178. 
irrevocable transfers, 91, 204. 
instrument under seal, 248-249. 
"Voidable." See Defeasance, Extent of. 
Waiver 
maintenance and contribution, 45. 
maintenance legislation, 295. 
model act, 3'24-325. 
Wales, 11. 
War Bonds. See U.S. Savings Bond. 
Washington. See also Table E. 
life insurance, 240. 
U.S. savings bond, 225. 
Wealth. See also Women. 
change in nature, 15-17. 
of women, 26. 
Welfare, Public. See Community 
Values. 
West Virginia. See Table E. 
Western Australia, 291. 
Widow. See also Equities; Community 
Values; Homestead; Mainte-
nance and Contribution; Statu-
tory Share; Widow as Creditor. 
current trends in widowhood, 27-28. 
financial need, vii, 6, 25-29, 44. 
Louisiana, 283. 
unworthy, 44, 163. 
Widow as Creditor. Chapter 17. See 
also Alimony; Creditors; Sep-
arate Maintenance. 
Widow, Invalid as to. See Defeasance, 
Extent of. 
Widower, 4, 267. See also Model Act; 
Statistics; Statutory Share. 
Wife. See Alimony; Antenuptial Trans-
fers; Creditors; Separate Main-
tenance; Widow as Creditor. 
"Wife's Part." See Custom of London. 
Wills. See also Community Values; 
Revocation by Operation of 
Law; Statute of Wills; Statu-
tory Share; Testamentary 
Transfer. 
early English, 49. 
construction of, 368. 
family allowance, 31. 
history, 39-41. 
joint, 228, 367. 
joint and mutual, 208. 
mancipatory, 40. 
mutual, 367. 
revocation by marriage, 369. 
statistics, 40. 
survivorship devices, 16. 
Wisconsin. See also Table E. 
equities, 146-147. 
U.S. savings bond, 225. 
Women. See also Wife; Widow. 
constitutional equality, 25. 
disadvantages under feudalism, 59. 
emancipation, relation to case law, 9. 
wealth, 25-29. 
popular beliefs, 25-26. 
statistics, 26-29. 
Wyoming, 64. See also Table E. 
